# JHANSI v. VISHWANATH AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 726
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-10-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1644 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, C. A. Vaidial!Ngam, I. D. Dua
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jhansi-v-vishwanath-and-ors-4941
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Foctories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948)-S. 2(1)-Tinze keepers-.'/ workers
lVithin the n1eaning of the section.
In an application under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936
the respondents claimed that they were workers within the meaning of
s. 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948. The Additional District Judge found
that some of the respondents were time keepers who maintained atten~
dance of the staff, job card particulars of the various jobs under operation
and the time sheets of the staff working on vaiious ·shops dealing with
the production of Railway spare parts and repairs etc. and that other
respondents were head time keepers entrusted with the task of supervising
the work of other respondents.
He, therefore, came to the conclusion
that the 'h'Ork done by the respondents was "incidental to" or "connected
with" the manufacturing process.
The High Court in revision affirMed
this order.
On the question whether the respondents fell within the
purview of the definition of "worker" in s. 2(1) of the Factories Act,
HELD: (i) The conclusion of the Additional District Judge on the
nature of the work of the respondents being one of fact must be held
to be binding on the High Court on revision and also not open to reassess--
ment on the merits in t1'\s Court on special leave appeal from the order
of the High Court.
(ii) The definition in s. 2(1) is fairly wide because it takes within
its sweep r.ot only persons employed in manufacturing process but also in
cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing
process and goes far beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing
process by extending it to other kinds of work which may either be
incidental to or connected with not only the manufacturing process itself
but also the subject of the' manufacturing process.
The definition therefore does not ex:clude those employees who were entrusted solely with
clerical duties. if they otherwise fell within the definition of the word
"worker".
All Jegi'slation in a welfare state is enacted with the object
of promoting general welfare, but certain types of enactments are ... nore
resoonsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate
and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieYoe
social reforms. The factories Act belongs to this category and, therefore.
demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative pur·
pose, without doing violence to the language. [728 C-D; 731 B-D]

## Text

726
WORKS MANAGER, CENTRAL RAILWAY WORKSHOP,
A
JHANSI
v.
VISHWANATH AND ORS.
October 9, 1969
[J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]
Foctories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948)-S. 2(1)-Tinze keepers-.'/ workers
lVithin the n1eaning of the section.
In an application under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936
the respondents claimed that they were workers within the meaning of
s. 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948. The Additional District Judge found
that some of the respondents were time keepers who maintained atten~
dance of the staff, job card particulars of the various jobs under operation
and the time sheets of the staff working on vaiious ·shops dealing with
the production of Railway spare parts and repairs etc. and that other
respondents were head time keepers entrusted with the task of supervising
the work of other respondents.
He, therefore, came to the conclusion
that the 'h'Ork done by the respondents was "incidental to" or "connected
with" the manufacturing process.
The High Court in revision affirMed
this order.
On the question whether the respondents fell within the
purview of the definition of "worker" in s. 2(1) of the Factories Act,
HELD: (i) The conclusion of the Additional District Judge on the
nature of the work of the respondents being one of fact must be held
to be binding on the High Court on revision and also not open to reassess--
ment on the merits in t1'\s Court on special leave appeal from the order
of the High Court.
(ii) The definition in s. 2(1) is fairly wide because it takes within
its sweep r.ot only persons employed in manufacturing process but also in
cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing
process and goes far beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing
process by extending it to other kinds of work which may either be
incidental to or connected with not only the manufacturing process itself
but also the subject of the' manufacturing process.
The definition therefore does not ex:clude those employees who were entrusted solely with
clerical duties. if they otherwise fell within the definition of the word
"worker".
All Jegi'slation in a welfare state is enacted with the object
of promoting general welfare, but certain types of enactments are ... nore
resoonsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate
and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieYoe
social reforms. The factories Act belongs to this category and, therefore.
demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative pur·
pose, without doing violence to the language. [728 C-D; 731 B-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1644 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 18, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision
Application 24 of 1966.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Sinf?h and S. Chakravart,-,
for respondents Nos. 1 to 28 and 30 to 57.
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CENIRAL RLY. v. VISHWANATH (Dua, J.)
727
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
order of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court
affirming on revision under s. 115 Civil P.C. the order of th~
learned Additional District Judge, Jhansi, who had allowed the
respondent's appeal from the order of the learned City Magistrate,
Jhansi, made on an application presented by the
respondents
under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act IV of 1936. The City
Magistrate was the "authority" appointed
under s. 15 and tlle
district court was the court of appeal under s. 17 of the said Act.
