# ' _,, JETHA BAI & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC v. ' SUNDERDAS RATHENAI, ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1988] 2 S.C.R. 871
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1988-02-04
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jetha-bai-sons-jew-town-cochin-etc-etc-v-sunderdas-rathenai-etc-etc-9874
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

' _,,
JETHA BAI & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC.
A
v.
. '
SUNDERDAS RATHENAI, ETC. ETC .
FEBRUARY 4, 1988
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, S. NATARAJAN AND
B
~
S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]
Whether against an order of a District Court in Revision under
section 20 of the Kera/a Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965,
a further Revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure-Determination of-Landlord-Tenant dispute-In c
r
the matter of.
These appeals together with a petition for special leave raised a
common question of law-whether against an order of a District Court
in revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent)
Control Act 2 of 1965, a further revision would lie to' the High Court
D
.
~
under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question
was not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal
Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133-A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 203,
the matters were listed for consideration, by a Bench of three Judges, of
the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict
.y
between the views taken in Aundal Ammal's case above-said and a later
E
decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt &
Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663, and whether the view taken in the earlier case
required reconsideration. Aundal Ammal's case arose under the Kerala
Act afore-mentioned, and the Shyamaraju Hegde's case was under the
•
karnataka Rent Control Act, and there were essential differences bet·
ween the two Acts.
F
'
""
The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section 18(5) of tbe
. Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of the Kerala High
Court in Vareed v. Mary, A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 103, which held that a
decision of a District Court under section 20 of the Kerala Act was
, '
undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court G
under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question decided
.\
by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above-mentioned, came
to be considered by this Court (a Bench of two Hon. Judges) in Aundal
Ammal's case (supra), and the Court held that the ratio laid down by
the Kerala High Court in Vareed's case (supra) could not be approved
because the High Court had not properly construed the sections 18(5)
H
871
A
B
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11988] 2 S.C.R.
and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error.
So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned, this Court held in
Shyamaraju Hegde's case (supra) that an order of a District Judge
under section 50(2), though it conferred finality under the Act, was
nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by revision umler
section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
What fell for consideration in the present cases was whether there ~
was any conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal's case (snpra)
and Shyamaraju Hegde's case (supra) and whether the ratio in the
former case required reconsideration.
c
Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special Leave, the
Court,
HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji & S. Natarajan, JJ.
D
After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail,
the Court conclnded that there was really no conflict between the two
decisions of this Conrt in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and
Shyamaraju Hegde's case (snpra), because the provisions in the two
Acts were materially different. As to the question whether a fresh think·
ing was called for on the scope of section 20 read with section 18(5) of
E the Kerala Act, the Court did not find any grounds for reconsidering
the view taken in the Aundal Ammal's case; on the contrary, the
renewed discussion by the Court of the matter called for a reiteration of
the view expressed in Aundal Ammal's case. l889C·Dl
The Court was unable to countenance in the circumstances of the
F case, the argument advanced that since the decision of the Kerala High
Court in Vareed v. Mary aforementioned had been a good law for a
number of years in the Kerala State and since

## Text

_Characters 0–39,875 of 61,380. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39875 for what follows._

' _,,
JETHA BAI & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC.
A
v.
. '
SUNDERDAS RATHENAI, ETC. ETC .
FEBRUARY 4, 1988
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, S. NATARAJAN AND
B
~
S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]
Whether against an order of a District Court in Revision under
section 20 of the Kera/a Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965,
a further Revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure-Determination of-Landlord-Tenant dispute-In c
r
the matter of.
These appeals together with a petition for special leave raised a
common question of law-whether against an order of a District Court
in revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent)
Control Act 2 of 1965, a further revision would lie to' the High Court
D
.
~
under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question
was not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal
Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133-A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 203,
the matters were listed for consideration, by a Bench of three Judges, of
the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict
.y
between the views taken in Aundal Ammal's case above-said and a later
E
decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt &
Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663, and whether the view taken in the earlier case
required reconsideration. Aundal Ammal's case arose under the Kerala
Act afore-mentioned, and the Shyamaraju Hegde's case was under the
•
karnataka Rent Control Act, and there were essential differences bet·
ween the two Acts.
