# JOSE DA COSTA & ANOTHER v. BASCORA SADASHIVA SINAI NARCORNIM & ANR

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 1067
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-04-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1521 of 1968
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jose-da-costa-another-v-bascora-sadashiva-sinai-narcornim-anr-6728
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

10 67
A
Ownership by prescription or adverse possessio11-K11owledge of possessionPosse,~sion for a long tin1e-Peaceful-Pennissible
posJession
whether
su!JiB
cient.
Porruraiese Civil Code-Articles 474, 505, 510, 528 and 529.
The respondent plaintiffs instituted a suit in 1961 in accordance with the
Portuguese law then in force in those territories for ejectmcnt of the defendantappellants from the suit property. It was alleged in the plaint that on the
death of father of the plaintiff No. 1. Sadashiva the suit land was assigned to
Sitabai mother of plaintiff No. 1 and that on the death of Sitabai the property devolved on the respondent No. 1 and his 6 sisters.
It was also contended that the house built on a portion of the land in dispute and occ.upied by
the defendants should be removed by the defendants and the defendants should
be directed to hand-over vacant possession of the plot to the respondents. The
appellants in their written statement pleaded that the suit property was given
on perpetual lease to the ancestors of the appellants and that no rent was paid
for over 40 years. The appellants further contended that the suit property was
in their open peaceful and continuous possession including that of their predece:i;sors in interest as owners for a period of more than 50 years and that they
have acquired a title by prescription.
The trial court decreed the suit. An appeal filed by the appellants before
the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner was dismissed. When the matter
came up before this Court by special leave this Court remanded the matter to
the court of the Judicial Commissioner for a finding on the plea of prescription raised by the appellants. The learned Judicial Commissioner after remand
.came to the conclusion that the appellants have failed to prove the acquisition
of full title to the suit property by prescription under the law in force at the
relevant time. The learned Judicial Commissioner also held that the appellants failed to establish their plea of perpetual lease.
Partly allowing the appeal,
c
D
E
HEID : (1) In view of the earlier decision of this
Court~ this Court
would be justified in deciding the appeal only on the question of plea of pres·
cription. The appellants had been in continuous possession of the enitre plot
of land described in para 1 of the plaint which has a larger area includin·g
the portion where the house of the appellant stands. In the year 1920, the
F
respondents sought to make their construction on the vacant portion of the
land close to the appellants' house which led to opposition and obstruction
from the appellants. Later on, the appellants agreed to the construction by
the respondents. However. so far as the land on which the appellants had
their house is concerned there was no proof nor any evidence of any change
on the part of the appellants to their open hostility to the respondents' title
to the same. The respondents did not give any evidence of any such amicable
solution.
On the other hand. it is admitted that they had reported. to the
G
Administrator without even caring to know the result of such action against
the appellants. The further fact that the respondents annexed to the plaint
a certified copy of the partition deed of 1920 which was obtained as early as
in 1920 goes to show that they were fully cognizant of the· public assertion
by the appellants of their own title, to the land on which their house stands
repudiating that of the respondents.
The learned Judicial Commissioner has
erred in holding that the appellants have not been able to prove an overt act
of possession to the knowledge of the respondents. According to Art. 474
of the Portuguese Civil Code oossession is defined as holding or fruition of
H
anything or right. The acts done by licence or permission do not constitute
possession. According to Article 505 things and rights are acquired by virtue
of_ possession. just as obligations are extinguished by reason of not demand~
ing their fulfilment. The

## Text

JOSE DA COSTA & ANOTHER
V.
BASCORA SADASHIVA SINAI NARCORNIM & ANR.
April 7, 1976
[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
10 67
A
Ownership by prescription or adverse possessio11-K11owledge of possessionPosse,~sion for a long tin1e-Peaceful-Pennissible
posJession
whether
su!JiB
cient.
Porruraiese Civil Code-Articles 474, 505, 510, 528 and 529.
