# JSO SUBHAS CHANDRA AND 01HERS v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELW AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1965] 1 S.C.R. 350
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 33 of 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. WANCllOO, M. Hidayatullah, RAGllUBAR DAYAL, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jso-subhas-chandra-and-01hers-v-municipal-corporation-of-delw-and-another-3319
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Punjab Municipal A.ct (Pun;. Ill of 1911), ss. 232, 235 and 236--
Scopt of.
The now defunct Municipal C<>mmitlee of Delhi resolved in Novembor 1957 that a graduate allowance should be paid to its graduate rlerlt.s
in the junior grade. The Municipal Committee was replaced by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi under Act 66 of 1957 and the Commissioner
of the Corporation admitted the claim only of those graduate junior
grade clerks who were granted permission to pursue higher studies
before July 1954. The petitioners who were other clerical employees
serving the C..orporation moved the Supreme Court by a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution alleging that the order of the Commis.<iooer
was discriminatory becau."IC there \vas no rational basis for excluding
them from the benefits of the resolution.
The respondents contended
that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi by his order G<'ted October 30,
1956, pused under s. 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911 ),
had prohibited the granting of such special pays or
other pecuniary
benefits and so, the impugned order being itself without jurisdiction the
petitioners could not complain of. being discriminated against.
HELD : The Order of the Chief Commissionor was
pcrfect.ly
legal and in view of that Order it w.s not open to the Committee to
sanction the payment of any allowance to any of its employees in November 1957. The rcsolutjon being without jurisdiction, the Commissioner
·Of the Corporation could not treat it as a basis for
sanctioning
the
graduate allowance to a graduate employee. ·rhe order of the Commis!ioncr being thus illegal, no question of discrimination arises and
lhe petition should be dismissed. (359 B-D].
By virtuo of the provisions of the Delhi Laws Act 1912, Adaptation
of Laws Order, 1950, and s. 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the
Chief Commissioner could make the order under s.
232 of the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911.
He had two sources of power under s. 232 and
s. 236 and was free to avail himself of either source. Section
232
certainly empowered him to
prohibit the
Committee from
granting
special pay or other pecuniary advantage to its employees when it was
"about to" do so.
Wben the doing of an act was so prohibited, the
Committee ceased to have any power to do it and a resolution passed
hy it that such act may be done can have no legal
validity .. The
precise meaning that should be given to the expression
11about to" de-
~
upon the context io which it is used, but there is no diftlcuhy
1n the instant case because, the order it.self mentions that it wu made
to appear to the Chief Commissioner that the Municipal Committee waa
"about to" grant special pay or other pecuniary benefits to some of its
employees. Though no opportunity was given to the Committee u r&-
<iuired by s. 235 of the Punjab Municipal Act, the Committee can
acquiesce and waive such oon-<:ompliance, and since the section does DOI
-require that an opportunity should be pveo to the parties affected by
~:
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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SUBHAS CHAND&>, v. MUNICIPAL CORPOKAr!O"<' ( Mudholkar /.) 351
A
the Order of the Chief Commissioner, they are not entitled to say the
Order is bad. Further, the section would
be inapplicable in a case
where the Order was passed by the .Chief Commissioner himself. [3540G; 35SA-C. 0-F: 3570-G; 358F-Gt
·
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 33 of 1964.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
B enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
c
K. Baldev Mehta, for the petitioners.
S. G. Patwardhan and 0. C. Mathur for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court wiis delivered by
Mudholkar J. Eleven clerical employees serving the
Corporation of Delhi have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for quashing an order dated . November 5, 1958
made by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Delhi
and
issuing a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, order or
D direction requiring the respondents to give effect to a resolution
dated November 1/8, 1957 passed by

## Text

JSO
SUBHAS CHANDRA AND 01HERS
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELW AND ANOTHER
&ptember 25, 1964
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCllOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGllUBAR DAYAL AND
J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Punjab Municipal A.ct (Pun;. Ill of 1911), ss. 232, 235 and 236--
Scopt of.
