# JANGBIR v. MAHA YIR PRASAD GUPTA

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 670
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-09-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 768 of 1972
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jangbir-v-maha-yir-prasad-gupta-6939
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Sewnd Appeal-Disturbance of a concurrent finding of fact without considerinJ? the objects of the notifications or discussinf? any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for
a decision is patemly exceeding the jurisdiction of the Jligh Court-Cil'il Procedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100.
Interpretation of documents-Principles applicable to interpretation of docu_
111mts-Notif1cations Nos. F. 915/59-R&S published in gazette dated
17-1-60
11/s. 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notification-GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958)
liazetted on 21-4-62-Whether the whole of Mauza Clwwkri M11bart1kabad and
whole of Onkar Nagar and Leklwpura were meant to be notified.
Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad was included within the
limits
of Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by a notification dated 7th January, 1960. By
a notification dated 12th April 1962, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 was extended to the localities mentioned in the schedule to th·: notification dated 7th Ja,nuary 1960. The respondent landlord who purchas«l a housesituated in Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1 situated at vi!!qge Chowkri J\lubarakabad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar Nagar II, filed a suit for cjectment of the appellant/tenant of a room in the said house and for recovery of
rent. The trial court and the first appellate court held that the
juri5diction
of the civil court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
However
on second appeal, a single judge of the High Court disturbed the findings of
fact and reversed the judgments of the courts below. Dismissing the appeal by
special leave the Court,
HELD : (i) There cannot be any' doubt, that, in the instant case. by deciding
to set aside the concurrent findings of fact, ignoring the law laid down by this
Court, and, before that by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the High
Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 100 C.P.C. without considering
the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of
documents which could indicate that a point of Jaw had really arisen for decisioN. [673 D-F]
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanyamayya & Ors., AIR 1959
SC 57;
Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. 1962(2)
SCR 509; Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR 208;
Bhusawal Borough Municipality v. Amalgamated Electricity Co.
Ltd. &
Anr.
1964(5) SCR 905; Secy. of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam & Or.<., AIR
1934 PC 112; Anup Malito v. Mita Dusadh & Ors. AIR 1934 PC 5 and Naraya11rao· Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao Deshmukh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171;
applied
(ii) The well known principles of iμterpretation of documents nre : (a)
firstly, a document must be construed as a whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so
'construed as not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a p:itent
absurdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column appears to
have been
carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indication of what was otherwise
clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the contents of
such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadvertance, would not
matter on an application of the principle : "Falsa Demonstratio 11011 1zncPt."
[675 B-Cl
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JANGBIR v. MAHAVIR PD. GUPTA (Beg, 1.)
671
(iii) Unless interpretation of a document involvas the question of application
of a principle of law, mere inferences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact. [6H CJ
Nedunuri Kameswaramnw v. Sampati Suhha Rao, 1963 (2) SCR 208; explained.
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras,
1956 SCR 691; referred to
(iv) In the instant case, it is evident that the proviso does not require the ·
mention of anything more than the urban areas which is to be included or
excluded from the limits of the . Municipal Corporation. That

## Text

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670
JANGBIR
v.
MAHA YIR PRASAD GUPTA
September 22, 1976
[M. H. BEG AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
Sewnd Appeal-Disturbance of a concurrent finding of fact without considerinJ? the objects of the notifications or discussinf? any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for
a decision is patemly exceeding the jurisdiction of the Jligh Court-Cil'il Procedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100.
Interpretation of documents-Principles applicable to interpretation of docu_
111mts-Notif1cations Nos. F. 915/59-R&S published in gazette dated
17-1-60
11/s. 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notification-GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958)
liazetted on 21-4-62-Whether the whole of Mauza Clwwkri M11bart1kabad and
whole of Onkar Nagar and Leklwpura were meant to be notified.
Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad was included within the
limits
of Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by a notification dated 7th January, 1960. By
a notification dated 12th April 1962, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 was extended to the localities mentioned in the schedule to th·: notification dated 7th Ja,nuary 1960. The respondent landlord who purchas«l a housesituated in Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1 situated at vi!!qge Chowkri J\lubarakabad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar Nagar II, filed a suit for cjectment of the appellant/tenant of a room in the said house and for recovery of
rent. The trial court and the first appellate court held that the
juri5diction
of the civil court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
However
on second appeal, a single judge of the High Court disturbed the findings of
fact and reversed the judgments of the courts below. Dismissing the appeal by
special leave the Court,
HELD : (i) There cannot be any' doubt, that, in the instant case. by deciding
to set aside the concurrent findings of fact, ignoring the law laid down by this
Court, and, before that by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the High
Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 100 C.P.C. without considering
the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of
documents which could indicate that a point of Jaw had really arisen for decisioN. [673 D-F]
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanyamayya & Ors., AIR 1959
SC 57;
Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. 1962(2)
SCR 509; Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR 208;
Bhusawal Borough Municipality v. Amalgamated Electricity Co.
