# JAN MOHAMMAD NOOR MOHAMMAD BEGBAN v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 505
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-08-18
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 11 of 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jan-mohammad-noor-mohammad-begban-v-state-of-gujarat-and-another-3629
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

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505
JAN MOHAMMAD NOOR MOHAMMAD BEGBAN
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER
August 18, 1965
[p. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K.. N.
WANCHOQ,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH AND 5. M. SIB.RI. JJ.J
Gujarat Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1964 (20 of 1964), ss.
5, 6, 27(2) and 30 validity of-Whether violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 31
of the Constitution-Rules under the Act, validity of.
The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act (22 of 1939) was
enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay and under the said Act
the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1941 were framed. By
a notification issued under the Act, the whole area within a radius of 12
miles of Ahmedabad City was declared in respect of certain agricultural
produce, a market area for the purposes of the Act. A market yard and
a market proper were also established for transactions in specified commodities. Under the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960 which becami>
operative as from May 1, 1960 two States-Maharashtra and Gujaratw1>re carved out of the territory of the former State of Bombay and the
town of Ahmedabad was included within the State of Gujarat, but Bombay
Act 22 of 1939 continued for the time being to remain applicable to the
Gujarat region by virtue of s. 87 of Act 11 of 1960. Subsequently the·
Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act 20 of 1964 wag passed but
u!lder s. 64 of the Act the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Rules,
1941 remained in operation.
The petitioner filed a petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution seeking a declaration that Gujarat Act 20 of
1964 \Vas illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative of Arts. 14,
19 and 31 of the Constitution of India and therefore null and void and
that the rules framed thereunder (being the Bombay Agricultural Produce
Market Rules, 1941) were also ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal, nun
and void.
He prayed for a writ of mandamus forbidding the State of
Gujarat from enforcing any of the provision9
of the
Act
and
the
Rules. The following grounds were urged in support of the petition : (1)
The powers conferred by ss. 5 and 6 of the Act were unfettered, wide
and unguided and on that account the fundamental rights of the petitioner
were infringed. (2) Retail sales which were not regulated by the provisions
of the 1>arlier Act were sought to bo regulated by Gujarat Act 20 of
1964.
(3) Retail trade was completely prohibited by the Act and the
prohibition amounted to an unreasonable restriction
upon
the
funda·
mental rights of the petitioner. ( 4) Section 30 of the Act gave wide powers
to evict a person carrying on business without a licence from the market
area.
(5) Section 27(2) not having provided the maximum licence fee
chargeable was illegal. ( 6) The market committee had no power to function as it was not constituted according to law.
The period of office of
the old committee which was to function for three years under Bombay
Act 22 of 1939 had expired in 1961 but the committee continued to function and no fresh elections were held.
(7) The rules pursuant to which
the market committee was constituted and functioned not ba\ing been
placed before the Legislature in the first meeting after the mies were
promulgated under Act 22 of 1939 as required by that Act, the mies
were unauthorised and so there was complete absence of machinery for
enforcement of 1he Act.
Despite the suspension Qf Art. 19 hy virtuo·
506
SUPRBMI! COURT
REPORTS
[1966) l S.C.R.
of the operation of Art. 358 .of the Constitution in the state of Emergency
A
declared by the President m December 1902, the Coun decided the
petition on merits because breach of fundamental rights under Arts. 14
and 31 was also alleged.
HELD: (i) The object of the Act being to ameliorate the condition of
agriculturists and to do away with middlemen, who, it is a matter of
..
common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the
transactions carried out through them, declaration under s. 5, of intention
B
to regulate tr

## Text

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505
JAN MOHAMMAD NOOR MOHAMMAD BEGBAN
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER
August 18, 1965
[p. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K.. N.
WANCHOQ,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH AND 5. M. SIB.RI. JJ.J
Gujarat Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1964 (20 of 1964), ss.
5, 6, 27(2) and 30 validity of-Whether violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 31
of the Constitution-Rules under the Act, validity of.
The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act (22 of 1939) was
enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay and under the said Act
the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1941 were framed. By
a notification issued under the Act, the whole area within a radius of 12
miles of Ahmedabad City was declared in respect of certain agricultural
produce, a market area for the purposes of the Act. A market yard and
a market proper were also established for transactions in specified commodities. Under the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960 which becami>
operative as from May 1, 1960 two States-Maharashtra and Gujaratw1>re carved out of the territory of the former State of Bombay and the
town of Ahmedabad was included within the State of Gujarat, but Bombay
Act 22 of 1939 continued for the time being to remain applicable to the
Gujarat region by virtue of s. 87 of Act 11 of 1960. Subsequently the·
Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act 20 of 1964 wag passed but
u!lder s. 64 of the Act the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Rules,
1941 remained in operation.
