# JUPUDYPARDHASARATHY v. PENTAPATI RAMAKRISHNAAND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2015] 14 S.C.R. 374
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-11-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2007
- **Bench:** M. Y. Eqbaland C. Nagappan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jupudypardhasarathy-v-pentapati-ramakrishnaand-others-30611
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Hindu Succession Act, 1956-s.14(1)-Right of Hindu
female - If in a Will, suit property is given to wife by her
C husband to enjoy and hold the same by way of maintenance
during her life time then by virtue of s.14(1) her limited right
becomes absolute right to the suit property.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law,
the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain
his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his
wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such
properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of
E Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality
which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,
grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral
right. The right of a widow to be maintained, although
does not create a charge on the property of her
F husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right
by moving the Court and for passing a decree for
maintenance by creating a charge. The Hindu Married
Women's Right to Separate, Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory
G recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be
no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing
right. [Paras 15, 16] [388-D-G]
H
2. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920
in which 'SR' has mentioned that his first wife died, the
374
JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
375
KRISHNA
second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, A
second wife also died. He, then, married to 'V' as a
third wife, who is alive. The executant of the Will also
mentioned the description of the properties owned by
him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his
third wife 'V' shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated B
in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also
mentioned in the Will that the widow 'V' shall also be
entitled to fetch water from the well situated in the
backyard of a different house. In other words, the
executant of the Will made arrangements for his third C
wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule
property till her life. Neither the genuineness of the Will
was disputed nor it was disputed that 'V' was enjoying
the property by way of maintenance. Unless the factum
of bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and D
her continuous possession are disputed, the question
of pleading and proof does not arise. Further,
indisputably, 'SR', the original owner of the property,
r.ealized the fact that his wife 'V' was issueless and she
has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his E ·
property. He further realized that physically he was weak
and may not' survive for long period. He therefore,
decided to give his properties to his family members.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made
in the Will and 'V' continued to enjoy the said property. F
In view of the admitted position; by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right
to the suit property. Though no specific word has been
mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance
life interest has been created in favour of 'V', whatever G
form a limited interest is created in her favour who was
having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same
has become an absolute right by the operation of Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 21, 31 to
34][394-A-D; 401-B-C, D-E, F-G; 402-B-C]
H
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti (1969) 3 SCC 628;
Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma
1991 (3) SCR 717: (1991) 4 sec 312 - relied
on.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao 2008 (10)
SCR 152 : (2008) 12 SCC 392; Mst Karmi vs.
Amru & Ors. AIR 1971 SC 745 -
held
inapplicable.
Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike 2006 (5)
suppl. SCR 799 : (2006) 8 sec 75 -
distinguished.
V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy
(dead) by Lrs; AIR 1977 SC 1944 : 1977 (3)
SCR 261; R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S.
Rajkumar & Others AIR 1962 SC 1493: 1962
Suppl. S

## Text

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A
B
[2015] 14 S.C.R. 3/4
JUPUDYPARDHASARATHY
v.
PENTAPATI RAMAKRISHNAAND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2007)
NOVEMBER 06, 2015
[M. Y. EQBALAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956-s.14(1)-Right of Hindu
female - If in a Will, suit property is given to wife by her
C husband to enjoy and hold the same by way of maintenance
during her life time then by virtue of s.14(1) her limited right
becomes absolute right to the suit property.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law,
the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain
his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his
wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such
properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of
E Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality
which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,
grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral
right. The right of a widow to be maintained, although
does not create a charge on the property of her
F husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right
by moving the Court and for passing a decree for
maintenance by creating a charge. The Hindu Married
Women's Right to Separate, Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory
G recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be
no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing
right. [Paras 15, 16] [388-D-G]
H
2. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920
in which 'SR' has mentioned that his first wife died, the
374
JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
375
KRISHNA
second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, A
second wife also died. He, then, married to 'V' as a
third wife, who is alive. The executant of the Will also
mentioned the description of the properties owned by
him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his
third wife 'V' shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated B
in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also
mentioned in the Will that the widow 'V' shall also be
entitled to fetch water from the well situated in the
backyard of a different house. In other words, the
executant of the Will made arrangements for his third C
wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule
property till her life. Neither the genuineness of the Will
was disputed nor it was disputed that 'V' was enjoying
the property by way of maintenance. Unless the factum
of bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and D
her continuous possession are disputed, the question
of pleading and proof does not arise. Further,
indisputably, 'SR', the original owner of the property,
r.ealized the fact that his wife 'V' was issueless and she
has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his E ·
property. He further realized that physically he was weak
and may not' survive for long period. He therefore,
decided to give his properties to his family members.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made
in the Will and 'V' continued to enjoy the said property. F
In view of the admitted position; by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right
to the suit property. Though no specific word has been
mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance
life interest has been created in favour of 'V', whatever G
form a limited interest is created in her favour who was
having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same
has become an absolute right by the operation of Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 21, 31 to
34][394-A-D; 401-B-C, D-E, F-G; 402-B-C]
H
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti (1969) 3 SCC 628;
Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma
1991 (3) SCR 717: (1991) 4 sec 312 - relied
on.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao 2008 (10)
SCR 152 : (2008) 12 SCC 392; Mst Karmi vs.
