# JAi SINGH AND ORS v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2010] 12 S.C.R. 358
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-09-23
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8233 of 2010
- **Bench:** B. Sudershan Reddy, Surinder Singh Nijjar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jai-singh-and-ors-v-municipal-corporation-of-delhi-and-anr-26380
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227 - Scope and
C ambit of - Discussed - Eviction petition, on the ground of subletting without written consent - Allowed by Rent Controller -
Order upheld by Tribunal - Writ petition under Article 227 by
MCD - High Court set aside the concurrent findings recorded
by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal and quashed the
D orders passed by them - Justification of - Held: Not justified
- The writ petition filed by MCD was liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay and /aches alone - Even otherwise,
exercise of power under Article 227 by th.e High Court, in the
peculiar facts of this case was improper -
The entire
E proceedings adopted by MCD were a subterfuge to avoid the
execution proceedings in a decree which had become final
between the parties - The High Court erroneously undertook
investigation into issues which did not even arise in the /is -
It traveled beyond the well defined contours of its jurisdiction
F under Article 227 - Rent Control - Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 - ss.14(1)(b) and 39(1) - Delayllaches.
The appellants claiming themselves to be the
landlords in respect of premises in question filed eviction
petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act,
G 1958. They alleged that the premises were let out to
respondent No.2 (OTC); that OTC sublet/assigned the
premises in favour of respondent No.1 (MCO) and parted
with possession in favour of MCD without the written
consent of the appellants and, therefore, both OTC and
H
358
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 359
OF DELHI AND ANR.
MCD were liable for eviction. The Assistant Rent Controller
A
(ARC) allowed the eviction petition holding that OTC had
sublet the premises to MCD. OTC lost in appeal before
the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT) as also in
appeal before the High Court.
Meanwhile, MCD too had appealed against the order
B
of ARC before ARCT and then before the High Court.
Following the order passed by the High Court in the
appeal filed by OTC, the appeal filed by MCD was also
dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court, but
C
then the said order was recalled, whereafter\MCD moved
an application with a prayer that its appeal be treated as
a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said
application was disposed off by the High Court,
whereafter MCD filed a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution, on which the High Court quashed the
orders passed by the ARC and ARCT.
Disposing ofthe appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the
High Court has the jurisdiction to ensure that all
subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial
tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the
bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power
and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance
with well established principles of law. The High Court is
vested with the powers of superintendence and/or
judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or
appeal lies to 'the High Court. The jurisdiction under this
Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
However, greater the power, greater the care and caution
in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected
to exercise such wide powe.rs with great care, caution
and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be
D
E
F
G
H
360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A within the well recognized constraints. It can not be
exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors
of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits
of its jurisdiction. Tliis correctional jurisdiction can be
exercised in cases where orders have been passed in
B grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of
fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court
cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and reappreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute
its own conclusions for the c.Jnclus

## Text

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A
B
[2010] 12 S.C.R. 358
JAi SINGH AND ORS.
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8233 of 2010)
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227 - Scope and
C ambit of - Discussed - Eviction petition, on the ground of subletting without written consent - Allowed by Rent Controller -
Order upheld by Tribunal - Writ petition under Article 227 by
MCD - High Court set aside the concurrent findings recorded
by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal and quashed the
D orders passed by them - Justification of - Held: Not justified
- The writ petition filed by MCD was liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay and /aches alone - Even otherwise,
exercise of power under Article 227 by th.e High Court, in the
peculiar facts of this case was improper -
The entire
E proceedings adopted by MCD were a subterfuge to avoid the
execution proceedings in a decree which had become final
between the parties - The High Court erroneously undertook
investigation into issues which did not even arise in the /is -
It traveled beyond the well defined contours of its jurisdiction
F under Article 227 - Rent Control - Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 - ss.14(1)(b) and 39(1) - Delayllaches.
The appellants claiming themselves to be the
landlords in respect of premises in question filed eviction
petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act,
G 1958. They alleged that the premises were let out to
respondent No.2 (OTC); that OTC sublet/assigned the
premises in favour of respondent No.1 (MCO) and parted
with possession in favour of MCD without the written
consent of the appellants and, therefore, both OTC and
H
358
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 359
OF DELHI AND ANR.
