# JAYANTILAL AMRIT LAL SHODHAN v. F.N. RANA AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1964] 5 S.C.R. 294 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1963 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jayantilal-amrit-lal-shodhan-v-f-n-rana-and-others-2978 - **Pages:** 50 ## Headnote 1963 November 5 294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] JAYANTILAL AMRIT LAL SHODHAN v. F.N. RANA AND OTHERS (P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.) Constitution of India, Arts. 2S8(1), 13(1)-Notification by President entrusting functions to State Officer-If has force of law-"Save as expressly provided in the Constitution", interpretation of-Delegation of powers by State officer-" Enquiry and Report by Collector"-Nature of functions-Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (11 of 1960), ss. 2(1i), 87-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), ss. 4, SA, 6. The President of India issued on July 24, 1959, a notification under Art. 2S8(1) of the Constitution entrusting with the consent of the Government of Bombay to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay the functions of the Central Government under the Act in relation to the acquisition of land for the purpose" of the Union. By the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960, two new states were constituted and the Baroda division was allotted to the State of Gujarat. Purporting to exercise! he powers entrusted by the notification issned by the President on July 24, !9S9, the Commissioner of Baroda Division notified under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, the appellants' land as being needed for a public purpose, and authorised the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act. After considering the objections raised by the appellant to the proposed acquisition, the Special Land Acquisition Officer submitted his report to the Commissioner, "" who issued the declaration under s. 6(1) of the Act. The appellant thereupon moved the High Court of Gujarat under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ but his petition was dismissed. The case of the appellant was that (I) the President's notification under Art. 2S8(1) was ineffective after the partition since the con- {· sent of the Government of the newly formed State of Gujarat to the entrustment of functions to its officers bad not been obtained as required by Art. 2S8(1); (2) the proceeding under s. SA of the Act being quasi-judicial in character, authority to make a report thereunder could not be delegated by the Commissioner nor could be consider such a report when made. Held: (i) (per Gajendragadkar, Shah and Dayal JJ.) Article 258(1) of the Constitution in effect enables the President to do by notification what the Legislature could do by legislation, namely, to entrust functions relating to matters to which executive power of the Union extends to officers named in the notification. Such notification, therefore, amends the Act in respect of which it is made by substituting as it were the words of the notification therein. 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 295 So interpreted it cannot be said that the notification of the President 1963 had not the force of law within the meaning of s. 87 read with s. 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganization Act. Jayanti/al Amrit It cannot be assumed simply because the President is the execuLal Shodhan tive bead of the Union that the exercise by him of his power v. under Art. 258(1) has not the force of law. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735, relied on. Chanabasappa Shivappa v. Gurppadappa Murigappa, l.L.R. 1958 Mysore 48, approved. Article 258(1) empowers the President to entrust to the State only such executive functions as are vested in the Union and are exercisable by him on its behalf; it does not authorise him to entrust such powers as are expressly vested in the President by the Constitution and do not, therefore fall within the ambit of Art. 258(1). The executive power of the Union extends to all matters in respect of which Parliament has power to make law and in respect of matters to which the power of Parliament extends. The expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" in the proviso to Art. 73(1} is not susceptible of a limited interpretation. A ## Text _Characters 0–39,729 of 109,286. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39729 for what follows._ 1963 November 5 294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] JAYANTILAL AMRIT LAL SHODHAN v. F.N. RANA AND OTHERS (P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.) Constitution of India, Arts. 2S8(1), 13(1)-Notification by President entrusting functions to State Officer-If has force of law-"Save as expressly provided in the Constitution", interpretation of-Delegation of powers by State officer-" Enquiry and Report by Collector"-Nature of functions-Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (11 of 1960), ss. 2(1i), 87-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), ss. 4, SA, 6. The President of India issued on July 24, 1959, a notification under Art. 2S8(1) of the Constitution entrusting with the consent of the Government of Bombay to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay the functions of the Central Government under the Act in relation to the acquisition of land for the purpose" of the Union. By the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960, two new states were constituted and the Baroda division was allotted to the State of Gujarat. Purporting to exercise! he powers entrusted by the notification issned by the President on July 24, !9S9, the Commissioner of Baroda Division notified under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, the appellants' land as being needed for a public purpose, and authorised the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act. After considering the objections raised by the appellant to the proposed acquisition, the Special Land Acquisition Officer submitted his report to the Commissioner, "" who issued the declaration