# JOHN MARTIN v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL Ja11.uary 21, 1975

- **Citation:** [1975] 3 S.C.R. 211
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-08-21
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 467 of 1974
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/john-martin-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-ja11-uary-21-1975-6711
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

211
Mailltcnance of Internal Security Act, 1971-S.8(1)-Scope of-Whether a
reasoned order should be passed by Government-Whether power of dete111io11
conje.rred on District Magistrate is violative of Art. 19-Detention after droppin11 earlier criminal ca~·es-Whelhl?r ma/a fide.
Pursuant to an order of detention the petitioner .was arrested under section 3(1) & (2) of the M:dntenance of Internal Security Act, 1971,
In a
petition under artkle 32 of the Constitution it was contended ( 1) that consideration of the petitioner's ·representation by the State Government instead of by
an impartial tribunal was not sufficient compliance with the requirement of
· art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (2) that the. order passed by the State Government should have been a reasoned one; (3) that the power of preventive detention conferred on the District Magistrate under s. 3 of the Act was violative
of art. r. 19 of the Constitution and (4) that the order of detention was made
in colourable exercise of power by the District Magistrate since no charge
sheets were filed against him in respect ·or the two incidents set out in the
detention order and in fact the cases were dropped.
Dismissing the petition,
HELl) :
( 1)
It
is
indisputable
on
a
plain
reading
of
s.
8 (1)
that the representation
that . may
be
maae
by
the
detenu
is to the appropriate Government and it is the appropriate Government which has
to consider the representation. This, however, does not mean that the a9propriate Government can reject the reP.resentation of the detenu in a casual and
mechanical manner.
The appropriate Government must bring to bear on the
consideration of the representation an unbiased mind. Art. 22, clause ( 5)
provides inter alia that the authority making the order of detention shall
afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against
the order of detention. It does .n.ot say as to which is the authority to which
the representation shall be made or which authority shaT! consider it. But s.8(1)
lays down in the clearest terms that the opportu.nity which is to be afforded to
the detenu is to make a representation against the order of detention to the
appropriate Government. [214F; 215B; 2141;.-FJ
Jayanaraya11 Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [19701 3 S.C.R. 225 and
Harad/ian Saha v. State of West-Bengal, W.P. 1999 of 1973, decided on August
21, 1974, followed.
(2) In Haradhan Saha's case it was held that there need not be a speaking
order.
There is also no failure of justice by the order not being a speaking
order.
All that is necessary is that there should be a real and proper consideration by the Goverqment. [21SF]
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal,
W.P. 1999 of 1973, decided on
August 21, 1974, followed.
Bhut Nath Mate, v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 SC. 806, referred to
and explained.
(3) ,It is not possible to say that the District Magistrate is not an officer
<if sufficiently high status or responsibility to be entrusted with the exercise of
the power of preventive detention. The District Magistrate is the head of the
administration of the district a-nd is incharge of maintenance not only of law and
order but also of public order as also smooth flow of supplies and services
essential to the community within his district and no fault can, therefore,
be found with the legislature in entrusting the exercise cl. the power al preventive detention to him in cases where it is ncces.sary to exercise such power toe
212
SUPRE)l(!E COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.l\.
the purpose of mnintenance of security of the State or publi~ order O! uupplies
and services essential to the community,
Moreover, exercise of such power
by the Dlstrkt Magistrate is made subject to the ~upervisory contl'ol andl check
of the Stnte Government by the provision that the order of detention must be
ap!)rovecl by the State Government within a period of · t2 days frc1m the
makinll of the· order of detention. The conferment of such
~owcr on the
District Magistrate cannot

## Text

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JOHN MARTIN
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
Ja11.uary 21, 1975
[K. K. MATHEW, P. N. BHAGWATI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]
211
Mailltcnance of Internal Security Act, 1971-S.8(1)-Scope of-Whether a
reasoned order should be passed by Government-Whether power of dete111io11
conje.rred on District Magistrate is violative of Art. 19-Detention after droppin11 earlier criminal ca~·es-Whelhl?r ma/a fide.