Amru & Ors. AIR 1971 SC 745 -
held
inapplicable.
Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike 2006 (5)
suppl. SCR 799 : (2006) 8 sec 75 -
distinguished.
V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy
(dead) by Lrs; AIR 1977 SC 1944 : 1977 (3)
SCR 261; R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S.
Rajkumar & Others AIR 1962 SC 1493: 1962
Suppl. SCR 418; Shakuntala Devi vs. Kam/a and
Others (2005) 5 SCC 390; Santosh and Others
vs. Saraswathibai and Another2007 (12) SCR 375
: (2008) 1 SCC 465; Subhan Rao and Others vs.
Parvathi Bai and Others (2010) 10 SCC 235; Sri
Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others
2010 (11) SCR 1157: (2011) 1 SCC 68; Nazar
Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others 1995
(5) Suppl. SCR 162: (1996) 1SCC35-referred
to.
Case Law Reference
1977 (3) SCR 261
referred to.
Para 9
AIR 1971 SC 745
held inapplicable. Para 9
2008 (10) SCR 152
held inapplicable Para 14
1962 Suppl. SCR 418
referred to.
Para 22
-
(1969) 3 sec 628
relied on.
Para23
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
377
KRISHNA
1991 (3) SCR 717
relied on.
Para 24
A
(2005) 5 sec 390
referred to.
Para 25
2007 (12) SCR 375
referred to.
Para 26
(2010) 10 sec 235
referred to.
Para 26
2010 (11) SCR 1157
referred to.
Para 26
B
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 162 referred to.
Para 29
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 799 distinguished.
Para 30
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. C
375of 2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2006 of the
High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
passed in First Appeal No. 1774 of 1991.
D
K.V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., A. Ramesh, R. Chandrachud,
Ravi Raghunath, Siddhant Buxy, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Shilpi
Gupta (For Ms. G. Madhavi)Advs. for the Appellants.
K. Ramamurty, A.T.M. Ranga Ramanujam, Sr. Advs.,
S. Kumar, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, M. Krishnan, V. Adhimoolam
E
(For Ms. Anu Gupta), K. Shivraj Chaudhuri, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·
M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is
directed against order dated 21.9.2006 passed by learned. F
Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, who allowed
the appeal preferred by Defendant no.1 and set aside the
judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit
preferred by the appellant.
2. The only question that needs consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the· High Court is correct in law in
interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in arriving at a
G
H
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba
Rao acquired an absolute interest in the property by the
operation of Section 14 of the Act.
3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property
originally belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had
B three wives. O~ly the second wife was blessed with two sons
and one daugh~e,. ir.sluding defendant-Narasimha Rao.
Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P. Venkata
Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba
Rao executed a Will in the year 1920 (Exh.A2) in favour of his
C 3'd wife Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will dated
14. 7 .1971 (Exh.B 1) in favour of defendant-Pentapati Subba
Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976. The case of the
defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to
D
transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff.
4. The plaintiff's-appellant's case is that he purchased
the suit property from one P. Nara·simha Roa who was having
a vested remainder in respect of the said suit property on the
expiry of life estate of testator's wife Veeraghavamma.
E According to the plaintiff-appellant, during the life time of
Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after her
death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.