The respondents through the Assistant Secretary of th~ National
Railway Mazdoor Union Work-shop Branch, Jhansi had asserted
in their application under s. 15 that they were workers within the
meaning of s. 2 ( 1) of the factories Act
( 63 of 1948) and
complained that th-;y were denied wages for overtime work done
by them on the erroneous ground that they
were no: workers
within the aforesaid provision. The learned Magistrate held that
the respondents had been entrusted with purely
clerical duties
and they were not connected in any manner with the manufacturing process.
On this conclusion their application was dismissed.
On appeal the learned Additional District Judge disagreed
with this view and came to the conclusion that the work done by
the respondents was incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process.
It was observed in the order that some of the
respondents were entrusted with the duty of checking the time of
work of each worker in the workshop, a few others were timekeepers and the remaining respondents prepared account sheets
on the basis of the time sheets and did other work incidental to
the running of the work-shop including payment of wages to the
staff of the workshop and the office.
The High Court on revision,
as already observed, affirmed the order of the learned Additional
District Judge.
·
On appeal in this Court the short question we are called upon
to decide is whether the respondents, who are time-keepers fall
within the purview of the definition of "worker" as contained in
s. 2 ( 1) of the Factories Act.
The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that the
appeal is incompetent on the ground that respondent No.
29
(T. A. Kolalkar) had died after the order of the High Court but
his name continqed to appear in the array of respondents,
As
his legal representatives had not been brought on the record, the
appe.al ~gainst him is incompetent and since there was a .ioint
apphcat10n on behalf of all the re·r,~n,
1 ents which was dealt w!lh
and decided by a common order by the learned Magistrate, the
appeal against the other r.espondenis
must also be held to be
incompetent.
The impugned order having become final as the
723
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.lt
deceased T. A. Kolaikar, the present appeal against other respondents should, according to the argument, be held to be incom·
petent because the reversal of the impugned order as against them
would give rise to conflicting decisions on the point.
Recently
this Court disallowed a similar objection in Indian Oxygen Ltd. v.
Shri Ram Adhar Singh and others(') and when the attention of the
respondent's learned
counsel was drawn to that decision, the
objection was not seriously pressed.
We now turn to the merits of the appeal.
The word "worker"
is defined in s. 2 ( 1 ) of the Factories Act to mean "a person
employed directly or through any agency, whether for wa~es or
not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the
machinery or premb;s used for a manufacturing process, or in
any other kind of work
incidental to, or connected with, the
manufacturing
process, or foe
subject of the
manufacturing
process."
This definiti?n seems to us to be fairly wide because it
takes . within its sweep not only persons employed in any manufa_cturing process but also in cleaning any part of the machinery
er premises
used for a manufacturing process and goes far
beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing process by
. extending it to other kinds of work which may either be incidental
·to or connected with not only the manufacturing process itself but
also the
subject of the
manufacturing . process. The word
"manufacturing process" is defined ~ s. 2(k) of the Factories
Act in fairly wide language.
It means any process for :
" ( i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, paclcing, oiling, washing, cleaning breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise
treating or
adaptin.e any article or substance with a view
to its use. sale, transport, delivery er disposal,
or
(ii) pumpinl! oil. water or sewage, or
1 iii) generating. transformin.e or transmitting power;
or
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!iv) composing types for printing. priniing by letter
G
press, lithography. photogravure or other similar
process or book binding:
( v) constructing. reconstructing. repairing, refitting.
finishing or breaking up ships or vessels;"
Now the conclusion of the learned Additional District Judge
H
on the nature 0f work of the respondents. which, in our opinion,
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CENTRAL RLY. v. VJSHWANATH (Dua, J.)
729
being one of fact, must be held to be binding on the High Court
on revision and also not open to reassessment on the merits
in
this Court on special leave appeal f; om the order of the High
Court on revision, is that, the time keeper; pr.epare the pay sheets
of the workshop staff, maintain leave account, dispose of settlement cases and maintain records for statistical purposes.
Fourteen of the respondents, accordin.·2 '.o t'1is conclusion, are timekeepers who maintain attendance cl the st1ff, job card particula1s of the various jobs under operation and time-sheets of the
staff working on various shops dealing with the production of
Railway spare-parts and repairs etc.
Fom of the
respondents
are head time-keepers entrusted with the task of supervising the
work of other respondents. The qnestion arises if on this conclusion it can be held that as a matter of law the respondents fall
outside the definiton of "worker" as contemplated by s. 2 (1) of
the Factories Act and that the High Court erred in dismissin~ the
revision.
The appellant's learned counsel has submitted that the expreision "incidental (o" or "connected with" connotes a direct connection with the manufacturing process and ther.efore if the duties
assigned to the respondents have no such direct connection with
the manufacturing process then they cannot fall within the purview of the word "worker". In support of his submission he has
referred to some law dictionaries.