The now defunct Municipal C<>mmitlee of Delhi resolved in Novembor 1957 that a graduate allowance should be paid to its graduate rlerlt.s
in the junior grade. The Municipal Committee was replaced by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi under Act 66 of 1957 and the Commissioner
of the Corporation admitted the claim only of those graduate junior
grade clerks who were granted permission to pursue higher studies
before July 1954. The petitioners who were other clerical employees
serving the C..orporation moved the Supreme Court by a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution alleging that the order of the Commis.<iooer
was discriminatory becau."IC there \vas no rational basis for excluding
them from the benefits of the resolution.
The respondents contended
that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi by his order G<'ted October 30,
1956, pused under s. 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911 ),
had prohibited the granting of such special pays or
other pecuniary
benefits and so, the impugned order being itself without jurisdiction the
petitioners could not complain of. being discriminated against.
HELD : The Order of the Chief Commissionor was
pcrfect.ly
legal and in view of that Order it w.s not open to the Committee to
sanction the payment of any allowance to any of its employees in November 1957. The rcsolutjon being without jurisdiction, the Commissioner
·Of the Corporation could not treat it as a basis for
sanctioning
the
graduate allowance to a graduate employee. ·rhe order of the Commis!ioncr being thus illegal, no question of discrimination arises and
lhe petition should be dismissed. (359 B-D].
By virtuo of the provisions of the Delhi Laws Act 1912, Adaptation
of Laws Order, 1950, and s. 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the
Chief Commissioner could make the order under s.
232 of the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911.
He had two sources of power under s. 232 and
s. 236 and was free to avail himself of either source. Section
232
certainly empowered him to
prohibit the
Committee from
granting
special pay or other pecuniary advantage to its employees when it was
"about to" do so.
Wben the doing of an act was so prohibited, the
Committee ceased to have any power to do it and a resolution passed
hy it that such act may be done can have no legal
validity .. The
precise meaning that should be given to the expression
11about to" de-
~
upon the context io which it is used, but there is no diftlcuhy
1n the instant case because, the order it.self mentions that it wu made
to appear to the Chief Commissioner that the Municipal Committee waa
"about to" grant special pay or other pecuniary benefits to some of its
employees. Though no opportunity was given to the Committee u r&-
<iuired by s. 235 of the Punjab Municipal Act, the Committee can
acquiesce and waive such oon-<:ompliance, and since the section does DOI
-require that an opportunity should be pveo to the parties affected by
~:
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUBHAS CHAND&>, v. MUNICIPAL CORPOKAr!O"<' ( Mudholkar /.) 351
A
the Order of the Chief Commissioner, they are not entitled to say the
Order is bad. Further, the section would
be inapplicable in a case
where the Order was passed by the .Chief Commissioner himself. [3540G; 35SA-C. 0-F: 3570-G; 358F-Gt
·
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 33 of 1964.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
B enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
c
K. Baldev Mehta, for the petitioners.
S. G. Patwardhan and 0. C. Mathur for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court wiis delivered by
Mudholkar J. Eleven clerical employees serving the
Corporation of Delhi have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for quashing an order dated . November 5, 1958
made by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Delhi
and
issuing a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, order or
D direction requiring the respondents to give effect to a resolution
dated November 1/8, 1957 passed by the Executive and Finance
Sub-Committee of the now defunct Municipal Committee of
Delhi.
The main ground on 'which the reliefs
are claimed is
that the action of the Conuni!isioner in making the order has
E
resulted in ·discrimination against the petitioners.
. In order to appreciate the point some facts h_ave to be stated.
Prior to the year 1948 the Municipal Committee recruited
matriculates and non-matriculates as clerks in the junior grade of
Rs. 35-2-65-3-95, In order to attract better qualified persons they
offered Rs. 45 as starting salary for graduates in this grade.
F Thereafter the Committee, by its resolution dated September 16,
1948, revised the grades and scales of pay for its entire staff on
the basis of the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission
appointed by the Government of lndia. By this resolution the
Committee created two junior grades for recruitment of clerks,
a grade of Rs. 55-3-85-4-125-5-130 for matriculates and
the
G
grade of Rs. 45-2-55-3-95-4-105 for non-matriculates.
According to the petitioners Pie Committee, in order
to
attract graduates and persons of higher academic qualifications
and for giving an impetus to the clerical employees for punum,
higher studies, decided by the same resolution, inter al.ia,
that
graduates working in the junior grade would be paid a "gnduate
ff .allowance" of Rs. 20 p.m. Further, according to them, this wu
sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner. Delhi by Memo No. P •
. 2(102)48-L.S.G. dated July 26/27, 1949.
