# K. BRAHMA SURAIAH & ANR v. LAKSHMINARAYANA

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 933
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-11-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. c 183 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. c. SHAH, v. RAMAswAMI, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/k-brahma-suraiah-anr-v-lakshminarayana-4807
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act,
1959-Mysore
Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules, 1961, r. 16-Rule providing that complaints and suits on behalf of Panclrtiyat to be filed lry
Secretary-Private complaint whether can be filed for offence under s.
220 of Act.
A private complaint was lodged against the appellants for an offence
under s. 220 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act,
1959. Rule ·16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties
Ru)es, 1961 provided that the Secretary shall have power to file complaints and suits on behalf of the Panchayat, and to ,conduct the proceedings on its behalf and on the orders of the Panchayat. On their conviction the appellants went to the High Court and contended that in view
of Rule 16 they could not be prosecuted on a private complaint. The
High Court decided against them on the view that the said Rule did not
preclude persons other than the Secretary from filing a complaint but it
only debarred complaints being made by others on behalf of the Panchayat. Against the High Court's judgment appeal by special leave was
filed in this Court.
HELD : (i) In the presence of r. 16 and fur the reasons given by
this Court in K. M. Kanavfs case which dealt with similar provisions
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under the Bombay Municipal Borough Act, 1925, it must be held that it
was the Secretary of the Panchayat who alone was competent to file the
complaint.
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Section 213(3) of the Mysore Act is analogous to s. 23A(3) of the
Bombay Act under which
the offence
fell in Kanavi's case.
On a
parity of reasoning it -could not be suggested that if there had been
any contravention of
s.
213(3)
any voter or member
of the
public could have filed a complaint in the matfer. The other provisions
also of the Act which follow, namely, ss. 214 to 219 indicate that it was
never contemplated that a complaint for an infringement or contravention
of the prohibition contained therein could be lodged before a Magistrate
having jurisdiction under s. 233 by any private individual in the presence
of specific rule that the Secretary shall have the power to file a complaint
on behalf of the Panchayat. Most of these sections i.e. ss. 217 and 218
postulate infraction of orders of the Panchayat for which the Panchayat
al.one would be interested in filing a complaint. Thus the scheme of the
Act also supports the view that a complaint could be filed only under
r. 16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules 1961
and could not have been filed by a private complaint. [936 H-937 'c1
K. M. Kanavi v. State <>f Mysare, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821, followed and
applied.
(ii) The High Court was not right in saying that all offences committed under the various provisions contained in the Act would be cognizable owing to the general powers conferred on police officer by
s. 236 of the Act. The section gives only a limited power to the police
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 s.c.R:
officer to effect arrest if an offence is committed in hls presence. The
A
present case moreover· did not relate to· the powers which a police officer
could exercise in. respect of an offence uiider s. 220 of the Act but to
the. question whether a private complaint could be filed. [S87 G-9'.38 CJ
Public Prosecutor v. A. V. Ramiah, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 392 referred to.
(iii) The difficulty felt by the High Court that a Secretary who is
subordinate· to the Chairman may find it embarrassing to file a complaint
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against him can hardly be accepted as serious. The Secretary has to act
on behalf of the Panchayat and it is the panchayat that would be vitally
interested in preventing and stopping any contravention of the provisions
of s. 220 of the Act.
The Secretary 'acts on behalf of the Panchayat
and the question of his subordination to any one of its office bearera is
of no consequence. [938 DJ

## Text

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K. BRAHMA SURAIAH & ANR.
v.
LAKSHMINARAYANA
November 26, 1968
[J. c. SHAH, v. RAMAswAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act,
1959-Mysore
Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules, 1961, r. 16-Rule providing that complaints and suits on behalf of Panclrtiyat to be filed lry
Secretary-Private complaint whether can be filed for offence under s.
220 of Act.
A private complaint was lodged against the appellants for an offence
under s. 220 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act,
1959. Rule ·16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties
Ru)es, 1961 provided that the Secretary shall have power to file complaints and suits on behalf of the Panchayat, and to ,conduct the proceedings on its behalf and on the orders of the Panchayat. On their conviction the appellants went to the High Court and contended that in view
of Rule 16 they could not be prosecuted on a private complaint. The
High Court decided against them on the view that the said Rule did not
preclude persons other than the Secretary from filing a complaint but it
only debarred complaints being made by others on behalf of the Panchayat. Against the High Court's judgment appeal by special leave was
filed in this Court.
HELD : (i) In the presence of r. 16 and fur the reasons given by
this Court in K. M. Kanavfs case which dealt with similar provisions
E
under the Bombay Municipal Borough Act, 1925, it must be held that it
was the Secretary of the Panchayat who alone was competent to file the
complaint.
F
G
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Section 213(3) of the Mysore Act is analogous to s. 23A(3) of the
Bombay Act under which
the offence
fell in Kanavi's case.