The respondent plaintiffs instituted a suit in 1961 in accordance with the
Portuguese law then in force in those territories for ejectmcnt of the defendantappellants from the suit property. It was alleged in the plaint that on the
death of father of the plaintiff No. 1. Sadashiva the suit land was assigned to
Sitabai mother of plaintiff No. 1 and that on the death of Sitabai the property devolved on the respondent No. 1 and his 6 sisters.
It was also contended that the house built on a portion of the land in dispute and occ.upied by
the defendants should be removed by the defendants and the defendants should
be directed to hand-over vacant possession of the plot to the respondents. The
appellants in their written statement pleaded that the suit property was given
on perpetual lease to the ancestors of the appellants and that no rent was paid
for over 40 years. The appellants further contended that the suit property was
in their open peaceful and continuous possession including that of their predece:i;sors in interest as owners for a period of more than 50 years and that they
have acquired a title by prescription.
The trial court decreed the suit. An appeal filed by the appellants before
the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner was dismissed. When the matter
came up before this Court by special leave this Court remanded the matter to
the court of the Judicial Commissioner for a finding on the plea of prescription raised by the appellants. The learned Judicial Commissioner after remand
.came to the conclusion that the appellants have failed to prove the acquisition
of full title to the suit property by prescription under the law in force at the
relevant time. The learned Judicial Commissioner also held that the appellants failed to establish their plea of perpetual lease.
Partly allowing the appeal,
c
D
E
HEID : (1) In view of the earlier decision of this
Court~ this Court
would be justified in deciding the appeal only on the question of plea of pres·
cription. The appellants had been in continuous possession of the enitre plot
of land described in para 1 of the plaint which has a larger area includin·g
the portion where the house of the appellant stands. In the year 1920, the
F
respondents sought to make their construction on the vacant portion of the
land close to the appellants' house which led to opposition and obstruction
from the appellants. Later on, the appellants agreed to the construction by
the respondents. However. so far as the land on which the appellants had
their house is concerned there was no proof nor any evidence of any change
on the part of the appellants to their open hostility to the respondents' title
to the same. The respondents did not give any evidence of any such amicable
solution.
On the other hand. it is admitted that they had reported. to the
G
Administrator without even caring to know the result of such action against
the appellants. The further fact that the respondents annexed to the plaint
a certified copy of the partition deed of 1920 which was obtained as early as
in 1920 goes to show that they were fully cognizant of the· public assertion
by the appellants of their own title, to the land on which their house stands
repudiating that of the respondents.
The learned Judicial Commissioner has
erred in holding that the appellants have not been able to prove an overt act
of possession to the knowledge of the respondents. According to Art. 474
of the Portuguese Civil Code oossession is defined as holding or fruition of
H
anything or right. The acts done by licence or permission do not constitute
possession. According to Article 505 things and rights are acquired by virtue
of_ possession. just as obligations are extinguished by reason of not demand~
ing their fulfilment. The law lays do'\vn conditions and the period of time
A
B
c
D
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
that are necessary for one as well as for the other thing and that is called'.
prescription. Under Article 528 of the Portuguese Code in the absence
of
registration of possession or title of acquisition prescription with respect to
immovable
property
or
rights
to
immovable
will
ope·
rate
by
virtue
of
possession
for
15
years.
Under
Art.
529
.J
when the possession of immovable property or rights to immovable property rhas lasted for a period of 30 years prescription will operate. Under the Porto·
guese lav;.· what appears to be clear is that permissive possession: is not suffi·
cient to prescribe title of the owner of the land. There is no evidence what~
seever for the conclusion of the Judicial Commissioner that the possession Of
the appellants was permissible under the respondents. On the other hand,
evidence is agai~t recognition by the appellants of any title in the respondents.