The petitioner filed a petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution seeking a declaration that Gujarat Act 20 of
1964 \Vas illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative of Arts. 14,
19 and 31 of the Constitution of India and therefore null and void and
that the rules framed thereunder (being the Bombay Agricultural Produce
Market Rules, 1941) were also ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal, nun
and void.
He prayed for a writ of mandamus forbidding the State of
Gujarat from enforcing any of the provision9
of the
Act
and
the
Rules. The following grounds were urged in support of the petition : (1)
The powers conferred by ss. 5 and 6 of the Act were unfettered, wide
and unguided and on that account the fundamental rights of the petitioner
were infringed. (2) Retail sales which were not regulated by the provisions
of the 1>arlier Act were sought to bo regulated by Gujarat Act 20 of
1964.
(3) Retail trade was completely prohibited by the Act and the
prohibition amounted to an unreasonable restriction
upon
the
funda·
mental rights of the petitioner. ( 4) Section 30 of the Act gave wide powers
to evict a person carrying on business without a licence from the market
area.
(5) Section 27(2) not having provided the maximum licence fee
chargeable was illegal. ( 6) The market committee had no power to function as it was not constituted according to law.
The period of office of
the old committee which was to function for three years under Bombay
Act 22 of 1939 had expired in 1961 but the committee continued to function and no fresh elections were held.
(7) The rules pursuant to which
the market committee was constituted and functioned not ba\ing been
placed before the Legislature in the first meeting after the mies were
promulgated under Act 22 of 1939 as required by that Act, the mies
were unauthorised and so there was complete absence of machinery for
enforcement of 1he Act.
Despite the suspension Qf Art. 19 hy virtuo·
506
SUPRBMI! COURT
REPORTS
[1966) l S.C.R.
of the operation of Art. 358 .of the Constitution in the state of Emergency
A
declared by the President m December 1902, the Coun decided the
petition on merits because breach of fundamental rights under Arts. 14
and 31 was also alleged.
HELD: (i) The object of the Act being to ameliorate the condition of
agriculturists and to do away with middlemen, who, it is a matter of
..
common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the
transactions carried out through them, declaration under s. 5, of intention
B
to regulate trade in agricullural produce in a specified area, after hearing
the objecllons and sugges~ions of interested parties, cannot be regarded
a& imposing unreasonable restrictions oa the right to carry on trade. The
preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act clearly indicate that the
powers conferred upon the Director arc to be exercised for the purpose
of regulating buying and selling of agricultural produce and for that purpmo
to C3tablish markets for sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The
powers under s. 6 are also to be exercised after giving an opponunity to
C
persorts interested to raise objections or to make suggestions as to tlie
proposed introduction of control on sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The autborily conferred upon the Director is not wide and arbitrary
merly because no principles are indicated for guidance. (515 D-H]
(ii) If regulation of trade in agricultural produce by the declaration
of market area and imposition of restrictions may be regarded as rca.sonablo when opcratiog on the wholesale trade it would be difficult to hold
that the identical restriction when operating on retail trade may be pa u
Wlreasonable_ (5 I 6 Fl
Moliamnrad llussain Gulani /.{ohanJ11111d and Anr. v. StrJ:t' of Bihar ,~
,for., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 659, referred to.
(ili) Ap11n from the geoerality of the provkions made in the Gu;arat
Act and the omission of retail .salas from the schca1c of exclusion, the
Act nod the rules clearly indicate that retail sales arc not sought to be
regulated by the provisions of the Act. It was rightly conceded on behalf
of the State that the Act r""d together with the rules does not purport to
place any restriction upon relail transactions in agriculural produce. 'lllcrcfoce no ticcnco is required untler the Act for carrying oo retail trade in
Agricultural produce in the m:trkct area,
an~ there is no prohit>itioP
against the carrying on of retail sa1e in :igricultural produce jn the r.13r~a !
area. (518 C-D)
(iv) Section 30 of the Act authorhes the eviction frl)01 the m:!rket of
any person found to be operating in th!! market \vilhout holding a v:tlid
licence.
The po\ver of eviction by the market como:ii~tee .is limited to
eviction from the precincts of the market. 1 he prov1s1on 1s app:trc'ltly
enacted for the purpose of imposing an additionJI penally :i.~ainst infrac·
1ion of lhc prohibition contained in s: 6(2).