MCD were liable for eviction. The Assistant Rent Controller
A
(ARC) allowed the eviction petition holding that OTC had
sublet the premises to MCD. OTC lost in appeal before
the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT) as also in
appeal before the High Court.
Meanwhile, MCD too had appealed against the order
B
of ARC before ARCT and then before the High Court.
Following the order passed by the High Court in the
appeal filed by OTC, the appeal filed by MCD was also
dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court, but
C
then the said order was recalled, whereafter\MCD moved
an application with a prayer that its appeal be treated as
a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said
application was disposed off by the High Court,
whereafter MCD filed a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution, on which the High Court quashed the
orders passed by the ARC and ARCT.
Disposing ofthe appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the
High Court has the jurisdiction to ensure that all
subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial
tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the
bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power
and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance
with well established principles of law. The High Court is
vested with the powers of superintendence and/or
judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or
appeal lies to 'the High Court. The jurisdiction under this
Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
However, greater the power, greater the care and caution
in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected
to exercise such wide powe.rs with great care, caution
and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be
D
E
F
G
H
360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A within the well recognized constraints. It can not be
exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors
of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits
of its jurisdiction. Tliis correctional jurisdiction can be
exercised in cases where orders have been passed in
B grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of
fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court
cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and reappreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute
its own conclusions for the c.Jnclusions reached by the
C courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial tribunals. The
power to re-appreciate evidence would only be justified
in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice
would be done unless the High Court interferes. The
exercise of such discretionary power would depend on
o the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of
ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice. [Para 13]
[370-8-G]
1.2. In the instant case, the High Court traveled
beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
E the Constitution. Both ARC and ARCT had acted within
the limits of the jurisdiction vested in them. The
conclusions reached cannot be said to be based on no
evidence. All relevant material has been taken into
consideration. Therefore, there was hardly any
F justification for the High Court to undertake an
investigation into issues which did not even arise in the
. /is. (Para 14] (370-H] [371-A]
1.3. Reference to the orders of ARC and ARCT only
G demonstrate that the High Court was not justified in
observingthat there has been 'serious dereliction of duty'
or that there has been 'blatant violation of the
fundamental principles of law and justice' by the ARC and
ARCT. It cannot be said that both ARC and ARCT
H considered the facts in a very mechanical way, or that the
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 361
OF DELHI AND ANR.
orders passed by ARC and ARCT exhibited any patent A
illegality writ large on the face of the orders or that ARC
and ARCT ignored the sequence of events in the facts
and circumstances of the case. [Para 21] [377-D-F]
1.4. The HigJ Court ought not to have exercised the
8
extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of this case.
A perusal of the order passed by the High Court (on the
application filed by MCD praying that its appeal be treated
as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution) clearly C
shows that the application was disposed of on the
statement made by the counsel for MCD that MCD should
file a fresh petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
if the same is permissible under law. Therefore, the
aforesaid order cannot be treated as an order passed by
the High Court permitting MCD to file a petition under D
Article 227 of the Constitution. However using the
aforesaid order of the High Court as an excuse, MCD filed
the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
challenging the orders passed by the ARC and the ARCT.
The High Court failed to bestow proper attention to the
E
objections taken by the appellants to the maintainability
of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.