Pursuant to an order of detention the petitioner .was arrested under section 3(1) & (2) of the M:dntenance of Internal Security Act, 1971,
In a
petition under artkle 32 of the Constitution it was contended ( 1) that consideration of the petitioner's ·representation by the State Government instead of by
an impartial tribunal was not sufficient compliance with the requirement of
· art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (2) that the. order passed by the State Government should have been a reasoned one; (3) that the power of preventive detention conferred on the District Magistrate under s. 3 of the Act was violative
of art. r. 19 of the Constitution and (4) that the order of detention was made
in colourable exercise of power by the District Magistrate since no charge
sheets were filed against him in respect ·or the two incidents set out in the
detention order and in fact the cases were dropped.
Dismissing the petition,
HELl) :
( 1)
It
is
indisputable
on
a
plain
reading
of
s.
8 (1)
that the representation
that . may
be
maae
by
the
detenu
is to the appropriate Government and it is the appropriate Government which has
to consider the representation. This, however, does not mean that the a9propriate Government can reject the reP.resentation of the detenu in a casual and
mechanical manner.
The appropriate Government must bring to bear on the
consideration of the representation an unbiased mind. Art. 22, clause ( 5)
provides inter alia that the authority making the order of detention shall
afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against
the order of detention. It does .n.ot say as to which is the authority to which
the representation shall be made or which authority shaT! consider it. But s.8(1)
lays down in the clearest terms that the opportu.nity which is to be afforded to
the detenu is to make a representation against the order of detention to the
appropriate Government. [214F; 215B; 2141;.-FJ
Jayanaraya11 Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [19701 3 S.C.R. 225 and
Harad/ian Saha v. State of West-Bengal, W.P. 1999 of 1973, decided on August
21, 1974, followed.
(2) In Haradhan Saha's case it was held that there need not be a speaking
order.
There is also no failure of justice by the order not being a speaking
order.
All that is necessary is that there should be a real and proper consideration by the Goverqment. [21SF]
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal,
W.P. 1999 of 1973, decided on
August 21, 1974, followed.
Bhut Nath Mate, v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 SC. 806, referred to
and explained.
(3) ,It is not possible to say that the District Magistrate is not an officer
<if sufficiently high status or responsibility to be entrusted with the exercise of
the power of preventive detention. The District Magistrate is the head of the
administration of the district a-nd is incharge of maintenance not only of law and
order but also of public order as also smooth flow of supplies and services
essential to the community within his district and no fault can, therefore,
be found with the legislature in entrusting the exercise cl. the power al preventive detention to him in cases where it is ncces.sary to exercise such power toe
212
SUPRE)l(!E COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.l\.
the purpose of mnintenance of security of the State or publi~ order O! uupplies
and services essential to the community,
Moreover, exercise of such power
by the Dlstrkt Magistrate is made subject to the ~upervisory contl'ol andl check
of the Stnte Government by the provision that the order of detention must be
ap!)rovecl by the State Government within a period of · t2 days frc1m the
makinll of the· order of detention. The conferment of such
~owcr on the
District Magistrate cannot be regal'ded as an unreasonable restriction on the
right of personal liberty of a citizen under Art. 19. [2160·0]
( 4) The order of detention made by the District Magistrate does not suffer
from the vice of ma/a fides or colourable exeri:ise of power. It is now wall
settled by several decisions of this Court that the mere fact that a· c:rimlnal
case had to be dropped agai.nst ~c detenu becai.:se the investigatin~ agency
could not procure evidence to sustain his conviction would not be sufficient to
hold that tbe detention order mnde against him was main fide. [218F·IJJ
B. C. Blswqs v. State of West Bengal, [1!172) S.C.C. 666, followed.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 467 of 1974.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India.