'Oi:iera!ing in. 1he 1:1.arkct
area· can in the context only rncan u-;1ng a plo:ce 1n the m:-in<~'. :'ltc:l for
the purchase or o;;ale of agricul!ural produce :.p7cificd in th~ .11otif.c-1!ion
under s. 6(2)
othcr,\·i..;~ :han in accordance \\1th the rHov1s1{l:'ls. <:·f
th"~
Act.
The apprehension of the petitioner that a oer'.->nn
infri~g:n-: th•:
regulatory provisions of the Act may be comp~ll1."d IP 11::1-.·e hi.i> t-carth
and h('lme at the instance of the m:irket authont1c ....
\\·;1" to~:11ly u:ifound·
ed. [518 H-519 CJ
(v) In terms s. 27(2) provides that the licences m.'Y be granted _in
such forms, for such periods, on such terms and cond1t1ons :ind resin~
tioM u may be prescribed or determined by the hye-laws and on payment
C'lf fees dct~rmine<l bv the market committee a·ithin such nra.titna as ninv
he prescribed..
This clearly contemplated fixation or maxima hy the rull~ ..
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JAN MOHAMMAD v. STATE (Shah, J.)
507
made Wider s. 59.
Therefore the suggestion that s. 27(2) not having
provided the maximum licence fee chargeable was illegal, could not be
accepted. (519 DI
(vi) The life of the market committee elected in 1958 was validly
extended from time to time by legal enactments or steps taken thereunder.
Finally by 'itrue of s. 64 of Act 20 of 1964 the market committee established under the earlier Act was deemed to be a market committee established under the new Act and members of the market committee boiding
office immediately before the commencement of the new Act continued to
hold office under the new Act. The contention that there was no legally
constituted market committee had therefore no force. [521 DJ
(vii) Section 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1959 docs not prescribe that
the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were piaced
before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on
which they are made under s. 26(1). Failure to place the rules before
the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules. Having
regard to the purposes for which it is made and in the context in wnich
it occurs, s. 26(5) cannot be regarded as mandatory.
The rules natl
been in operation since the year 1941 and by virtue of s. 64 of the Gujarat
Act 20 of 1964 they continued to remain in operation. (522 B-D]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 11 of 1964.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of fundamental rights .
Ahmedmiyen Miyasaheb Peerzada, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor General, N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. KE A char, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.
By this petition the petitioner seeks to restrain the
State of Gujarat from enforcing the Gujarat Agricultural Produce
F Markets Act 20 of 1964, on the plea that certain provisions of
the Act infringe the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to
the
petitioner under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act 22 of 1939
was enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay and rules
were framed thereunder. By a notification issued under the Act,
G the whole area within a radius of 12 miles of Ahmedabad City
was declared in respect of certain agricultural produce, a market
area for the purposes of that Act and a market yard and a market
proper were established for transactions in specified commodities.
A market committee was established under s. 5 of the Act for
the Ahmedabad market area. In 1959 'a locality known as the
H "Kalupur market" was declared a sub-market yard for the purposes of the Bombay Act, and traders carrying on business in the
Kalupur market yard were required by the market comnittee tc>
508
SUPREME
COUllT
REPORTS
[ 1966) I S.C.R.
take out licences authorising them to carry on their trade. Certain
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traders in agricultural produce file<! petition No. 129 of l 9S9 in
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging diverse
provisions of the Act and the rules and bye-laws fra!Md thereunder on the plea that those provisions placod unreasonable restrictions on their right to carry on trade in agricultural produce
and thereby infringed their fundamental right guaranteed under B
Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution. This Court by judgment dated
May 2, 1961 (Mohammad Hussain Gu/am Mohammad
and
another v. The State of Bombay and Anr)(') upheld the validity
of s. 4 (authorising declaration of market areas), s. 4A ( authorising declaration of principal and sub-market yards), s. S (authoc
rising the constitution of market committees), s. SAA (specifying
the duties of market committee), s. SA (authorising the market
committee to issue licences in accordance with rules to traders,
commission agents, brokers, weighmen, measurers,
surveyors,
warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market) of the
Bombay Act and further held that the fee authorised to be levied
D
by s. 11 was a levy charged for services rendered by the market
committee in connection with the enforcement of the various
provisions of the Act and therefore s. 11 was valid, that under
s. 29 the power given to the State Government to add to, or to
amend, or to cancel any of the items of the agricultural produce
specified in the Schedule in accordance with the local conditions
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prevailing in different parts of the State was intra vires, and that
r. 64 being a mere method for enforcing the regulatory provisions
with respect to market yards and sub-market yards was
also
valid. But the Court held that r. S3 insofar as it authorised the
market committee to fix the rates of fee to be collected on agricultural produce bought and sold in the market area, and rr. 65,
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66 and 67 insofar as they authorised the market committee to
grant a licence for doing business in any market were beyond the
powers conferred on the market committee by s. SA and were
ultra vires.