5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the
parties that Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata
F
Subba Rao in favour of Veeraghavamma but she had limited
interest to enjoy the property during her life time and thereafter
the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to enjoy the said
property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma.
However, the trial court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma
G under the Will did not become enlarged into absolute estate
under Section 14(1) of the Act and the vested remainder in
favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get extinguished in respect
of the scheduled properties. Accordingly, the suit was decreed.
H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
379
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant A
no.1 - P. Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment
and decree of the trial court holding that Veeraghavamma
became the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of
Section 14( 1) and she had every right to bequeath the said
B
property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first defendant under
Exhibits B.1 and B2.
7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the .
plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal before the High
Court, first defendant died and his legal representatives were C
brought on record and are arrayed in the present appeal as
respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant no.3,
and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was
defendant no.4, were brought on record after his death during
pend ency of this appeal. Rest respondents were brought on
D
record as legal representatives of second defendant, who died
during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has vacated
the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff on
6.7.2006, appellanrhas moved before us an application for
deletion of respondent no. 4 from the array of parties. It is
E
ordered accordingly.
8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal
we would like to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1)
which is as under:-
"!, Purawattli Venkata. Subt>a l<..ao, S/o la~ ffularvathy
Venkamma Vysya, Business, Rio Rajatimundhry, have
executed the Will di. 24.08.1920 with good ·
consciousness and wisdom.
F
I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less G
physical strength and consequently I may not survive for
longer period, hence I have proposed to give all my
properties both movable and immovable mentioned in
the schedule below by way of this Will.
H
380
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 148.C.R.
My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two sons
by name Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a daughter
by name Nagarathnamma. My 2nd wife also died.
Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and
she is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have
house property bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another
house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5 shop rooms
abutting to them with vacant house site covered by
D.No.6/870 in lnnespeta, Rajahmundry Village,
Rajahmundry Sub Registry, E.G. Dist.I have wet land of
extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram
Sub Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed
property was in the name of my 2nd wife and after her life
time my two sons mentioned above got the same
mutated it in their names.
I have a policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life
Insurance Company and I have to receive monies from
the said policy and also silver, gold, brass articles house
hold utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron safe etc., I have
made the following dispositions which are to take place
after my life time.
My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled
house with site and compound wall and with half right in
the well covered by municipal D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry
and after lifetime of my wife my 2"d son Narasimha Rao
shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift,
sale etc. My second son Narasimha Rao shall have
absolute rights such as gift and sale in respect of the
tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms
covered by D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above
two properties with Chavidi and one Big latrine out of
the two and that my wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy
for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after
.her life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the
property with absolute right. The saidVeeraraghavamma
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
,. 381
KRISHNA [M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
is entitled to fetch water from the well situated in back A
yard of house bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so
Maniyarao shall have absolute rights such as gift and
sale etc .• in respect of ac 15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land
of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk and my eldest
· son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/-which I am liable to pay B
to her and thus either Nagarathnamma or any one has
got no right in the said property.
The amount receivable from the Insurance Company
referred above shall be recovered and my two sons,
daughter and my wife, all the four shall share the same C
equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take
the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or
demand for any oweties against another. (Emphasis
given)
D
This Will I have executed with full and good
consciousness and the same shall come into force after
my life time. The properties mentioned in this Will are all
my self acquired properties and I did not get any
ancestral properties.
·
I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during
my life time.
Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
Attesting Witnesses
Modali Subbarayudu
Yendi Surayya
E
F
Scribed by Pu.larvati Venkata Subba Rao G
With his own handwriting
The contents of the said will shall come into force after my
lifetime.
Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao"
H
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this
Court in the case of II. Tu/asamma and others vs. Sesha
Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) but held that in
that case on the basis of compromise the Hindu widow was
allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her
B maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily
applicable to that case. Whereas, the trial court held that the
decision of this Court in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru &
Ors., (AIR 1971SC745), is applicable because in that case
the Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her husband on
c the strength of Will where under she was given life estate in
the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and
27 of the trial court's judgment are quoted thus:-
D
E
F
G
H
"25. The first defendant's counsel placed heavy reliance
on the decision reported in Palchuri Hanumayamma vs.