F
'
""
The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section 18(5) of tbe
. Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of the Kerala High
Court in Vareed v. Mary, A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 103, which held that a
decision of a District Court under section 20 of the Kerala Act was
, '
undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court G
under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question decided
.\
by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above-mentioned, came
to be considered by this Court (a Bench of two Hon. Judges) in Aundal
Ammal's case (supra), and the Court held that the ratio laid down by
the Kerala High Court in Vareed's case (supra) could not be approved
because the High Court had not properly construed the sections 18(5)
H
871
A
B
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11988] 2 S.C.R.
and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error.
So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned, this Court held in
Shyamaraju Hegde's case (supra) that an order of a District Judge
under section 50(2), though it conferred finality under the Act, was
nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by revision umler
section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
What fell for consideration in the present cases was whether there ~
was any conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal's case (snpra)
and Shyamaraju Hegde's case (supra) and whether the ratio in the
former case required reconsideration.
c
Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special Leave, the
Court,
HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji & S. Natarajan, JJ.
D
After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail,
the Court conclnded that there was really no conflict between the two
decisions of this Conrt in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and
Shyamaraju Hegde's case (snpra), because the provisions in the two
Acts were materially different. As to the question whether a fresh think·
ing was called for on the scope of section 20 read with section 18(5) of
E the Kerala Act, the Court did not find any grounds for reconsidering
the view taken in the Aundal Ammal's case; on the contrary, the
renewed discussion by the Court of the matter called for a reiteration of
the view expressed in Aundal Ammal's case. l889C·Dl
The Court was unable to countenance in the circumstances of the
F case, the argument advanced that since the decision of the Kerala High
Court in Vareed v. Mary aforementioned had been a good law for a
number of years in the Kerala State and since the High Court had been
entertaining revision petitions under section t15 C.P.C. against the
revisional orders of the District Courts under sections 20( 1) of the
Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to stand even though
G the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this
Court, and the reason therefore, the Court observed, could be set out
by referring to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted
therein, in West Ham Union v. Edmonten Union, 13 1908 AC l at 4;
Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. v. Hongton V. Chester i.e. Street
Assessment Committee, 12 1937 2 All ER 298, affirmed in 1938 (2) All
H E.R. 79. These decisions had been followed in Brownsee Haven Proper·
~. .
JETIIA BAI v. SUNDERDAS
873
-1
ties Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, [1958] 1 All ER, 205. On similar lines,
A
this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed v. Mary
(supra), as the decision suffered from miscontruction of the relevant
sections in the Act, and the weakness in the reasoning bec01me manifest
in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh
Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32 = 1980 2 SCC 378 = AIR
B
1980 SC 892. [889E-F; 890A-C]
,
In the light of the conclusion of the Court, all the appeals
succeeded in· so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to
entertain revision petitions under section 115, C.P.C., was concerned.
In Civil Appeals Nos. 626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, the High Court
allowed the revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C., and ordered c
t
the eviction of the tenants. In Civil Appeal No. 2079of1981, the District
Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the
order of eviction. In the Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986, the District
Judge allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by
the Rent Controller and the High Court confirmed the said order in
D
revisions. In the Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983, the District Judge
~
reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellant Authority and ordered eviction and the High Court confirmed the order of the
District Judge. In the petition for special leave listed with the appeals,
the Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction
'(
under section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Controller for deciding the question whether the tenant was entitled to resist
E
the claim for eviction. The District Court and the High Court confirmed
the order of remand. [890D-G I
•
In accordance with the pronouncement of the Court, the order
of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., in each of the appeals
F
above-mentioned was set aside and the revisional order of the District
-~
Judge in each case, restored to become operative. The appeals were
directed only against the orders of the High Court passed in revision,
and they were disposed of with the pronouncement of the Court on the
above lines. [890G-H; 891A]
'
In the petition for special leave also, the order of the High Court G
under section 115 C.P.C., was not sustainable, but even so, the Court
~-
did not find any merit in the petition, because the finding of the
Appellate Authority and the order of remand passed by it had been
confirmed by the District Court 'and as such, there were no merits in
the petition. [891B]
H
874
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] 2 S.C.R.
