# JYOTI PERSHAD v. THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, N. H.Ajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jyoti-pershad-v-the-administrator-for-the-union-2241
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

Slu1n Areas-J.mprovement and clearance of-Validity of enactment-Co,.stit,.tionality-Rent Control-Operation
of Rent Control Act in areas governed by Slmn Areas Act-Delhi 6- Ajmer Rent
Control Act, I952 (38 of I952)-Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, Ig56 (96 of Ig56), s. r9-Constitutian of lndid,
Arts. I4, r9(r)(j).
The petitioner after a prolonged litigation and having fu].
filled all the conditions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, obtained
decrees of ejectment against the tenants,
April 2I.
126
SUPREME l!)QURT REPORTS
[1962)
z96z
In the meantime the Slum' Areas (Improvement and Clearance) ~.\\ct, 1956, came into force and the petitioner in accordance
Jyoti Pershad withs. rg of the said ,Slum1Areas .(I.ct applied to-the competent
v.
authority for per.mission to execute the.decree, \yhich perplissio~
Administrator for \Vas ref Used inter alia on the grounds O[ harrlship tO the tenants 3.nd
The Union Terri- the hurhan aspect ·of th~··ca::;e. 1iTh'e appeals therefrom Were also
tory of Delhi
rejected1
The' petitioner moved the Supreme Court fOr issue of
a. writ of certiorari to quash the orders on the ground that (I)
s. rg ol the Act was invalid an\! uncons\i~utional as violative, of
the petitioner's rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and i9(r)(f) of the
Constitution, in as much as s., 19 of the Slum Areas Act' was a
super-imposition on the rights of die petitio!\er who had s~ tisfied
the requirements of the Rent' Control Act bdfore obtaining his
decree, which amounted to unreasonable re~trictions on the right.
to hold:property guaranteed by the Constituti9n, and (2) that
s. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act vested an unzuided, unfettered, and
uncontrolled Power in arl exedutive officer to \vithhold permission to execute a decree which the petitioner had obtained alter
satisfying the reasonkble requirem,.ents of the la\v as enacted in
the Rent Control Act, (3) The power conferred on the competent authority bys. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act was an exces_sive delegation of lt:.gislaiive po\ver and therefore unconstitutional.
Held, thats. rg of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 19561-3.yas not obnoxious to the equal protection of
laws guaranteed by''Ai;t. 14 of the Constitution. There was
enough guidance to the competent ·authority in the use of his
<liscretjon under s. 19.(1) of the Act_ The restrictions imposed
by s. I9 of the Act could not' b'e said to be unreasonable.
The guidance could be derived irom the enactment anrl that
it bears a reasonable aQd rational. relationship to the 0bjccnti
be attainen by the A~t and 'in fact would fultll the 'purpose
which lhe law seeks to. achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of
slums, with interim protection for tl;e slum dwellers until they
were moved info better dwellings.
T\le order of ~he. competent authority in the present case
was not open to challenge as it' was ,in line .with the policy and
purpose of the Act.
•
So long as the Legislature indicated in.the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the .. pohcy and purpose of
the enactment, the-mere fact that the legislation \Vas skeletal
or that every detail of the application of law to a particular
case, was not laid down in- the enactment itself or the fact that
e. discretio~ )Vas left to those en truste~ with adrhinistering the
law, afforded no basis ciiher for the contention that there had
been an excessiv"e delegation of legislative power as to amount
to an abdication of its functions, ·or that the discretion- vested
was uncanalised and unguided so as to amotl.nt to a carte blanche
to discriminate, If tho power or discretion has been conferred
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
in a manner which was legal and constitutional the fact that
z96z
the Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provision, could not be a ground for invalidating the law. ·
]voti Pershad
The freedom to 'hold property' was not absolute but was
.. v.
subject. under Art. 19.(5), to "reasonable re~trictions" being Adnunis~rator Jo:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,519 of 60,813. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39519 for what follows._

•
-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
out that though Rustica varieties of tobacco are gene-
'96'
rally not known to be used for biris, when they are
Jagan•ath
cured in broken leaf grades they cau be used with
v.
admixture with biri tobacco like Pandharpuri tobacco Union of llldia
for imparting strength to biri mixtures, and so accord-
. ---
ing to the Committee no generalisation in this matter Ga;endrngadkar J.
is possible and it cannot be asserted that. all forms of
this variety are incapable of use in biris.