Proceedings under Article 227 can be initiated in the
absence of the availability of an alternative efficacious
remedy. In the present case, MCD had consciously
F
withdrawn RCSA which had been filed under Section
39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal had been
filed against the order of the ARCT. The High Court
committed a patent error of jurisdiction in entertaining the
writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which G
was unconscionably belated. The objection raised by the
appellants to the entertainment of the writ petition under
Article 227, on the ground of delay and laches was
brushed aside· by the High Court on two wholly untenable
grounds, i.e:- (i) the orders passed by the ARC and ARCT
H
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A suffered from patent illegality on the face of the orders
and ii) the MCD was bonafide prosecuting a case in the
wrong court, due to mistake of law. Both reasons stated
by the High Court in support of its conclusions, are
contrary to the facts on the record. [Paras 22, 23] [377B G] [379-F-H] [380-A-F]
1.5. It is apparent that the entire proceedings adopted
by MCD after the dismissal of the RCSA filed by OTC
were a subterfuge to avoid the execution proceedings in
a decree which had become final between the parties. In
C the application seeking conversion of RCSA to a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was categorically
stated by MCD that the aforesaid RCSA was not
maintainable. The aforesaid statement is a clear
admission that the appeal filed by the MCD did not
D involve a substantial question of law. [Para 24] [381-B-D]
1.6. Having made an admission that no substantial
question of law was raised in the RCSA, withdrawal of
the same could not possibly have been used as a
E justification for filing a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution. If the RCSA was devoid of any substantial
question of law, the petition under Article 227, based on
the same facts, would be equally devoid of any
substantial question of law. This categoric admission of
F the MCD was ignored by the High Court whilst recording
the finding that the orders of ARC and ARCT were passed
"in blatant violation of fundamental principles of law and
justice." This apart in the peculiar facts of this case, it
could not be held that MCD had been bona fide
G prosecuting a case in the wrong court. It was seeking a
remedy provided under Section 39(1) of DRC Act. Even
this appeal was filed beyond limitation. It was delayed by
431 days. In the meantime possession of a part of the
premises had already been taken by the appellants.
H lnspite of the objections having been raised to the
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 363
OF DELHI AND ANR.
maintainability of a writ petition under Article 227 of the
A
Constitution, they were rejected by the High Court. In
such circumstances, it was wholly inappropriate for the
High Court to entertain the writ petition under Article 227
of the Constitution. [Para 24] [381-E-H] [382-A-B]
1.7. The High Court has the power to· reach injustice
whenever and wherever found. However, the High Court
committed a serious error· of jurisdiction in entertaining
B
the writ petition filed by MCD under Article 227 of the
Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of this case.
C
The decision to exercise jurisdiction had to be taken in
accordance with the accepted norms of care, caution,
circumspection. The issue herein only related to a
tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating to the
ownership of the land <!>n which the superstructure or the
D
demised premises had been constructed. The whole
i~sue .of ownership of plot is the subject matter of a civil
I' suit in the High Court. The High Court, therefore, ought
not to have given any opinion on the question of
ownership. The High Court traveled beyond the well
defined contours of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
E
the Constitution. [Paras 25, 26] [383-B-E]
Estral/a Rubber v. Dass Estates (P) Ltd. 2001 (8) SCC
97, relied on.
Madras Bangalore Transport Co. [West] v. lnder Singh
& Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1564; Resham Singh v. Raghbir Singh
. & Anr. 1999 (7) SCC 263 and Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life
Insurance Coropration of India 1998 (3) SCC 1,, rE1feirred to.
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1986 SC 1564
1999 (7) sec 263
~ 998 (3) sec 1
refarred to
referred to
referred to
Para 7
Para 10
Para 10
F
G
H
A
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 12 S.C.R.
2001 (8) sec 97
relied on
Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8233 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 23.3.2009 of the High
B Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM (M) No. 516 of 2007.
WITH
C.A. No. 8234 of 2010.
C
Altaf Ahmed, Ranjit Kumar, Bhargava V. Desai, Rahul
Gupta, Nikhil Sharma for the Appellants.
Madhu Tewatia, Sidhi Arora, P. Parmeswaran, Dr. Monika
Gusain, Hariom Yaduvanshi, Hemant Malhotra, Manish Pitale,
D Wasi Haider, C.S. Ashri, Vishnu B. Saharya (for Saharya &
Co.) for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. In this special leave
E petition, the petitioners have challenged the judgment of tile
Delhi High Court in a Writ petition under Article 227 qf/ the
Constitution of India, CM (M) No.516 of 2007, dated 23rd
March, 2009, whereby the High Court has quashed and set
aside the order passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal
F ["ARCT" for short] dated 12th March, 2001, upholding the order
passed by the Additional Rent Controller ["ARC" for brevity].
2. Heard counsel. Leave granted.
The facts, as noticed by the High Court, are that the
G appellants are claiming themselves to be the landlords in
respect of premises constructed on the plot of land No.2, Block
B, transport area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta
Road, Karol Bagh; New Delhi.