We are, therefore, left with the long continuous and peaceful, possession by the
appellants of the land with the residential house thereon since the time of their
ancestors after a clear repudiation of the title of the respondents to the land
in 1920. The fact that the appellants set up title in Vishnu Narcomim describing him as respondents' ancestor does not affect the position in view of
the respon,dents' denial that Vishnu had anything to do with the land. The
Jutiicial Commissioner fell into an error by not keeping the distinction Between Vishnu's title and the respondents' title. The origin of ownership of land
being dipped in the misty past what emerges from the evidence in the absence
of proof of lease or permission by the respondents' own ancestors is that the
appellants have been in long and open possession of the land over which they
I.
Iave constructed their house for a period long ~nough for that possession to '-"'
ripen into ownership. The appellants have acquired title to the said land by
prescription. Since there is no proof of permissive possession under the res~
pondents or their ancestors there is no question of application of Article 510.
The learned counsel for the appellants has confined his claim in this case only
to the land on which appellants have their house. The suit of the respond~
ents so far as it relates to the portion of the land on which the appellants
have their house is dismissed and in respect of the remaining portion of land
is decreed. [1070G, !072A-D. 1073A-H, !074A-C, !075D-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1521 of 1968
E
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the
F
G
20th January,
1968 of the Court of Addi. Judicial Commr.,
Goa
Daman, Diu in Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1966.
)<,
U. R. Lalit, K. Rajendra Chowdhary, Mrs. Veena Khanna and
S. L. Setia, for the appellants.
V. M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J.-The appellants in this appeal by
special
leave
Jose da Costa and his wife, Isabela Braganca, are the defendants and
the respondents, Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornim and his wife,
Durgabai Narcornim, are the plaintiffs in the original suit.
The plaintiffs instituted a suit in the court of Judge of Quempem
<
Comarca on February 27, 1961, in accordance with the Portuguese
~
law then in force in those territories for ejectment of the defendants
from the suit property. It was alleged that on the death of Sadashiva,
father
of the plaintiff, Bascora,
in
partition
proceedings
with
H
minors (inventario), this plot was assigned to Bascora's mother, Sitabai,
towards her moiety in the estate.
On Sitabai's death, the property
devolved on the plaintiffs, Bascora and his six sisters.
Before the
partition of the property among the legal heirs of Sitabai,
Bascora
...
JOSE DA COSTA "· BASCORA SADASHIVA (Goswami. !.)
l 069
acquired the rights from some of his sisters and became the. o"'.ner
of the suit property with other heirs.
Bascora's parents had mhentecl
this properly from their ancestors.
The father of Bascora h~d pc~-
mitted the ancestors of the defendants to bmld a house for thc1r residence on a part of the property subject to the condition that they
shall have to vacate the plot when called upon to do so.
In the. latter
event, they shall be entitled to remove the super-structures of
the
building raised by them.
Even so, the plaint goes on to say that
Caetana
Esperanea
Fernandes the mother of the appellant, Jose da Costa, executed
a
deed on November 16, 1920, before the notary public of Comarca,
which indicated that she and her family members were owners of
the plot.
On the basis of this deed, the defendants asserted ownership of that part of the plot on which stands the house built by their
~:nce~tors and nO\V in their occupation.
On the above allegations. the plaintiffs prayed fc.r a declaration
that the plaintiff, Bascora, and the other heirs of his mother. SiLabai,
are the only owners of the plot in dispute and that the house in
the
occupation of the defendants on a part of that plot was c()nstruct.ed
in the circumstances and subject to the terms mentioned in the plaint.
They further prayed that ,the defendants be directed to vacate the
f'\Ot after removing the materials of their house.
The defendants denied the allegations and pleaded that it
was
Visnum Bascom Sinai Narcornim, an ancester of the plaintiffs, who
had given the suit property on perpetual lease to Pascoal da Costa, an
ancestor of the defendants in the year 1875. at an annual rent of rupees
>(
2 4/-.
It was stated further that no such rent has been paid for over
forty years before the suit nor has any rent ever been claimed by the
family of the plaintiffs for such a long time.
