# JAi NARAIN v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 923
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-08-23
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 172 of 1969
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jai-narain-v-municipal-corporation-of-delhi-5742
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

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JAi NARAIN
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
August 23, 1972
. [J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA AND H. R. KHANNA,. JJ.]
923
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Ss. 2(1) (J), 7(1), 16(1)
-Sale of patjsa prepared with unper1nitted Coal tar dye--Activitybeing distinctly anti.,sociol if s. 4 Probation of Offenders Act could be
applied-Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
In lsherdas v. Punjab this Court held on a cornideration of s. 18
of the Probation of offenders Act that its operation is not excluded in
cases of persons found guilty of offences under ~he Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954.
That decis'ion however, expressed a note of
caution that adulteration of food being a menace to public health and
the Act having been enacted with the object of . eradicating that antisocial evil and for ensuring purity of articles of food sold to the members
of the public, Courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of s.4
of the Probation of Offenders Ao't.
Isherdas v. Punjab· A.LR. 1972 S.C. 1295.
The appellant, an employee of a sweetmeat shop found guilty under
s.7(1) read with s. 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months
and
of rupees one thousand. It was found that the patisa sold by him were
prepared with unpermitted coal far dye and therefore,
were
adulterated food stuff as defined by s. 2(1 )(j). On the question whether in the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the evil to prevent which
s.. 16 of the Prevention of Food· .i\dulteration Act was enacted, s. 4,
of the Probation of Offenders Act could be applied.
HELD : The sale of an article of food prepared \\ith unpermittcd
coal tar dye is an anti-social activity, deleterious to the health of those
\vho would consume them as article of food, the ·cradiction of \vhich is
the priacipal aim of the Act and in particular of s.16 thereof. The
evil would appear to be more perniciom when it is realised that patisa
are more often than not purchased and consumed by children and by
persons from- the non-affluent sections of the society.
The colouring
matter was obviously used to attract customers, without any regard to
the injury it would cause to these who consumed them. The appellant's
activity being thus. distinctly_ anti-social, it \vould be neither expedient
nor in consonance \Vith the object \\·ith v:hich the Prevention of Food
Act.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal Appeal
No. 172 of 1969.
App.ea! by certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the iudgment and order dated June 20,
1969 of the Delhi. High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 385 of 1968.
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
Hardev Singh, for the appellant.
A
Jindra Lal and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the respond·~nt.
The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. In March 1967, the appellant was an employee
in a sweetmeat shop, known as Bengal Sweet Shop being. shop
D
No. 6, Sector II, in Ramakrishna Puram, New Delhi. _The shop
was owned by one Budh Ram and one A. K. Bhattacharya.
On March 15, 1967; wit. F. Dean, a Food Inspector in· the
employment of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi; went' to the.
said shop and purchased 'patisa' which were sold to him by the
appellant.
These were sold to him from a lot exposed for sale.
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The Food Inspector then divided the patisa into three portions and
packed each of them into sealed bottles, one of which was handed
over by him to the appellant.
On an analysis of the sample by the Public Analyst appointed
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, XXXVII of 1954
it was found. that the patisa were prepared with unpermitted coal
tar dye, and therefore, were adulterated food stuff.
A complaint
to that effect was filed before the Magistrate, 1st Class, Delhi, who,
after recording evidence, found the appellant and the said Budh
Ram guilty under s. 7 ( 1) read with s. 16 ( 1) of the Act, and
sentenced each of the two accused

## Text

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JAi NARAIN
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
August 23, 1972
. [J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA AND H. R. KHANNA,. JJ.]
923
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Ss. 2(1) (J), 7(1), 16(1)
-Sale of patjsa prepared with unper1nitted Coal tar dye--Activitybeing distinctly anti.,sociol if s. 4 Probation of Offenders Act could be
applied-Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
In lsherdas v. Punjab this Court held on a cornideration of s. 18
of the Probation of offenders Act that its operation is not excluded in
cases of persons found guilty of offences under ~he Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954.
That decis'ion however, expressed a note of
caution that adulteration of food being a menace to public health and
the Act having been enacted with the object of . eradicating that antisocial evil and for ensuring purity of articles of food sold to the members
of the public, Courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of s.4
of the Probation of Offenders Ao't.
