# January 17 THE STATE OF BOMBAY v. R. S. NANJI

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 18
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1954
- **Bench:** S. R. Das, ACTING c. J, Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas, B. P. Sinha, Jafer !Mam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/january-17-the-state-of-bombay-v-r-s-nanji-1299
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Bombay' Land Requisition Act, 1948 (BomblJ.y Act XXXIII of
1948), s. 6 (1)-Reguisition of premises by Bombay Government for
housing an officer of State Road Transport Corporation-Whether for
a public purpose-1/xpression
1p'llblic purpose'-Meaninq of-Road
Transpo1't Corporation Act, 1950 (Parliament Act LXIV of 1950),
s. 19( 1)( c)-Corporation empowered to provide living aooommodation
for its employees-Premises requisitioned for Corporation-Whether
for a public purpose.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of s. 5 of
the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bom·
bay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises
specified therein, fore. public purpose, namely, for housing an otlicer
of the State Road Ti·ansport Corporation which is a public utility
service. On a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution
filed by the respondent the requisition order was set asiae by the
Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for
a public purpose and therefore oould not have been made unaer s. 5
of the Requisition Aot.
On appeal by apecial leave to the Supreme
Court.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the
requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had
been wrongly set aside by the High Court;
(2) the phra.se 'public purpose' includes a purpose, that is, an
object or aim, in which the gene1·al interest of the community, as
opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and
----"-
•
vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances
will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public
purpose has been established;
(3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees
suitable conditions of service including .............. . living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide s. 19(1)
(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950;
(4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read
as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in
the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the
requisition would have been for a public purpose;
(5) in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly rmd vitally
concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order
to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition
Act.
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary oj State for India in Counci! ((1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay v. Bhonji Munji
and Another ([1955) 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay v. Ali
Giilshan ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.

## Text

1S
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
getting them. cultivated through hired labour as conn 'h
P1'
4 templated in the definition of 'private lands'. We are
Sin~~ a":<I a=he• clearly of opinion that the mortgage deed conferred
v.
no authority on the mortgagees to admit tenants so
Musi .• of Munshi as to confer on them rights of occupancy.
Nath P,.asad
In the result, we must hold that the defendants of
and other.
· the .second party have failed to establish that they
Venkatarama
have any rights of occupancy over the suit lands, and
Ayyar 1.
that the plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to a decree
in ejectment, with future mesne profits as claimed in
the plaint. This appeal is allowed, the decree of the
lower court is set aside, a'nd that of the Subordinate
Judge of Monghyr restored as against 2nd party
defendants with costs throughout.
The suit as
agairist the first party defendants is dismissed, but
in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
1956
January 17
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
R. S. NANJI.
[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA AND JAFER !MAM JJ.)
Bombay' Land Requisition Act, 1948 (BomblJ.y Act XXXIII of
1948), s. 6 (1)-Reguisition of premises by Bombay Government for
housing an officer of State Road Transport Corporation-Whether for
a public purpose-1/xpression
1p'llblic purpose'-Meaninq of-Road
Transpo1't Corporation Act, 1950 (Parliament Act LXIV of 1950),
s. 19( 1)( c)-Corporation empowered to provide living aooommodation
for its employees-Premises requisitioned for Corporation-Whether
for a public purpose.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of s. 5 of
the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bom·
bay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises
specified therein, fore. public purpose, namely, for housing an otlicer
of the State Road Ti·ansport Corporation which is a public utility
service. On a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution
filed by the respondent the requisition order was set asiae by the
Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for
a public purpose and therefore oould not have been made unaer s. 5
of the Requisition Aot.
On appeal by apecial leave to the Supreme
Court.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the
requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had
been wrongly set aside by the High Court;
(2) the phra.se 'public purpose' includes a purpose, that is, an
object or aim, in which the gene1·al interest of the community, as
opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and
----"-
•
vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances
will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public
purpose has been established;
(3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees
suitable conditions of service including .............. . living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide s. 19(1)
(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950;
(4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read
as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in
the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the
requisition would have been for a public purpose;
(5) in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly rmd vitally
concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order
to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition
Act.
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary oj State for India in Counci! ((1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay v. Bhonji Munji
and Another ([1955) 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay v. Ali
Giilshan ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 235 of 1954.
On Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Order dated the 26th day of February 1953 of
the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 120 of 1952
arising out of the Order dated the 11th day of September, 1952 of the said High Court ·in its Ordinary
Original Jurisdiction in Misc. Application No. 216 of
1952.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( B. Sen
and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant.
Sri Narain Andley,J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder
Narain, for the respondent.
1956
The State of
Bomay
v.