A
Per S. Ranganathan, J. (dissenting)
While a number of enactments of various States on rent control
confer specific jurisdiction on the State High Courts, some others are
broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments.
Though the Court was concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka
B enactments in these matters, a similar question might well arise under
th~ corresponding enactments of some other States as well. [89IC-D]
The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders. The question in these
matters was whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section
C
l lS C.P.C., could be invoked to seek a further revision ofthe revisional
order passed by the District Judge. This question was answered in the
negative in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 SCC 133 (a
decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju
Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987] 3 J.T. 663 (a decision under the
Karnataka Act), and hence this reference to a larger Bench. [89IE-F]
D
Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of
the C.P .C. against any order of the District Judge/Court. The fact that
the order might have been passed under a special statute or that the
statute contained expressions purporting to confer finality on the order
of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court, had
E been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This was the effect
of the decisions in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore,
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 871 and Krishandas Bhatija v. Venkatachala Shetty,
S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju's case
(supra), which were direct decisions under the Karnataka Act. In the
opinion of his Lordship, there was no vital or material difference betp
ween the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should
follow under the Kerala Act also. (891G-H; 892A-B]
Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendments in 1975, the rent
control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District
Munsiff or the Civil JudgejRent Controller. There is no provision for
O an appeal from this order but there is one for revision. This revisional
power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the
District Court. The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the
Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District
Munsiff. Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the District
Judge under this provision is final. The Kerala pattern is the same
It except that section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller
' .
i
'!"--.
y
):' _
' _,
t \
,
,. >.-,
t
" .,
,y
y
~
. ~\.
t
k
JETHA BAI v. SUNDERDAS
875
to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a
A
superior rank. Section 20 provides for revision. The revisional power is
to be exercised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the
subordinate Judge, and·the High Court, in other cases. Section 20 does
not provide, as does section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision
of the District Judge would be final. The much wider and more em·
phatic langiiage of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction
B
of the High Court under s. 115 of the C.P.C., as had been held in the
two cases referred to above, and it was difficult to see the justification
for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. l892C·Hl
This led to the question of a choice between the two views of this
Court---0ne in Shyamaraju and the other, in Aundal Ammal. Shyama- c
raju followed the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal v. The
Municipal Corporation, lndore, AIR 1977 SC 1955 and Krishnadas
Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978,
decided on February 13, 1978. The only other decision of this Court,
having relevance in the present context, was Vishesh l(umar v. Shanti
Prasad, I 1980 I 3 SCR 32, relied upon in Aundal Ammal. His Lordship
D
was in agreement with the view in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was
rendered in a totally statutory context. That decision turned largely .on
legislative history of s. ll5 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial
Small Causes Courts Act, in their application to the State of Uttar
Pradesh. His Lordship was, therefore, inclined to lean in favour of the
view that had commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of
E
the Karnataka Act, and to hold that the High Court had a power of
revision over the order of the District Judge under the Kerala Act as
well. The result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely
exclude the High Court in the Renf Control matters, and, this, as the
two Acts were in pari materia according to his Lordship's view, would
leave the litigant in Karnataka only a right of revision to the District
F
Court. It was doubtful whether, in the absence of clear language, the
Legislature could be held to have intended to completely exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important Branch of law. The
provisions did not and could not, in his Lordship's view, preclude the
applicability of s. 115 of the C.P .C. to an order passed by the District
Court, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land.
G
Section 18 and 20 had a vital role to pay but their effect was not to
eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section
115. [893A-F;894B·C)
As a result of the various decisions of the Courts, the position had
been that right through in the State of Karnataka and for at least a
H
876
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] 2 S.C.R.
A
~ •
period of 20 years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view had been in
,.-
favour of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court. In
a matter of procedure, such a long standing practice should not be
,
B
disturbed unless the statutory indication was quite clear to the
contrary. [894F]
The revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable. [894G]
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [19871 l S.C.C. 133;
Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt & Ors., [198713 J.T. 663;
Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [19841 K.L.T. 845; Vareed v.