When the petition in Mohammad Hussain's case(') wa' filed.
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the town of Ahmedabad was part of the State of Bombay. Under
the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960 which became operative as from May 1, 1960 two States-Maharashtra and Gujarat
-were carved out of the territory of the former State of Bombay
and the town of Ahmedabad was included within the State of
Gujarat, but Bombay Act 22 of 1939 continued until it was
altered to remain applicable by s. 87 of Act 11 of 1960 to the
H
(I) (1962) 2 S. C.R. 6~9
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JAN MOHAMMAD V. STATE (Shah, J.)
509
A Gujarat region. After the decision of this Court in Mohammad
Hussain's case(') the Governor of Gujarat amended in certain
matters the Act, the rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder in
their application to the Gujarat State by Ordinance 1 of 1961.
The Ordinance was intended to rectify the defects pointed out by
this Court in Mohammad Hussain's case('). Four petitions were
B then filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of the Amending Ordinance and especially
the
notification which amended r. 53 (specifying the maxima of fees
to be charged) as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was
also contended that s. SA (authorising the grant of licences in
accordance with the rules to traders, commission agents, brokers,
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weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market area) which was amended was only
prospective and therefore the infirmity noticed in the earlier judgment of this Court still remained, and that the new section 29-B
which rectified the defect in the establishment of markets under
the Act was insufficient to validate what had been done before
D the Ordinance came into force. It was also contended that the
bye-law under which the market committee issued licences
to
dealers was disi;:riminatory and imposed unreasonable restrictions
on the fundamental right to carry on trade and business and was
therefore unlawful and that the market committee was not entitled
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to control retail trade as the same was not within the provisions of
the Act and in consequence the market committee was
using
r. 64 in a manner in which it was not intended to be used and
therefore that rule though it was upheld in the earlier judgment
had become ultra vires. This Court rejected all the contentions
raised by the petitioners.
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Thereafter Writ Petitions Nos. 71 of 1964 and 112 of 1964
were filed by three traders carrying on business at Baroda. The
petitioners claimed a declaration that the bye-laws framed by the
market committee were void in that they infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g)
and also Arts. 301 and 304 of the Constitution, and that in any
G event the bye-laws were ultra vires the Act and the Rules. Those
petitions were heard before this Court on November 9, 1964 and
after arguments were fully heard, the petitioners applied for
leave to withdraw the petitions.
Tn the meantime on September 25, 1964 the petitioner Jan
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Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban filed this petition for a
declaration that the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act
(I) [1962] 2 S. C. R. 659
510
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1966) l S.C.R.
20 of 1964 was "illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative
A
of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India and therefore
null and void," that the rules framed thereunder being the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1941 were "also ultra
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vires, unconstitutional, illegal, null and void," and for a writ of
mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus, direction or
order forbidding the State of Gujarat from enforcing any of the
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provisions of the Act and the Rules.
Numerous grounds were
set up in the petition, but counsel for the petitioner restricted his
arguments at the hearing to the following only :
( 1) that the powers conferred by ss. 5 & 6 of the
Act were unfettered, wide and unguided and on
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that account the fundamental
rights of the
petitioner were infringed;
( 2) that retail sales which were not regiilated hy
the provisions of the earlier Act were sought to
be regulated by the Gujarat Act 20 of 1964;
I>
(3) that retail trade was completely prohibited
by
the Act and the prohibition amount~d to an un·
reasonable
restriction upon the fundamental
rights of the petitioner;
( 4) that s. 30 of the Act gave wide powers to evict
a person carrying on business without a licence,
from the market area;
( 5) that s. 27 ( 2) not having provided the ma~i
mum licence fee chargeable was illegal;
( 6) that the market
committee had no power tc>
function as it was not constituted according to
law.
The period of office of the old committee
which was to function
for three years under
Bomb3y Act 22 of 1939 had expired in 1961,
but the committee continued to function and no
fresh elections were held; and
( 7) that the rules
pursuant to which the market
committee was constituted and functioned not
having been placed before the Legislature
in
the first meeting after the rules were promulgated under the Bombay Agricultural Produce
Markets Act, 1939, a~ required by that Act,
the rules were unauthorised and there was comG
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JAN MOHAMMAD V. STATE (Shah, J.)
plete absence of machinery for enforcement of
the Act.