H
3. In the eviction petition, it was stated that the premises
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 365
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
were let out to respondent No.2, Delhi Transport Corporation
A
[for short "OTC"], on a monthly rental of Rs.3500/-. OTC has
sublet/assigned the premises in favour of respondent No.1,
Municipal Corporation of Delhi [for short "MCD"] and parted with
possession in favour of MCD without the written consent of the
appellants. Therefore, both OTC and MCD were liable for
B
eviction. The High Court has noticed the sequence of events
since the transport services were being run by Gwalior Northern
India Transport Company (for short "GNIT") to the time when
OTC stepped into its shoes. The appellants claimed that the
tenancy of the premises was with OTC. MCD had, however, c
claimed that the legal possession was retained by MCD; rent
was being paid by MCD.to OTC.
4. The ARC by an order dated 11th November, 1989, upon
consideration of the rival contentions, held:
"19. Admittedly it is respondent No.2 (MCD) who is in
· possession of the premises in question. It is also admitted
that respondent No.2 (MCD) pays a sum of Rs.3500/- as
rent to respondent No.1 (OTC) by way of cheques. It is not
D
the case of the respondent that any written consent of the
E
petitioners was obtained in this regard. Therefore, it has
to be held that respondent no.1 (OTC) has either sublet,
assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the
tenanted premises illegally to respondent No.2 (MCD). It
is well settled that in voluntarily (sic) transfers are also
F
included with the meaning of sub-letting etc. in Section
14(1)(b) DRC Act.".
5. The order passed by the ARC was upheld by the ARCT
with the following observations:
·
"15. After having heard up the matter in all its possible
aspects I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the finding
G
of the learned trial aourt by holding that there exists
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and
since th$ exclusive possessi<m of the premises was
H
A
B
c
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
handed over by the erstwhile tenant to the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, i.e., respondent No.2 which is itself
a separate and independent legal entity, it amounts to subletting."
6. The High Court set aside the concurrent findings
recorded by the ARC and ARCT with the following observations:
"The orders passed by learned ARC and the learned
ARCT categorically show that neither the learned ARC nor
learned ARCT has devolved upon the facts of the case
and nor had even considered the concept of tenancy and
sub tenancy in this case in the peculiar circumstances of
this case."
7. The High Court held that this is not a case of sub-letting
o as Delhi Transport Services (for short "DTS"), Delhi Transport
Undertaking (for short "DTU"), MCD and OTC were the creation
of statute. The premises had come to them after it was acquired
. by Union of India (UOI) from GNIT on nationalization of the
business. There was no parting with possession by OTC to
E MCD, therefore, it was not sub-letting. The OTC was
incorporated in lieu of DTU as a separate company to facilitate
running of transport business. Mere payment of Rs.3500/- per
month by MCD to OTC does not show sub-letting or parting with
possession. Relying on a judgment of this Court in Madras
F Bangalore Transport Co. [West] Vs. lnder Singh & Ors. [AIR
1986 SC 1564], the High Court has held that:
"In the case in hand, the situation, is much better. The
alleged original tenant GNIT stood acquired by a
Legislative Act and the premises went to DTS. DTS was
G
converted to DTU and DTU was further converted into
OTC. The premises remained in occupation of the same
entity which changed its form from one to another. Thus it
cannot be said that it was a case of sub-letting under any
circumstances. The orders passed by learned ARC and
H
learned ARTC are liable to be set aside for non application
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 367
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of law and non consideration of facts at all."
8. The objection raised by the appellants to the
entertainment of the petition under Article 227, on the ground
of !aches, has been rejected with the following observations:
A
B
"The respondent in this case has strongly objected to
entertaining the petition on the ground of limitation. The
petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. In exercise of this power, interfering
with the orders of the Court of Tribunal has to be done
where this Court finds that there was a serious dereliction
C
of duty and blatant violation of the fundamental principles
of law and justice and where, the order caused grave
injustice and needs to be corrected. Although the petitioner
herein had not been vigilant in prosecuting the appeal
below but that cannot prevent his Court from correcting the
D
patent illegality writ large on the face of the orders of the
ARC and Tribunal below. Both the ARC and ARCT passed ·
orders without considering the facts of the case in a very
mechanicai manner. Neither the learned ARC nor learned
ARCT had taken into account the sequence of facts
E
brought before them regarding acquisition of the entire
assets of GNIT and conversion of DTS to DTU and then
to DTC by the Legislative Act and the order has been
passed merely on the ground that amount of Rs.3500/-
was being remitted by the MCD to OTC. The Courts below
did not even consider the issue as to who was the tenant
and how MCD became the sub-tenant of respondent once
F
the premises was owned by Union of India and the
leasehold rights of the entire land vested in Union of India.