R. S. Nanji
1956
The State of
Bombay
v.
R. S~ Nanji
20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956. January 17. The Judgment of the Court
was d-elivered by
IMAM J.-·By an order dated 12th May 1952, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order the Government of the State of Bombay requisitioned under
section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
(Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), hereinafter referred
to as the Requisition Act, the premises specified
therein. The impugned order, so far as it is relevant
to the present appeal, stated,
"Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub·section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII
of 1948) the Government of Bomhay is pleased to
requisition the said part of the building for a public
purpose, namely, for housing an Officer of the State
Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility
service".
The respondent filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High
Court and the application was heard by Tendolkar, J.
who set aside the impugned order. Against his decision the appellant appealed and a Division Bench of
the said Court affirmed the decision of Tendolkar, J.
The present appeal is by special leave against the
decision of the High Court.
The principal ground upon which the impugned
order was set aside was that the requisition was not
for a public purpose and therefore could not have
been validly made under section 5 of the Requisition
Act.
On behalf of the appellant, the Attorney-General
has urged that in the circumstances of the present
case, the requisition was for a public purpose and the
impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the
High Court. In support of his submission he relied
upon certain provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (LXIV of 1950), hereinafter referred
to as the Act, the decision of the Privy Council in the
case of Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for
India in Council(') and the decisions of this Court in
(1) [19H] L.B. ~2 I.A. 44.
•
S.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another(1)
and The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (Civil Appeal
No. 229 of 1953) decided on the 4th of October 1955(9).
On the other hand, Mr. Andley, on behalf of the respondent, contended that to requisition the premises
to house an employee of the State Road Transport
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, could not be regarded as a public purpose because that was a matter in which the general interest
of the community was not directly and yitally
concerned. He urged that although their Lordships
of the Privy Council rightly approved the observations of Batchelor, J. concerning the expression
'public purpose', they erred in their decision in
Hamabai's case. In any event, Hamabai's case could
be distinguished as in that case there was a scheme
for constructing houses for Government servants
generally and not procuring residential accommodation for one particular individual. The validity of
the impugned order was also questioned by him on
the ground that nothing had been established to
prove that by housing an officer of the Corporation
in the requisitioned premises the needs or the purposes
of the Corporation would be served or that it would
contribute to the efficiency of the officer concerned.
Before Tendolkar, J. two points had been raised (1)
that no enquiry, as required by section 5 of the Requisition Act, was held and (2) that the impugned
order was invalid as the requisition was not for a public
purpose. The former question was decided against
the respondent while the latter was decided in his
favour. In appeal, the first point does not appear to
have been put forward as there is no reference to it
in the judgments of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. In this Court the only point argued was
as to whether the requisition was for a public purpose
or not. Before proceeding to consider that question
it is necessary to make some reference to the purpose
for which the Corporation is established, its composition, the extent of control exercised by the State
Government over it and its activities.
(1) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 777.
(2) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 867.
1956
The Slate of .
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanji
lmamJ.
1956
The State of
Bombay
••
R. S. Nanji
ltnanl'J,
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
It was not disputed before us that the Corporation
is a public utility concern and is governed by the
provisio.ns of the Act. The purpose for which the
Corporation was created may be gathered from the
provisions of section 3 of the Act which enables a
State Government to establish a Road Transport
Corporation having regard to the advantages offered
to the public, trade and industry by the development
of road transport, the desirability of co-ordinating
any form of road transport with any other form of
transport and the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area
and of providing an efficient and economical system
of road transport service.
The Corporation consists of a Chairman and
members appointed by the State Government who
are removable by that authority.
Where capital is
subscribed by the issue of shares under section 23 of
the Act provision is made for the representation of
the share-holders in the Corporation and the manner
in which they are to be elected in accordance with
rules to be framed under the Act.
Its Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and its Chief Accounts
Officer are to be appointed by the State Government.
The other officers and servants are to be appointed
by the Corporation but the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay shall be determined by regulations made under the Act subject
to the provisions of section 34, which authorises the
State Government to issue directions and general
instructions to the Corporation and these instructions may include directions relating to the recruitment and conditions of service.
The Corporation is under the effective control of
the State Government. In addition to what has
already been mentioned when referring to the composition of the Corporation, the capital of the Corporation may be provided by the Central and State Governments in such proportion as is agreed between them.
When no such capital is provided, the Corporation
may raise capital, as is authorised by the State Government, by issue of shares. These shares are guaran-
>-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS
23
teed by that Governm:ent. The budget of the Corporation has to be submitted to the State Government
for approval and its accounts are to be audited by an
auditor appointed by that Government. The balance
of the net profits, after providing for various matters
mentioned in section 30 of the Act, is to be made
over to the State Government for the purpose of road
development. The Corporation can be superseded by
the State Government or that Government may, after
an enquiry under section 36, authorize a person by
notification in the official Gazette to take over the
Corporation and administer its affairs during the
period the notification is in force.