Besides, it
would be quite possible for dealers in the said varieties of tobacco to send them to other parts of the
country where they are used for the purpose of manufacturing biris. Therefore, the grievance made by
the petitioners that the tobacco in which they deal
can never be used for biris i8 obviously nut well
founded.
In the result the petition fails and is di,,missed with
costs.
Petition dismissed.
JYOTI PERSHAD
v.
THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION
TERH.ITORY OF DELHI
(AND CONNECTED PETITIONS)
(B. P. SINHA, 0 .• J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. H.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Slu1n Areas-J.mprovement and clearance of-Validity of enactment-Co,.stit,.tionality-Rent Control-Operation
of Rent Control Act in areas governed by Slmn Areas Act-Delhi 6- Ajmer Rent
Control Act, I952 (38 of I952)-Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, Ig56 (96 of Ig56), s. r9-Constitutian of lndid,
Arts. I4, r9(r)(j).
The petitioner after a prolonged litigation and having fu].
filled all the conditions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, obtained
decrees of ejectment against the tenants,
April 2I.
126
SUPREME l!)QURT REPORTS
[1962)
z96z
In the meantime the Slum' Areas (Improvement and Clearance) ~.\\ct, 1956, came into force and the petitioner in accordance
Jyoti Pershad withs. rg of the said ,Slum1Areas .(I.ct applied to-the competent
v.
authority for per.mission to execute the.decree, \yhich perplissio~
Administrator for \Vas ref Used inter alia on the grounds O[ harrlship tO the tenants 3.nd
The Union Terri- the hurhan aspect ·of th~··ca::;e. 1iTh'e appeals therefrom Were also
tory of Delhi
rejected1
The' petitioner moved the Supreme Court fOr issue of
a. writ of certiorari to quash the orders on the ground that (I)
s. rg ol the Act was invalid an\! uncons\i~utional as violative, of
the petitioner's rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and i9(r)(f) of the
Constitution, in as much as s., 19 of the Slum Areas Act' was a
super-imposition on the rights of die petitio!\er who had s~ tisfied
the requirements of the Rent' Control Act bdfore obtaining his
decree, which amounted to unreasonable re~trictions on the right.
to hold:property guaranteed by the Constituti9n, and (2) that
s. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act vested an unzuided, unfettered, and
uncontrolled Power in arl exedutive officer to \vithhold permission to execute a decree which the petitioner had obtained alter
satisfying the reasonkble requirem,.ents of the la\v as enacted in
the Rent Control Act, (3) The power conferred on the competent authority bys. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act was an exces_sive delegation of lt:.gislaiive po\ver and therefore unconstitutional.
Held, thats. rg of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 19561-3.yas not obnoxious to the equal protection of
laws guaranteed by''Ai;t. 14 of the Constitution. There was
enough guidance to the competent ·authority in the use of his
<liscretjon under s. 19.(1) of the Act_ The restrictions imposed
by s. I9 of the Act could not' b'e said to be unreasonable.
The guidance could be derived irom the enactment anrl that
it bears a reasonable aQd rational. relationship to the 0bjccnti
be attainen by the A~t and 'in fact would fultll the 'purpose
which lhe law seeks to. achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of
slums, with interim protection for tl;e slum dwellers until they
were moved info better dwellings.
T\le order of ~he. competent authority in the present case
was not open to challenge as it' was ,in line .with the policy and
purpose of the Act.
•
So long as the Legislature indicated in.the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the .. pohcy and purpose of
the enactment, the-mere fact that the legislation \Vas skeletal
or that every detail of the application of law to a particular
case, was not laid down in- the enactment itself or the fact that
e. discretio~ )Vas left to those en truste~ with adrhinistering the
law, afforded no basis ciiher for the contention that there had
been an excessiv"e delegation of legislative power as to amount
to an abdication of its functions, ·or that the discretion- vested
was uncanalised and unguided so as to amotl.nt to a carte blanche
to discriminate, If tho power or discretion has been conferred
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
in a manner which was legal and constitutional the fact that
z96z
the Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provision, could not be a ground for invalidating the law. ·
]voti Pershad
The freedom to 'hold property' was not absolute but was
.. v.
subject. under Art. 19.(5), to "reasonable re~trictions" being Adnunis~rator Jo:
placed upon it "in the interests of the general public". The 1 he Union Tm•-
criteria for determining the dt·gree of restriction on the right
tory 0! Del/ii
to hold property which would be considered reasonable, were
by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age
to age and should be related to the adjustments necessary to
solve the problems which communities faced from time to time.