In Law Lexicon in Briti>h
India by Ramanathan Iyer "incidental power" is stated to
be,
power that is directly and immediately appropriate tc the
existence of the specific power granted and not one that has a slight
or remote relation to it. The word ''incidental" in the expres';ion
"incidental labour" as used in Mechanic's Lien Statutes allowing
liens for work and labour performed in the
construction, re·
pairs etc. of a building etc. is stated in this Law Lexicon to mean
labour directly done for and connected with or actually incorporated in the building or improvement : service indirectly or
remotely associated with the construction work is not covered by
this expression. Reference has next been made by the counsel to
the Law Dictionary by Ballentine where
also
the expression
"incidental power" is staied in the same
terms.
In Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary the meaning of the words
"incident"
and
"incidental" as used i.1 various English statutes have been noticed.
We do not think they can be of much assistance to us. The decision in Haydon v. Taylor(') noticed in this book at first sight
appeared to us to be of some relevance, but on going throu~h it.
we do not find it to be of much help in construing the statutory
provisions with which we are concem~d. Similarly the decision
in Frederick Haves Whymper v. John Jones Harney(') seems to
be of little guidance.
(I) 122 E.R.
554
12) 144 P.R. eJc
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.R.
On behalf of the respondents our attention has been drawn
to a decision of this Court. in Nagpur Electric Light and Power
Co. Ltd. v. Regional Director Employees State Insurance Corporation Etc. (1).
This decision deals with the Employees
State
Insurance Act and on a comparison of the definition of the word
"employee"' as contained ins. 2(9) of that Act with the definition
of the word "worker" ins. 2( 1) of the Factories Act, it is observed
that the former definition is wider than the latter.
It is further
added that the benefit of the Factories Act does not extend to
field worlcers working outside the factory whereas the benefit of
the Em;:iloyees State Insurance Act extends inter a/ia to the employees meniioned in s. 2(9)(i) whether working inside the factory or estahlishment or elsewhere. Reliance has, however, been
placed on behalf of the respondents on the observations at page 99
of the report where reference is made to the clerks entrusted with
the duty of time-keeping and it is observed that all these employees are employed in connection with the work of the factory.
A person doing non-manual work has been held in this case to
be include<' in the word "employee" within the meaning of s.
2(9) (i) if employed in connection with the work of the factory.
The ratio of this decision which is concerned with the construction of different statutory language intended to serve a different
ob.iect and purpose is of no direct assistance in construing the
definition of the word "worker" as used in the Factories Act.
The respond~nts' counsel has then submitteJ that the previous
history of the Act throws helpful light on the legislative intendment and in this connection he has referred to the definition ot
the word "worker" in the Factories Act XXV of 1934. The word
"worker" in s. 2 (h) of that Act was defined to mean :
"a person employed, whether for wages or not, in
any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of
the machinery or premises used for a manufact11ring
process, or in any other kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with the manufacturing proces'
or connected with the subject qf the manufacturirg
process, but does not include any person solely employed in a clerical capacity in any room or place where
no manufacturing process is being carried on."
It is argued that the deletion of the words conveying exclusion of persons solely employed in a clerical capacity in a place
where no manufacturing process is carried on suggests that the
present definition of "worker" is wide enough to take within its
fold even those persons who are employed solely in clerical capacity if otherwise :hey fall within the definition.
The appellant
counsel has, on his part, by reference to the definition in the Act
(1)
[1967] 3 S.CR. 92
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731
of 1934, argued that the deletion of the word "whatsoever" after
"any other kind of work" is indicative of the legislative intention
tc restrict the scope of "any other kind of work" in the current
Act.
The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the
law regulating labour in factories.
It is probably tru.e that all
legislation in a welfare state is enacted with the object of promoting general welfar~; but certain types of enactments are
more
rspcnsive to some urgent social demands
and also have more
immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating mor.~
directly to achieve social reforms.
The enactments with which
we are concerned, in our view, belong to this category and, there·
fore, demand an interpretation liberal
enough to
achieve
the
legislative purpose, without doing vio!.~nce to the language. The·
definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore, does not
seem to us ;o exclude those employees who are entrusted solely
with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of
the word "worker".
Keeping in view the duties and functions
of the respondents as found by the learned Additional
District
Judge. we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view
taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the·
word "worker".
Deletion of the word "whatsoever" on which
the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make
much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant.
We have not been persuaded to hold that the High Court was
in error in affirming the decision of the learned Additional Disttict Judge. In the result this appea'. fails and is dismissed with
costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.