Mary, AIR 1969 103; Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [19801 2 SCR
C 32; Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar &
Ors., ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585; Chhaganlal v. The Municipal
Corporation, lndore, AIR 1977 SC 1555; Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S.
Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February
13, 1978; M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant & Ors., AIR 1987 Karnataka 186;
0
S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1954 S.C. 497; West Ham Union v.
Domonton Union, 13 1908 A.C. l at 4; Robinson Brothers (Brewers)
Ltd. v. Honghton & Chester_ie....Street Assessment Committee, 12 1937
2 All E.R. 298 and 1938 2 All E.R. 79 and Brownsee Haven Properties
Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, [195811 All ER, 205 referred to.
E
CIVIL APPELLA1E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 626
of 1981 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1980 of the Kerala
High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2939 of 1978.
F
P.S. Poti, G. Viswanatha Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, E.M.S. Anam. R. Sathish, M.A. Firoz, N. Sudhakar,
Miss Nalini Poduval and S. Balakrishnan for the appearing parties.
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:
y.
G
NATARAJAN, J. These appeals by special leave and the special
leave petition have been clubbed together and listed for consideration
'
1
of a common question of law involved in them, viz. whether against an
order of a District Court in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala
i
Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965 (for short the Kerala
Act), a further revision would lie to the High Court under Section 115
H of the Code of Civil Procedure.
\
}---·
t
JETIIA BAI v. SUNDERDAS [NATARAJA-1\1, J.]
'i'f77
Though the question is not res integra in view of the decision of
this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987) 1 SCC 133:
AIR 1987 SC 203, the appeals have been listed for consideration by a
Bencl• of three Judges of the very same question in order to see
whether there is any conflict between the views taken in Aundal
Ammal's case (supra) and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju
Hedge v. G. Venkatesha Bhat & Ors., [1987) 3 J.T. 663 and whether
the view taken in the earlier case requires reconsideration.
Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be mentioned that
Aundal Ammal's case arose under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju
Hedge's case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act.
Since there are essential differences between the two Acts, it is neces,
sary to set out the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act came to be
rendered by this Court.
A
B
c
As per section 20(5) of the Kerala Act "a Rent Control Court"
.means a Court constituted under Section 3. Under Section 3(1) "the
D
Government may, by Notification in the Gazette appoint a person who
is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsif to be the Rent Control
Court for such local areas as may be specified therein." Section 11 of
the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant only by
making an application to the Rent Control Court and it also sets out
the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant.
E
Section 18 of the Act provides for an Appeal being preferred by an
aggrieved person to the Appellate Authority. The relevant portions of
Section 18 are as under:
"18. Appeal:(l)(a) The Government may, by general or
special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such offi·
F
cers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate
Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes
of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may
be specified in the order.
(b)
G
(2) ....... .
(3)
Explanation .....
H
A
B
c,
E
F
878
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] 2 S.C.R.
(4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers
~
of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears or
rem.
~
(5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court
shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question
in any Court of law, except as provided in section 20."
'..ii
(Emphasis supplied).
I
Then comes Section 20 which provides for Revisions and it reads as
follows:
"20. Revision:(l) In cases where the appellate authority
empowered under section 18 is a subordinate Judge, the
District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at
any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for
and examine the records relating to any order passed or
proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or
propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1)
shall be in it discretion.
20A. Power to remand: In disposing of an appeal or
application for revision under this Act, the appellate
authority, or the revising authority, as the case may be,
may remand the case for fresh disposal according to such
directions as it may give."
The scope and effect of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5) of
the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench of the Kerala
High Court in Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 Kerala 103. The Full Bench
i
G held that since the District Court exercising revisional powers under
Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act functions as a Court and not as a
persona designata, the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that
1".-
Court including any right of appeal or revision will be inhered to the
decision rendered by the District Court. In that view of the matter the
Full Bench held that a decision of a District Court under Section 20 of
H the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction
JETHA f!AI v, SUNDERDAS [NATARAJAN, J.]