If law failed to take account of unusual situations of pressing
urgency arising in the country and of the social urges generated
by the patterns of thought, evolution and of social consciousness,
it would have to be written down as having failed in the very
purpose of its existence. Where the legislature enacted laws,
which in its wisdom, was considered necessary for the solution
of human problems, the tests of "reasonableness", had to be
viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature.
In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging
of their validity the courts had to approach it from the point
of view of furthering the social interest which it was the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the courts were not, in
these matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of
a society which was trying, by enacted Jaw, to solve its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and
thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole.
Thot the provisions of the special enactment, the Slums
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act. 1956, will in respect
of the buildings in areas declared slun1 areas operate in addi~
tion to the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, (1959] S.C.R. 279,
Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh. [1955] 1 S.C.R.
380, M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 803, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952] S.C.R. 435, Kcdar Nath Bajoria v. State of West
Bengal, (1954] S.C.R. 30 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India,
(1957] S.C.R. 233, discussed.
ORIGINAL JumsmcTroN: Petitions Nos. 67, 87 and
130of1959.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. S. Narula '1nd S.S. Chadha, for the petitioners.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen
and T. 1vl. Sen, for Respondrmts Nos. 1, 2 and 5 (In
128
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1962)
r96i
petition Xo. 83 of 1959) 1, 2 (l.nd 12 (In Petition No. 67
Jyuli Pmhad of 1959) and 1, 2 and 4 (In Petition No. 130 of 1959) .
. . v.
JV. S. Barlingay (l.nd A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for responAd"''"''"010' for dent No. 3 (In Petn. No. 83 of 1959).
TJi, Union Ternlory of /J.tl.i
Sardari Lal Bhatia, for respondents Nos. 3a., 4, 5, 0
(a, b, c,) and 7-10.
J. D. Jain and !{. L. Mehta, for the Intervener in
Petition No. 67 of 1959 (Phool Chanel).
1961.
April 21.
The Judgment of tho Court was
delivered by
Ayy••g•• J.
AYYANOAR, J.-Thesc th~ee petitions have been
filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. 32 of tho Coμstitution challenging the constitutionality of s. 19 and particularly sub-s. 3, of thn Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clea.ranee) Act 1956 (Central
Act 96 of 1956), on the ground t.ha.t it offends the fundamental right of tho petitioners guaranteed to them
by Arts. 14 and 19(1Xf).
To appreciate the grounds on which this contention is sought to be sustained it is necessary to set out
brieily a. fow facts.
W c might however mention that
though the constitutional objection, a.<lvcrted to is
common to a.11 the three petitions, it is sufficient to
refer to the fa.ct.a of tho case in \Vrit Petition No. 67
of 1959 which is typical of the cases before us.
The petitioner-Jyoti Pershad-is the owner of a.
house in Delhi in which respondents 3 to 11 wore
tenants.
Each of these nine individuals occupied a
single room in this house. As the petitioner <'onside red
the house to be old and required to he demolished and
reconstructed, he submitted a plan to the Connril of the
Delhi ::llunicipal Committee a.nd applied for sanction
for the reconstruction of the house. The plan was
sanctio1l('tl and thereafter the petitioner filed suits
against these nine tenants under s. 13(1)(1() of the
Delhi a.ml Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 (which
will hereafter be referred to as tile Hent Control Act).
The suits were rcsibtcd by the tena.nts
Two matters
had to be proved under s. 13(1Xgl of the Rent Control
Act by a plaintiff before he could obtain an urder of
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
eviction: (i) tha;t there was a plan which had been
'96'
sanctioned by the municipal authorities which made
Jyoti Pershad
provision for the tenants then in occupation of the
v.
house being accommodated in the house as reconstruc- Admini,1.ator for
ted, and (ii) that the plii.intiff had the necessary funds Th• un;m; Territo carry out the reconstruction. The plan which had
10'Y of Delh•
been approved by the Delhi Municipal Committee
Ayy;;;.gar 1.
made provision for the construction of a doublestoreyed building with twelve rooms which was,
therefore, more t)lan ample for the nine tenants for
whom accommodation had to be provided. The plaintiff also established that he had deposited cash in the
State Bank of India sufficient for reconstructing the
house as sanctioned in the plan. On December 8, 1956
the Civil Court in Delhi passed decrees in favour of
the petitioner for the eviction of respondents 3 to 11.