352
SUPUMB OOU1T llEPOllTS
(1965] I S.C.ll.
It is common ground that by resolution No. 447 dated July
A
16, 1954 as amended by resolution No. 550 dated July 30, 19.54
the Committee stopped payment of the graduate allowance to
future recruits but continued its payment to such of the permanent and temporary employees in the junior grade who were
already in receipt of the allowance.
Thirty employees of the
Committee made representations to the Committee against conE
fining the payment of the allowance only to those persons who
were already in receipt of it and demanded that this allowance
should be paid to every employee who passed his B.A. examination after 1954 as well as to every graduate employee recruited
after 1954.
This representation
succeeded and by resolution
No. 693 dated November 1, 1957 the Committee resolved that
C
the system of payment of personal pay of Rs. 20 per mensem to
all graduates in the junior grade be revived and that the neces.,ary
sanction of the Chief Commissioner to this proposal be obtained.
On Noven~ber 8, 1957 the Committee amended the aforesaid
resolution :>y resolution No. 701 and directed that the words
0
"Necessary sanction of the Chief Commissioner be obtained"
aprearing at the end of the resolution be deleted. According to the
petitioners, therefore, this resolution came into operation immediately and they became entitled to payment of Rs. 20, with
retrospective effect.
Before this resolution could be implemented the Municipal
E
Committee of Delhi was replaced by the Municipal Corporation
nf Delhi by the coming into force of the Delhi Corporation Act,
1957 (66 of 1957). The petitioners, therefore, approached the
(\1111missioner of the Corporation and requested him to give effect
tn the resolution of November 1, 1957 as amended by the resolut inn dated November 8, 1957.
By Office Order No. 1343 FSf
F
(58) dated November 5, 1958 the Commissioner admitted the
claim for payment of graduate allowance to those graduate junior
~rade clerks of the erstwhile Delhi Municipal Committee who
had heen granted permission to pursue higher studie; hefore July
30. 1954. but not to the remaining 18 persons.
The grievance
of the petitioners is that this Order of the Commissioner is dis·
G
criminatory because there is no rational basis for excluding them
from the henefit of the aforementioned resolution of the Committee.
The petitioners then moved a petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab but eventually withdrew it.
They have now come to this Court under
Art. 32 of tho Constitution.
H
1'be petitioners' application is resisted on behalf of the Corporation on two main grounds.
The first ground is that they
SUBHAS CHANDRA v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Mudholkar /.) 353
A have come to this Court after a long delay and the other ground
is that the impugned order of the Commissioner was itself without juri<dic'i' .~ .md. therefore, the petitioners cannot complain
of being discriminated against. ·
The petitioners admit that there was a delay of about five yean;
B in making this petition but they._explain it by pointing out that all
this was occasioned by reason of the fact that their writ petition
remained pending in the High Court of Punjllb for almost five
years and that they had to withdraw it .ultimately because the
learned Judge before whom the petition went for final hearing
C pointed out •hat in view of a previous decision of the High Court
a joint petition of the kind was
not entertainable.
Further,
according to them, where a person seeks to enforce a fundamental right under Art. 32 of the Constitution mere delay cannot
stand in his way.
In our opinion, it is not 11ecessary to pronounce upon this point because the petition must fail on the
D other ground urged on behalf of the respondents.
It is true that no resolution of the Committee nor any rule or
bye-law has been . brought to our notice which requires that an
employee must, before pursuing higher studies, obtain the permission of the Committee and. therefore, there was no reasonable
E basis for treating the petitioners differently from t,be 12 perSons
whose claim to the allowance was admitted by the Commissioner.
But the question is whether the Commissioner could
legally
admit the claim even of those 12 persons.
Mr.
Patwardhan,
appearing for the respondents, contends that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi by his .Order dated October 30, 1956 made in
F exercise of the powers vested in him by s. 232 of the Punjab
Municioal A··• 1911 (hereafter referred to as the Act) prohibited all municipal and notified area Committees within the Siate
of Delhi, from among other things, revising the existing scales of
pay of any of their employees and granting any spe.cial pay or
any other pecuniary benefits to them.