Tadikamalla Kotilingam (1986 (1 )ALT.546), it is only in
that decision it was held that it is not necessary that the
will or other documents under which property is given to
a Hindu female should expressly specify that the property
is given to a Hindu female should expressly specify that
the property is a given in lieu of a pre-existing right or
right of maintenance and that it is sufficient if only a right
was in existence in favour of the Hindu female on the
date when the document was executed. It is a judgment
rendered by a single judge of the High Court. It is a case
where the High Court was considering the bequest of
property to a Hindu widow under a will as life estate.
26. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha
Reddi (A.LR. 1977 SC 1944) a l:iindu widow obtained a.
decree for maintenance against the brothers of her
deceased husband and was executing the said decree
for maintenance. During that time, the Hindu Widow and
the brothers of her deceased husband entered into a
compromise where under the Hindu widow was allotted
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
383
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
immovable properties to be enjoyed only as limited owner A
power of alienation. It was a case where the Hindu Widow
was allotted properties expressly in lieu of her
maintenance and satisfaction of her maintenance
decree. Therefore, Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily
applicable to that case. On the other hand, in the decision
B
reported in Mst Karmi vs. Amro (A.LR. 1971 SC 745) a
Hindu widow succeeded to the properties of her husband
on the strength of a Will where under she was given life
estate in the properties. In those circumstances the
Supreme Court held that the Hindu widow having C
succeeded to the properties of her husband on the
strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these
properties over and above that given to her under that
will and that the life estate given to her under the will
cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions o
of the Hindu Succession Act. It was a decision rendered
by three Judges of Supreme Court. This decision was
not referred to in the subsequent decision of the year ·
1977 referred to above. The decision of the year 1977
was also rendered by three judges of the Supreme Court.
E
When the latter decision of the Supreme Court is in all
fours with the facts in the case on hand, the former
decision of the Supreme Court of the year 1977 cannot
be applied to the facts of the present case.'
27. In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. MohinderSingh (A.LR. 1987 F
SC 2251) the provisions of Section 14( 1) of the Act were
applied because it was a case where the Hindu female
was put in possession of the property expressly in
pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in
her. Similarly, in the decision reported in Gurdip Singh
G
vs.Amar Singh (1991 (1) L.W.15)the Supreme Court
applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act where
the wife acquired property byway of gift from her husband
explicitly in lieu of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs.
H
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A
Thakorbhai Chelabhai (A.l.R. 1979 SC 993) also the .
B
Hindu widow obtained possession of the property in
default of payment of maintenance to her. So, the
Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1)
of the Act to that case."
10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the
decision quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the
High Court, the trial court held that the life estate of
Veeraghavamma under ExhibitA-2 will not become enlarge
into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
C Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders
interest of Narasimha Rao in the suit property.
11. In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio
decided by this Court in the decisions noted by the trial court
0
and also other decisions of this Court, reversed the finding of
the trial court and held that the case falls under Section 14( 1)
. of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner
of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the
said property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao
E under Exhibits B-1 and B-2. The High Court held that:-
F
G
.H
"ln view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble
Justice Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of
the Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the reasoning
given by the trial Court, that as there is no specific wording
in the instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in
lieu' of a pre-existinQ right or right of maintenance the
same do not become enlarged into absolute estate, is
not relevant and is quite contrary to the aforesaid
judgment.
Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as
the guardian of P. Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff
it could not be said that Veeraraghavamma had no preexisting right or right of maintenance in respect of the
property in which a limited interest had been created in
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
385
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
her favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having A
properties other than the property in question, after the
death of his natural father, Veeraraghavamma was
appointed as his guardian. Immediately after the vendor
of the plaintiff attained majority the guardianship·was
discharged and he used to manage his own movable B
and immovable properties individually. It carinot be said
that for the first time the life estate has been created under
Ex.A2 Will in favour of Veeraraghavamma, as
undoubtedly, she was having a pre-existing right to be
maintaine'd by her husband, therefore, it is the duty of C
her husband to maintain her during her lifetime. Though
no specific words have been mentioned in Ex.A2 that in
lieu of maintenance the life estate has been created,
under Section 14(1) in whatever form a limited interest
is created in favour of a Hindu female, who is having a o
pre-existing right of maintenance, it becomes absolute
right after 1956 Act came into force.··
As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue
of Section 14( 1 ) of the Act she had right to bequeath the ·
said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B 1 E
and B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P.