Section 15 of the Rent Control Act enacted:
"15. (1) The Court shall, when passing any
decree or order on the grounds specified in clause (f)
or clause (g) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13, ascertain from the tenant whether he elects
to be placed in occupation of the premises or pn.rt
thereof from which he is to be evicted and if the
tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election
in the decree or order and specify therein the date
on or before which he shall deliver possession so
as to enable the landlord to commence the work
of repairs or building or re-building as the case
may be.
(2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before
the date specified in the decree or order, the landlord, shall, on the completion of the work of repairs
or building or re-building place the tenant in
occupation of the premises or part thereof.
(3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession
on or before the date specified in the decree or order
the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs
or building or re-building, within one month of the
specified date or fails to complete the work in a
reasonable time or having completed the work, fails
to place the tenant in occupation of the premises in
17
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Jyoti PtTsl1ad
v.
Admi,.istTator for
Tiit Unio,. Territory of DelAi
accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may, on
the application of the tenant made within one year
from the specified date, order the landlord to place
the tenant in occupation of the premises or pa.rt
thereof on the original terms and conditions or to
pay to such tenant such compensation as may be
fixed by the Court."
The tenants, however, refused to give up possessession within the three months time granted to them
by the decrees to vacate the preml1es but went up in
a.ppea.l against the orders of eviction under s. 34 of the
Rent Control Act to the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi.
These appeals were finally disposed of against the
tenant-appellants, some on the merits a.nd some by
reason of abatement, by the end of October, 1957.
C nder the rules governing the construction of houses
on plans sanctioned b,v the Delhi Municipal Committee, the sanctioned building had to be completed
within a period of one year from the date of sanction.
As a result of this rule the sanction obtained by the
petitionur la.peed and he ha.d, therefore, to obtain fresh
sanction if in consequence of his success in the appeals
before the Senior Sub-Judge he still desired to demo·
lish and reconstruct the building.
:Meanwhile, two changes ca.me a.bout in the la.w
governing m~tters relevant to the present case: The
first was that the Slum Areas (Improvement a.nd
Clearnnce) Act 96 of 1956, which will be hereafter
referred to a.s the Act, was enacted by Parliament and
ca.me into force in the Delhi area.. Section 19 of that
Act which is impugned in these petitions runs:
"19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, no person
who has obtained a.ny decree or order for the eviction of a. tenant from a.ny building in a. slum area
shall be entitled to execute such decree or order
except with the previous permission in writing of
the competent authority.
(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an
application in writing to the competent authority
in such form and containing such particulars as
may he prescribed.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
(3) On receipt of such application the competent
Ig6I
authority, after giving an opportunity to the tenant Jyoti Pershad
of being heard and after making such summary
v.
inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it Admini,trator Jo~
thinks fit, shall by order in writing either grant The Un•on T•msuch permission or refuse to grant such permission.
10'Y of Delh•
( 4) Where the competent authority refuses to
Ayyangar J.
grant the permission it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a
copy thereof to the applicant."
The other change in the law was that due to the
enactment of rules and regulations providing for a
co-ordinated development and planning of buildings in
the Delhi Area the type of constructions that could be
sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Committee underwent a radical alteration as a result of which in the
area now in question double-storeyed buildings were
not permitted to be constructed and that if the petitioner's house had to be reconstructed it could only
have three living rooms making allowance for the size
of the rooms and the free space that had to be left on
either side of the building in accordance with the
revised municipal regulations.
It would have been noticed that the right of the
tenants to insist on the landlord providing accommodation for them in the reconstructed building
guaranteed to them by s. 15 of the Rent Control Act,
had ceased by reason of their failure to quit and deliver vacant possession of the tenements occupied by
them within 3 months fixed by the order of the Civil
Court (vide s. 15) and hence they had no statutory
right under the Rent Control Act to be provided with
accommodation by the landlord.
Thus freed from obligation to the tenants the petitioner filed on the strength of these decrees for eviction nine applications under s. 19 of the Act before
the competent authority for the eviction of the
tenants from the nine rooms in the building on the
ground that the building had to be reconstructed as it
was in a dilapidated condition. These petitions were
dismissed by the competent authority by his order dated
January 13, 1958 on the ground that the sanction to
] yoti Pe, shad
••
.Admi11islralvr for
TIJ1 Union Tenilory of Delhi
Ayyangar ] .
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
reconstruct the building which the petitioner had
obtained from the municipality in 1956 had expired.
The order recited:
"Since it may take some time for the petitioner
to obtain fresh sanction for reconstruction and there
is also the possibility of sanction not being given at
all, it would be no use continuing with these proceedings until it is definitely known that the landlord has obtained sanction for reconstruction. These
nine applications are accordingly filed with the
option to the petitioner to have them revived without payment of extra fee in case he is able to obtain
sanction."