It was Pascoal da Costa
who possessed the plot as his own and originally built one house on it,
but subsequently his descendants constructed more houses so that
at present there are three houses and one stable on the plot in dispute.
On Pascoal de Costa's death, in inventario proceedings, this property
on November 16, 1920, was "consolidated in full ownership in the
!'atritnony of the descendants of the said Pascoa~ cla C\ista. n
The defendants further aver in their written statement that the
suit property has been in their "open, peaceful and continuous" possession including that of their predecessors-in-interest. as owners for a
period o' more than 50 years and that they have acquired title hy
prescription.
The trial court decreed the suit on April 30. J 9f.6., directing the
d2fendants ~o ren1ove the:r supcrstruatures on th·: land or in th~;. alt..:rnative to receive from the plaintiffs Rs. 10841- which was found to be
the value of the materials of the house in question as per estimate of
the experts appointed for the purpose.
On appeal the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner dismissed the same on January 20, 1968,
and affirmed the decree of the trial court.
The defendants came to
this Court by special leave against the judgment of the Additional
Judicial Commissioner and this Court by its order dated August
1,
t8-72iSCI/76
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
1975, which has since been reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 1853, remanded
the appeal to the Judicial Commissioner for a finding on the plea of
prescnption raised by the defendants by observing as follows :-
yi
"The plea of prescription goes to the root of the matter.
It was raised by the defendants in their pleadings and the
matter was put in issue.
It was again taken up in the
grounds of appeal filed in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, but was left undecided.
For the purpose of doing
complete justice in the case, we think it necessary to have the
advantage of the finding of the court below on this issue.
Accordingly, we remit this case to the Co_urt of the Judicial
Commissioner, Goa Daman and Diu with the direction that
it should after rehearing the parties record a specilic Jinding
. on the issue as to whether the defendants had acquired full
title to the suit property by prescription under the law in
force at the relevant time.
The Judicial Commissiqner shall
submit his report with reasons therefor to this Court within
~
four months from the date on which the records are received
in his court. In the meantime the appeal shall remain pending in this Court."
We have actually taken the facts of this case from the above decision.
The Judicial Commissioner 'has since submitted his report dated
December 5, 1975, and the appeal has come up before us for final
hearing.
After examining the entire evidence, oral and documentary,
the
Judicial Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the defendants
have failed to prove their acquisition of full title to the ,suii 'property )(,
by prescription under the Jaw in force at the relevant time.
During the hearing we did not have before us any printed Portuguese Civil Code or any standard legal treatise to which we ;would have
ordianily liked to refer.
Counsel for the appellants, however, produced
certain extracts from various articles to which counsel for the respondents has not taken any exception. There is also reference ~ certain
articles from the Portuguese Civil Code in the earlier judgment of this
Court as also in the Report submitted by the Judical GQmmissioner.
Bot)l the parties accept those articles as correct, although the original
books are not before us.
In view of the earlier decision of this Court and after hearing the
parties we feel that we will be justified to decide this appeal only on
the question relating to the plea of prescription .
. Since the original perpetul!l lease was not produced iJ;I aJllr,t and
a certified copy of the original translation of the perpetual. Je~e issued
on November 23, 1920, was alqne produced, we have po f,eaS.Qll to
dis~J!ree with the conch,1sion qf the, ll!Rki~I ~sioner that the
defendants failed to estaltlish tb,eir ple:;i of pe,pe~l!:il JCllSe qf the land.
Before we may proceed .further it will be approPfiate to rote t.hat
even the plaintiffs themselves laid a nucleus fot the plea of adverse
•
)
..
JOSE DA COSTA v. BASCORA SADASHIYA (Goswami, !.)
I 071
possession to be easily taken up by the defendants.