under s. 6(1) of the Act. The appellant thereupon moved the High Court of Gujarat under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ but his petition was dismissed. The case of the appellant was that (I) the President's notification under Art. 2S8(1) was ineffective after the partition since the con- {· sent of the Government of the newly formed State of Gujarat to the entrustment of functions to its officers bad not been obtained as required by Art. 2S8(1); (2) the proceeding under s. SA of the Act being quasi-judicial in character, authority to make a report thereunder could not be delegated by the Commissioner nor could be consider such a report when made. Held: (i) (per Gajendragadkar, Shah and Dayal JJ.) Article 258(1) of the Constitution in effect enables the President to do by notification what the Legislature could do by legislation, namely, to entrust functions relating to matters to which executive power of the Union extends to officers named in the notification. Such notification, therefore, amends the Act in respect of which it is made by substituting as it were the words of the notification therein. 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 295 So interpreted it cannot be said that the notification of the President 1963 had not the force of law within the meaning of s. 87 read with s. 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganization Act. Jayanti/al Amrit It cannot be assumed simply because the President is the execuLal Shodhan tive bead of the Union that the exercise by him of his power v. under Art. 258(1) has not the force of law. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735, relied on. Chanabasappa Shivappa v. Gurppadappa Murigappa, l.L.R. 1958 Mysore 48, approved. Article 258(1) empowers the President to entrust to the State only such executive functions as are vested in the Union and are exercisable by him on its behalf; it does not authorise him to entrust such powers as are expressly vested in the President by the Constitution and do not, therefore fall within the ambit of Art. 258(1). The executive power of the Union extends to all matters in respect of which Parliament has power to make law and in respect of matters to which the power of Parliament extends. The expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" in the proviso to Art. 73(1} is not susceptible of a limited interpretation. A constitutional provision authorising the Union to exercise its power over matters in respect of which the State Legislature has also power to make law, has operation not withstanding the limitation enacted in the proviso. It is well settled that functions which do not fall strictly within the field legislative or judicial, must fall in the residuary class executive and be regarded as such. (ii) The Indian Constitution does not make a rigid division of functions and although it is possible to characterise with precision that an agency of the State is executive, legislative or judicial, it cannot be said that a particular function exercised by any individual agency necessarily bears the character of the agency exercising the functions. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1955] 2 S.C.R. 225 and Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyamsundar, [1962) 2 S.C.R. 339, referred to. The enquiry made by the Collector is not a judicial or quasijudicial enquiry and the report made by the Collector under s. SA of the Land Acquisition Act is administrative. The Commissioner therefore in appointing the Additional Land Acquisition Officer as the Collector or acting on his report in pursuance of the functions entrusted to him by the notification acted within the authority conferred on him. Per Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ.-Article 258(1) interpretted in the light of the scheme and setting in which it appears and the language it uses, clearly indicates that in giving the President the F.N. Rana 1963 Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] power to entrust his functions, it is contemplating the entrustment of the executive functions of the Union only and no other. The 'functions' occurring in the Article, even if not expressly qu,alified by the word 'executive', must in the context mean functions of the same nature as the executive power of the Union. The words 'entrust functions' and 'with the consent of' indicate that in entrusting his functions the President is creating an agency which is more in consonance with carrying out the executive power of the Union. Article 258(1) is, therefore, capable of one meaning, viz., that it enables the President to entrust the State Government or its officers, with its consent, to carry out functions which appertain to the executive power of the Union vesting in him and no other kind of power. It delimits not merely the field which ordinarily must be List I of the Seventh Schedule but also the nature of the functions which must be executive. Amir Khan v. State, I.LR. [1962] 2 All. 310, disapproved. The basic concept of law is that it should consist of a body of rules which govern the conduct of persons forming the community in which it is enforced and which that community enforces throttgh necessary machinery. So judged, the notification issued by the President under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution has not the force oflaw within the meaning of ss. 2{d) and 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. It is merely an executive order with the authority of law behind. In order that the notification or order may have the force of law it has to contain a rule or body of rules regulating the conduct of a person or persons that can be enforced in a court of law, having been passed by a body authorised to do so. 