# JAi NARAIN v. KISHEN CHAND

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 855
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-02-27
- **Bench:** H!Dayatullah, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jai-narain-v-kishen-chand-4651
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

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Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, s. 57(1), first provi~cope of.
The respondent lanO!ord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant
under section 13(l)(k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, !9j2,
on the ground that the appellant had c,itused damage to the premises. The
trial court ordered ejecl!nent in February, 1959, and the appellate auth<>-
rity dismissed an appeal in November, 1959.
The Delhi Rent Control
Act 1958 came into force in February, 1959. In a revision application
before the High Court, the appellant invoked the provisions of the 1958
Act and relied upon section 14(1) (j) read with s. 57 of the new Act.
The High Coun, acting under section 14 (1 )(j) and sub.,.ection ( 10) of
the same section gave the appellant the alternative to pay compensation
for the damages caused. The landlord then filed an application for review
of the High Court order pointing out that the new Act was not applicable
to the c:jase in view of the first proviso of section 57 ( 2) . The High Coun
granted the review and reversed its earlier orders.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that
by virtue of the first proviso of section 57(2) the High Court was bound
to have regard to the provisions of the 1958 Act even in proceedings
pending and governed by the 1952 Act.
HELD : Dismissing the appeal,
The language of the first proviso to section 57(2) clearly shows that
the proviso applies to those cases only in which ~ection 54 cannot be
made applicable. The area in the present case is admittedly subjected to
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956, which is one
of the. enactments mentioned in s. 54. Accordingly the terms of the proviso
would have no application in this case. [857 G; 859 BJ
The High Coun had rightly held that the phrase "to which section 54
does not apply", _goyerns the word "premises" and is not connected with
the words '·in any such suit or proceedings".
[858A-B]