SIL
Counsel submitted ltbiat the pet,itioner~s fundamental rights
under Arts. 14, 19 & 31 of the Constitution were infringed by
enactment of the Act and the promulgation of the Rules and byeB Jaws and the exercise of the authority by the State of Gujarat
and the market committee pursuant thereto. It may at once be
observed that the President of India
having declared
in the
month of December 1962 a state of emergency in exercise of the
powers reserved under the Constitution, the right to enforce the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution
C remains suspended by virtue of Art. 358 for the duration of the·
period of the emergency.
On this ground alone, a large majority
of the contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner may fail.
But we have heard full arguments on the petition and as the
petitioner has attempted to urge that by the Act and the Rules
and the Bye-laws the guaranteed freedoms under Arts. 14 & 31
D are also infringed, we propose to decide this petition on the
merits, apart from the preliminary objection as to the suspension
of Art. 19 which disentitles the petitioner during the subsistence·
of the emergency from obtaining any relief from this Court on
the footing of the breach of his fundamental right to carry on
business.
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We may usefully refer in the first instance to certain provisions of the Act which are material for the purpose of this petition. The Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law
relating to the regulation of buying and selling of agricultural
produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural proF duce in the State of Gujarat.
Section 2 defines various expressions in the Act.
"Agricultural produce" is defined as meaning
all produce, whether proceised or not, of agriculture, horticulture
and animal husbandry, specified in the Schedule, [cl. (i)] :
"licence" means a licence granted under s. 6, or, as the case may
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be a general or special licence granted under s. 27, [cl. (ix)] :
"market" means a market declared or deemed to be declared
under the Act, [cl. (xii)] : "market area" means any area declared
or deemed to be declared to be a market area under the Act, [cl.
(xiii)] : "market committee" means a market committee established or deemed to be established under the Act, [cl. (xiv)]: "market
proper" means any area declared or deemed to be declared to be·
a market proper under the Act, [(cl. xv)] : "principal market
yard" means an enclosure, building or locality declared or deemed to be declared to be a principal market yard under the Act,
512
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[J%GJ I S.C.R.
{cl. (xvii)]: "retail sale"' means a sale of any agricultural produce not exceeding such quantity as a market committee may by
bye-laws determine to be a retail sale in respect of such agricultural produce, [cl. (xviii)]: and "trader·· means any person, who
carries on the business of buying or selling of agricultural produce
or of processing agricultural produce for sale [cl. (xxiii)l.
Section 5 authorises the Director (appointed by the State Government) to declare his intention of regulating the purchase and sale
of such agricultural produce and in such area, as may be specified
therein.
Section 6 authorises the Director to declare an area
specified in the notification as market area. It provides that after
the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued under
s. 5 and after considering the objections and suggestions received
before its expiry and holding such inquiry as may be necessary, the
Director may, by notification in the Official Gazette declare the
area specified in the notification or any portion thereof to be
a market area for the purposes <if the Act in respect of all or any
of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the said notification.
By sub-s. (2) of s. 6 it is provided that notwithstanding
anythug contaned in any law for the time being in force, from
the date on which any area is declared to be a market area under
sub-s. (I ) . no place in the said area shall be used for the purchase
or sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification
except in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
By sul>-s.
(3) it is provided that nothing in sul>-s. (2) shall apply to the
purchase or sale of any such agricultural produce. if its producer
is himself the seller and the purchaser purchases it for his own
private consumption.
Section 7 provides that for ead1 market
area. there shall be a market which shall consist of--(i) one
principal market yard, (ii) sub-market yards. if any. and (iii) all
markets proper notified under sui>-ss. (2) & (3); by sub-s. (2)
the D;rcctor is authorised to declare anv enclosure. building or
localitv in any market area to be a principal market yard and
any other enclosure. building or locality to be a sub-market yard.
and a specified area as a market proper.
Scx:tion 8 prohibits
operations in the market area or any part thereof except under
and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted under
the Act.
Section 9 deals with the establishment and constitution
of market committee or committees.
Incorporation and constitution of market committees and their powers and duties :ire
dealt "ith by Ch. IV of the Act which consists of ss. 10 to 31.
By s. 26 it is provided that it shall be the duty of every market
committee to maintain and manage the market. to take all possible
steps to prevent adulteration and to promote grading and standarA
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JAN MOHAMMAD V. STATE (Shah, J.)