'Authority of law' must be distinguished from 'the force of law' and every order that has the authority of law behind it would not be one having the force of law unless it complies with the basic concept of law. An order having the authority of law behind it may be recognised by cottrts but unless it prescribes a rule of conduct which a person or persons must obey there can be no question of its being enforced by a court oflaw or other authority. It is not correct to say that when the Government names the authority which will make the rules, its order has the force of law. In so naming the Government performs an executive function. The notification of the President under Art. 258(1) is an executive order which the courts must recognise and an order of the Commissioner of a Division in pursuance of it will have the same effect as the order of the Central Government. But it cannot be said that a notification of the President under Art. 258(1) effects an 'amendment of the law in connection with which the order is • • • 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 297 made. It was therefore, not correct to say that the definition of 1963 'appropriate Government' ins. 2(ee) of the Act was amended because of the notification in question. Jayantila/ Amrit The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. Lal Shodhan 735, distinguished. v. Madhubhai Amathalal Gandhi v. Union of India, [1961] 1 F.N. Rana S.C.R. 191, Public Prosecutor v. Illur Thippayya, I.LR. [1949]_ Mad. 371, King Emperor v. Abdul Hamil, (1923) I.LR. II Pat. 134 and Ramendrachandra Ray v. Emperor, (1931) I.LR. XVlll Cal. 1303, held inapplicable. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951] S.C.R. 682, considered. Chanabassapa Shivappa Tori v. Gurupadappa Murgeppa Hanji, I.LR. (1958] Mys. 48 and Haji K.K. Madu v. Food Inspector Kozhikode, I.LR. [1961] Kerala 639, doubted. The notification not being law was not saved under s. 87 and the Commissioner of Baroda Division, therefore, had no power to act under the notification in question since it had not the consent of the State of Gujarat and his notifications for acquisition of the property must be struck do-nn. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 14, 1962, of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 145of1961. G.S. Pathak, G. Dutta, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N.S. Bindra and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents. November 5, 1963. The Judgment of P.B . Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah and Raghubar Dayal JJ. was delivered by Shah J. The dissenting Opinion of K.N. Wanchoo and Subba Rao JJ. was delivered by Wanchoo J. SHAH J.-By notification published on September Shah J. 1, 1960 under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, the Commissioner, Baroda Division, State of Gujarat, exercising functions entrusted to him under a notification dated July 24, 1959, issued by the President, under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution, notified that a piece of land Part of Final Plot No. 686, Ellis 298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 Bridge Town Planning Scheme, belonging to the appe- . . llant was likely to be needed for a public purpose Jayantzlal Amrzt viz., construction of a Telephone Exchange Building Lal Shodhan in Ellis Bridge, Ahmedabad. v. Notice was thereafter served by the Additional F.N. Rana Special Land Acqui~ition Officer, Ahmedabad (who ShahJ. was appointed by the order of the Commissioner to perform the functions of a Collector), upon the appellant under s. SA of the Act inviting objections to the acquisition of the land. The appellant filed objections to the proposed acquisition. The Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer submitted his report to the Commissioner, who issued a notification dated January 11, 1961, under s. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, declaring that the land notified under the earlier notification was required for the public purpose specified in col. 4 of the schedule and that the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, was appointed under cl. (el of s. 3 to perform the functions of the Collector for all proceedings to be taken in respect of the land and to take order under s. 7 of the Act for acquisition of the land. The appellant then moved the High Court of Gujarat under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate write setting aside the notifications dated September 1, 1960, and January 11, 1961, and the proceedings under s. SA of the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, held in respect of the land of the appellant and the decision of the Commissioner, Baroda Division, and for a writ setting aside the notification dated January 19, 1961, under s. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and for interim relief. This petition was dismissed by the High Court. With certificate of fitness under Arts. 132(1) and 133 (l)(c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred. In this appeal counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions:-- (1) That the Commissioner had in the events that had happened no power to issue the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the ... ' 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 299 Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, purporting 1963 to act upon the notification issued by the - President on July 24, 1959, under Art. 258(1)Jayantilal Amrit of the Constitution entrusting the functions Lal Shodhan of the Union Government relating to acquisiv. tion of land to the Commissioners of Divisions F.N. Rana in the State of Bombay, because those functions {;Ould not be performed after the State of Bombay ceased to exist, and the State of Gujarat came into existence, and the consent of the Government of the latter State to the entrustment of functions to its officers had not been obtained; and (2) that the proceeding under s. SA of the Land Acquisition Act being quasi-judicial, authority to make a report under that section could not be delegated by the Commissioner, and that the report made by the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer could not in any event be considered by the Commissioner. It may be useful to set out certain statutory provisions in the context of the relevant constitutional set up. By the Constitution as amended by the Seventh Constitutional Amendment Act, 1956, legislative power in