879
~. -1
of the High Court especially when there is no provision in the Act A
providing for an appeal against an order of the District Court under
, ~
Section 20 or in the alternative any express provision declaring the
finality of the said order. The decision of the Full Bench held the field
for a number of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases
where the competence of the High Court to entertain a revision under
Section 115 C.P.C. against an order of a District Court passed under B
Section 20( 1) of the Kerala Act was challenged the contention was
repelled by reference to the judgment of the Full Bench. One such
case in point is Balaga;igadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984] KLT 845.
The question decided by the Full Bench, however, came to be
raised before this Court, in Aundal Ammal's case (supra). A Bench c
+~ consisting of E.S. Venkataramiah, J. and one of us (Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J.) held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in
Vareed's case (supra) cannot be approved because the High Court had
not properly construed Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act. The
relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms:
D
• "<
"In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-seclion (5) ofSection 18 clearly states that such decision of the
appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act
~Y
shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner
under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied E
prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when
a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in
question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states
that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any court
of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20, it
F
cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law
and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Produce could revise
an order once again after revision under Section 20 of the
.\
Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four courts,
'
that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the G
1
different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or
public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and
justice demands finality with qmck disposal of case. The
language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with
Section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts must so
construe."
H
880
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19881 2 S.C.R.
The Bench drew support for its conclusion from an earlier deciA sion of this Court in Veshesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [ 1980 I 3 SCR
32: 1980(2) SCC 378: AIR 1980 SC 892. In that case the two questions
that fell for consideration were:
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
"(1) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an
order of the District Court under s. 115 disposing of a
revision petition?
(2) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 against an order of the District Court
under s. 25, Provisional Small Cause Courts Act disposing
of a revision petition?"
Answering both the questions in the negative, it was held in so far as
question no. 1 is concerned, as follows:
" ........ In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard
must be had to the principle that the construction given to a
statute should be such as would advance the object of the
legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by
it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the
High Court over a revisional order passed by the District
Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative
scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdictionto reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High
Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large
measure, lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the
District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than
Rs.20,000, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed
to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court, for the High
Court would then en joy jurisdictional power in respect of
an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below
Rs.20,000. That was never intended at all."
The second question was answered as under.
"The question before us arises in those cases only where
the District Judge has exercised revisional power under s.
·)o-· .
JETifA BAI v. SUNDERDAS [NATARAJAN, J.[
881
25. Is an order so made open to revision by the High Court
A
under s. 115. Code of Civil Procedure? An examination of
the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the
present enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of correcting
decrees or orders made by a Court of Small Causes the Act
provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under
B
s. 24 and s. 25 respectively. Cases in which the District
Judge and High Court respectively exercise revisional
power, revisional powers are specifically mentioned. A
complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in
the Act. Moreover, s. 27 of the Act provides:
I
"27. Finality of decrees and orders. Save as provided c
r~
by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing
provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be
final."
The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order
D
. ~
made by a Court of Small Causes should be final subject
only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is a point for consideration that had s. 25, in its application to the State of Uttar
·Y
Pradesh continued in its original form the High Court
would have exercised the revisional power under s. 25, and
E
no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional
power of the High Court under s. 115 of the Code. All the
indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within
the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended
to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil
Procedure. By way of abundant caution s. 7 of the Code
F
~
made express provision barring the application of ss. 96 to
112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 7 of the Code
merely embodies the general principle against resort to
remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
,,
Although the court of the District Judge is not a court
G
~
constituted under the Act the general principle continues
to take effect. No change in the principle was brought
about merely because revisional power under s. 25, before
the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District
Judge. It must be remembered that the legislative intention
behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the
H
882
A
g
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1988] 2 S.C.R.
burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of
1 ·
cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act. We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in
s. 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final
order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside
the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another
statute."
Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) that "the
C Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court
in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under '-.J
Section 115 CPC."
f
Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of the High
Court and of this Court pertaining to Section 50 read with Section
D 48( 6) of the said Act, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant
provisions of the Act as they stood before and after the amendments
effected by the Amendment Act 31of1975. The relevant portions of
Section 48 and 50, as they stood before the amendment and after the
amendment are as under:
E
F
G
H
Before the Amendment
After the Amendment
48.
48.