This Court can set aside the findings and the orders of the
G
Tribunal below if there was no evidence at all to justify the
findings and the findings were perverse. The order can .
also be set aside if no reasonable or prudent person can
possibly come to such a conclusion despite the fact that
the petition was not brought before this Court by the
petitioner soon after the passing of the order. In Badlu and
H
A
c
368 '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 12 S.C.R.
another Vs. Shiv Charan and Others [(1980) 4 SCC 4011,
Supreme Court observed that the delay caused in
prosecuting the case in bona fide and good faith in wrong
court due to mistake of law or facts can be condoned, I,
therefore, consider that petition is not liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay, nor learned ARCT was
justified in dismissing the application. Learned ARCT went
wrong in dismissing the application of the petitioner for
condonation of delay. The order of learned ARCT on this
count also is liable to set aside. It is ordered accordingly."
9. Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants submits :
1.
The exercise of power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, by the High Court, in the
P
peculiar facts of this case was improper.
E
2.
The petition was liable to be dismissed on th.e
ground of delay and laches alone.
3.
Even otherwise, the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction by acting as an appellate court.
4.
The High Court erroneously decided the question
of ownership of the premises which was not even
an issue in the proceedings, under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
5.
Even on facts, the findings are contrary to the
material on record.
10. On the other hand, Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned
G counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the High
Court was fully justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution to correct the patent, factual and legal
errors committed by ARC and ARCT. She has emphasised the
entire history ~ftransformation of GNIT into OTC. According to
H the learned counsel, there was no landlord and tenant
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 369
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINOER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
relationship between the predecessor of the appellants and
A
GNIT. The payment of Rs.3500/- per month was a misnomer.
The plot vested in the Government under the agreement dated
23rd April, 1948, therefore, GNIT was incompetent to transfer
.any perpetual lease to Bharat Singh. The amount of Rs.3500/
- was being paid to Bharat Singh as compensation for the
B
amount spent by him on behalf of GNIT for construction of the
depot. She further submits that the land vested in DOA, i.e.,
Government. Therefore, Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. In
any case, the appellants have failed to prove that there has
been any parting with possession, without the written consent c
of the landlord. The ARC and ARCT ignored vital documents
in concluding that there has been subletting by OTC to MCO.
In fact, MCO has retained the legal possession all along. The
payment of Rs.3500/- was only being routed through OTC, as
a matter of convenience. On the question of delay and laches,
0
it is submitted that the High Court had converted the RCSA to
a petition under Article 227. The delay has been condoned as
the MCO had been bona fide pursuing the wrong legal remedy.
The High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India had the jurisdiction to undo the injustice caused to the
E
MCO by the orders of ARC and ARCT. In support of her
submissions, learned counsel relied on a number of judgments
of this Court, viz. , on subletting: Resham Singh Vs. Raghbir
Singh & Anr. [1999 (7) SCC 263]; Bharat Sales Ltd. Vs. Life
Insurance Coropration of India [1998 (3) SCC 1] and on
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
F
Constitution of India, Estral/a Rubber Vs. Dass Estates (P) Ltd.
2001 (8) sec 97.
11. Mr. Ahmad, in reply submits that the sub-tenant OTC,
cannot be permitted to plead a case which even the tenant G
could not have pleaded.
12. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the
learned counsel.
13. Before we consider the factual and legal issues H
370
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
involved herein, we may notice certain well recognized principles
governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High
Court, under this Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all
subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial tribunals,
B
exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their
authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to
ensure that they act in accordance with well established
principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of
superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where
c no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction
under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is,
however, well to remember the well known adage that greater
the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The
0
High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide
powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The
exercise of jurisdiction must be wi.thin the well recognized
constraints. It can not be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop',
to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting
within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction
E
can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in
grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or
liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the
evidence. Generally, it can not substitute its own conclusions
F
for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/
quasi judicial tribunals. The power to re~appreciate evidence
would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where
grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
The exercise of such discretionary power would depend on the
G peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring
that there is no miscarriage of justice.