Therrafter the petitioner applied to the municipal
authorities for sanctioning a building plan. As stated
earlier, tho building plan approved by tho municipality could permit only a building consisting of one
floor in which there were three living rooms and
sanction for the construction of a building with such
accommodation was gra.nt{Cld.
With this sanctioned
plan, the petitioner renewed his application under
s. 19 for permission to execute the decree of tho Civil
Court and evict the tenants. By order dated July 30,
1958 a.II these applications were dismissed. The reason
assigned for the order was stated in these terms:
"If the decree is allowed to be executed they will
be thrown out and it will be impossible for them to
get accommodation in the reconstructed building.
They are old tenants and as stated above also very
poor. The execution of the decree will involve very
real hardship to them. They are all occupying
only one Kothri each and paying rent at Rs. 3 per
mensem, and they have no complaint to make
about the condition of their Kothries. The landlord
has four or five other houses which he has let out
on rent. The case has a human aspect and I
disallow the execution of the decree against the
tenants."
The petitioner preferred appeals against this order
to the Administrator of the Union T<lrritory, Delhi to
whom appeals lay under s. 20 of the Act. The
appeals were dismissed, the appellate authority
saying:
,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
133
"I would have allowed the appellant permission
x96r
to evict the tenants, if the property itself was dilab
Jyoti Petsha.d
pidated and declared unfit for human habitation y
v.
a competent authority. This is not so.
The land- Administrator for
lord naturally desires to get a better return from The Union Tmiland in the congested areas of the city by rebuilding
tory of Delhi
on it to better specifications, so that he can get
d
Ayyangar ].
higher rent from it. But if this ten ency is permitted to have an unrestricted play, then the result
will be the eviction of a large number of poor
people from slum areas.
In the circumstances, the appellant should wait
until either his property is declared dangerous by
the Municipal Corporation, or under a Slum Clearance Scheme he is asked by the competent authority itself to demolish it or rebuild it in a particular
manner."
In these circumstances the petitioner has moved
this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash
these orders on the ground already adverted to, viz.,
-i
that s. 19 of the Act is invalid and unconstitutional
as violative of the petitioner's rights guaranteed by
Arts. 14 and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. In passing
we may observe that we are not concerned with the
validity of the particular oi·ders passed in·the case but
only with the general question as to the constitutionality of the impugned s. 19 of the Act.
Before setting out the points urged by Mr. Narula
-learned. Counsel for the petitioners-in support of
his submission that s. 19 of the Act was, in so far as it
enabled the competent authority to withhold permission to those who had obtained decrees for eviction
from executing their decrees, unconstitutional, it
would be necessary to read the material provisions of
the Rent Control Act, 1952, which imposes a restriction
on the right of landlords, inter alia to evict tenants
from the premises occupied by them. Chapter III of
that Act imposes a control over the eviction of
tenants. A tenant is defined (Vide s. 2(j)) as meaning
"any person by whom or on whose account rent is
payable for any premises including such sub-tenants
or others who have derived title under the tenant
196r
Jyoti P1rsAod
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
under the provisions of any law before the commencement of the Act." Section 13(1) enacts:
••
Ad,,,,iNislralor for
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other la.w or any contra.ct, no decree
or order for the recovery of possB11Bion of any premises sha.11 be passed by any Court in favour of the
T Alt U #io" Terrilory of Delhi
Ayya•gar J,
landlord a.gs.inst any tenant (including a tenant
whose tenancy is terminated):".
This blanket protection is, however, subject to the
conditions enumerated in the proviso which reads:
"Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is B&tisfied-"
Then follow ten grounds the existence of one or other
of which enables a. landlord to obtain a. decree from
a. Civil Court for the recovery of possession from tenants. Among the grounds thus enumerated it is suffi.
cient to rcfrr to grounds (f), (g) a.nd (1), ground (g)
being the ground upon which the petitioner in the
present ca.se obtained the decrees for eviction and these
run:
"(f) tba.t the premises have become unsafe or
unfit for buma.n habitation and a.re bona. fide required by the hmdlord for carrying out repairs which
cannot be carried out without the premises being
va.ca.ted; or
(g) tha.t the premises a.ro bona. fide required by the
landlord for the purpose of re-building the premises
or for the replacement of the premises by any builing or for the erection of otbrr buildings, and
that surb building or re-building cannot be carried
out without. the premises being vacated; or
(I) that tho landlord requires the premises in
order t-0 carry out a.ny building work a.t the instance
of the GO\·ernment or the Delhi Improvement Trust
in pursuance <>f any improvement scheme or development scheme."