respect of acquisition and requisitioning of property is vested. under entry 42 in the Concurrent List in the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures. But by virtue of Art. 372, the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 relating to compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes continues to remain in force. The Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, authorises the appropriate Government by s. 4(1) to publish the preliminary notification that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, and upon the publication of such a notification the officers either generally or specially authorised by the appropriate Government in that behalf are clothed with authority, among other, to enter upon and survey the land and to do all acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for the purpose, to set out the boundaries by placing marks and cutting Shah J. 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 trenches etc. The expression "appropriate Govern- - ment" is defined by cl. (ee) ofs. 3 in relation to acquisiJayantilal Amrit tion of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Lal Shodhan Government, and in relation to acquisition of land v. for any other purposes, the State Government. Any F.N. Rana person interested in any land notified under s. 4(1) may within thirty days after the issue of the notificaShah J. tion object in writing to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. The Collector must give to the objector an opportu- · nity to be heard and after hearing such objection and making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, he has to submit the case to the appropriate Government with a report containing his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the report is made final by sub-s. (2) of s. SA. The expression "Collector" is defined in s. 3(c) as meaning the Ccllector of a district, and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the appropriate Government to perform the functions of a Collector under the Act. By s. 6 the appropriate Government is authorised to make a declaration, if the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report under s. 5A sub-s. (2) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose. The declaration so made is by sub-s. (3) of s. 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be. By s. 7 the appropriate Government or an officer appointed by the appropriate Government in that behalf, may direct the Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land declared to be needed and the Collector then causes public notice to be given informing the parties concerned that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. He then holds an inquiry into the nature of the interest of the person claiming compensation, and the objections to the measurement of the land to be acquired and to make an award setting out the true area of the land, the compen~ation which in his opinion should 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 301 be allowed for the land, and the apportionment 1963 of compensation among persons known or believed ~- . to be interested of whose claims he has information Jayanti/al Arnrit (ss. 9 & 11). It is clear from this brief resume that Lal Shodhan where land is acquired for the purposes of the Central v. Government, notification under ss. 4 and 6 may be F.N. Rana issued by the Central Government and inquiries Shah J. may be made under ss. 5A and 9 and compensation awarded by an Officer designated by the Act as the Collector, who in the case of acquisition for the purposes of the Union would normally be an officer specially • appointed in that behalf by that Government. + Jn exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 258 of the Constitution the President of India on July 24, 1959, issued a notification entrusting with the consent of the State Government of Bombay, to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay, the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, in relation to acquisi· tion of land for the purpose of the Union within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the said Commissioners subject to the same control by the Government of Bombay as is from time to time exercisable by that Government in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose of the State. At the date of the notification the territory which· now forms the State of Gujarat and in which the land in dispute is situate was part of the State of Bombay, but on May 1, 1960,--called the appointed day-as a result of the reorganisation of the State of Bombay under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, out of the territory of that State, two States were carved out-the State of Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat, and the territory covering the Baroda Division was allotted to the State of Gujarat. To ensure a smooth bifurcation of the State of Bombay, provisions relating to the continuance in office of the officers in the same posts which they occupied before the appointed day, and maintaining the territorial extent of laws were enacted. Section 82 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, enacted that every person who, imme- 302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 diately before the appointed day, is holding or dis- . . charging the duties of any post or office in connection Jayantilal Amrit with the affairs of the State of Bombay in any area Lal Shodhan which on that day falls within the State of Maharav. shtra or Gujarat shall, subject to an order by a comF.N. Rana petent authority, continue to hold the same post Shah J. or office in that State and shall be deemed, as from that day, to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Government of, or other appropriate authority in that State. By s. 87 provi>ion was made for maintaining the territorial extent of the laws even after the appointed day. It was enacted· that provisions of Part II (i.e. provisions relating to the reorganisation of Bombay State into two States) shall not be deemed to have effected. any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to the State of Bombay shall, untill otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day. By s. 