Ltd. &
Anr.
1964(5) SCR 905; Secy. of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam & Or.<., AIR
1934 PC 112; Anup Malito v. Mita Dusadh & Ors. AIR 1934 PC 5 and Naraya11rao· Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao Deshmukh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171;
applied
(ii) The well known principles of iμterpretation of documents nre : (a)
firstly, a document must be construed as a whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so
'construed as not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a p:itent
absurdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column appears to
have been
carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indication of what was otherwise
clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the contents of
such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadvertance, would not
matter on an application of the principle : "Falsa Demonstratio 11011 1zncPt."
[675 B-Cl
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JANGBIR v. MAHAVIR PD. GUPTA (Beg, 1.)
671
(iii) Unless interpretation of a document involvas the question of application
of a principle of law, mere inferences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact. [6H CJ
Nedunuri Kameswaramnw v. Sampati Suhha Rao, 1963 (2) SCR 208; explained.
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras,
1956 SCR 691; referred to
(iv) In the instant case, it is evident that the proviso does not require the ·
mention of anything more than the urban areas which is to be included or
excluded from the limits of the . Municipal Corporation. That area was sufficiently clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant, for the Revenue
Estate· or Mauza and for tlie colony or the village.
The whole of
Mauza
Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were
meant to be notified. The mere fact that the last column was not filled up in
such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra number lay did not
affect the question whether the a~ea to be included was sufficiently indicated
or not. The provisions of Section 1 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as well
as of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act refer
only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra nos. which are convenient divisions
for the purpose of indicating what lay within each area. [674 H, 675 A-ll, GH]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 768 of 1972.
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Jud!liment and Order dated
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24-8-71 of the Delhi High Court in RS.A. No. 137/67.
G. N. Dikshit and R. N. Diksht~, for the Appellant.
0. P. Malhotra, S. N. Mehta, Uma Datta, Sat Pal and M. Iyengar,
for the Respondent.
The Judgmellt of the Court was delivered by
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BEG, J.-Jangbir, appellant, is a tenant of a room in a house which
was purchased by the respondent Mahavir Prasad Gupta on 15th May,
1956, for Rs. 1930/- shown in his sale deed as situated in "Khasra
No. 203, Khewat No. 1, situated at Village Chowkri
Mubarkabad,
Delhi Province, within the abadi of Onkar Nagar-II".
The landlord
owner had filed a suit ~or the ejectment of the appellant and for reF
covery of rent which was dismissed by a Subordinate Judge of Delhi
on 26th May, 1966 on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') which provided the only modes of relief for
aggrieved landlords by proceeding under the Act.
The respondent landlord had alleged that the suit lay in the ordinary
Civil Court and that it was governed by the provisions of the Transfer
G
of Property Act inasmuch as the house, in which the appellant was the
tenant of a room, fell outside the area to which the Act was applicable.
The short question on which the case was decided was whether the
house of the respondent was situated in an area to which the Act had
been applied by a notification tinder Section 507(a)
of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act,
1957, dated 7th January, 1960. published in the Delhi Gazette on 17th January, 1960 read with the notiH
fication dated 12th April, 1962 under Section 1, sub. s. (2) of the Act.
published in the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962.
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672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
The operative part of the notification of the Delhi Administration
reads as follows :
"No. F. 9/5/59-R&S-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), the Corporation with
the previous approval of the Central Government
hereby .
declares that the following localities mentioned in the Schedule given below, hitherto forming part of the rural areas,
shall cease to be rural area".
Thereafter, was
given a
schedule and
then came the
heading
"Shahdara Zone".
The schedule has 5 columns.
The first is for the
"Serial No."
The second is for the name of the "Revenue estate",
which is translation of Mauza, said to be an area composed of several
villages.
The third column is for the name of the actual ·;i!lage or
colony of the Mauza. It is headed "Name of Colony Village proposed
to be included in the urban area". The fourth column is for what is
called the "square number". The last and the fifth column was headed :
"Khasra/Killa Nos.
covered by the Colony /Villages".