Appeals:-(J)Notwithstanding
Appeals:-(!) omitted.
anything contained in any laW for the
time being in force, every person
aggrieved by an order under
section 14, Section 16, Section 17 or
section 21, passed by the Controller
or the Court may within thirty days
from the date of the order, prefer an
appeal in writing to the District
Judge having jurisdiction over the
area in which the premises are
situate.
2 ............. .
3 ............. .
4 ............. .
5. The appellate authority
shall send for the records
2 ............ ..
3 ............ ..
4 ............. .
5. The appllate authority
shall send for the records of
JEfHA BAI v. SUNDERDAS [NATARAJAN, J.]
883
1
of the case from the Court
the case from the Controller and
or the Controller, as the case
after giving the parties an opporA
may be, and after giving the
tunity of being heard and if
1
parties an opportunity of being
necessary after making such further
heard and if necessary after
enquiry as it thinks fit either itself
making such further enquiry as
or through the Controller shall
it thinks fit, either itself or
decide the appeal.
\
through the Court or the ControB
t
Iler, as the case may be, shall
decide the appeal.
Explanation .............
6. Subject to any decision of the
6. An order of the court or the
High Court under section 50 the
Controller shall, subject to the
l-'
deciskin of the District Judge shall
decision of the District Judge or the c
be final, and an order of the Court
High Court under section 50 or of
'
or the Controller shall, subject to
the relevant appellate authority
'
the decision of the relevant appelunder this Act be final and shall
late authority under this Act or of
not be liable to be called in question
the High Court under section 50,
in any court of law whether in a
be final and shall not be liable to
suit or other proceeding or by way
be called in question in any court
of appeal or revision.
D
of law whether in a suit or other
proceedings or by way of appeal
or revision.
50. Revision by the High Court
50. Revision.
y
1. The High Court may, at any
(1). The High Court may, at any
E
time, call for and examinetime, call for examine any order
passed or proceeding taken by the
(i) the records relating to any
court of Civil Judge under this Act
decision given or proceedings
or any order passed by the Contaken by the District Judge.
troller under sections 14, 15 16, or
17 for the purpose of satisfying itself
(ii) any order passed or proceedas to the legality or correctness of
F
·~
ing taken by the Court under this
such order or proceeding and may
Act or any order passed by the
pass such order in reference
Controller under section 14,
thereto as it thinks fit.
section 15 or section 16.
for the purpose of satisfying itself as
A
to the legality or correctness of such
G
decision, order or proceeding and
~
may pass such order in reference
thereto as it think fit;
2. The costs of, and incidental
2. The District Judge may, at any
all proceedings before the High
time, call for and examine any order
Court shall be in its distretion.
passed or proceeding taken by the
H
A
B
c
884
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988) 2 S.C.R.
Court of Munsiff referred to in
sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of
section (3) for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the legality
or correctness of such order in
reference thereto as he thinks fit.
the order of the District Judge shall
be final.
3. The costs of and incidental to all
proceedings before the High Court
or the District Judge shall be in the
discretion of the High Court or the
District Judge, as the case may be."
On a reading of the provisions it may be seen that under Section 48 as
it stood prior to the amendment, an appeal lay to the District Judge
against an order passed under Sections 14, 16, 17 or 21 by the Rent
Controller or the Court and thereafter a revision lay to the High Court
under Section 50 of the Act. Sub-section (6) of Section 48 further
D provided that the decision of the District Judge shall, subject to the
decision of the High Court under Section 50, be final and the order of
the Court or the Controller shall subject to the decision of the relevant
Appellate Authoirty under the Act or of the High Court under Section
50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court
E
F
G
of law, whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or
revision. One of the changes effected by the Amending Act was to
confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in the place of District Munsifs in
respect of house rent control cases arising in the city of Mangalore.