Isherdas v. Punjab· A.LR. 1972 S.C. 1295.
The appellant, an employee of a sweetmeat shop found guilty under
s.7(1) read with s. 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months
and
of rupees one thousand. It was found that the patisa sold by him were
prepared with unpermitted coal far dye and therefore,
were
adulterated food stuff as defined by s. 2(1 )(j). On the question whether in the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the evil to prevent which
s.. 16 of the Prevention of Food· .i\dulteration Act was enacted, s. 4,
of the Probation of Offenders Act could be applied.
HELD : The sale of an article of food prepared \\ith unpermittcd
coal tar dye is an anti-social activity, deleterious to the health of those
\vho would consume them as article of food, the ·cradiction of \vhich is
the priacipal aim of the Act and in particular of s.16 thereof. The
evil would appear to be more perniciom when it is realised that patisa
are more often than not purchased and consumed by children and by
persons from- the non-affluent sections of the society.
The colouring
matter was obviously used to attract customers, without any regard to
the injury it would cause to these who consumed them. The appellant's
activity being thus. distinctly_ anti-social, it \vould be neither expedient
nor in consonance \Vith the object \\·ith v:hich the Prevention of Food
Act.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal Appeal
No. 172 of 1969.
App.ea! by certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the iudgment and order dated June 20,
1969 of the Delhi. High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 385 of 1968.
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
Hardev Singh, for the appellant.
A
Jindra Lal and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the respond·~nt.
The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. In March 1967, the appellant was an employee
in a sweetmeat shop, known as Bengal Sweet Shop being. shop
D
No. 6, Sector II, in Ramakrishna Puram, New Delhi. _The shop
was owned by one Budh Ram and one A. K. Bhattacharya.
On March 15, 1967; wit. F. Dean, a Food Inspector in· the
employment of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi; went' to the.
said shop and purchased 'patisa' which were sold to him by the
appellant.
These were sold to him from a lot exposed for sale.
C
The Food Inspector then divided the patisa into three portions and
packed each of them into sealed bottles, one of which was handed
over by him to the appellant.
On an analysis of the sample by the Public Analyst appointed
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, XXXVII of 1954
it was found. that the patisa were prepared with unpermitted coal
tar dye, and therefore, were adulterated food stuff.
A complaint
to that effect was filed before the Magistrate, 1st Class, Delhi, who,
after recording evidence, found the appellant and the said Budh
Ram guilty under s. 7 ( 1) read with s. 16 ( 1) of the Act, and
sentenced each of the two accused to simple imprisonment for a
period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000, in default imprisonment for a further period of three months.
On an appeal by the
appellant and his co-accused, the said Budh Ram, the Additional
Sessions Judge allowed Budh Ram's appeal and set aside the order
of conviction passed against him on the ground that though he
and the said Bhattacharya were partners in the firm which carried
on thel said shop, there was nothing to show that Budh Ram was in
charge of the said shop or its business or was in any way responsible for the sale of articles sold in the shop.
He found that
,Budh Ram was, on the contrary, an employee of a club in New
Delhi and'was therefore at best a sleeping partner.
So far as_the
appellant was concerned, the Additional Sessions Judge held that
he was an employee of the firm, concerned with the sales, that the
prosecution had led sufficient evidence to establish its case against
him, and therefore, his conviction could not be interfered with.
Regarding the sentence awarded to him, the Additional Sessions
Judge remarked that (a) the case was not covered bys. 2(i) (j) of
the Act, but was one which amounted to violation of rules 23 to
30 of the Rules framed under the Act, (b) that there was nothing
in the evidence to show that the use of the unpermitted coal tar
dye in the manufacture of the patisa in question rendered them injurious to health, and ( c) that there was no allegation of the appelD
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JAi NARAIN v. MUN!C!Pl\L CORP. (She/at, !.)
925
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!ant havin!' committed a similar offence before.
On these grounds
he partially allowed the appeal by reducing the .sentence of impri-.
sonme:nt to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the
appellant before he was granted bail.
The order awarding the
said fine was not interfered with.
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Against.that order, the Municipal Corporation filed a revision
petition in the High Court urging that in view of the mandatory
provisions of s. 16 of the Act providing for the compulsory minimum sentence, the Additional Sessions Judge ought not to have
interfered with and reduced the sentence in1posed by the Trial
Magistrate.