The activities of the Corporation are manifold in
pursuit of which there is a statutory duty to so exercise its powers as to provide, secure or promote the
provision of an efficient, adequate, economical and
properly co-ordinated system of road transport in
the State or part. of it and in any extended area (vide
section 18 of the Act). The powers of the Corporation are stated in section 19 of the Act. These powers,
although not exhaustive, cover a wide field.
Particular reference need be made only to some of them.
Section 19(1) provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corpo·
ration shall have power:-
(a) .................. ..
(b) .................. ..
(o) to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including fair wages, establishment
of provident fund, living accommodation, places for
rest and recreation and other amenities".
Section 19(2) exclgding the explanation to clause
(a) and some clauses with which we are not immediately concerned, states,
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the powers
conferred by sub-section (1) shall include power:-
(a) to manufacture, purchase, maintain and
repair rolling stock, vehicles, appliances, plant, equipment or any other thing required for the purpose of
any of the activities of the Corporation referred to in
sub-section (1).
1956
The State of
Bombay
v.
R. S. NaKji
lmamJ.
1956
The State oj
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanji
lmatnJ.
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
(b) to acquire and hold such property, both
movable and immovable, as the Corporation may
deem necessary for the purpose of any of the said
activities and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any
property held by it.
(d) to purchase by agreement or to take on
lease or under any form of tenancy any land and to
erect thereon such buildings as may be necessary for
the purpose of carrying on its undertaking."
Tf!.e provisions of the Act read as a whole lead us
to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the
impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public
purpose. Indeed the learned Judges of the High
Court were of this opinion and Mr. Andley did not
contend to the contrary. According to him, in this
case, the requisition was not for the Corporation but
for an employee of the Corporation and for his convenience which could not be a public purpose.
The expression 'public purpose' has been considered
in many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them
except the three cases cited by the Attorney-General.
In Hamabai's case(') the observation of Batchelor, J.
to the effect "General definitions are, I think, rather
to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I
make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the
phrase 'public purposes' in the lease; it is enough to
say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it
may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object
or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned" received the
approval of the Privy Council. Their Lordships, however, rejected the contention that there cannot be a
'public purpose' in taking land if that land when
taken is not in some way or other made -available to
the public at large. This contention had been raised
because the Government had resumed lands, which
had been the subject of a lease and a sanad, the
terms of which permitted the Government to resume
the lands for any public purpose, with a view to erect
(!) [\91!1) L.R. 42 I.A. 44.
-
I
!
'
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
thereon dwelling h<;mses for the use of Government
officials as their private residence on adequate rent.
The concluding portion of the judgment of the Privy
Council is important and needs to be quoted. It stated,
"But here, so far from holding them to be wrong, the
whole of the learned judges, who are thoroughly conversant with the conditions of Indian life, say that
they are 81).tisfied that the scheme is one which will
redound to public benefit by helping the Government
to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such
a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ,
and upon its own statement it commends itself to
their judgment". In Bhanji Munji' 8 case(1) the requisition was for housing a person having no housing
accommodation. After considering the affidavits, the
facts and the circumstances of the case, Bose, J.
observed "The Constitution authorizes requisition for
a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If, therefore, a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact homeless,
the purpose is fulfilled". In Ali Gulshan's case(s) the
requisition was for the purpose of housing a meniber
of the staff of a foreign Consulate. This Court held
that the requisition was for a State purpose, which
it is needless to say must be regarded as a public purpose. An examination of these and other cases leads
us to the conclusion that it is impossible to precisely
define the expression 'public purpose'. In each case
all the facts and circumstances will require to be
closely examined in order to determine whether a
'public purpose' has been established. Prima facie the
Government is the best judge as to whether 'public
purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but
it is not the sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter
whenever a question is raised whether a requisition
order is or is not for a 'public purpose'. The cases of
Hamabai, Bhanji Munji and Ali Gulshan are merely
illustrative. In each of them primarily the person
directly and vitally concerned would be the person
to whom the residential accommodation would be
(1) [1955] 1 S.O.R. 777.
4
(2) [1955] 2 S.O.R. 867.
1956
The State of
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanji
Imam].
1956
The State oJ
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanj;
Imam}.
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956J
allotted with which prima facie the general interest of
the community would not be directly concerned at all.