R. K. Jain, for the petitioner.
G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-The petitioner in this petition seeks a writ of
habeas corpus challenging the validity of his detention under an order
made by the District Magistrate, Burd wan under sub-section ( 1) read
with sub-section (2)
of section 3 of the Maintenance of ID.ternal
Security Act, 1971. The order of dc:tention was made on 10th July,
1973 on the ground that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with
a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial t.o the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Pursuant to the order of detention the petitioner was arrested on 24th
August, 1973 and immediately on his arrest he was served with the
grounds of detention. There were two incidents referred to in
the
grounds of detention as forming the basis for arriving at the subj1ective
satisfaction on the part of the District Magistrate and they were as
follows :
"l. On 23.1.73 at about 03.00 hrs. you along with your
associates (i) Michael Anfony, son of M. Danial @ Ram
Murti of Purniatetao, P. S. Hirapur, District Burdwan (ii)
Bhiren Antony, son of Michael Pitter of Purniateloo, P. S ..
Hirapur, Distt. Burdwan, and others committed theft in respect
of two spans of electric. line, 240 feet in length from pole
No. 7 to 9 in Street No. 23 of Chittaranjan· township, P. S.
Chittaranjan, Dist. Burdwan and thereby clamped
down:
darkness over the entire area causing inconvenience and hard-·
ship to the people in general living in that area, which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies
and
services
essential to the community.
2. On 22-2-73 at about 04.00 hrs. you along with your
associates (i) Michael Antony, SC!ll of M. Danial @ Ram
Murti of. Purnlatalao, P. S. Hiraour, Dist. Burdwan, (ii)
Dhiran Antony, son of Michael Pitter of Purniatalao, P.S ..
Hirapur, Distt. Burdwan and others committed.
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JOHN MARTIN v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, !.)
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theft in respect of 2 electric conductors, 200 feet long from
pole Nos. 1 and 2 at Cross Road No. 3, Sunset avenue,
Chittaranjan township, P. S. Chittaranjan, Dist. Burdwan and
thereby clamped down darkness in the entire area causing
much inconvenience and hardship to the people in general
living in that area, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community."
Meanwhile the District Magistrate reported the fact of the making of
the order of detention to the State Government and the order of detention was then approved by the State Government by an order dated
21st July, 1973. The State Government also reported the fact of
approval of the order of detention to the Central Government within
seven days from the date of the order of approval. The State Govern~
ment thereafter placed the case of the petitioner before the Advisory
Board on 20th September, 1973. On 25th September, 1973 the n.:pre-
~cntation of the petitioner against the order of detention was received
by the State ·Government and after due and proper consideration the
State Government rejected it by an order dated 29th September, 1973.
The representation was then forwarded by the State Government to
the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board, after considering the
case of the petitioner and taking into
account the.
representation
received from him, made a report to the State Government on 23rd
October, 1973 statipg that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for
the detention of the petitioner. The State Government thereafter confirmed the order of detention by an urder dated 1st November, 1973.
There were several contentions urged by Mr. R. K. Jain, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner amicus curiaes against
the validity of the order of detention and we shall deal with them in
the order in which they were urged. But l>efdre we do so, we may
point out that there was one contention sought to. be raised by Mr.
R. K. Jain on behalf of the petitioner which we did not allow to be
urged. That was that the power conferred by section 13 of the Act to
detain a person for a period of twelve months or until the cessation
of the emergency whichever is longer was violative of article 19 of the
Constitution and, in any event, the continuance of the emergency was
mala fide and the period of twelve months having eiapsed from the
date of detention, the petitioner was entitled to be set free. We did not
permit Mr. R. K. Jain to raise this contention on hchalf of the petitioner inasmuch as it involved a question as to the validity of a provision of the Act and the legality of the continuance of the emergency
and this question. could not be properly determined unless there was
an adequate plea to that effect and the Central Government had an
opportunity of meeting such ple_a by filing an affidavit and notice was
also given to the Attorney General to enable him to make his submission on this question. We would. therefore. confine ourselves only to
the other contentions raised by Mr. R. K. Jain on behalf of the petitioner.
The first contention urged by Mr. R. K. Jain on behalf of the petic
ticner was that the representation of the petitioner ought to 11ave been
considered by a11 impartial tribunal constituted by the State Government and it was not sufficient compliance with the requirement of
{
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
art. 22, clause ( 5) that it should have been c<,msidered only by the State
Goverhment. This contention was sought to be
SUjJported by reference to certain observations of Faz! Ali, J., and Mahajan, J., in A. K.