The right of the landlord, however, who obtains a.n
order for eviction under either cl. (f) or (g) above set
out is subject to the provisions of s. 15 whose terms
ha.ve a.lrea.dy hll6n set out.
The result, therefore,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
would be that in the cases covered by these two claus1961
es the tenants would be entitled, if they conform to Jyoti Pershad
the terms of these provisions, to be reinstated in the
•.
newly constructed premises after the reconstruction. It Administ1a101 for
might be pointed out that under s. 38 of the Rent The Union TmiControl Act the provisions of the Act and the Rules
to•y of Delhi
made thereunder are to have effect notwithstanding
h
. h
. d .
Ayyangar ].
anything inconsistent t erew1t
contame
m any
other law for the time being in force.
The argument of the learned Counsel was that the
restriction upon the rights of landlords to the enjoyment of the property imposed by s. 13 of the Rent
Control Act could not be open to any objection, legal
or constitutioI:\al because the Legislature has set out
with precision the grounds upon which possession
could be recovered, the defences that might be set up
by the tenants and the conditions subject to which the
rights either of the landlord or of the tenant could be
exercised. It is the super-imposition of the provisions
of s. HJ of the Act on the rights of a landlord-decreeholder who had satisfied the requirements of the Rent
Control Act before obtaining his decree that was
stated as amounting to an unreasonable restriction on
the right to hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f).
This will be a convenient stage at which we might
set out in brief outline the argument urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. They were mainly
three: (1) Section 19(3) of the Act vests an unguided,
unfettered and uncontrolled power in an executive
officer to withhold permission to execute a decree
which a landlord has obtained after satisfying the
reasonable requirements of the law as enacted in the
Rent Control Aot.
Neither s. 19 of the Act nor any
other provision of the Act indicates the grounds on
which the competent authority might grant or withhold permission to execute decrees and the power
conferred is, therefore, arbitrary and offends Art. 14
of the Constitution. (2) The same point was urged in
a slightly different form by saying that the power
conferred on the "competent authority" bys. 19(3) of
the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative
power and was, therefore, unconstitutional. (3) The
SUPRl!lMl!: COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
vesting of a power in an executive authority to ovorJyoti Pershad ride-at his sweet will and plea.sure-rights to prov.
pcrty without any guidance from the Legislature conAdminis1,.1or for stituted an unreasonable restraint on tho petitioner's
n, U•ion Tmi-right to hold property, a right which in the case of the
tory of Delh•
property of the type now in question would includo a
right to obtain possession from the tenant in order
Ayya•gar J.
..
either to improve it by reconstruction or for the purpose of his own use. Apart from the objection regarding tho vesting of a.n unguided power in a.n executive
authority which is the common ground of objection
urged in regard to points (I) and (2), learned Counsel
submitted that the right vested in a.n e.xccutivo authority to prevent for an indefmite and indeterminate
period of time the right to enjoy his proporty was for
this further reason e.xccssivo and a.n unreasonable restraint which could not be justified under Art. 19(5) of
tho Constitution.
We shall proceed to consider theso points in that
order. The first ground alleged is that s. 19 of the
Act is constitutionally invalid as violative of the
equal protection of the laws conferred under Art. 14
of the Constitution, in that an unguided and arbitrary
discretion is vested in the "competent authority".
Tho import, content and scope of Art.. 14 of tho
Constitution has been elaborately considered and o.xplained in numerous decisions of this Court and it is,
therefore, unnecessary for us to embark on any fresh
investigation of tho topic, but it would be sufficient
to summarise the principles, or rather the rules of
guidance for the interpretation of the Article which
have alread·v been established, and then consider tho
application -of those rules to the provisions of tho
enactment now impugned. It is only necessary to
add that the decisions of this Court lii.ying down the
proper construction of Art. 14 rendered up to 1959
havo been summarised in the form of 5 propositions
by Das C. J. in Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ('), but we a.re making a. summary on slightly
different lines more relevant to the enquiry regarding
the provision with which we are concerned in tho
present ca.so.