We are concerned here with serial No. 7 which has the entries indicated below
made under the appropriate number of each column :
"I. No. 7.
2. Chowkri Mubarakabad.
3. Onkar Nagar.
Lekhu Pura.
4. Square No. Not given.
5. Across "Onkar Nagar" are shown : "238, 242, 240, 234,
235, 236, 234, 231, 230 and 271"; and, across "Lekhu
Pura" are shown : "215 to 217, 211, 212, 199 to 203".
The notification published in the Gazette of India on 21st April,
1962, may be reproduced in toto. It reads :
"New Delhi, the 12th April, 1962.
G. S. R. No. 486-ln exercise of powers conferred by
the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), the Central Governmen.t
hereby extends all the provisions of the said Act :-
·
(a) to the areas which immediately before the 7th April,
1958, were included in the Notified Area Committee,
Najafgarh and the Notified Area Committee, Narela;
and
(b) to the localties mentioned in the schedule to the notification of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi No.
F-9/5/59-R&S, dated the
28th
December, 1959.
published in the Delhi Gazette Part IV, dated the 7th
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JANGBIR V. MAHAV!R PD. GUPTA (Beg, J.)
673
January, 1960, and which by virtue of tha! notification have formed part of the urban areas within the
limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
(No. 35/8/61-Delhi-I)
A. V. Venkatasubban, Deputy Secretary".
The Subordinate Judge, very rightly observed that there was no dispute between the parties that Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabi1;d was
included within the limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation by the notification dated 7th January, 1960.
He pointed out that there was no
indication of a sub-division of Khasra No. 203 showing that any part
of it was divided or separately numbered.
·
The disappointed plaintiff landlord was, however, not content with
so obviously correct a finding.
He appealed to the District Judge who
agreed entirely with the Trial Court and also recorded a· finding of fact
that Khasra No. 203, situated in the Mauza or Revenue Estate
of
·Chowkri Mubarakabad, was covered by the notifications. It seems to
us that no other inference was reasonably possible.
The plaintiff respondent seems, in a gambling spirit, to have decided
to try his luck by a second appeal to the High Court. What surprises
us is that a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, without considering
the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really
arisen for decision before him, decided to set aside the concurrent findA
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ings of fact, and, thereby, patently exceeded the jurisdiction of the High
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Court nnder Section 100 Civil Procedure Code. We need hardly say
that there cannot be any doubt that he did so. We are surprised that
the law laid down by this Court, and, before that, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should have been so comp1etely ignored.
By way of example we
m_ay refer to the following cases :
Deity
Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanyamayya & Ors.('); Sri Sinha Ramanuja
Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr.( 2); Nedunuri KamesF
waramma v. Sampdti Subba Rao(3); Bhusawal Borough Municipality
v. Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr.(4);
Secy. of State v.
Rameshwaram Devasthanam & Ors.( 5); Anup Mahto v. Mita Dusadh
& Ors.,(G) Sahebrao Narayanrao Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao
Deshmukh & Anr.(7)
It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the construction of a
G
document is always a question of law.
Reliance
was placed uoon ·
Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai v. The . Commissioner of
Income-tax,
Madras,( 8) and Nedunuri
Kameswaramma v. Sampati · Subba Rao
(Supra).
This Court has never laid down that inferences from contents of a documents
always raise
questions of law.
Indeed, in
(1) A.LR. 1959 S.C. 57.
(2) [1962] (2) S.C.R. 509.
H
(3) [1963] (2) S.C.R. 208.
(4) [1964] (5). S.C.R. 905.
(5) A.LR. 1934 PC. 112.
(6) A.LR. 1934 P.C. 5.
(7) A.LR. 1933 P.C. 171.
(8) [1956] S.C.R. 691.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 s.c.R.
Nedunuri Kaineshwaramma's case (supra), this Court observed (at
p. 215-216)
"A construction of documents (unless they are documents of title) produced by the parties to prove a question
of fact does not involve an issue of law, unless it can be shown
that the material evidence contained in them was misunderstood by the Court of fact.
The documents in this case,
which have been the subject of three separate considerations,
were the
Land Registers the
Amarkam, and
Bhooband
Accounts and the Adangal Registers, together with certain
documents derived from the Zamindari records.
None of
these documents can be correctly described as a document of
title, whatever its evidentiary value otherwise''.
We think that, unless interpretation of a document involves the
question of application of a principle of law .mere inferences from or
the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question
of fact.