Gopalan v. State of Madras.( 1) Now it is true that Fazal Ali, J.
observed in this case that "the right to make a representation which has
been granted under the Constitution must carry with it the right to the
representation being properly considered by an impartial person or
persons-the constitution of an Advisory Board for the purpose
of
reporting whether a person should be detained for 1more than three
months or not is a very different thing from constituting a board for
the purpose of reporting whether a man s~ould be' detained for
a
single day", and Mahajan, J., also ~aid : "the right has been conferred
to enable a detained person to prove his innocence and to ·secure
justice, and no justice. can be said to be secured unless th·e representatirm is considered by some impartial person-it follows that no justice
ca!l be held secured to him unless an unbiased person considers the
merits of his representation and gives his opinion on the guilt or
innocence of the person detained. In my opinion the right cannot be
defeated or made elusive by presuming that the detaining authority
itself will consider the representation 'Yith an unbiased mind and will
render justice. That would in a way make the prooccutor a judge in
the case and such a procedur~ is repugnant to all notions of justice".
But we do not think that thes·~ observations made by two out of six
learned Judges can be regarded as laying down the law on thi! point.
Since A. K. Gopalan's case(I) there has been a long cotena of deci~ions
of t,his Court where th~ view has consistently been taken that the representation of the detenu must be considered by the State Government. Article22, clause (5) provides inter alia that the authority making the ord·::r of detention shall afford the detenu the earliest opportu·
nity of making a representation against the order of detention. It does
not say as to which is the authority to which the representaticin shall
b~ μmde or which authority shall consider it. But section 8, sub .. section
(1) of the Act lays down in the clearest terms which admit of no
doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the detenu is to
mnke a representation against the cirder of detention to the app1·opriate
Government. Therefore, it is indisputable on a plain reading of section
8, sub·section ( l) that the representation that may be n:::dc by the
pctenu is to the appropriate Government and it is the apprnpriate
Governm~nt which has to consider the representation. This Court,
speaking through Ray, J., (as he then was), affirmed this position in
Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Benga/( 2 ) and pointed out inter
alia that "the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion imd
judgment on the representation before sending the case alcnp ~ith
the d_etenu's representation to the Advisory Board".
So
al~o in
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Benga/( 3 )
this
Court,
speakinothrough Ray, CJ., observed that "there is an obligation on the Stat~
to consider the representation-section 8 of the Act which casts an
obligation on the State to consider the representation affords
the
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
(2) fl970) 3 S.C.R. 225.
(3) W.P. 1999 of 1973. dee. on Aug. 21, 1974.
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JOHN MARTIN v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagw::1i, ].)
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detenu all the rights which are guaranteed by Article 22(5). · The
Government considers the representation · to
ascertain
essentially
whether the order is in conformity with the power under the lawthe order of the Government rejecting the representation of the detenu
must be after proper consideration". It may be pointed ot1. that botlt
the decisions in Jayanarayan Sukul's case and Haradhan Saha's case
(supra) were decisions rendered by a Bench of five Judges. We must,
therefore, hold that under section 8 ( 1) of the Act, it is the approprivate Government that is required to consider the representation of
tJi.-.: detenu. This, however, does not mean that the appropriate Government can reject the representation of the detenu in a· casual or
mechanical manner. The appropriate Government must pring to bear
on the consideration of the representation an unbiased mind. There
should be, as pointed out by this Court in Haradhan Saha's case, (supra)
"a real and proper consider:ition" of the representation by the appropriate Government. We cannot over-emphasis·e the need for the closest and most zealous scrutiny of the representation for the purpose of
deciding whether the det·ention of the petitioner is jus.tified.