14. In our opinion, the High Court in this case, has traveled
beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
H
Constitution. Both ARC and ARCT had acted within the limits
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 371
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of the jurisdiction vested in them. The conclusions reached
A
cannot be said to be based on no evidence. All relevant
---- [llaterial has been taken into consideration. Therefore, there
was hardly any justification for the High Court to undertake an
investigation into issues which did not even arise in the lis.
B
15. The appellants had filed a simple eviction petition
___b_efore the ARC, under Section 14(1 )(b) of Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 (in short "DRC Act"). They had stated that OTC was
their tenants in premises as the entire plot No.2 with the
construction thereon at Jhandewalan known as Karol Bagh C
Depot, as per plan attached. Monthly rent was stated to be
Rs.3500/-. It was claimed that OTC has sublet the premises to
MCD, without permission of the landlord. Therefore, both OTC
and MCD were liable for eviction.
16. Both OTC and MCD took identical pleas. Their D
defence was that the appellants are neither the owners nor the
landlords of the demised premises. They claimed that Late
Bharat Singh (LBS) had agreed to construct the depoUor and
on behalf of GNIT. He was receiving Rs.3500/- p.m. for the
money spent on construction. Therefore, the term rent is a
E
misnomer. Allegations of subletting were denied. The business
of GNIT was nationalized and taken over by the government
vide agreement dated 23rd April, 1948. The plot was mutated
in the name of Government of India. Thereafter, Delhi Road
Transport Corporation Act, 1950, "Yas enforced. Under this Act,
F
Delhi Transport Services (DTS) was established. From then the
onward DTS was in occupation and started paying the rent of
Rs.3500/- till the enactment of DMC Act, 1957. Under this Act,
the transport service in Delhi was given to Delhi Transport
Undertaking (DTU), which was made a wing of MCD. Since then
G
MCD started releasing Rs.3500/- to LBS through its wing, DTU.
After the death of LBS, the amount has been paid to the
appellants, without any objection. On passing of Delhi Road
Transport Laws (Amendment) Act, 1971, Delhi Transport
Corporation, came into existence as a statutory body. But the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
possession of the demised premises remained with MCD. As
OTC had taken the place of DTU, the rent amount, thereafter,
was routed through OTC. Therefore, there was no subletting.
In any event, since the property vests in Government of India,
Delhi Rent Control-Act would not be applicable.
B
C
17. Taking into consideration the aforesaid claims of the
parties, the ARC concluded that there is no dispute with regard
to construction and ownership of the depot by LBS. The
appellants are successors ot LBS. The issues as crystallized
by the ARC are as follows:-
"(i)
The tenant has sublet, assigned or otherwise parted
with possession.
(ii)
It may be in respect of the whole or any part of the
0
premises.
E
F
G
H
(iii)
Such subletting etc has taken place on or after the
9th day of June, 1952.
(iv)
Such subletting etc has taken place without
obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord.
(v)
The first and the foremost ground that requires to
be seen is whether relationship of landlord and
tenant exist between the petitioners and respondent
No.1 or not."
Thereafter in Para 9 ARC observes :-
"Whether relationship of landlord and tenant was
contemplated or not is the most important fact
which has to be seen."
18. Thereafter, ARC proceeds to consider the implications
of the agreement dated 10th November, 1944, wherein LBS
agreed to develop the plot of land. He is referred to as the
prospective purchaser. The lease with GNIT was provided for,
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 373
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
LBS was to pay all taxes. GNIT had to pay 10% p.a. of the entire
A
cost of the building. GNIT were to execute a ten year lease. Rent
of Rs.3500/- was regularly paid. The ARC noticed that
Government of India had moved the Rent Controller, New Delhi
for fixation of fair rent in June, 1950. The Rent Controller, after
conducting an enquiry had fixed the agreed rent as the fair rent.
B
An appeal against the order of Rent Controller, New Delhi
dated 26th December, 1950 was dismissed by the learned
District Judge at Delhi by an order dated 3.5.1951. Not only
this, ARC notices that during the course of present
proceedings, rent was deposited in court for the period 1.4.93 c
to 30.11.93, by OTC. Therefore, they can not now be permitted
to say that MCD is the tenant, in possession. In such
circumstances, the ARC held that OTC has sublet the,premises
to MCD.