The Committee was
G therefore, according to Mr. Patwardhan, incompetent to. pass die
resolution No. 693 dated November 1, 1957 and then amend it
by resolution No. 701 dated November 8, 1957.
Mr. Baldev
Mehta appearinii for the petitioners challenges the validity of the
order of the Chief Commissioner on the grounds that it was
beyond the. scope of s. 232 of the Act and that rio opportunity
H
was given to the Committee to offer an explanation as contem•
plated by s. 235 of the Act nor was any order ultimately made
under that section.
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1965) I S.C.R.
In the first place, according to him, s. 232 of the Act could
A
not be resorted to by the Chief Commissioner but only by the
Deputy Commissioner.
Before the passing of Punjab Act 34 of
I 9 5 3 this section read as follows:
"232. The Commissioner or the Deputy Cornmis-
'ioner may by order in writing. suspend the execution
of any resolution or order of a committee, or joint committee or prohibit ch~ doing of any ace which is about to
be done, or is being done in pursuance of or under cover
of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the committee in the exercise of its
powers under the Act, if, in his opinion the re;olution,
or order or act is in excess of the powers con~rred by
law or contrary to the interests of the public or likely, to
cause waste or damage of municipal funds or propeny,
or the execution of the resolution or order, or the doing
of the act, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, to
encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to
the public or to any class or body of persons."
By the aforesaid Act the words "Commissioner or
the" were
deleted.
It has not been brought to our notice that the amendB
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ing Act was applied to the Stnte of Delhi.
We must, therefore.
proceed on the footing that the word "Commissioner" was still
E
there in s. 232tof the Act as applic<l to the State of Delhi. By
virtue of the provisions of the Delhi Laws Act. 1912 contained
in Schedule B as adapted by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.
the e~pression "the Commissioner" used in any enactment applicable to the State of Delhi has to be read as "tho.1 State Government of Delhi".
The expression "State Government" as defined
F
i11 sub-s. ( 60) of s. 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall a;
respects anything done l!,fter the commencement of the Constitution and before the commencement of the Constitution ( Sevr·1th
Amendment) Act, 1956 mean, in a Part C State, the Ct'e«rat
Government. "Central Government" is defined in sub-s. ( 8) of
s. 3 of that Act and me.mt in relation to a Part C State like Delhi,
G
the Chief Commissioner thereof.
Oearly, therefore, the Chief
Commissioner could make an order of the kind we have to consider here under s. 232 cf the Act.
Mr. Mehta, however, contends that what the Chief Cornrnislioner could do under the section before the Delhi Corporation Act
ol 1957 came into force was to suspend the execution of a resoluH
doa or order of a Committee or prollibit the doing of an act which
l1fllS abOUt to he done and that it did not empower him to prohibit
SUBHAS CHANDRA v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Mudholkar J.) 355
A the Municipal Committee from passing a resolution. It is true that
the section did not enable the Chief Commissioner to prohibit a
Committee from passing a particular kind of resolution but it
certainly empowered him to prohibit the Committee from doing
an act which was about to be done.
Here, the order of the
Chief Commissioner to which we have adverted, in fact prohibited
B the Committee from, among other things, granting special pay or
any other pecuniary advantage to any of its employees.
What was.
thu5 expressly prohibited was the doing of an act but not passing
of a resolution.
Even so, we think that when the doing of an act
was prohibited the Committee ceas.ed to have any power to do that
C act anti a resolution passed by it to the effect that the act be done,
can have no legal validity .
•
But, Mr. Mehta said, the power of the Chief Commissioner
was exercisable only when the Municipal Committee was about
to do something and not to prohibit something in the distant
future.
In this regard he has referred us to the meaning given
D to the expression "about to" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and
to an English decision referred to therein.
Whal precise meaning should be given to the expression must naturally depend upon
the context in which it is used but it does involve the element of
anticipation.
To this extent, therefore, Mr. Mehta is right that
s. 232 does not authoris.e the authorities mentioned therein to
E make a blanket prohibition as to the doing of an act or a series
of acts unless the authority anticipated that such acts would be
done.
There is, however, no difficulty in the case before us
becaus.e the order its.elf mentions that it had been made to appear
to the Chief Commissioner 'that the Municipal Committee of
F Delhi, amongst other things, was about to revis.e the existing
s.cales of pay of its employees, creating posts and granting ·advanc.
increments or special pay or other pecuniary benefits to some of
its existing employees.