Para 5 of the
plaint may, therefore, be quoted :-
"5. Notwithstanding this, the mother and mother-in-la\\
of the defendants Caetana Esperanca Fernandes with the
ambition of alleging to the said plot of the plaintiffs rights
that do not assist her, participated as an executing party
in a deed drawn up on 16 Noyember, 1920, by the former
notary public of this Comarca, Salinho da Silva, wherein a
plot having the denomination of
"Deulacodil tucda"
or
"Mordi" was partitioned, one-third of which was assigned
to the said Caetana, and with basis in that partition the
defendants allege to be the owners of the ground whereon
the said house raised by their ascendants is situate."
Indeed this repudiation of title of the plaintiffs by the defendants gave
rise to the cause of action.
We cannot accept the submission of
Mr. Tarkunde on behalf of the respondents that the word "allege" in
the above paragraph in the present tense makes any difference in the
matter of the plea.
A
B
c
Not only in the plaint, but also in the evidence, the plaintiff Bascora
gave further reinforeemenf to the plea of adverse possession when he
D
stated thus :
" ..... in 1920 the deponent (that is the plaintiff), desiring to build the house existing in the plot of land, there were
disputes raise-0 by defendant's motlier and by one Santana
Costa and then the deponent (that is the plaintiff) notified
them through the Administration Office of Sanguem to vacate
the plot land.
He does not know what subsequent course
his petition had ....... "
Mr. Tarkunde submits that there might have been some dispute
which, however, was settled and the plaintiffs built the house on the
suit land and the defendants also continued on the land under
the
E
earlier permissive arrangement.
Mr. Tarkunde draws our attention
F
to the following passage in the evidence of defendant No. 1 :-
"In 1920 more or less, the plaintiff built a house in the
plot in question and begun to stay there.
The same house
was built very near the house where the deponent (that is
the defendant No. 1) stays and which alreac!y existed at the
time of that building.
The deponent was about 14 or 15
years old.
The grandfather of the deponent Pascoal da
Costa and his uncle Francisco Piedade Costa and even the
deponent's mother opposed the said building raised by the
plaintiff.
The question was amicably solved at the house
of Narcornins Bencares to which the plaintiff belongs, to the
effect that the plaintiff should build the house and reside in
it as well as the said persons who had their houses in it
should continue to res;de therein.
The deponent came to
know of these facts regarding the dispute and its solution after
hearing his said uncle Francisco Piedade da Costa."
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
107 2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
Apart from the fact that the above is hearsay evidence we
are
clearly of the view that the statement is not sufficient to annihilate the
.
j
theory of repudiation of the title of the plaintiffs to the propertY: It
r·
stands to reason that the defendants had been in continuous possession
of the entire plot of land described in para 1 of the plaint which is
a larger area including the portion where the house of the defendants
stands.
In the year 1926 the plaintiffs sought to make their constmction on the vacant portion of the land close to the defendants' house
which led to opposition and obstruction from the defendants.
At
that time apparently the defendants later agreed to the constmction by
the plaintiffs and that seems to be the reference to the "amicable"
solution in the above extract.
So far as the land on which the defendants had their house, there
was no proof nor any evidence of any change on the part of the defendants to their open hostility to the plaintiffs' . title to the same.
The
plaintiffs did not give any evidence of any such amicable solution. On
~
the other hand, it is admitted that they had reported to the Administrator without even caring to know the result of such action against
the defendants.
The further fact that along with the plaint
the
plaintiffs annexed a certified copy of the partition deed of November
16, 1920, which copy was obtained as early as on December 22, 1920goes to show that they were fully cognizant of the public assertion by
the defendants of their own title to the land on which their house stands
repudiating that of the plaintiffs.
Mr. Tarkunde submits that there ·
is no evidence that this document had been actually obtained by the
plaintiffs, but production of the document without any explanation from
the side of the plaintiffs speaks a volume about their knowledge of
the repudiation of title.
·
)<:
Mr. Tarkunde also invited our attention to the statement of defendant No. 1 to the effect :
"that the plaintiff for reasons of enmity does not receive
this rent nor he ever asked for its payment to the deponent
(that is defendant No. 1) and other members of his family."