It was the~ ~ontendcd on behalf of the petitioner that the order
passed by the State Government rejecting the representation of the
detenu should be a reasoner! order and since in the present case the
order of the State Government did not disclose any reasons for rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the detention of the petitioner
.was invalid. The argument of the petitioner was that unless reasons
were given bv the State Government. how could it be ensured that
there .was real and proper consideration of the representation of the
detenu. This contention, attractive though it may
seem, is, in our
opinion, not welJ founded. It stands concluded by the decision in
Haradhan Saha's case (supra) to which we have just referred. It was
pointed out in that case by Ray, CJ., speaking on behalf of the Court :
"There need not be a spe,aking order. There is also no failure of _justice
bv the order not being a speaking order. All that is necessary is that there
should be a real and proper consideration by the Government". These .
observations must give a quietus to the contention that the order of
the State Government must be a reasoned order. It is true that in Bhut
Nath Mate v. State of West Be11C!al(1) Krishna Iver, J., soeaking
on behalf of a Division Bench of this Court observed that : "It mu:·t
be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge 1lnd the
essential answers in the representation have been impartially considered". but if we r·ead the judgment as a whole there can be no
doubt that these observations were .not meant to lay down a Jegal
requirement that the order of the State Government must he a f,f:·~ak
ing order but they were intended to convey an admonition to the State
Governm~nt that it would be eminentlv desirable if the order disclN.ed
that "the substance of the charec and the essential answers in the
representation" had been impartially considered. The learned Judge
in fact started the discussion of this ooiRt bv stating : "We are not
·persuaded that a speaking order should be passed bv rhe Governmrnt
or by the Advisory Board while aoproving or advising continuance of
detention". In any event, the decision in Haradhan Saha's case (supra)
---------~ ---
(1) A.LR. 1974 S.C.
~06.
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975) 3 S.C.R.
being a decision rendered by a Bench of five Judges must prevail with
us. We, therefore, reject the present contention of the petitioner.
The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that it
was obvious from the order of detention that the District Magistrate
had made the order of detention in a mechanical fashion without applying his mind to the facts of the case relating to the petitioner. We do
not think there is any substance in this contention. The order of detiention is in proper form and it does not betray any lack of application
of mind on the part of the District Magistrate.
Then Mr. R. K. Jain on behalf of the petitioner contended that the
power of preventive detention conferred on the District Magistrate uuder
section 3 of the Act was violative of Art. 19 of the Constitution inasmuch as the District Magistrate was hardly an officer of such high and
respon;ible status as could be entrusted with the exercise of such drastic
power subversive of personal liberty. This contention is also futile
and must be rejected. It is not possible to say that the District Magistrate is not an officer of sufficiently high status or responsibility to be
untrusted with the exercise of the power of preventive detention. The
District Magistrate is .the head of the administration of the District and
is in charge of maintenance not only of law and order but also of public
or~er as also s.!Tlooth flow of supplies and services essential to th1~ com·
munity within his district and no fault can, therefore, be found with
the legislature for entrusting the exercise of the power of preventive
detention to him in cases where it is necessary to exercise such power
for the purpose of maintenance of the security of the State or public
order or supplies and servic> essential to the community. · Moreover,
the exercise of such power by the District Magistrate is made subj<:ct
to the supervisory control and check of the State Government by the
provision that the order of detention must be approved l~y the: State
Government within a period of twelve days from the making of the: order
of detention. The conferment of such power on the District Magistrate
cannot in the circumstances be regarded as an unreasonable restriction
on the right of personal liberty of a critizen under Art. 19.
The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the
order of det1~ntion was invalid since the District Magistrate had not
stated in the 01tler that the petitioner would be likely to indulge in
preiudicial acts in future and hence it was necessary to detain him.
A mere reading of the order of iietention is sufficient to repel this contention.
The order of detention starts with the rectal that the Dis·
tric~ Magistrate was satisfied with respect to the petitioner that "with
a v.1ew to prnventing ~im from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
mamtenance of suoohes and services essential to the commun'itv" it
w~s nece~sarv to detain. him. This recital clearly shows that th~ Dis-
~nct M ag1strate was satisfied that the petitioner would be likely to act
in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services
esse~tial to the con:munitv and that was the reason why the Distric;t
Magistr.ate t~ought 1t necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to
preventmg him from acting in such manner.