19. Thereafter, MCD challenged the aforesaid order q
before the ARCT in RCA No.9 of 2001. The aforesaid appe~I
was beyond limitation by 431 days. It appears that even though
the ARCT did not find any substance in the reasons given by
the MCD for seeking condonation of delay, the appeal was still
considered on merits. ARCT discussed at length the. negligent
E
attitude of the MCD in pursuing the proceedings in the court of
ARG. Ultimately, the ARC was left with no alternative but to
proceed against the MCD ex-parte on 25th of August, 1999. It
was observed by the ARCT that the delay was wholly unjustified
as well as wholly unexplained. We may notice the observations
F
made by the ARCT which are as follows:
"Now, looking to the appellant's stand through another
angle, I find that the appellant and respondenVDTC are
both governmental organization and it does .not stand to
G
mind that respondenVDTC or its representative would not
intimate the appellant/MCD about its not being
represented to some advocate or about its having been
proceeded ex-parte. The case was admittedly on last state
and it appears that the appellant took chance and stayed
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
out of the scene and has now come up with this hopelessly
delayed appeal with a cock and bull story which does not
seem to be any way bonafide, reasonable and acceptable
to mind. Strangely enough, the appellant even did not
disclose in the application as to on which date or month,
B
the court bailiff had gone to the demises premises, and
this lengthy delay of about 431 days (or 393 days after
excluding the time taken in obtaining the certified copies)
has remained completely unexplained. The application for
seeking condonation of delay, thus, is found to be without
c
any sufficient or reasonable ground and needs to be
dismissed. Order as such with the dismissal of the
appellant is application for condonation of delay - this
appeal meets the same fate."
Having observed as such, the ARCT considered the appeal
D on merits on the assumption that the application of MCD for
condonation of delay has been allowed, though it had not been
allowed. The ARCT thereafter considered the entire gamut of
facts and circumstances in detail. The ARCT noticed the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the MCD and
E considered each submission in detail.
F
G
H
20. It was submitted that ARC had failed to distinguish the
three expressions: sublet, assigned and otherwise
parted with possession. This was answered as follows:
"I feel that the submissions made by learned counsel
Sh.Chachra do not gather any support from the records
because the learned ARC has dealt with insufficient details
of the needed requirements and it was only thereafter that
he came to a conclusion of the respondenUDTC having
sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession
of the demised premises in favour of this appellant. For
attracting the applicability of a ground of eviction u/s
14(1)(b) of the Act, it has either to be direct circumstance
of subletting which ordinarily may not be possible to be
detected since it is, in most cases, a secret deal between
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 375
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant or it is the assignment
A
where under the tenant has to divest himself of all the rights
that he had as a tenant or parting with possession which
circumstances postulates the parting with legal possession
also i.e. the tenant surrenders his. legal right of are-entry
to the premises. This mischief of Section 14(1)(b) ofthe
Act is complete if any of the three expressions gets
established. It is certainly no necessary and nor has it been
B
so held by any of the pronouncements of any superior
courts that pleadings on this aspect must state in specific
terms that it either sublet or assignment or parting with c
possession. In case a party succeeds in establishing the
first expression sublet the to my mind. It goes to establish
that even the other two expressions assignment and
parting with possession stand proved because the
moment a tenant indulge a third person as his tenant (sub0
tenant) qua the demised premises-he (tenant) squarely
. assigns and also parts with possession. in both ways as
he divests himself of all the rights as he had as a tenant
and part with possession to delivering· and only physical
possession but also fully surrendering his legal possession
over the tenanted premises. The impugned judgment did
discuss evidence with a clear angle that the appellant had
been parting rent of Rs.3,500/- per month to respondent I
OTC every month. The respondent OTC was admittedly not
in possession any way of the demised premises as the
appellant's own stand on this point is admittedly th~ same.