We must regard Hamabai's case as a decision to the
effect that the general interest of the community was
directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of
the Government servants because it would be to its
benefit to have such servants and, therefore, providing living accommodation for them was a public purpose. The decision in Bhanji Munji's case must be
read as one in which the general interest of the com·
munity was directly and vitally concerned with prevention of lawlessness and disease and to house the
homeless in order to avoid such a contingency was a
public purpose. In Ali Gulahan's case a State purpose was served because the State Government was
interested in its own trade or commerce and in the
efficient discharge of his duties by a foreign Consul
who would be concerned with such trade or commerce.
In the present case it is possible to construe the
impugned order as a requisition on behalf of the Corporation as it does not name any individual for
whom the requisition is being made. In other words
the requisitioned premises were at the disposal of the
Corporation to house one of its officers to be named
later on. Apart from that, there is a statutory power
in the Corporation under section 19(l)(c) of the Act
to provide living accommodation for its employees
and under section 14 the Corporation appoints such
number of its officers and servants as it considers
necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Corporation appoints only such officers as are needed for
the efficient discharge of its functions and that the
State Government was requested to requisition some
premises as living accommodation for one of them
whose posting at Bombay was necessary. Indeed the
affidavit of Mr. Nadkarni, Accommodation Officer of
the Government of Bombay, states that the official
of the Corporation has to perform his duties in Bombay. Having regard to the provisions of section 19(2)
(a) and (b) of the Act, the power in the Corporation
-
•
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
to provide living accommodation for its employees
must be regarded as one of its statutory activities
under section 19(1). The word 'acquire' may include
the power to purchase by agreement but is wide
enough to enable the Corporation to request the State
Government to acquire property under the Land
Acquisition Act (I of 1894) in order to provide living
accommodation for its employees.
The activities of
the Corporation under section 19(1) are so interlinked
with its successful functioning as a Road Transport
Corporation that requisitioning or acquisition of property to advance and ensure those activities must be
regarded as for a public purpose.
It would not be
sufficient to merely establish the Corporation.
It
has to have an adequate and efficient staff, living accommodation for whom would be an absolute need of
the Corporation.
Its officers have to be efficient in
the discharge of their duties, for upon them depends
the successful working of the road transport system
upon which the public must rely and thus it would be
directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of
the employees of the Corporation.
It was suggested
that a line must be drawn somewhere, otherwise there
was no guarantee to what lengths the powers of requisition might be exercised by the Government. It
is sufficient to say that each case would have to be
decided upon the facts and the circumstances appearing therein.
Here the Corporation is a public
utility concern and the general interest of the community is directly and vitally concerned with its
activities and its undertaking. A break down in the
organisation of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of the interest of the
community. Providing living accommodation for its
employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation
and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road
transport system and it must, therefore, be held that
the impugned order was validly passed under the
Requisition Act.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the decision
1956
The State of.
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanji
Imam].
1956
The State of
Bombay
v.
R. S. Nanji
lmam·J.
1956
January 20
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
of the High Court is set aside.
Costs in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by
the appellant to the respondent as directed by the
order granting Special Leave. Each party, however,
will bear his own costs in the High Court.
RAM CHANDRA PALA! AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS.
(S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA AND JAFER IMAM JJ.]
Fundamental Bights, Infringement of-Acts creating virtual
State monopoly in motor transport busine:s-Application of one Act
to certain groups of owners and another to certain others operating
different routes in different localities-If makes for discrimination
and inequality-If restricts rights to hold property and practise
trade and business-Notification terminating permits for taking over
transp01·t business, if confiscates property without cmnpensationFreedom of inter-state and intra-state trade, if a fundamental rightConstitution of India, hts. 14, 19(1)(!) and (g), 31(2), 301, 3050rissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947), s. 4-0rissa
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) A.ct, 1948 (Orissa Act I of 1949), s. 1.
The petitioners were owners of Stage Carriage Services holding
permits under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939.
The State Government of Orissa, in pursuance of its scheme of a Nationalised State
Transport as contemplated by the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation
of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act of 1947 (Orissa
Act XXXVI of 194 7) and Orissa Act I of 1949, which amended the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, issued notifications
under those Acts intimating the owners of different Stage Carriage
Services operating different routes within the districts of Orissa that
,..
with effect from the 1st ol January, 1955, either the Orissa Road
Transport Co. Ltd., or the State Transport Service, formed under
the two Acts 1 would exclusively operate the said routes. The owners
impugned the Acts as unconstitutional and violative of their fundamental rights. It was contended that the two Acts, whose provisions were materially different, discriminated against them and in
favour of the aforesaid transport services as also in their arbitrary
application to different zones and territories of the State and contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was lurther contended that
the provisions of the Acts and rules framed thereunder infringed
Arts- 19(1)(f) and (g) by putting restrictions on the rights to hold
property and to practise trade and business, that the Notifications