\1) [1959] S.C.R. 279, •W• 301 •
2 S.C.tt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
(l) If the statute itself or the rule made under it
z961
applies unequally to persons or things similarly situat-
.
ed, it would be an instance of a direct violation of the Jyoti Pershad
Constitutional guarantee and the provision of the Adminis;;.10, for
statute or the rule in queation would have to be The Union Tmistruck down.
tory of Delhi
(2) The enactment or the rule might not in terms
enact a discriminatory rule of law but might enable
Ayyangar J.
an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded
to persons or things similarly situated. This would
happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an
authority, be it the Government or an administrative
official acting either as an executive officer or even in
a quasi-judicial capacity by a legislation which does
not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or
intelligible purpose, thns clothing the authority with
unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate.
"The legislature must declare the policy of the
law and the legal principles which are to control
any given cases and must provide a standard to
guide the officials or the body in power to execute
the Jaw. The essential legislative function consists
in the determination or choice of the legislative
policy and of formally enacting that policy into a
binding rule of conduct."
[Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh (1)].
"No rules have been framed and no directions
given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the licensing officer.
Practically the
Order commits to the unrestrained will of a single
individual the power to grant, withhold or·cancel
licences in any way he chooses and there is nothing
in the Order which could ensure a proper execution
of the power or operate as a check upon injustice
that might result from improper execution of the
same".
[Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The ·
State of Uttar Pradesh(')].
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 380, 388.
18
(2) [1954] s.c.R. 803, 813.
•
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
'96'
In such circumstances the very provision of the
Jyoti Pmhad law which <'nables or permits the authority to discriv.
minate, offrnds the guarantoo of equal protection
Admo"istrntor forafforde<l by Art. 14. Possibly the best instance of this
The u"'"" Tmi- type of casl' is afforded by tho legislation under conj
10'Y 01 Dttho
sideration in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar('), the ratio underlying which was thus exAyyangar }.
plained in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of SauraBhtra ('):
"If it clepends entirely upon the pleasure of the
l::>tate Government to make any classification it
likes, without any guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a reasonable relation must exist between the classification and the objective that the
legislation has in view. On the other hand, if the
legislature indicates a definite objective and the
<liscrction has been vested in the State Government
as a means of achieving that object, the law itself
cannot be held to be discriminatory, though the
action of the State Government may be condemned
if it offends against the equal protection clause, by
making an arbitrary selection."
(3) It is manifest that the above rule would not
apply to cases where the legislature lays down the
policy and indicat€s the rule or the lino of action
which should serve as a guidance to tho authority.
Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory
provision eonforring the power, no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules
themselves or the policy indicated lay down different
rules to be applied to persons or things similarly
situated. Even where Ruch is not the case, there
might be a t ransgrcssion by the authority of the limits
laid down or an a.buse of power, but the actual order
would bo set a.Hide in appropriat€ proceedings not so
much on the grou11cl of a violation of Art. 14, but as
really heing heyontl its power.
(4) It is not., however, essential for the kgislation
to comply with the rule a.s to equal protection, that
the ruleH for t.he guidance of tho designated authority,
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 2oi.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
which is to exercise the power or which is vested with
I96I
the discretion, should be laid down in express terms 1 t. P
, d
. .
,
]f
yo i
ersr1a
in the statutory prov1s10n 1tse .
v.
"The Saurashtra case would seem to lay down the Administrator for
principle that if the impugned legislation indicates The Union Tmithe policy which inspired it and the object which it
tory 0! Delhi
seeks to attain, the mere fact that the legislation
Ayyangar f•
does not itself make a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be
applied, but leaves the selective application of the
law to be made by the standard indicated or the
underlying policy and object disclosed is not a sufficient ground for condemning it as arbitrary and,
therefore, obnoxious to article 14."
[Kedar Nath Bajoria v.
The State of West
Bengal(')].
"So long as the policy is laid down and a standard
established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to
selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by
the Legislature is to apply."
[Harishankar Bagla and another v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh(')].
Such guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light of the
surrounding circumstances which necessitated the
legislation, taken in conjunction with well-known facts
of which the Court might take judicial notice or of
which it is appraised by evidence before it in the form
of affidavits, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of
Saurashtra (') being an instance where the guidance
was gathered in the manner above indicated, (b) or
'i
even from the policy and purpose of the enactment
which may be gathered from other operative provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situations
or generally from the object sought to be achieved by
the enactment.
"The policy underlying the Order is to regulate the
(1) [195") S.C.R. 30, 46.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 380, 388.
(3) [1952] S.C.R. 435, 461, 462.
Jyoti PersJtad
v.
Ad,ninislralr>r for
'l he u,iion Territory of Dtlhi
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
transport of cotton textile in a. manner that will
ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the
country and make it available a.t a. fair price to all.