513
disation of the agricultural produce as may be prescribed,
to
provide such facilities in the market as the Director may from
time to time direct and to enforce in the market area the provisions of the Act, the rules, bye-laws and the conditions of licences
granted under the Act in connection with the purchase and sale
of the agricultural produce with which it is concerned. It shall
also be the duty of every market committee to collect and maintain such information relating to market intelligence as may be
prescribed and to supply the same to Government whenever so
required. Section 27 by the first sub-section provides that on the
establishment of a market, the market committee may, subject to
rules made in that behalf, grant or renew a general licence or a
special licence for the purpose of any specific transaction
or
transactions to a trader, general commission agent, broker, weighman, surveyor, warehouseman or any person to operate in the
market area or part thereof, or after recording its reasons therefor, refuse to grant or renew any such licence.
By sub-s. (2) it
is provided that licences may be granted under sub-s. ( 1) in such
forms, for such periods, on such terms and conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed or determined by the bye-laws and on
payment of fees determined by the market committee within such
maxima as may be prescribed. By sub-s. ( 3) power is conferred
upon the market committee to suspend or cancel a licence.
Section 28 authorises the market committee to levy from time to
time prescribed fee and to collect the same on the agricultural
produce bought or sold in the market area.
Chapter V deals
with the Market Committee Fund and State Agriculfural Produce
Market Fund.
Chapter VI prohibits the
collection of trade
allowances, other than allowances prescribed by rules or byeF laws made under the Act.
Chapter VII deals
with offences.
penalties, investigation and procedure for the trial of offences.
Chapter VIII deals with the control by the Direclor and the State
Government in the matter of administration of the Act and Ch. IX
deals with miscellaneous matters, including the power to frame
G
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rules and bye-laws.
The Act was, as is clear from its preamble
and this review of its provisions, enacted with a view to provide
satisfactory conditions for the growers of agricultural produce
and to sell their produce on equal terms and at reasonable prices .
The ordinary cultivator in our country suffers from many handicaps : he is generally illiterate, and often ignorant of the prevailing prices in the market of agricultural produce.
Establishment
of regulated markets is a well-known expedient for ameliorating
the condition of the agricultural producers by eliminating the
middlemen and bringing the consumers in direct contact with the
514
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(1966] I S.C.R.
producers and thereby securing an ordered plan of agricultural
development.
The Legislature has, by the Act, attempted, with
this object in view, to set up machinery for declaring certain areas
as markets and for setting up market yards in which the business
of selling and buying agriculturai produce may be carried on. The
Act provides for the constitution of market committees authorised
to maintain and manage the markets and to effectuate supervision, prevent adulteration and promote grading and standardisation of the agricultural produce and to enforce in the market
area the provisions of the Act and the bye-laws.
For that purpose the market committees arc authorised to grant licences and
levy fees within the maxima as may be prescribed by the rules
framed under the Act.
The scheme of the Act is substantially
A
8
the same as under the Bombay Act 22 of"! 9"39 which by s. 87 of
the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 continued to ;1pply to the
territory of Gujarat even after the territory was constituted into a
separate State.
Power to fran1e rules under s. 59 for generally
carrying out the provisions of the Act is conferred upon the State
D
Government by the Act, and until that power is
exercised by
virtue of s. 64, anything done or action taken (including any
appointment, order, notification,
rule,
bye-law made, licence
issued, or fee imposed) under the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 shall
be deemed to ha vc been done or taken, under the corresponding
provisions of the Act and shall continue in force until it is superseded by anything done or action taken under this Act. It appears
that till the date on v:hich this petition was filed and even thereafter no rules were framed in exercise of t.h.c powers conferred
under s. 59 by the State Government of Gujarat, and the rules
framed under Bombay Act 22 of 1939 continue to remain in
operation.
Even the market committees which had been formed
und~r the Act of l 919 continue to function and byc-la\\S framed
hy them hold the field.
This Court in :H.C.V.S. Ar111zachala Nadar ere. v. The State
of Madras and Ors( 1 ) was called uoon to deal with the validity of
F
the Madras Commercial Crops Market' Act
20 of 1933.
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that case certain traders had challcngcJ the validity of Madras
Act 20 of
1913 on the j!round that the provisions of the Act
imposed unreasonable restrictions upon their right to do busines;.
and the Court on an exhaustive review of the provisions of the
Act h.~ld that the provisions which imposed liability to take out a
licence for carrying on trade in "commercial crops", and the
JI
restrictions relating to the place where the business may be carried
(I) [19S9] Supp. l.S.C.R. 92
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JAN MOHAMMAD V. STATE (Shah, J.)