On a
parity of reasoning it -could not be suggested that if there had been
any contravention of
s.
213(3)
any voter or member
of the
public could have filed a complaint in the matfer. The other provisions
also of the Act which follow, namely, ss. 214 to 219 indicate that it was
never contemplated that a complaint for an infringement or contravention
of the prohibition contained therein could be lodged before a Magistrate
having jurisdiction under s. 233 by any private individual in the presence
of specific rule that the Secretary shall have the power to file a complaint
on behalf of the Panchayat. Most of these sections i.e. ss. 217 and 218
postulate infraction of orders of the Panchayat for which the Panchayat
al.one would be interested in filing a complaint. Thus the scheme of the
Act also supports the view that a complaint could be filed only under
r. 16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules 1961
and could not have been filed by a private complaint. [936 H-937 'c1
K. M. Kanavi v. State <>f Mysare, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821, followed and
applied.
(ii) The High Court was not right in saying that all offences committed under the various provisions contained in the Act would be cognizable owing to the general powers conferred on police officer by
s. 236 of the Act. The section gives only a limited power to the police
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 s.c.R:
officer to effect arrest if an offence is committed in hls presence. The
A
present case moreover· did not relate to· the powers which a police officer
could exercise in. respect of an offence uiider s. 220 of the Act but to
the. question whether a private complaint could be filed. [S87 G-9'.38 CJ
Public Prosecutor v. A. V. Ramiah, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 392 referred to.
(iii) The difficulty felt by the High Court that a Secretary who is
subordinate· to the Chairman may find it embarrassing to file a complaint
B
against him can hardly be accepted as serious. The Secretary has to act
on behalf of the Panchayat and it is the panchayat that would be vitally
interested in preventing and stopping any contravention of the provisions
of s. 220 of the Act.
The Secretary 'acts on behalf of the Panchayat
and the question of his subordination to any one of its office bearera is
of no consequence. [938 DJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
c
183 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March 30, 1966 of the Mysore High Court im: Criminal Revision
Petition No. 384 of 1965.
R. B. Datar, for the appellants.
The respondent did not appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J.
This is an appeal by special leave from a judg- ·
ment of the Mysore High Court in which the only point involved
is whether a private complaint could be entertained for the commission of an offence under s. 220 of the Mysore Village Panchayats & Local Boards Act, 1959, hereinafter called the "Act".
The appellants who were the Vice-Chairman and the Chairman
of the Keladi village panchayat were convicted under the aforesaid section and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 and Rs. 40
and in default to undergo 7 days and 5 days' simple imprisonment
respectively.
A private complaint was filed against the appellants alleging
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that they gave bids at an auction held at the village panchayat and
appellant No. 1 purchased a radio belonging to the panchayat for
Rs. 35/-. Appellant No. 2 also bid at the same auction for the
radio. According to s. 220 of the Act no member or an employee
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of a panchayat shall directly or indirectly bid for or acquire interest in any movable ·or immovable property sold at such sale
:in connection therewith. If any person contravenes this provision he is to be punished, on conviction, with a fine which may
extend to Rs. 500/-. Under Rule 16 of the Mysore Pancbayat
Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules, 1961 promulgated under
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the provisions of the Act, only the Secretary of the Panchayat has
the power to file a complaint on behalf of the Panchayat. The
High Court was of the view that this Rule did not preclude persons
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K. B. SURAJAH v. LAKSHMINARAYNA (Grover, J.)
935
other than the Secretary from filing a complaint but it only debarred complaints being made by others on behalf of the Panchayat.
Now Rule 16 may be reproduced. :-
"The Secretary shall have power to file complaints
and suits on behalf of the Panchayat and to conduct the
proceedings on its behalf under the orders of the
Panchayat."
Jn K. M. Kanavi v. The State of Mysore(') the appellant Kana vi,
who was the president of Municipal Borough of Gadag Betgeri
had been removed from J>residentship. He refused to hand over
the charge of all the papers and property which were in his possession relating to the Borough to the new President in spite of an
order made by the Government under s. 23A of the Bombay
Municipal Boroughs Act 1925, hereinafter called the "Bombay
Act" to that effect.
Pursuant to orders made by the Divisional
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner the new President
filed a complaint against Kanavi for an offence punishable under
s. 23A(3) of the Bombay Act. The appellant was convicted and
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-. A question arose whether
the compaint filed by the new President was competent as it was
not filed in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act.