This statement cannot be tom from the context of the alternative plea
set up by the defendants.
This statement is fairly consistent with
the alternative plea of perpetual lease of the land set up by the defendants.
According to the defendants the land had been in their occupation on perpetual lease from Visnum Narcomim, the plaintiffs' paternal uncle and once that would have been acknowledged by the plaintiffs the defendants would perhaps be willing to pay even to the plaintiffs the annual rent.
But it is the clear case of the plaintiffs tha.t
the story of perpetual lease was false and fraudulent and besides that
Visnum Narcornim had no interest in the land and was not competent
or 1uthorised to lease out the same.
We, therefore, cannot accept
the e,xaggerated importance to the above statement of the defendant
No. 1 in his cross-examination.
The Judicial Commissioner, however, rightly observed that "an
overt act of possession to the knowledge of the plaintiffs nnd their
(
/
y'
) •
JOSE DA COSTA v. BASCORA SADASHIVA (Goswami, J.)
1073
ascendants must be shown to have taken palce."
From the above
discussion, we have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that
the defendants have been able to establish the same and the Judcial
Commissioner is not right in taking a contrary view.
According to Article 474 of the Portuguese Civil Code, "Possession
is defined as holding or fruition of any thing or right.
Para 1.
The
acts done by licence or permission do not constitute possession .... "
According to Article 505, ' things and ;ights are acquired by virtue
of possession, just as obligations are extinguished by reas.on of not
demanding their fulfihnent.
The law lays down conditions and the
period of time that are necessary for one as well as for the
other
thing.
This is called prescription.
A
"
,_)
Proviso.
The acquisition of things and rights is known as positive
C
prescriptjon; the discharge of the obligations by reason of not demanding their fulfilment is known as negative prescription."
Article 528 reads thus :
"In the absence of registration of possession or title of
acquisition, prescription with respect to immovable property
or rights to immovable will operate by virtue of possession for
D
15 years."
Article 529 of the Code is as follows :-
"When, however, the possession of immovable property
or rights to immovable property referred to in the foregoing
article has lasted for a period of 30 years, prescription will
operate; and no mala fide or absence of title can be averred,
except the provisions of Article 510."
Thus even under the Portuguese law what appears to be clear is
that permissive possession is not sufficient to prescribe title of the
owner of the land.
E
The Judicial Commissioner was not right in holding that possession
F
of the defendants was permissive under the plaintiffs.
There is no
evidence is against recognition by the defendants of any title in the
evidence is against recognition by the defondants :if any title in
the
plaintiffs as such.
The Judicial Commissioner mistook the defendants'
admission of the alleged perpetual lease under Visnum Narcornim as
permissive occupation under the plaintiffs even after holding :hat the
defendants failed to establish perpetual lease.
G
We are, therefore, left with the long, continuous and peaceful possession by the defendants of the land with the residential house thereon
since the time of their ancestors after a clear repudiation of the title
of the plaintiffs to the land in 1920.
The fact that the defendants set
up title in Visnum Narcornim describing him as plaintiffs' ancestor,
does not affect the position in view of the plaintiffs' avowed denial that
H
Visnum Narcornim had anything to do with the land.
Visnum
Narcornirn is survived by his own descendants and we are not dealing
with a case where Visnum Narcornim's heirs as such have
sought
A
B
c
D
11)74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 s.c.R.
eviction of the defendants from the land.
The plaintiffs do not accept
Visnum Narcornim's title to the land as their title.
The
Judicial
Commissioner fell into an error becau.se of not keeping the distinction
between Visnum Narcorllim's title to the land and the plaintiffs' title
to the same.
The origin of ownership of the suit land being dipped
in the misty past what emerges from the evidence, in the absence of
proof of lease or permission by the plaintiff)>' own
an~estors, is
the defendants have been in long and open possession of the land
over which they have constructed their house for a period long enough
for that possession to ripen into ownership.