The obvious reason for making this
order was that the Municipal Committee was soon to cease to
exist and the Corporation of Delhi to take its place. The Chief
G Commissioner, therefore, did not want the Committee to enter
into commitments which would bind its successor.
A perusal of
the proceedings of the Committee during the relevant
period
shows that the Committee had before it numerous proposals
relating_ to the emoluments of its employees and the Chief Commissio11er must have known about them.
H
Mr. Mehta then contended that if upon its true construction
s. 232 permitted the Chief Commissioner to suspend the execution
. of any resolution or order of a Committee but did not prolu"bli
356
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[1965) 1 S.C.R.
the passing of a resolution the Committee was quite competent to
A
pass the resolutions of November 1 and 8, 1957 and in this
connection he referred us to the decisions of the Punjab High
Court in Mistri Mohammad Hussain v. Municipal Committee,
Sialkot('), Lahore Municipality v. /agan Nath( 2 ) and Mahadeo
Prasad v. U. P. Government('). None of these cases helps him
B
but one of them goes against his contention.
In the first case the
Deputy Commissioner had ordered the suspension of a resolution
passed by a Committee sanctioning the construction of a platform
after the platform had been constructed.
In order to give effect
to the orde- the Committee ordered under s. 172 the demolition of
the platform.
The High Court held that as the platform could
not be said to have been constructed without sanction its demolition could not be ordered under s. 172.
In the second
case the High Court, following the above decision. he!d that
under s. 232 the Deputy Commissioner can prohibit the doing
of an act or suspend the execution of a resolution before the
act was done or the resolution carried out.
In the third case
the Allahabad High Court bad, amongst other provisions,
to
consider s. 34(1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 wbereunder the District Magistrate could prohibit the execution or
further execution of a resolution passed by a Municipal Committee.
Thr High Court poin:ed out
t~iat this pro,i<ion did
not, as did the
corresponding
provision in an
earlier Act,
empower the District Magistrate to make an order in anticipation of an act which was about to be done.
This case is thus
distinguishable.
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Then there is the objection of Mr. Mehta that no opoortunity
was
given
to
the Municipal
Committee to show
cause
against the order of. the Chief Commissioner as required by
F
s. 235 of the Act It is obvious that s. 235 an..,Jies to a ca.~ where
an order was made by an authority subordinate to the State
Government and does not, in terms, apply to an order made by
the State Government
(here, the Chief Commissioner> itself.
Mr. Mehta, however, contends that the essential requirement of
s. 235 is that the Committee must be given an opportunity to be
G
heard and such opportunity cannot be dispensed with even if
the original order under s. 232 is made by the State Government.
According to him, the non-compliance with this requirement has rendered the order void and ineffective.
In support
of this contention be relies on the decision in Abdul Gaffoor v.
H
State of Madras('). That was a case in which a Municipal
(I) A.l.R. 19361.ahore 689.
(2) A.l.R. 1939 l~honl 511.
(3) I.Lil. (1948) All. 512.
(4) A.l.R. 1952 MU. SSS.
SUBHAS CHANDRA v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Mudholkar J.)357
A Committee had granted, the application of the petitioner under
s. 250 of the Madras Distl'ict Municipalities Act, 1920
and
permitted him to instal an oil engine to run his cinema but had
rejected a similar application by the second respondent.
The
Government, acting .llnder s. 252 of the Madras Act, set aside
the resolution of the Milnicipality and directed it· forthwith to
B accord its permission to respondent No. 2 to instal an oil engine.
The High Court quashed the order of the Government on the
ground that the Government could' not make such an order without giving an opportunity to the petitioner, who was affected by
the order, to offer an explanation as contemplated by the first
proviso to s. 36 of the Act.
This decision cannot afford any
C assistance to the petitioners before us as there is no provision in
the Punjab Municipal Act
analogous
to the above provision
requiring the Government to afford an opportunity to all
the
persons affected, to offer an explanation.
Section 235 requires
the State Government to give an opportunity to the municipality
0
and tp none else.
No grievance is alleged to have been made
by the Committee of the omission by the Government to give it
the opportunity contemplated by s. 235. It has to be borne in
mind that an order under s. 232 takes effect immediately and its
operation is not made. dependent upon the action contemplated
under s. 235.