515
A on were reasonable and did not infringe the right guaranteed by
Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. In Mohammad Hussain's
case(') this Court held following the judgment in Arunachala
Nadar's case(') that the impugned provisions viz. ss. 4, 4A, 5,
5A and 5AA of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act 22
B
of 1939 were not unconstitutional.
It was pointed out by this
Court that the provisions impugned in that case were substantially
the same as were contained in Madras Act 20 of 1933 and therefore the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions could not
be regarded as unreasonable.
Section 5 of the Gujarat Act authorises the Director to declare
c his intention to regulate purchase and sale of agricultural produce
in a specified area after inviting objections or suggestions from
the local authorities functioning in the area, and from
other
persons.
By s. 6 of the Direct~r after considering the objections
amd suggestions received within the period specified in the notification is authorised to declare the area or part thereof a market
D area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds
of produce specified in the notification. The object of the
Act being to ameliorate the condition of agriculturists and to do
away with the middlemen, who, it is a matter of common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the transactions carried out through them, declaration of intention to reguE late trade in agricultural produce in a specified area, after hearing
the objections and suggestions of interested parties, cannot be
regarded as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right
to
carry on trade.
The argument that the authority conferred upon the Director
F is wide and arbitrary, because no principles are indicated for
guidance has no force.
The Director is appointed by the State
Government to exercise such powers and perform such functions
and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by or under the
Act, and the exercise of the powers and the performance of the
duties is for the purpose of regulating the purchase and sale of
G agricultural produce and ther.~by doing away with malpractices
in the trade. The preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act
clearly indicate that the powers conferred upon the Director are
to be exercised for the purpose of regulating buying and selling
of agricultural produce and for that purpose to establish markets
for sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The powers under
H s. 6 are to be exercised after giving an opportunity to persons
interested to raise objections or to make suggestions to the pro-
(2) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 92
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SUPREME
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[1966] I S.C.R.
posed introduction of control on sale and purchase of agricultural
A
produce.
It is only after the objections and suggestions
are
received and considered by the Director in the light of the object
and purpose of the Act, and he is satisfied that it is in the interest
of the producer and the general public that there should be
,
regulation of the trade in agricultural produce in the
specified
area that he may proceed to declare the m:irkct area.
ll
It was urged on behalf of the petitioner th:it in Mohammad
H11ssai11's case(') this Court had upheld the validity of provisions
in the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 analogous to ss. 5 & 6 of the
Gujarat Act only on the ground that by the Bombay Act retail
trade was not intended to be controlled, whereas under
the
Gujarat Act authority is given to control the retail trade also, aad
on that account the provisions of ss. 5 & 6 would be regarded as
infringing the fundamental right to carry on trade and business.
The question whether by the provisions of the Act and the rules
framed thereunder the L1!gislaturc has attempted to impose restrictions upon retail trade in agricultural produce will be presently considered when we deal with the second and the third contentions advanced by the petitioner.
But assuming that such a
power is conferred, we fail to appreciate how solely on that
account it can be said that the provisions of the Act infringe Art.
19 (I )(g) of the Constitution or may be regarded as conferring
an arbitrary authority.
Reasonable restrictions on the right of
a citizen to carry on tradc--rctail as well as wholesalo--may be
placed by legislation.
The test of the validity of the restrictions
lies in the nature of the restrictions and not in the nature of trad~.
!f regulation of trade in agricultural produce by the declaration
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of market area and imposition of restrictions may be regarded as
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reasonable when operating on the wholesale trade, it would be
difficult to hold that the identical restrictions when operating on
retail trade may be deemed unreasonable. We do not think that
the observations made by this Court in Mohammad ll11ssai11's
case(') justify the argument urged by the petitioner.
Challenge
to th:~ validity of ss. 5 & 6 must therefore fail.
It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that whereas retail
sales were not regulated by the provisions of the Bombay Act 22
of 1939, those sales were sought to be regulated by the Gujarat
Act, and as a result of the provisions enacted in that Act retail
trade was completely prohibited. It was urged that there was no
provision for licensing retail trade in agricultural produce, and in
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(!) {1962) 2 S.C.R. 659
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JAN MOHAMMAD v. STATE (Shah,/.)