The defendants in our
opinion should be held to have acquired title to the said land by
prescription.
There being no proof whatsoever of permissive possession under
the plaintiffs or their ancestors, there is no question of application 0f
the rule laid down under Article 510, relied upon by Mr. Tarkunde.
Article 510 reads thus :
"One who possesses a thing in another's name cannot
acquire it by prescription except if the title of possession has
been inverted, either due to an act of a third pai:Jy, or by
objection raised by the possessor to the right of the other
in whose name he was possessing it and not refuted by the
latter; but in such event the prescription shall run from the
date of inversion of the title.
Sole para : The title is said
to be inverted when it is substituted by another title capable
of transferring the possession or ownership (dominio)."
E
According to the Judicial Commissioner the above Article is applicable and since the defendants could not prove that there had been
at some time "in,version of title" their po~session was merely "detencaon
(namely, a precarious possession) and such physical detencao without
"animus" cannot be invoked for the purpose of claiming any effect
that possession in one's own name or as of right connotes.
It is
difficult to see how Article 510 can be attracted to the instant case.
F
The defendants had at no time possessed the land on which their house
stands in the name of the plaintiffs.
They were never accepting the
position of permissive possession under the plaintiffs and had asserted
perpetual lease under Visnu.m Narcornim, who, even according to the
plaintiffs, was an unauthgrised person.
Article 510 would not be
attracted to this case when the defendants alternatively were possessing
in the name of Visnum Narcornim or his descendants.
Article 510
G
is, therefore, clearly out of the way.
We are, therefore, not even
required to consider whether there was any "inversion of title"
in
this case or not.
It is clear that the defendants' ancestors and, after them, the defendants have been in possession of the land since 1815. Title of the plaintiffs was repudiated openly in the year 1920.
The d>fendants are
H
in possession by occupying the house standing on the land and the
house was constructed by the defendants' ancestors.
The plaintiffs
had made a complaint about their conduct in denying their title t-0 the
land and in opposing their construction as early as in 1920.
The
)(
..
f.
)
JOSE DA COSTA r. BASCORA SADASIJIVA (Goswami, J.)
1075
passivity and inertness of the plaintiffs thereafter for over forty years
till the institution of the suit in 1961 clearly establishes the plea
of
prescrjption set up by the defendants.
It is significant that even the plaintiffs, being out of possession of
the land in suit for a long number of years and having constructed
their house on a, portion of the land only in the year 1920, sought
to establish the title to the property "by virtue of the prescription liiat
operated in their favour" (see paragraph 3 of the plaint).
Mr. Tarkunde has made a further submission, which appears
to
have received approval of the Judicial Commissioner, that the defendants' witnesses while d~cribing the land in suit acknowledged it as
"the plaintiffs' land". It may not be overlooked that the plaintiffs also
have their own house on a part of the land.
We, therefore, cannot
agree that the defendants' witnesses by identifying the land in suit in
that manner defeated the claim of the defendants with
regard
to
the adverse possession.
·
We n1av observe that
Mr. L'<lli1:, the learned counsel
fer
appellants, ·fairly conceded that he was conlinin!! his claim in
case only to the land on which the defendants have their house.
the
this
The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed.
The plaintiffs' suit for
title to the land in occupation of the defendants and for their eviction
so far as that portion of the land with their house on it is concerned
is dismissed.
The plaintiffs' suit for declaration in respect of
the
remaining portion of the land, however, is decreed.
As there is no
prayer for eviction of any person other than the defendants, that claim
is rejected.
We express no opinion with regard to the claim
of
persons who may be in occupation of the land other than the defendants who are not impleaded in the suit and against whom no relier
has been claimed.
The judgment and decree of the Additional Judicial Conuni5sioner to the extent indicated in this judgment arc set aside.
There wi1l be, however, no order as to costs.
P.H.P.
Appeal allowed in part.
A
B
c
D
E
F