In case, the first expression sublet has been established,
almost in an admitted style, through various acts admitted
documents and stands taken in various court proceedings,
the other two expressions would also go hand in hand and
E
F
the Ld. ARC was not any way required to state as to under
G
which of the three expressions, parties case felt Evidence
or specific admissions through deeds and conduct find
duly discussed through various admitted or proved
documents and these negates the plea of the appellant that
the
1evidence had not been discussed by the Ld. Trial
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376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
Court. I feel the impugned judgment carries all these
necessary details and these need not be repeated here
any further."
ARCT thereafter considered in detail the relationship of
B landlord and tenant between LBS and various statutory entities,
in succession. The transformation of GNIT, through OTS to OTC
was duly noticed, and dilated upon. It was noticed that OTC
which was a government undertaking, was a successor in
interest of a private transport comnany. It was further noticed
that the "land underneath the superstructure I the demised
· C premises might or might not belong to the government and the
superstructure was built around May, 1948 by predecessor-ininterest of respondents 1 to 3 and an amount of Rs.3,500/- per
month was agreed to be paid being a fair return against the
investment made towards construction of superstructure". The
0 submission that Rs.3,500/- per month was paid as
compensation for construction of the superstructure was
considered and rejected with the observations :-
E
F
G
H
"The submission of appellant's Ld. Counsel that the amount
was agreed to be paid only with a vie to compensate the
predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 3 and was not
the rental of the super-structure does not seem to be
carrying any weight and to my mind this submission cannot
stand because the moment, we speak of compensation
- it indicates to some specific amount of a specific period
by which the liability would be deemed to have been
discharged. It never means a flowing steam of payments
to continue till infinity. It has got to be the rental only and it
was also to understand, taken and acted upon by the
parties as is clearly and unambiguously indicated from the
admitted stand of respondent/OTC. The respondent I OTC
had in its written statement admitted this amount as rent
though at other point it denied it being so. Really,
respondent I OTC could not suppress the truth and at
times, it honestly leaned towards it and described this sum
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 377
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of Rs.3,500/- as-monthly rental. Paras( a), (f) and (k) of brief . A
facts of the written statement of respondent/OTC clearly
reflect the above stand. In para {e), the words used are
and would give it on rental basis to GNIT. The words used
. in para (f) are that Sh. Bharat Singh constructed a depot
on plot No. 2 and rented out the same structure to GNIT
8
at a monthly rental of Rs.3,500/-. Para (k) states ... and the
GNIT company continued paying a rent of Rs.3,500/- per
month to Sh. Bharat Singh for the amount he had invested
on.the super-structure and also for the amount he had
financed to GNIT company. These terms are no misnomers
C
and actually they pump out the real intent of the parties
under which respondent I OTC started making payments
of monthly rentals to respondents 1 to 3 their predecessorin-interest".
1
21. We have been constrained to make elaborate
D
reference to the orders of ARC and ARCT only to demonstrate
that High Court was not justified in observing that there has
been 'serious dereliction of duty' or that there has been 'blatant
violation of the fundamental principles of law and justice' by the
ARC and ARCT. We also cannot accept the observations of
E
the High Court that both ARC and ARCT have considered the
facts in a very mechanical way, or that the orders passed by
ARC and ARCT exhibited any patent illegality writ large on the
face of the orders. We also do not agree that the ARC and
ARCT ignored the sequence of events through which GNIT was
F
substituted by OTC. The entire sequence of metamorphosis of
GNIT into OTC have been elaborately explained and dilated
upon.
22. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court
ought not to have exercised the extra ordinary jurisdiction under
G
Article 227 of the Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of
this case. We may briefly indicate the reasons for saying so:-
(i)
Initially the appellants filed a petition for eviction
against OTC and MCD. They had clarified that
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A
B
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R.
MCD has been impleaded only to avoid multiplicity
of proceedings.
(ii}
Decree of eviction was passed. OTC lost in appeal,
lost in RCSA in the High Court. However, the High
Court clarified it shall have no bearing on the appeal
filed by MCD. The order dated 31/01/2001, passed
by the High Court in CM (M) No.31 of 2001 reads
as under:-
"There is a concurrent findings of facts and law against the
C
petitioner. It is not for this Court to substantiate for
judgment over the judgment of the Court below through the
proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Dismissed.
D
I am informed that the MCD has challenged the impugned
order before the Rent Control Tribunal. Dismissal of this
petition shail have no bearing on the determination of the
Appeal filed by the MCD.