The grant or refusal of a. permit is thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the
Textile Commissioner is to be exercised in such a.
way as to effectuate this policy. The conferment of
such a. discretion cannot be ca.lied invalid a.nd if
there is a.n abuse of the power there is amplo power
in the Courts to undo the mischief."
Ilarishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(').
In Pannalal Binjmj v. Union of India's case(') the
purpose of the provision which was administrative
conveniencu for enabling assessments to be ma.de in
the manner indicated by the Income-tax Act was held
t-0 afford a sufficient guidance so as to render the
provision immune from attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14.
In the circumstancrs indicated under the fourth
head, just as in tho third, the law enacted would be
valid being neither a. case of excessive delegation or
abdication of legisla.tiv-c authority viewed from one
aspect, nor open to objection on the ground of violation of Art. 14 as authorising or permitting discriminatory treatment of persons similarly situated. The
particular executive or quasi-judicial act would, however, be open to challenge a.s already stated on the
ground not so much that it is in viofo.tion of tho equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14, because
e.1: concessis that was not permitted by tho statute but
on the ground of the same being ultra vires as not
being sanctioned or authorized by the enactment itself.
The si\uation i1f.:such cases would be parallel to the
tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules
ma.de undor statutes which enable the rule-ma.king
authority to ena.61; subsidiary legislation "to carry out
the purposes of the Act". The criteria to be applied
to determine the validitv of such rules could, in our
opinion, be appropriately applied to determine the
validity of the action under the provisions like the
one <lea.It with under the la.st two hoa.ds.
(1) [1955] J S.C.R. 38o, 388.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 233.
. .
I.
.,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
In the light of what we have stated above we
r961
have now to consider the point urged by the learned
Jyoti Pershad
Counsel for the petitioner that the Act has vested in
v.
the competent authority the power to withhold evic- Administ.ator for
tion in pursuance of orders or decrees of Courts with- The Union Tmiout affording any guidance or laying down any
ta.y of Delhi
principles for his guidance on the basis of which he
could exercise his discretion. In other words, that the
..Jyyangar 1·
Act lays no fetters and has vested in him an arbitrary
and unguided power to pick and choose the decreeholders to whom he would permit execution and those
to whom he would refuse such relief. On the other
hand, the learned Attorney-General submitted that
the discretion vested in the competent authority was
not unguided and that though s. 19 of the Act did not
in terms lay down any rules for his guidance, the same
could be gathered from the policy and purpose of the
Act as set out in the preamble and in the operative
provisions of the Act itself.
We consider that there is considerable force in this
submission of the learned Attorney -General.
The
preamble describes the Act as one enacted for two
purposes: (1) the improvement and clearance of slum
areas in certain Union Territories, and (2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. These
twin objects are sought to be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment. Chapter II which consists of one section-s. 3-provides a definition of
what are "slum areas" and their declaration .as such.
The tests for determining whether the area could be
declared a "slum area" or not briefly are whether the
buildings in the area are (a) unfit for human habitation,
or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding etc.
detrimental to safety, health or morals. It is in areas
so declared as "slum areas" that the rest of the enactment is to operate. The provisions, however, make it
clear that in order that an areii may be declared a
"slum area" every building in that area need not be
unfit for human habitation or that human habitation
in every building in such area should be detrimental
to the safety, health or morals of the dwellers. We
are making this observation because of a suggestion
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
made, that the declared purpose of protecting the tenants from eviction was inconsistent with the policy
Jyoti Pcrshad
v.
underlying the declaration of an area as a "slum area"
Administrator for and that thus the Act manifested two contrary or conThe Union Terri- flicting ideas or principles which would negative each
tory of Delhi
other and thus leave no fixed policy to guide "the
competent authority" when exercising his powers to
Ayyangar ].
f
grant or re use eviction when an application was made
to him in that behalf under s. 19 o.f the Act.
Chapter III is headed 'Slum Improvement' and
makes provision for two types of orders: (1) to require
the improvement of buildings where repairs-major
or minor-would make them reasonably habitable for
the slum dwellers (vide ss. 4-6), and (2) cases where
mere repairs or adjustments would not suffice but
what is required is the demolition of the entire building. In the latter case certainly the occupants of the
building would have to be evicted and the building
vacated and power is conferred for effectuating this
purpose vide s. 7 (1) and 7 (3). It might be that the
whole area might consist of dwellings of the type
which require demolition and it is Chapter IV that
makes provision for this category of cases which is
headed "Slum Clearance and Re-development".