## Text

A
JAi NARAIN
v.
KISHEN CHAND
February 27, 1969
B
[M, H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
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Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, s. 57(1), first provi~cope of.
The respondent lanO!ord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant
under section 13(l)(k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, !9j2,
on the ground that the appellant had c,itused damage to the premises. The
trial court ordered ejecl!nent in February, 1959, and the appellate auth<>-
rity dismissed an appeal in November, 1959.
The Delhi Rent Control
Act 1958 came into force in February, 1959. In a revision application
before the High Court, the appellant invoked the provisions of the 1958
Act and relied upon section 14(1) (j) read with s. 57 of the new Act.
The High Coun, acting under section 14 (1 )(j) and sub.,.ection ( 10) of
the same section gave the appellant the alternative to pay compensation
for the damages caused. The landlord then filed an application for review
of the High Court order pointing out that the new Act was not applicable
to the c:jase in view of the first proviso of section 57 ( 2) . The High Coun
granted the review and reversed its earlier orders.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that
by virtue of the first proviso of section 57(2) the High Court was bound
to have regard to the provisions of the 1958 Act even in proceedings
pending and governed by the 1952 Act.
HELD : Dismissing the appeal,
The language of the first proviso to section 57(2) clearly shows that
the proviso applies to those cases only in which ~ection 54 cannot be
made applicable. The area in the present case is admittedly subjected to
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956, which is one
of the. enactments mentioned in s. 54. Accordingly the terms of the proviso
would have no application in this case. [857 G; 859 BJ
The High Coun had rightly held that the phrase "to which section 54
does not apply", _goyerns the word "premises" and is not connected with
the words '·in any such suit or proceedings".
[858A-B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 389 of
G
1966.
.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
~arch 25, 1964 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi
m Review Application No. 23-D of 1963'.
C. B. Agarwa/a, Uma Mehta, M. L. Kapur and K. K. Sinha,
H
for the appellant.
II(
fl C. Misr«, Hishamber [al and H. K. Puri, for the respon-
(lent.
8 56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] j S.C.R
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J., This is ~ appeal by a tenant who had
rented a shop No. 2687 in Kinari Bazar, Delhi from the respondent on Rs. 13.50 P per month. In those premises he was selling
Usha sewing machines and fans. It appears that the level of t~e
shop was too high from the road and his clients were troubled m
going to his shop and so he lowered the level and thereby altered
the premises to suit his convenience.
The landlord thereupon
filed a suit against him for his eviction under s. 13(1)(k) of the
Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952. The suit was filed
on November 13, 1957. The trial court ordered on February 19,
1959 ejectment and payment of Rs. 145/- as arrears of rent. An
appeal against the order of the trial court was dismissed by the
appellate authority on November 16, 1959.
A revision application was then filed by the tenant on March 25, 1960. During the
course of that revision he invoked the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1956 which had come into force on February 9,
1959 and relied upon s. 14 (1) (j) of the new Act read withs. 57.
Previously he had not relied upon the new Act although the Act
had been in force during the pendency of the previous proceedings. The High Court acting under s. 14(1)(j) and sub-s. (10) of
the same section, gave him the alternative of paying compensation in the sum of Rs. 500 which it appears that the landlord
hi.mself had assessed as the damages caused by the act of the
tenant. The landlord later filed an application for review of the
order and pointed out that the new Act was not applicable to
the case in view of the first proviso of s. 57 sub. s. (2). The High
Court thereupon granted the review and reversed its earlier order
and ordered the eviction of the tenant.
In this appeal it is contended that the High Court was in
error in passing the order on review and that the previous order
was the correct order in the light of the provisions of the Act of
1958. We have therefore to consider which of the two orders
of the High Court is the correct order and whether the review was
properly granted or not.
As is very frequent in our country, Rent Control Acts are
changed from time to time causing numerous difficulties in their
interpretation and application. Here too, we have a succession
of Acts which were passed, to say nothing of the amendments
which were made in the body of each of the Acts as they came.
We are concerned first with the Act of 1952, namely. The Delhi
a11d Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
Section 13(1)(k) of that
Act gave a right to the landlord to evict a tenant who, whether
before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises, or notwithstanding previous notice. had used or dealt with the premises
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JAi NARAIN v. KISHEN CHAND (Hidayatu/lalr, C.J.)
8 57
in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord
by the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust while giving
him a lease of the land on which the premises were situated. We
are not concerned with the latter part but with the first part where
the tenant before or after the commencement of the Act had
caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises. Whether the lowering of the floor was causing substantial
damage to the premises is a question into which we need not go,
because the concurrent finding of the courts of fact is that it did
so.
This question was not raised before us.
Therefore, if s.
13 (l)(k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 applied,
the eviction of the tenant was the proper order to make in view
of the finding .that he had caused substantial damage to the premises. However, the matter comes to the Court because of the
passing of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which came into
force on February 9, 1959. Section 57(1) of that Act provided
that the Delhi an&! Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 in so far as it
was applicable to the Uniop. Territory of Delhi, was being repealed. While repealing it, a special saving was however made,
by sub-s. (2) of the same section in favour of all suits and other
proceedings which were then pending under the repealed Act and
it was provided that those suits and proceedings should be cO.ntinued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
Act as if that Act had continued to be in force and the new Act
had not been passed. This would have really been a very proper
provision to make to separate the operation of the two Acts but
the Legislature went still further and added two provisos.
We
are ccmcerned only with the first of the two provisos on which
much dispute has arisen in this case. That proviso reads as follows:
"Pro_vided that in any such suit or proceeding for
the fixatmn of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises to which section 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to
the provisions of this Act :"
This proviso contains a proviso within itself which excepts the
case. of pre~ises to which s. 54 of the Act does not apply. That
sectmn proVIdes as follows :
"Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or
the Slum Ar~as (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956
or the Delhi Tenants
(Temporary Protection) Act
1956."
'
The ~ffect. of the proviso which we have quoted above is variously
d~scnbed by counsel on opposite sides. According to Mr. C. B.
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
Agarwala who argued for the tenant, the ~ords "to w_hich section 54 does not apply" govern the words ' any such smt or proceeding" and not the words "any premises".
The High Court
in the order passed on review was of the opinion that these words
governed the words "any premises". In our opinion, this is the
correct view to take of the matter.
·
To begin with, it must be noticed that the proviso speaks of
two things, namely, tlie fixation of standard rent and the eviction
of a tenant from any premises. The wocds "from any premises"
cannot be connected with the phrase "for the fixation of standard
rent'', because then the preposition would have been "of any
premises" or "for ·any premises" and ,not "from any premises."
This means that the first phrase has to be read as complete in
itself beginning from the words "for the fixation" and ending
with the words, "standard rent". The second phrase then reads
"or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises".
The words
"from any premises" go very clearly with the words "eviction of a
tenant" and not with the words "any suit or proceeding".
The question then arises, where does the phrase "to which
s. 54 does not apply" connect itself ?
According to Mr. Agarwala
that phrase must be connected with the words "in any such s.uit
or proceeding".
Since the suits contain two kinds of matters,
namely, fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant from any
premises, we have to turn to the provisions of the statutes to
which s. 54 refers, namely, the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act, 1956 and the Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act,
1956. The first two do not deal at all with the fixation of fair
rent and the third speaks of fair rent, but it does not provide for its
fixation. It would be pointless to use the language 'any suit or
proceeding to which s. 54 does not apply' in relation to fixation
of standard rent. It follows therefore that the phrase "to which
s. 54 does not apply" really governs 'premises'.
Read in that
way, all the three Acts fall in lin_e, because they provide for premises and not for fixation of standard rent. The Administration
of Evacuee Property Act. 1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Delhi '.fenants (Temporary
Protection) Act, 1956 all deal with premises and property and
therefore the phrase "to which section 54 does not apply" is connected with the words "premises".
That is the view which the
High Court has taken and we think rightly. The proviso did not
apply and the matter had to be governed by the old Delhi and
Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which had ~
repealed.
It was contended before us that this legislation was intended
to soften action against tenants still further and that the policy
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JAi NARAIN v. K!SHEN CHAND (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
8 59
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of the law had been to give more and more protecti~ to the
tenants and we must therefore read the statute in consonance with
that policy.
ThiS would be an argument to consider if the language of the statute was not quite clear.
But the language is
clear enough to show that the proviso applies only to those cases
in which s. 54 cannot be made applicable. It is admitted before
R us that thiS area is subjected to the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956. If that is so, then, on the terms of the
proviso on which much reliance is placed by Mr. Agarwala, the
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 cannot be taken
into consideration. They are to be taken into consideration only
in those cases to which the Acts mentioned in s. 54 do not apply,
that is to say, in respect of premises not governed by those statutes.
Since this shop iS governed by one of the statutes, the
J:li'oviSo has no application. The High Court's' view was therefore
right. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.