Narasimha Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority
to sell the said property under Ex.A 1 sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff. As the limited interest of
Veeraraghavamma blossomed into absoh,ite right,
F
bequeathing the said property in favour of the first
. defendant under Exs.B 1 and B2 is legal and valid. In view
of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I
am of the opinion that the limited interest to enjoy the
property during the lifetime of Veeraraghavamma G
blossomed into an absolute right in accordance with
Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
came into force and the vested remainder created in
favour of the vendor of the plaintiff is nullified."
H
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A
12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate
appearing for the appellant, confined his argument to the
question of law as to whether the High Court erred in law in
holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the
widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in
B the properties. Learned counsel made the following
c
D
. E
F
G
H
submissions:-
"(i) Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each
and every Will granting a limited/life interest in a property
to a widow is deemed/assumed to be in lieu of her
maintenance. If the testator in his Will specifically provides
that he is granting only life interest in the property to his
. widow, his right to limit his widow's right in the property
is recognized by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. Further, the testator's right to dispose off his
property by will or other testamentary disposition is
recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956. Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders
Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the same Act otiose.
(ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. (1972)4 SCC 86), a
3-Judge Bench of this Court held to the effect that a widow
who succeeded to the property of her deceased husband
on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights in the
property other than those conferred by the will.. "The life
estate given to her under the Will cannot become an
absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu
Succession Act"
(iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC
99, this Court clarified the difference between sub-section
(1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby restricting the right of a
testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his
wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment
in Tulsamma case.
JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
387
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
(iv) V. Tulsamma's case involved a compromise decree A
arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the
widow against her husband's brother in a case of
intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of
testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it
may not be applicable to cases of testamentary B
succession. However, in terms of law declared therein,
a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to
every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in
a property to the widow on the ground that the widow
has a ·pre-existing right of maintenance.
C
(v) This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court in
Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8
SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13 and 14 thaHhe
right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
cannot be rendered otiose by a wide interpretation of D
Section 14( 1) and that these two provisions have to be
balanced.
(vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by
this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi E
Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this
Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for
the respondents therein that there was no proposition of
law that all dispositions of property made to a female
Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to
F
maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or
under the statutory law.
(vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of
Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal.· ·
(viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh's G
case and followed subsequently, therefore, appears to
be that the question as to whether Section 14( 1 ) applies
to a Will granting life interestto a widow hinges on the
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A
finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of
maintenance. This leads to the second arguments."
13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted
the fact that the life interest in property granted to the widow by
way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to
8
be specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court
based on examination of evidence and material on record.
14. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of
the decision in G Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao, (2008) 12
c sec 392, learned counsel submitted that issues are reqoired
to be framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show
that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of maintenance.
15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband
has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is
D possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to ·
be maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled
that the claim of Hindu widow to be mC)intained is not a_ mere
formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,
grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From
E the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be
maintained, although does not create a charge on the property
of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by
moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance
by creating a charge.
F
16. The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate,
· Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving
statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be
'no doubt that the right t<;> maintenance is a pre-existing right.
G
1 ?. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR
1977 SC 1944, three Judges Bench of this Court has
elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to
maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice
Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-
H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
389
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.)
"Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis _A
of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric
Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions
emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics
of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance:
(1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a B
personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned,
and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property.
If the husband has property then the right of the widow to
maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his
property and any per~on who succeeds to the property C
carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;
(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right,
to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in
property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can 0
be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created
for her maintenance on the property either by an
agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;
(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment
and is of such importance that even if the joint property E
is sold and the purchaser has notice_ of the widow's right
to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide
for her maintenance;
(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a preexisting right which existed in the Hindu law long before
F
the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is,
therefore, a pre-existing right;
(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social
and temporal relationship between the husband and the G
wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of coowner in the property of her husband, though her coownership is of a subordinate nature; and
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B
c
D
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[2015] 14 S.C.R.
(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the
property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the
possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person
who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is
in a position to make due arrangements for her
maintenance."
18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, their Lordships observed: -
"In the light of the above decisions of this Court the
following principles appear to be clear:
"(1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956
Act must be liberally construed in order to advance the
object of the Act which is to enlarge the limited interest
possessed by a Hindu widow which was in consonance
with the changing temper of the times;
(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of
Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely
recognises a pre-existing right without creating or
conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held
by this Court in Badri Pershad case.