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, the expression "law" includes any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye-law, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having, immediately before the appointed day, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the State of Bombay. The notification issued by the President of India on July 24, 1959, under Art. 258(1) in terms entrusted { certain functions under the Land Acquisition Act to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay and it was recited therein that the consent to such entrustment of the State Government of Bombay had been obtained. It is common ground that before the date of the notification issued by the Commissioner, Baroda Division, who was then functioning as an officer of the State of Gujarat, under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act no order expressly entrusting the functions of the Union Government under the Land Acquisition Act to any officer in the t, • , 5S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 303 State of Gujarat was issued by the President, and 1963 the authority of the Commissioner to notify for acqui- . . sition of the land of the appellant was sought to beJayantzlal Amnt derived solely from ss. 82 and 87 of the Bombay ReLal Shodhan organisation Act. v. F.N.Rana The appellant contended that the power exercisable by the President being executive in character, Shah J. the functions which may be entrusted to a State Government or to an officer of that State under Art. 258(1) are executive, and entrustment of such executive authority not being "law" within the meaning of s. 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, the Commissioners of the new State of Gujarat after May I, 1960, were incompetent, by virtue of the Presidential notification, to exercise the functions of the Union Government under the Land Acquisition Act. Support to this plea was sought to be derived from the division of Part XI of the Constitution into Ch. I containing Arts. 245 to 255 dealing with distribution of legislative powers and Ch. JI containing Arts. 256 to 261 dealing with "administrative relations between the States'', and it was submitted that Art. 258, occurring as it does in Cb. II of Part XI, must be deemed to deal with matters administrative or executive and not legislative. Founding the argument upon the title of Ch. II and the character of the two preceding Arts. 256 and 257 dealing with the exercise of the executive power of the State so as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament, and in a manner so as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union which extends to the giving to the State Governments directio?s as may be necessary for that purpose, it was claimed that Art. 258 deals with the entrustment of executive functions and that entrustment of executive functions by notification issued by the President cannot amount to law, within the meaning of s. 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. The plea about the placing of Art. 258 in Ch. II and the character of the two preceding Articles as indicative of the character of the powers conferred 304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 by Art. 258( 1) is not at all decisive: for cl. (2) of Art. -. - . 258, and cl. (3) of Art. 261, which occur in Ch. II, Jayantila/ Amrit deal with matters legislative and judicial. At this Lal Shodhan stage Art. 258 may be set out: v. "(1) Notwithstanding anything in this ConF.N. Rana stitution, the President may, with the consent Shah J. of the Government of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. (2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any State may, notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect to which the Legislature of the State has no power to make laws, confer powers and impose duties, or authorise the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the State or officers and authorities thereof. (3) Where by virtue of this article powers and duties have been conferred or imposed upon a State or officers or authorities thereof, there shall be paid by the Government of India to the State such sum as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India, in respect of any "extra costs of administration incurred by the State in connection with the exercise of those powers and duties." By the first clause, the Pre>ident is authorised to entrust with the consent of the State Government, to that Government or its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. Clause (2) deals with the exercise of legislative authority of Parliament in matters exclusively within its competence to confer powers and impose duties upon the State or officer> and authorities thereof. Clause (3) provides for payment of sums determined in the manner prescribed by the Union for the burden of extra costs incurred by the State < 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 305 in connection with the performance of duties and 1963 exercise of powers conferred or imposed by virtue ---' of Art. 258. · Jayantilal Amrit The High Court held that the entrustment of functions under Art. 258(1) did not fall within the executive power of the Union. Jn the view of the High Court functions which were not judicial or legislative would not necessarily be regarded as executive, and that certain functions which did not fall within the three recognised categories- legislative, judicial and executive, may be pla<:ed in the category of miscellaneous functions. But it is now well settled that functions which do not fall strictly within the fiel m dealmg with the question whether publi~hing printing and selling of text books for the use of student~ may be regarded as an executive function of the State (I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 225. I/SCI/64-20 Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana Shah J. 1963 Jayanti/a/ Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana Shah J. 306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] Government, Mukherjea C.J., speaking Court observed: for the "It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away." It cannot however be assumed that the legislative functions are exclusively performed by the Legislature, executive functions by the executive and judicial functions by the judiciary alone. The Constitution has not made an absolute or rigid division of functions between the three agencies of the State. To the executive, exercise of functions legislative or judicial are often entrusted. For instance power to frame rules, regulations and notifications which are essentially legislative in character is frequently entrnsted to the executive. Similarly judicial authority is also entrusted by legislation to the executive authority: Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyamsundar(l), In the performance of the executive functions, public authorities issue orders which are not far removed from legislation and make decisions affecting the personal and proprietary rights of individuals which are quasi-judicial in character. In addition to these quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative functions, the executive has also been empowered by statute to exercise functions which are legislative andjudicial in character, and in certain instances, powers are exercised which appear to partake at the same moment of legislative, executive and judicial characteristics. Jn the complexity of problems which modern governments have to face and the plethora of parliamentary business to which it inevitably leads, it becomes necessary that the executive should often exercise powers of subordinate legislation: Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 7, Art. 409. It is indeed possible to characterise with precision that an agency of the State is executive, legislative or judicial, but it cannot be predicated (!) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339. , 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 307 that a particular function exercised by any individual 1963 agency is necessarily of the character which the agency - bears. Jayanti/a/ Amrit Lal Shodhan But it is not necessary to dilate upon this matter v. in detail. For the purpose of this case it would F.N. Rana serve no useful purpose to decide whether under Art. 258(1) by a Presidential notification only executive Shah J. functions of the Central Government may be entrusted to the State or to an officer of the State. By the notification in question only "the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act I of l 894, in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union" have been entrusted to the Commissioners of Divisions. The power exercisable by the appropriate Government under s. 55 of the Land Acquisition Act to frame Rules under the Act has not been entrusted to the Commissioner. Whether such a function can be entrusted does not call for examination in this case. An argument advanced at the Bar which proceeded upon an erroneous premise about the field in which Art. 258(1) operates may however be noticed. That clause enables the President to entrust to the State the functions which are vested in the Union, and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union: it does not authorise the President to entrust to any other person or body the powers and functions with which he is by the express provisions of the Constitution as President invested. The power to promulgate Ordinances under Art. 123; to suspend the provisions of Arts. 268 to 279 during an emergency; to declare failure of the Constitutional machinery in States under Art. 356; to declare a financial emergency under Art. 360; to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of perwns appointed to posts and services in connection with the affairs of the Union under Art. 309-to enumerate a few out of the various powers-are not powers of the Union Government; these are powers vested in the President by the Constitution and are incapable of beirg delegated or entrusted to any other body or authority 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 under Art. 258(1 ). The plea that the very nature of these powers is such that they could not be intended Jayanti/a/ Amrit to be entrusted under Art. 2 58t l) to the State or Lal Shodhan officer of the State, and therefore that clause must v. have a limited content, proceeds upon an obvious F.N. Rana fallacy. Those powers cannot be delegated under Art. 258(1) because they are not the powers of the Shah J. Umon, and not because of their special character. There is a vast array of other powers exercisable by the President-to mention only a few-appointment of Judges : Arts. 124 & 217, appointment of Committees of Official Languages Act: Art. 344, appointment of Commissions to investigate conditions of backward classes: Art. 340, appointment of Special Officer for Scheduled Castes and Tribes: Art. 338, exercise of his pleasure to terminate employment: Art. 310, declaration that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give to a public servant sought to be dismissed an opportunity contemplated by Art. 311(2)-these are executive powers of the President and may not be delegated or entrusted to another body or officer because they do not fall within Art. 258. The question which must be considered is whether the notification issued by the President is law within the meaning of s. 87 read with s. 2ld) of the Bombay ~ Reorganisation Act, 11 of 1960. It is necessary in the first instance carefully to analyse the three stages of the con5titutional process leading to the ultimate exercise of function of the Union Government, by , the State or an officer of the State to whom the function is entrusted. The three stages are- (i) conferment of power upon the President as the bead of the. Union to exercise the functions of the Union; • (ii) entrustment of the function by the President to the State Government or an officer of the State .Government; liii) exercise of the function by the State or