The satisfaction of the
(4) A. T. R. 1974 S. C. 806.
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JOHN MARTIN v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, J.)
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District Magistrate as regards the necessity for detention of the petitioner was grounded on a reasonable prognosis. 9f the future behaviour
of tne petitioner based on his past conduct, namely, participation in
the two incidents set out in the grounds of detention, judged in the light
of the surrounding circumstances. The District Magistrate in fact stated
in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in reply filed by him that he w~s satisfied
that "if. the detenu-petitioner was not detained under the said Act he
was likely to act further .in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community. The acts committed
by detenu showed a course ot conduct which satisfied me that it was
necessary to make the said order of detention".. This contention must
also, therefore, fail.
Mr. R. K. Jain ori behalf of the petitioner then urged that there
was nothing to show that the Central Government had applied its
mind to the case of the petitioner on receipt of the papers from the
State: Government. But this contention is also futile. It is clear from
the affidavit in reply filed by tb,ll District Magistrate that the fact of
the approval of the order of detention by the State Government was
communicated to the Central Government along with the grounds of
detention and such other p!J,rticulars as in the opinion of the State Governmem had a bearing on the necessity or an order of detention.,
Plainly, this was in compliance with
the requirement of section 3,
sub-section ( 4). Section 14, sub-section ( 1) undoubtedly conferred
power on the Central Government to revoke or modify an order of
detention but merely because the Central Government did not do so,
it does not mean that the Central Government did not apply its mind
to the case of the petitioner forwarded to it by .the State Government
There is riothing to show that the_ Central Government did not consider
the case of the petitioner or apply its mind to the grounds of detention
and other particulars received by it from the State Government. The
Central Government not being a party to the petition, it could not have
an opportunity of stating whether it appl;ed its mind to the case of the
petitioner for the Purpose uf .<lecidinl); whether or not to intervene by
revoking or modifying the order of detention.
It was also urged by Mr. R. K. Jain ori behalf of the petitioner that
there was some other material before the District Magistrate besides
the two incitients referred to in the grounds of detention and since
this material was not disclosed to the petitioner, he was deprived of
an opportunity of making effective representation and that vitiated the
order of detention. Now. Mr. G. S. Chatterjee, lerrrned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, produced before us the history sheet of
the petitioner which was placed before
the District Magistrate and
which, we can legimately assume, must have weighed with the District Magistrate in inducing the requisite subiective satisfaction. This
historY-sheet showeld that besides the two
incidents set out in the
grounds of detention, there was no other material which could have
possibly weighed with the District Magistrate in . reaching his subjeC··
tive satisfaction.
Of course there was material of a general nature
about the antecedents of the petitioner but that
could not possibly
have had anv impact in the process of reaching subJective satisfaction
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 3 s.c.R ..
and we would therefore, be justified in accepting the statement of the
District Magistrate in his affidavit in reply that the two incidents set out
in the grounds of detention were the only material on which he based
his subjective satisfaction for the J:>urpose of making the order of detention.
We accordingly reject this contention.
The last contention urged by Mr. R .. K. Jain on behalf of the: petitioner was that the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate in colourable exercise of power, since no charge-sheets
were
filed against the petitioner in the court of the magistrate in resp1~ct of
the two incidents set out in the grounds ot detention and the crimin.al
cases registered with Chitaranjan Police Station were dropped by filing
final Report as true, briefly described as F.R.T. To understand this contention it is necessary to state a few facts which may be gathered from
the affidavit in reply filed by the District Magistrate. The first iucident took place on 23rd January, 1973 and in respect of it, a criminal
case was registered with Chittaranjan Police Station on 12th February,
1973. Similarly, in respect of the second incident, which took place
on 22nd February, 1973, a criminal case was registered with Chittaranjan Police Station on 2nd March, 1973. Both these criminal cases
were tiled in the court of Sub-Divisional Juliicial Magistrate, Asansole.