(3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary
and far-reaching changes in the Hindu society and every
attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act
which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried
to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu
male and female in matters of intestate succession;
(4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and has to be
interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to
destroy the effect of the main provision."
19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of
the law and different authorities came to the following
conclusions:-
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
391
KRISHNA[M. Y. EOBAL, J.]
"We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions A
which we have reached after an exhaustive
considerations of the authorities mentioned above on the
question of law involved in this appeal as to the
interpretation of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956.
These conclusions may be stated thus:
B
"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an
empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right
against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is C
recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and
has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu
jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right
may not be a right to property but it is a right against
property and the husband has a personal obligation to D
maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the
female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If
a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the
said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate,
even without a charge the claim for maintenance is
E
doubtless a pre-existing .. right so that any transfer
declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any
new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing
rights.
F
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been
couched in the widest possible terms and must be
liberally construed in favour of the females so as to
advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the
socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long G
needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a
proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with
the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso
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B
c
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[2015] 14S.C.R.
should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the
effect of the main provision or the protection granted by
Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally
inconsistent with the main provision.
·
(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,
decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent
and new titles in favour of the females for the first time
and has no application where the instrument concerned
merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise
pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in
favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1)
will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an
instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing
right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share
to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has
absolutely no application and the female's limited interest
would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by
force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any,
under the document would have to be ignored. Thus
where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in
lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument
is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions
placed on the powers of the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like 'property acquired by
a female Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance',
'or arrears of maintenance', etc. in the Explanation to
Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable
to these categories which have been expressly excepted
from the operation of sub-section (2).
(6) The words 'possessed by' used by the Legislature in
Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and
include the state of owning a property even though the
owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
393
KRISHNA [M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under A
a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956
Act had been passed but had not been given actual
possession under a final decree, the property would be
deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section
. 14( 1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is B
equally well settled that the possession of the widow,
however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or
title, because the section does not contemplate the
possession of any rank trespasser without any right or
title.
C
,
(7) That the words 'restricted estate' used in Section 14(2)
are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section
14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also
any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the
transferee."
D
20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision
of this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru ( 1972 Vol. 4
SCC 86). In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that
case will not apply in the facts of the present ca~e. In Mst. Karmi
E
case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of the property,
had executed a Will directing that on his death, his.entire estate
would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and
thereafter, the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the
death of Jaimal. The properties were mutated in the name of F
Nihali who eventually died in 1960. On her death, the collaterals
claimed the properties on the basis of Will, but the appellant
claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali under
her Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having
succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on th.e strength of Will
cannot claim any right in those properties over and above that G
. was given to her under the Will. The Court observed that the
life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an
absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act,
1956.
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A
21. The facts in Karmi's case (supra) and that of the
present case are fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the
Will was executed in 1920 in which Subba Rao has mentioned
that his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one
daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He, then, married
B to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The
executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of
the properties owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned
in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for
life one tiled house situated in the compound wall. For that
c enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the widow
Veeraraghavamma shall also be en\itled to fetch water from
the well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other
words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for his
third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule property
D till her life. The intention of the executant is therefore clear that
he gave the suit schedule property to his third wife
Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property
for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like
Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executant directed
E that his entire estate will devolve upon his widow
Veeraraghavanima.
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of
R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar &
Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493, while interpreting the provisions
F
of Section 14(1) of the Act observed:-
G
H
" 16. By Section .14(1) the legislature sought to convert
the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric
Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest
into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto
gave to the expression "property" the widest connotation.
The expression includes property acquired by a Hindu
female by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in
lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA
395
KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]
from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or A
after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by
purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner
whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended to
convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property
however restricted the nature of that interest under the
B
Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate.
Pratapmull case undoubtedly laid down that till actual
division of the share declared in her favour by a
preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate
a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognis19d as owner, C
but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the
enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a
codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes
in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and
succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full o
rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional
limitations on her powers of dispositions which were
regarded under the Hindu law as inherentin her estate.
She is under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent
in respect of property possessed by her at the tiryie of E
her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the
share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her
· sons or her grandsons was in lieu other right to
maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition.