# JEEWANTt PANDEY v. KISHAN CHANDRA PANDEY - **Citation:** [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1003 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1981-10-20 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2754 of 1981 - **Bench:** A. P. Sen, A. V Aradarajan - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jeewantt-pandey-v-kishan-chandra-pandey-8255 - **Pages:** 7 ## Headnote Family Law-Jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain a petition for nullity of 111arriage under se::tlon 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Words and Phrases-:\feaning of the word "residence"-Section 19(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 clarified. The appellant is the wife, and the respondent is the husband. The parties originally belonged to village Bag:ya;i, Di'itrict Pithoragarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh. They fell in love and the appellant became cncients, as the respondent had access to her during the period of courtship. As her father was opposed to her marriage, the appellant was brought in a advance stage of pregnancy to Delhi and through the intervention of her uncle Basant Kumar their marriage was solemnised according toArya Samaj rites at New Delhi. A few days after the marriage, the respondent left the residence or Basant Kumar on the pretext of fetching his belongings from the residence of his uncle who also lives at Delhi and never returned. He served a notice on the appellant alleging that the marriage was a nullity as she got pregnant through son1eone else and that fraud was practised on him by her uncle and that he bad coerced to marry against his will. The appellant after denying the allegations filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Act in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Class-I, Delhi which was decreed in her favour and the said decree had become final. Later on, the respondent filed a petition under section 12 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Almora, alleging that the parties were residents of village Bagyan while in fact at all material times both resided at Delhi. A few days after, the appellant delivered a dead child at Delhi. Later on, by her written statement she challenged the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Almora to try the suit. The district Judge answered the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction against the appellant. The High Court, in appeal, by its judgment affirmed the order. Hence this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD; 1:1. In the context of clause (ii) of the sectio~ 19 of the Hindu B c D E F G M · A t 1955 the word "resides" must mean actual residence and not a arnagec,' Ir·· H legal or constructive residence; it certainly does n~t con~ote the P. ace o ong1n. In order to give jurisdiction on the ground of ures1dence' , something more than a mere temporary stay is required. It must be more or less of a ~permanent A B c D E F G H i004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 1 s.c.i\. character, and of such a nature that the court in which the respondent is sued, is his natural forun1. In the instant case, at the commencement of the proceedings both the parties admittedly resided at Delhi and, therefore, the District Judge, Almora did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. [1008 F-H, l009A] 1 :2 The word "iesidence" is a flexible one and has many shades of meaning but it must take its colour and content from the context in which it appears and cannot be read in isolation. It is capable of being understood in its ordinary sense of having one's own dwelling permanently, as well 'as in -Jts extended sense. In its ordinary sense "residence" is more or less of a permanent character. The expression "resides" means to make an abode for a considerable time; to dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time. It is the place where a person has a fixed home or abode. Where. there is such fixed home • or such abode at one place the person cannot be said to reside at any other place where he had gone on a casual or temporary visit, for example, for health or business or for a change. If a person lives with his wife and children in an established home, his legal and actual place of residence is the same. If a person has no established home and is compelled ta live in hotels, boarding houses or houses of others, his actual and ph)'sical habitation is the place where he actually or pe ## Text - ioo:l A JEEWANTt PANDEY v. KISHAN CHANDRA PANDEY October 20, 1981 (A. P. SEN AND A. V ARADARAJAN, JJ.J Family Law-Jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain a petition for nullity of 111arriage under se::tlon 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Words and Phrases-:\feaning of the word "residence"-Section 19(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 clarified. The appellant is the wife, and the respondent is the husband. The parties originally belonged to village Bag:ya;i, Di'itrict Pithoragarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh. They fell in love and the appellant became cncients, as the respondent had access to her during the period of courtship. As her father was opposed to her marriage, the appellant was brought in a advance stage of pregnancy to Delhi and through the intervention of her uncle Basant Kumar their marriage was solemnised according toArya Samaj rites at New Delhi. A few days after the marriage, the respondent left the residence or Basant Kumar on the pretext of fetching his belongings from the residence of his uncle who also lives at Delhi and never returned. He served a notice on the appellant alleging that the marriage was a nullity as she got pregnant through son1eone else and that fraud was practised on him by her uncle and that he bad coerced to marry against his will. The appellant after denying the allegations filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Act in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Class-I, Delhi which was decreed in her favour and the said decree had become final. Later on, the respondent filed a petition