Another change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the
District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control Court by deleting
sub-section (1) of Section 48. The third change effected is of a twofold nature. The first is to restrict the High Court's powers of revision
under Section 50 to only those cases decided by the city Civil Judges
and the second is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in
respect of cases decided by the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in areas
outside the city of Bangalore. Thus what the legislature had done was
to do away with the remedy of an appeal so as to save the litigants from
"a large segment of time and much expenses". The resultant position
is that as against the orders of District Munsifs acting as Rent Controllers a right of appeal to the District Judge and a further revision to the
High Court has been taken away and instead only a right of revision to
the District Court is provided. In so far as the cases disposed of by the
Civil Judges in the city of Bangalore are concerned, a right of revision
H is provided to the High Court. Notwithstanding the changes effected,
.
'
.,l
!
'
JE1HA BAI v. SUNDERDAS {NATARAJAN, J.{
885
Section 48( 6) inter alia provided that an order of the Court or the
Controller shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge or the A
High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be
called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other
proceeding or by way of appeal or revision.
In the background of the changes made by the legislature, a Full
B
Bench of the Kamataka High Court went into the question in Krishnaji
Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivra(l'I Kavalekar & Others, ILR
1978 Kamataka 1585 whether by reason of Section 48(6) a further
revision against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under
Section 50(2) of the Kamataka Act would lie or not to the High Court
under Section 115 of C.P.C. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was), who
spoke for the Full Bench held that in the light of the decisions of the C
Supreme Court in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore,
AIR 1977 SC 1555 and Krishnadass Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala
Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913of1978 decided on 13th February 1978 the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. to revise an
order of the District Judge passed under Section 50(2) will stand D
unaffected.
The correctness of this view was questioned before another Full
Bench of the Kamataka High Court in M. M. Yaragatti v. Vasant &
Others, AIR 1987 Kamataka 186. The Full Bench took the view that in
the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in two subsequent
cases, viz. Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and Vishesh Kumar's case E
(supra), the law laid down in Krishnaji's case (supra) cannot be considered good law any longer and as such a further revision to the High
Court under Section 115 C.P.C. will not lie against an order passed by
a District Judge in exercise of his revisional powers under Section
50(2) of the Kamataka Act.
The correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench in Yaragatti' s case (supra) fell for consideration by this Court in Shyamaraju's
case (supra). A Bench of this Court held that in so far as the Kamataka
Act is concerned, the relevant provisions warranted invoking the ratio
F
in Chhaganlal's case (supra) and Krishna Das Bahtija (supra) and
therefore the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji's case G
(supra) is the correct one and not the view taken in Yaragatti's case
(supra). The position, therefore, is that so far as the Kamataka Act is
concerned an order of a District Judge under Section 50(2), though
conferred finality under the Act is nevertheless open to challenge
before the High Court by means of a further revision under Section
H
115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
886
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1988] 2 S.C.R.
A
What now falls for consideration is whether there is any conflict
between the decision in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and Shyamaraju
Hegde's case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case requires
reconsideration.
Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative
B given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions
because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different. However, to clarify matters furtJter we may point out the differences between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity. Under the Kerala Act,
against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided over by a
District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal
C under Section 18. The Appellate Authority has to be a judicial officer
not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Appellate Authority
has been conferred powers co-extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having over-riding effect. Having these factors in mind,
the Legislature has declared that in so far as an order of a Rent Control
Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or
D revision by an Appellate Authority; and in so far as an Appellate
Authority is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be
liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as pmvided in
section 20. As regards Section 20, a division of the powers of revision
exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and
the District Court. In all those cases where a revision is preferred
E against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18, the District Judge has been constituted
the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision
sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a
Subordinate Judge, the High Court has been constituted the Revisional authority. The revision al powers conferred under Section 20,
F whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may
be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by
a High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity
or propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that, the
Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have been ex'
G pressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20A of the Act.
Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case
before the Rent Control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz. the
District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account
H of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before
•
' .
'
y ..... ·
1. ..
A-
,, .
JETHA BAI v. SUNDERDAS [NATARAJAN, J.[
887
'--;'
three coutts, viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the ReviA
. '
sional Court, there was no need to make the revisional order of the
District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means
of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure
Code. It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) that the
~
Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms
of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) in their proper perspective and
B
this failing had affected its conclusion. According to the Full Bench, a
revisional order of a District Court under Section 20 laid itself open for
further challenge to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. because
of two factors viz.