Where an order is made thereunder by an authoE rity other than the State Government that authority has to report
to the State Government.
But, though such authority is bound
to make a report its order is not inoperative or inchoate. It has
to be given effect to by the Committee.
Jt is true that till the
procedure set out in s. 235 is complied with it cannot be regarded
as final.
But want ·of. finality does not vitiate the order under
F s. 232.
The order is, unless modified or annulled by the State
Government, legally effective and binding on the Committee.
The Committee can, therefore acquiesce in it and waive the noncompliance by the State Government with the provisions of
s. 235. Since section 235 does not require an opportunity to be
given to parties affected by the order other than the Municipality
G the petitioners are not entitled to say that the order is bad. The
decision relied on thus does not assist them.
Besides, as . we
have already pointed out, in the present case s. 235 is wholly in~
applicable because the order in question has been passed by the
Chief Commissioner.
H
Then, ·according to him, the Chief · Commissionet or the
State Government could not resort to s. 232 of the Act which i~
a general provision but could act only under s. 236, sub-9. I 2)
L2Sup./64-IO
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) l S.C.K.
read with sub-s. ( 1) which is a special provision dealing with the
A
powers. of the State Government. The provision runs thus:
'· ''236 (1). The State Government and Deputy Commissioners acting under the orders of the State Gov~rn-
-
ment, shall be bound to require that the proceedings
· of committees shall be in conformity; with law and with
B
the rules in force under any enactment for the time
being applicable to. Punjab generally or the areas over
which the committees have authority.
(2) The State Government may exercise all powers
necessary for the performance of this duty, and may
among other things, by order in writing, anJiul or
modify any proceeding which it may consider not" to be
in ·conforrii.ity with Jaw or with such rules as aforesaid,
or for the reasons which would in its opinion justify an
order by the·Deputy Commissioner under section 232."
Comparing them with those of s. 232 it would be apparent that
though there is a certain amount of overlapping when we read in
s. 232 the words 'State Government' for 'Commissioner', the ambit .
of the tWo provisions is not quite the same. The overlapping' is
-due to the fact that the two provisions are contained in an· Act
which was passed in 1911 for being applied in the former Province
<>f Punjab and that it was by virtue of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912
that they were applied. to the erstwhile province of Delhi with
certain modifications. · In its original form the power under
c
D
E
s. 232 was not exercisable by the Provincial Government. It is only
because of the modification made in s. 232 that the words "thz
Provincial Government of Delhi" and later "the State Government of Delhi" had to be read for the word "Commissioner'' in F
s. 232.- As a result of the overlapping between the two sets of
provisions in their application to the State of Delhi what has
happened is that. two sources of power, one under s. 232 and
another under s. 235, are now available to the State Government
and it was free to avail itself of either source.
G
Finally, according to Mr. Mehta the proper provision under
which action could be taken by the authorities was s. 42 and this
provision rendered s. 232 inapplicable.
Under that provision a
Deputy Commissioner can check extravagant expenditure by the
Committee and order it to reduce the remuneration of any of its
employees but that action under it cannot be taken in anticipation.
No ground has been raised in the petition in regard to this. That
apart, here we are concerned with the competence of the State
H
SUBHAS CHANDRA v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Mudholkar /.)359
A Government to make an order of the kind which the Chief Commissioner made on October 30, 1956.
That provision could not
have been resorted to by him and cannot, therefore, be regarded as
a special provision which excluded the utilisation of s. 232.
Further, it cannot be so construed as to disentitle the authorities
mentioned in.s. 232 from prohibiting in anticipation an action such
B as increasing the emoluments of its employees.
We are satisfied that the order of the Chief Commissioner
dated October 30, 1956 was perfectly legal and in view of that
order it was not open to the Committee to sanction the payment
of an allowance to any of its employees thereafter.
The resoluC
tion passed by it on November 1, 1957 was, therefore, beyond
its jurisdiction and consequently the Commissioner of the Corporation could not treat it as a basis for sanctioning the allowance
of Rs. 20 p.m. to any graduate employee of the Municipal
Committee who was not in receipt of the· allowance till then. The
order of the Cemmissioner dated November 5, 1958 being thus
o illegal no question of discrimination arises.
The petition is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the
case we make no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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