under section 12 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Almora, alleging that the parties were residents of village Bagyan while in fact at all material times both resided at Delhi. A few days after, the appellant delivered a dead child at Delhi. Later on, by her written statement she challenged the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Almora to try the suit. The district Judge answered the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction against the appellant. The High Court, in appeal, by its judgment affirmed the order. Hence this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD; 1:1. In the context of clause (ii) of the sectio~ 19 of the Hindu B c D E F G M · A t 1955 the word "resides" must mean actual residence and not a arnagec,' Ir·· H legal or constructive residence; it certainly does n~t con~ote the P. ace o ong1n. In order to give jurisdiction on the ground of ures1dence' , something more than a mere temporary stay is required. It must be more or less of a ~permanent A B c D E F G H i004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 1 s.c.i\. character, and of such a nature that the court in which the respondent is sued, is his natural forun1. In the instant case, at the commencement of the proceedings both the parties admittedly resided at Delhi and, therefore, the District Judge, Almora did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. [1008 F-H, l009A] 1 :2 The word "iesidence" is a flexible one and has many shades of meaning but it must take its colour and content from the context in which it appears and cannot be read in isolation. It is capable of being understood in its ordinary sense of having one's own dwelling permanently, as well 'as in -Jts extended sense. In its ordinary sense "residence" is more or less of a permanent character. The expression "resides" means to make an abode for a considerable time; to dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time. It is the place where a person has a fixed home or abode. Where. there is such fixed home • or such abode at one place the person cannot be said to reside at any other place where he had gone on a casual or temporary visit, for example, for health or business or for a change. If a person lives with his wife and children in an established home, his legal and actual place of residence is the same. If a person has no established home and is compelled ta live in hotels, boarding houses or houses of others, his actual and ph)'sical habitation is the place where he actually or personally resides. [1008 B-C, E·F] [The Court allowed the appeal and directed that the petition for nullity of marriage filed by the respondent under s. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955i be returned for presentation to the proper courti i.e., the court of the District Judge, Delhi.] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2754 of 1981. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th August, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1904 of 1978. M. K. Garg for the Appellant. K. K. Mahrotra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. The short point involved in this appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, is whether the Court of the District Judge, Almora had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for nullity of marriage filed by the respondent under s. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). To bring out the point, it is necessary to state a few facts. It appears that the parties originally belonged to village Bagyan, ... - - JEEWANTI PANDEY v. K.C. PANDEY (Sen, J.) 1005 District Pithoragarh, in the State of Uttar l'radesh. The appellant's case is that they fell in love and she became enceinte, as the respondent had access to her during the period of courtship. Her case is that she wanted to marry the respondent, but her father was opposed to the alliance as her elder brother and sister were unmarried. She was therefore brought in an advanced stage of pregnancy to Delhi and through the intervention of her uncle Basant Kumar, the marriage was solemnised on January 24, 1976 according to Arya Samaj rites dt the Arya Samaj Mandir, Hanuman Road, New Delhi. Three days after the marriage, i.e. on January 27, 1976, the respon- .. dent left the residence of Basant Kumar on the pretext that he had to fetch his belongings from the residence of his uncle Dharm Nand Pant who also lives at Delhi, and never returned. On February 6, 1976, he served a notice on the appellant alleging that the marriage was a nullity as she got pregnant through someone else, that fraud was practised on him by her uncle Basant Kumar and that he had been coerced to marry her against his will. On February 17, 1976 she sent a reply denying the allegations made therein. On March 2, 1976 she filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under s. 9 of the Act in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Class I, Delhi. A B c D It may here be stated that although the appellant is a resident of Delhi as she lives with her uncle Basant Kumar at Lajwanti Garden, and the respondent was also a resident of Delhi being employed, at all material times, as Radio-Technician in the Ministry E of Home Affairs, Rail Bhavan, New Delhi, he started the present proceedings not at Delhi but at Almora. On March 18, 1976 the respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage under s. 12 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Almora alleging that the parties were residents of village Bagyan, District Pithoragarh, i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the • Court of District Judge, Almora. On March 23, 1976 i.e. just after five days of the filing of the petition under s. 12 of the Act the ~ appellant delivered a dead child at Delhi. On February 25, 1977 the Subordinate Judge, Class I, Delhi decreed the appellant's suit for restitution of conjugal rights under s. 9 of the Act. In decreeing her claim for restitution of conjugal rights, the learned Subordinate Judge observed : "That to sum up, the evidence adduced by petitioner proves that the petitioner and respondent were )