517
A view of the prohibition contained in s. 6(2) an unreasonable
restriction was placed upon the right of the petitioner to carry on
retail trade in agricultural produce. Section 6 (2) expressly provides that no place in any market area shall be used for the purchase or sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and by
II
sub-s. (3) it is provided that nothing in sub-s. (2) shall apply to
the purchase or sale of any such agricultural produce, if its producer is himself its seller and the purchaser purchases it for his own
private consumption. It may appear at first sight that subject to the
reservation of transactions covered by sub-s. (3), all trade in agriculC tural produce in the market area is sought to be brought within the
regulatory provisions of the Act. The exception clause in s. 6 ( 3)
is somewhat more restricted than the exception clause ins. 4(2A)
of the Bombay Act 22 of 1939. Bys. 4(1) of the Bombay Act
the Commissioner was authorised to constitute a market area and
by sub-s. ( 2) it was provided that no place in such area shall, subD
ject to the provisions of s. SA, be nsed for the purchase or sale of
any agricultural produce specified in the notification issued thereunder.
Sub-section (2A) of s. 4 provided that nothing in subs. (2) shall apply to the purchase or sale of such agricultural
produce, if the producer of such produce is himself its seller and
the purchaser is a person who purchases such produce for his own
E
private use or if such agricultural produce is sold to such person
by way of a retail sale. There was an express provision made in
the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 which excluded from the operation of
sub-s. (2) sale of agricultural produce by way of retail sale. Under
the Gujarat Act no such exclusion is expressly prescribed. But,
apart from the generality of the provisions made in the Gujarat
F
Act and the omission of retail sales from the scheme of exclusion,
the Act and the rules clearly indicate that retail sales are not
sought to be regulated by the provisions of the Act. It may be
noticed that the State of Gujarat has not framed any new rules :
the rules framed under the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 remain in
operation by virtue of s. 64 and the rules framed under the Bombay
G
Act 22 of 1939 have been framed on the footing that no retail
sale is sought to be regulated thereby. Clause ( 4) of r. 53
excludes from the levy of fee sellers who are themselves producers
of the agricultural produce offered for sale and buyers who by
such produce for their own private and/ or household use. Rule
60 which deals with sales of agricultural produce and trading in
H
markets by the first clause provides that all agricultural produce
brought into the market shall pass through the principal market
yard or sub-market yards and shall not, subject to the provisions
518
SUPREME
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REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
·Of sub-rule (2) be sold at any place outside such yards. Sub-rule
(2) deals with processed agricutlural produce. By sub-rule (3)
it is provided that such details of all agricultural produce resold in
the market area shall also be reported to the market committee
in accordance with the provisions of the bye-Jaws.
Sub-rule ( 4)
enacts that the price of agricultural produce brought into the
market for sale shall be settled by open auction or by open agreement and not by secret signs and no deductions shalt be made from
the agreed price of the consignment except for any authorised
trade allow<mce.
The provisions with regard to infom1ation and
report to the market committee about the resale of the agricultural
cultural produce and the prohibition of sales othcrn ise than by
open auction or by open agreement clearly indicate that r. 60 does
not deal with retail sales. The learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat has conceded, and we think
that the concession is rightly made, that the Act read together with
the rules does not purport to place any restriction upon retail transactions in agricultural produce. TI1ercforc no licence is required
under the Act for carrying on retail trade in agricultural produce
in the nwrkct arc:i, and there is no prohibition again;t the carrying
on of retail sale in agricultural produce in the market area.
In this connection bye· law 35 (I )(a) of the Agricllltural Produce !\brket Committee. Ahmedabad also indicates that no retail
sales arc intended to be regulated. That bye-law states that there
will be two classes of Jicenccd traders 1·iz. '"A" class traders and
··1r clas' traders: those holding '"A" class traders' licence shall be
entitled to buy and/or sell agricultural produce in quantities not
below 10 lbs. in the market yard: those holding "B" class traders'
licence shall be entitled to purchase agricultural produce in quantities not he low I 0 lbs. in the market ) ard and to sell in retail to
consumers anywhere in the market area.
The "B" class traders'
licence is manifestly for purchasing agricultural produce.
It was then contended that s. 30 conferred power upon the
111arket con1n1ittl'e of .... u1n1nariiy cvil.'.ting fron1 the 11u1rket
any
pcrsnr.. if lie is found in the market area without holding a valid
licencL'. This. it was urged. made a large inroad upc111 tbe fundamental rioht ouaranteed to the citizens to move freely throughout
"
e
the territory of l nJia. and to reside and settle in any part of the
territory in India.
But s. 30 authorises the eviction from the
market any person found to be operating i~ t.hc market without
holding a valid licence. The power of ev1cl1on by the market
committee is limited to eviction from the precincts of the market.
The provision is apparently enacted for the purposl! of imposing an
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JAN MOHAMMAD v.