The name of the petitioner was not mentioned in the First Information
Report in either of thesio two cases but his participation in the two
incidents was revealed in the course of investigation. The petitioner
was arrested on 1st March, 1973 in connection with some other case
and he was shown as arrested in connection with these two cases since
they were pending against him. The petitioner was thereafter released on bail though we do not know the precise date on which such release was effected. It appears that no charge-sheet was filed in both
these cases and these cases were droppetl by filing F.R.T. The affidavit
in reply does not state as to what was the reason for which F.R.T.
was filed and these cases were dropped but taking the case of the State
at its worst. we may presume that this was_ done as the police c:ould
not procure evidence to sustain the conviction of the petitione1:. The
petitioner was discharged from these cases on 6th June.
1973 an-\
from, the other case nlso he was discharged on 14th June, 1973. The
01-lder of drt~ntion wa~ thereafter made on 10th July. 1973 but the
petitioner was abscondinJt and he could not, therefore, be arriested
until 2·1th Au1zust, 1973. On these facts it is difficult to see how it
can be contended that the order of detention was passed by the Dis~
trict Magistrate: mala fide or in colourable exercise of his power. It is
now well settkd by several decisions of ·-this Court that the mere fact
that a criminal case had to be dropoeld against a detenu because: the
investigatfon could not procure evidence to smtain
his
convktiorr
would not be sufficient to hold that the detention order made against
him is mala fide. We mav refer onlv to one of these decisions. narnelv,
B. C. Biswas v. State of West Ben!!C'/.(I) There, the grounds on which
the order of detention was ba~ed rl'ferred to two inci<ll'nts in which the
detenu and his ass<'ciates were-alleged to have participated. Reports
were lodged with the police against the detenu in resoect of the two
incidents mentioned in
th~ grounds of detention. The investigating
(!) [1972] s. c. c. 66f.
A
13
c
\
D
E
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
JOHN MARTIN v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, /.)
219·
officer after investigating the cases relating to those incidents submitc
ted a ~·eport that "nothmg could be had against the peuuoner". The.
detenu was, therefore, discharged in those cases. l he argument urged
on behalf of the detenu was that in the circumstances the order of
detention should be held to ·be. mala fide. This argument was rejected
by a Division Bench in !he fo1lo~ing words :
.. In our opinion, even if it may be assumed that cases
were registered against the petitioner by the police in respect
of the two incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention aml
the police as a res\tlt of the investigation could not procure
evidence to sustain the, conviction
of the petitioner,
that
fact would not be sufficient to hold that the detention order
m~de against the petitioner was mala fide. The matter is
indeed concluded bv a decision of this Court in the case.
of Sahib Singh DugaJ, v. Union of India.P) The petitioner in
that case was arreste(l on December 6, 1964, for offence
under the Official Secrets Act.
On March 11, 1965, the
Investigating Officer made a report to the Court to the effect
that the petitioner and others involved- in that criminal case
might be discharged as sufficient evidence for their conviction.
could not be discovered during the investigation. The Magistrate consequently discharged the
petitioner
and
others.
Immediately after the petitioner came out of the Jail, he
was servet:l with an order for his ·detention under
Rule
3()( 1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules. One of the con-
. tentions which was advanced on behalf of the petitioner In
petition under Article 3 2 of the Constitution was that the
detention order was mala fide .inasmuch as it had been made
after the authorities had decided to drop criminal proceedings because of inability to get sufficient evidence to secure
conviction. This contention was repelted by this Court and
it was held that th!;' above circumstance was not sufficient
t~ lead to th~ inference that. the action of the detaining authont.y was mala fide.
This Court observed :
"We cani10t infer merely from the f'act thnt the authorities decilded to drop the case under the Official Secrets
Act and thereaf.ter to order the detention of the petitioners
under the Rules that the order of detention was niala ftde."
Jn view of the above, we hold that the order for the detention of the petitioner h~s not been shown to be mala
fide."
We must for the same reason's hold that the order of detentk
made by the District Magistrate in the present case does not guff
from the vice of .mala fidp or colourable exercise of power.
· These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner
and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule·
is discharge(}.
P.B.R.
Petition dismissed;
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(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R. 313.