We think that, if the learned Judge of the High Court had cared
to consider the provisions of law relating to the exten~ion of the Act
to urban areas.or to bear in mind the correct principles of construction
of documents, or, tried to appreciate the true nature of the case
before him, he could not have possibly interfered with the concurrent
findings of the two Courts below simply because the number of the
Khasra in which the house of respondent lay was not mentioned against
both the portions of Chowki Mubarakabad but wholly against Lekhu
Pura.
In so far as the assumption, from the entries in column 5 of
the notification, could be that th1~ whole of No. 203 fell in Lekhupura.
it was an obviously erroneous assumption.
A clerical error was ti'le
most that was indicated by such an entry.
But, even so, it left no
doubt that the whole Khasra No. 203 ·was duly notified.
"l. · (1) This Ad may be called the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958.
(2) It extends to the area included within the limits of the
New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment
Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as
are
specified in the
first
Schedule;
Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend this Act or any proYisiorr
thereof, to any other urban area included within the limits
of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or exclude any area
from the operation of this Act or any provision thereof".
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It is evident that the proviso does not require the mention of anythin o- more than the urban area which is to be included or excluded
fro; the limits of the Municipal Corporation. That area was sufficient-
)._
ly clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant for the Revenue
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JANGBIR V. MAHAVIR PD. GUPTA (Beg, J.)
675
Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the village. It is clear from
these that the whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole
of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to be notified. The mere
fact that the last column was not filled up by whoever drew up the
notification in such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra
number lay did not affect the question whether-the area to be included
was sufficiently indicated or not.
The well-known principles of interpretation applicable to such cases are : (a) Firstly, a document must
be construed as a whole.
(b) Secondly, it has to be so construed as
not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a patent absurdity.
(c) Thirdly, if any entry of a column appears to have been carelessly
made, so as not to give a correct indication of what was otherwise
clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the contents of such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadvertence, would not matter on an application of the principle : Falsa
Demo11stratio non nocet.
A deliberate intention to omit a part of a
Khasra number the whole of which is given in the notification of 7th
January, 1960, could not possibly be inferred.
When we look at Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957, we find the relevant part runs as follows :
"507. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act,-
( a) the Corporation with the previous approval of the
Central Government
may, by notification in the
Official
Gazette, declare that any portion of the rural areas shall cease
to be included therein and upon the issue of such notification
that portion shall be included in and form part of the urban
areas;
(b) the Corporation with the previous approval of the
Central Government may,
by notification in the
Official
Gazette,-
(i) exempt the rural areas or any portion thereof from
such of the provisions of this Act as it deems fit.
(ii) Levy. taxes, rate·s, fees and other charges in the rural
areas or any portion thereof at rates lower than those
at which such taxes, rates, fees and other charges are
levied in the urban areas or exempt such areas or
portion from any such _tax, rate, fee or other charge;"
Thus, we find the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the Act as well as
of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act
refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra Nos. which are
convenient divisions for the purposes of indicating what lay within each
area.
The Khasra is often spoken of as the "village map".
Khasra
for "abadi" areas even indicat~ the type of construction which may lie
within a particular number or the use to which a piece of land was
being put. The term "urban area" or "rural area" is used for much
larger units than Khasra Nos. It would, obviously, be quite impossible
to think of one particular number, within an "abadi" area, left out or
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676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977) 1 S.C.R.
dropped deliberately, without any rhyme or reason, from the notifications mentioned above. No conceivable reason has been suggesteJ for
such an omission. Indeed, there is not even an omission the effec;t of
which may have been helpful to the appellant. It was only a cq"se
where the whole number is shown against one village only instead of
being shown against two.
The learned High Court Judge, by basing his whole judgment on
a farfetched conjecture from supppsed omission of No. 203 in column
5, against Onkar Nagar, adopted a construction of the Notification,
if that is what the learned Judge was doing, which was quite un intelligible with reference to the facts of the case or purposes of such notifications.
The learned Judge would h_ave been well advised to rest
content with the obviously correct position that what the two Courts
below had done was to arrive at a pure finding of fact as to whether
a particular Khasra number containing the house in question was included within a Mauza to the whole of which the provisions of the Act
had been plainly extended. In view of all the facts of the case, no
other conclusion was reasonably possible.
Consequently, we allow this appeal, by special leave, with costs
throughout, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the
plaintiff's suit.
As no counsel appeared to hear the Judgment today's
costs are disallowed to both the parties.
S.R.
Appeal allowed.
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