its officer, on behalf of the Union. - 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309 By Art. 258(1) the President as the head of the Union 1963 is competent to entrust functions in relation to any . matter to which the executive power of the Unionlayanrilal Amnt extends to any State Government, or officer of that Lal Shodhan Government. These are functions of the Union v. and not of the President. There is no doubt thdt the F.N. Rana investment of power or authority upon the President i> part of the Constitution and has necessarily the force of law. There is however controversy between the parties about the true character of the entrustment of the functions by the President. The character of the exerdse of the function so entrusted must depend upon the field in which it operates and its impact upon the citizens' rights. The President is authorised by Art. 258( I) to entrust functions with which the Union Government is invested, provided the functions are in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. By virtue of Art. 367, the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to the interpretation of the Constitution and s. (8) defines "Central Government" by cl. (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, as meaning the President and includes Ill relation to functions entrusted undef cl. (1) of Art. 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Governme~t acting within the scope of the authority given to 1t under that clause. By Art. 53 the executive power of the Union is vested in the President and is exercisable by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution and the e!'ecutive power .of the Union by Alt. 73 extends subject to the prov1s10ns of the Constitution: (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and (b) to th~ ~x~rc!se of such rights, authority and Junsd1ct10n as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreements: Shah J. 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-cl. . . (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in the ConstiJayantilal Amnt tution or in any law made by Parliament, extend Lal Shodhan in any State to matters with respect to which the v. Legislature of the State has also power to make laws. F.N. Rana Prima facie, the executive power of the Union extends ShahJ. to all matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws and in respect of matters to which the power of the Parliament extends. It was claimed that by the use of the expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" it was intended that unless a provision in the Constitution expressly enacts that the executive power of the Union shall, within the meaning of Art. 73(1) proviso, extend to a matter in respect of which the Legislature of a State has also power to make laws, that provision cannot exclude the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1 ). But the expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" is not susceptible of that limited interpretation. A provision in the Constitution conferring authority upon the Union to exercise its powers in matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws, operates notwithstanding the liffiltation enacted by the proviso. Article 298, which, inter alia, extends the power of the Union to the "acqui~ition" of property, is one such provision. Our attention has not been invited to any provision which makes an enactment of the nature suggested by counsel for the appellant excluding the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1 ). Articles 353, 360(3), 339(2), 256 and 257 on which reliance was pla~ed, merely enact provisions in the Constitution for giving directions to the State Governments in respect of certain specified matters or purpose,. The form in which these provisions are couched do not expressly provide that within .the field of their operation Art. 73(1) proviso will not apply. The language used, on the other hand, supports the view that power is conferred upon the Union to do certain things falling within the limits of the executive power, even though normally the power in respect of that matter may be exercised by the State Legislature - ' ' 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 311 by virtue of the legislative entry to which it relates. 1963 It is therefore open to the President, subject to the . ~ . proviso to cl. (I) of Art. 73, with the consent of the Jayantzlal Amrit State Government, to entrust executive power of the Lal Shodhan Union relating to acquisition of land either to the v. State or any officers of the State. F.N. Rana We are in this appeal not concerned to ascertain Shah J. whether the exercise of powers entrusted to the State or its officers has the force of law. We are directly concerned with the nature of the power exercised by the President under Art. 258(1) entrustmg functions to the State or its officers. The President is indisputably the executive head of the Union, but it cannot be assumed on that account that the exercise of power by him under Art. 258(1) cannot have the effect of law within the meaning of s. 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. By the notification dated July 24, 1959, issued by the President, power was entrusted to the Commis&ioner, Baroda Division, in respect of matters relating to acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By item 42, List III, the subject of acquisition of property falls within the Concurrent List and the Union Parliament has power to legislate in respect of acquisition of property for the purpose of the Union, and by virtue of Art. 73 (l)(a) the executive power of the Union extends to the acquisition of property for the Union. By Art. 298 of the Constitution ~he executive power of the .Union extends to the carrymg ~n of any tr.ade or busmess and to the acquisition, holdmg and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. The expression "acqui- ~ition, ~olding an.ct disposal of property" would, 111 our Judgment, mclude compulsory acquisition of property. That is a provision in the Constitution which within t~e meaning of the proviso to Art.