The H~h Court accepted that contention and setting
asid~ the order of sentence, as modified by the Additional Sessions
Jud~e. restored the order of sentence passed by the Trial Magistrate.
The High Court, however, granted a certificate under Art.
J 34 ( c) of the Constitution.
The appellant filed this appeal on the
strength of that certificate.
Counsel for the appellant did not challenge before us either the
order of conviction or the order of sentence passed against him
by the High Court, which, as aforesaid, confirmed the conviction
and restored the order of sentence passed by the Trial Magistrate.
Tl\e only point raised by him was that the appellant should be given
the benefit of s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 under
which the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant
could be dispensed with and an admonition should instead be
given to him.
Tu a recent decision in !sher Das v. Punjab(') to which two of
us were parties, it was held on a consideration of s. 18 of the
Probation of Offenders Act that its operation is not excluded in
~ases of persons found guilty of offences under the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
The former Act was brought on
the statute book in 1958, but no specific exception as regards the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, though an earlier
Act, is to be found therein, just as an exception in respect of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 has been expressly made. The
provisions of the Probation of Offtjnders Act,
1958, therefore,
apply to persons found g 1ilty under the Prevention of Food Adulterafion Act. That decision, however, ex;Jressed a note of caution
that adulteration of food being a menace to public health and the
Act having been enacted with the object of eradicating that antisocial evil and for ensuring purity of articles of food sold to the
~e.mbers of the public cour1:s should not lightly resort to the pro-
":ISlons of s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act which applies to
offenders who are 21 years of age or above.
(!) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1295.
926
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.lt ..
The question, therefore, is whether we ought to apply, in the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the evil to prevent
whkh s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration was enacted,
s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and release the appellant
from the sentence of simple imprisonment awarded to him with
an admonition and a warning only.
Under s. 2(i) (j), the patisa, in the preparation of which a noripermissible colouring matter has been used, is an adulterated article.
Such an article is adulterated food as defined by cl. (v) of
s. 2, as that clause defines 'food' to include any ai:ticle used in the
preparation of human food or any flavouring matter.
Sec. 7 provides that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf
manufacture for sale, or store, or sell "any adulterated food" or
any article of food in contravention of any other provision of the
Act or of any' rule made thereunder.
Sec. 16 provides for a minimum sentence of imprisonment for not less than six months inter
alia for the offence of selling adulterated food.
The proviso confering discretion to the courts in the matter of sentence does not
apply to sales of food which is adulterated under s. 2(i) (j). The
policy of s. 16, therefore, is clearly to impose a sentence not less
than that provided therein inter alia for sale of food articles adulterated as defined by s. 2 (i) (j). Under rule 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, addition of a colouring
matter to any article of food except as specifically permitted under
the rules is prohibited.
Rule 28 makes only the coal tar dyes
specified therein permissible in the preparation or manufacture of
articles of food set out in rule 29.
There is no dispute that the coal tar dye used in the patisa sold
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by the appellant was not one of the coal tar dyes permissible under
rule 28. That is also clear from the report of the Public Analyst,
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the correctness of which was not under any challenge before us.
Though there was no express evidence on the record that the use
of the part'.cular coal tar dye in the making of the patisa sold at
this shop was injurious to health, it must be presumed to be so
from the fact that it is not one of the permitted coal tar dyes enumerated in r. 28. It is, therefore, clear that the sale of such an
article of food was an anti-social activity, deleterious to the health
of those who would consume them as article of food, the eradicatioil of which is the principal aim of the Act and in particular of s.
16 thereof. The evil would appear to be more pernicious when
it is realised that patisa are more often than not purchased and
consumed by child:en and by persons from the unaftluent sections
of the wciety, who cannot afford to buy costlier sweets prepared
by more sophlsticated .processes.
The
~,olouring matter was
obviously used to attract customers, without any regard to the
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JAI NARAIN v. MUNICIPAL CORP, (Shelat, J.)
927
injury it would cause to those who consumed them.
The appellant's activity being thus distinctly anti-social, we do not think that
it would be cither expedient or in consonance with the object with
which the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was passed to apply
s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
There being no other point raised for our consideration, the
appeal fails and is dismissed.
K.B.N.
Appeal dismissed