Section 200 of the Bombay Act provided that the Standing Committee and subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) the Chief Officer
may order proceedings to be taken for the recovery of any penalties and for the punishment of any persons offending against the
provisioas of the aforesaid Act. This Court was of the opinion
that the complaint which had been filed by the new President was
for initiating the proceedings for the punishment of Kanavi who
had offended against the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 23A and
as the new President was not the Chief Officer and he had not filed
the complaint under any direction made by the Standing Committee the complaint could not be entertained. In that care also
the High Court had taken the view that s. 200(1) was only an
enabling section which gave the power to the Standing Committee
and the Chief Officer to make a direction for taking of proceedings and it could not be held to be exhaustive of the authorities
who could make directions for initiation of proceedings.
The
High Court had taken notice of the fact that there was no provision in that Act for~idding cognizance of offences being taken
except on a complamt made under a direction of the Standing
Committee or the Chief Officer.
This is what was observed by
this Court :-
"~e are unable to accept the interpretation put by
the High Court on s. 200(1) of the Act. It is true that
there is no specific provision in the Act laying down that
[19681 3 S.C.R. 821.
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
cognizance of an offence under the Act is not to be .
taken except on a complaint filed in accordance with a
direction made under s. 200(1), but the scheme of the
Act and the purpose of this provision ins. 200(1) makes
it clear that the legislature intended that such proceedings should only be instituted in the manner laid down
in ·that sub-section.
The word "may" was used only
because the legislature could not have enacted a mandatory provision requiring the Standing Committee or
the Chief Officer to make a direction for institution of
proceedings in all cases.
This word was intended to
give a discretion to the Standing Committee or the Chief
Officer to make directions for taking proceedings only
when they considered it appropriate that such a direction should be made and to avoid compelling the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make such directions in all cases.
The use of this word "may" cannot
be interpreted as laying down that, if a proceeding for
punishment of any person for contravention of any of
the provisions of the Act is to be instituted, it can be
instiriited in any manner without complying with the
requirements of s. 200(1) of the Act. If the interpretation put by the High Court on this provision is accepted, it would mean that this provision was totally unnecessary, because there would be no need to confer
power on the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer
to make such directions if such directions could be made
or proceedings instituted at the instance of any private
individual. We cannot accept the submission that this
provision was made in the Act simply by way of abundant caution. In fact, if the provision had been made
with such an object in view, there is no reason why the
power should have been expressed to be conferred on
the Standing Committee and the Chief Officer only and
not on the President of the Municipality.
We, consequently, hold that, if any proceeding for punishment of
any person for contravention of any of the provisions
of the Act is to be instituted, it must be instituted in the
manner laid down in s. 200(1) of the Act and in that
manner only."
It may be mentioned that the expression of the above opinion
was based on a consideration of the previous decisions of this
Court.
Following the ratio of the above decision it would be
legitimate to hold that the complaint, in the present case, could
be filed under Rule 16 only by the Secretary of the Panchayat and
by no one else. It may be pointed out that in the· Act s. 2_13(3)
is. analogous to s. 23A(3) of the Bombay Act.
On a panty of
reasoning it could not be suggested that if there had been any
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K. B. SURAIAH v. LAKSHMINARAYNA (Grover, I.)
937
contravention of s. 213(3) any voter or member of the public
could have filed a complaint in the matter. The other provisions
also of the Act which follow, namely ss. 214 to 219 indicate
that it was never contemplated that a complaint for infringement
or contravention of the prohibition contained therein could be
lodged before a magistrate having jurisdiction under s. 233 by
any private individual in the presence of a specific rule that the
Secretary shall have the power to file a complaint on behalf of
the Panchayat. Most of these sections i.e. ss. 217 and 218 postulate infraction of orders of the Panchayat for which the Panc:J!ayat
alone would be interested in filing a complaint. We are satisfied
that the scheme of the Act also supports the view which we are
taking that a complaint could be filed only under Rule 16 of the
Mygore Panchayat Secretaries' Powers and Duties Rules, 1961
and could not have been filed by a private complainant.
The High Court seems to have relied on s. 236 of the Act
which deals with powers of police officers. This section provides
that any police officer may arrest any person committing in his
presence any offence against any of the provisions of the Act or
of any rule, regulation or bye-law made thereunder. The person
dITested has to be produced before the nearest magistrate within
a period of 24 hours of arrest.
The police officer effecting the
arrest must give immediate information to the Chairman or the
Secretary of the Panchayat of the commission of such offence
and give all assistance in the exercise of his lawful authority. The
High Court was of the view 'that under the provisions of this
section the police officer could submit a charge sheet under s.
173 of the Criminal Procedure Code after necessary investigation·
for offences committed under the Act.
Chapter II of the Act
relates to establishment and constitution of Panchayats.
There
are certain sections in it which by express words make offences
committed under them cognizable but in the same Chapter there
are other sections which do not contain any such provision; for
instance, ss. 15, 17, 21 and 22 expressly provide that the offences
committed under them would be cognizable but ss. 16, 18, 19
and 20 do not contain any such provision. In other words the
offences committed under them must be deemed to be not comizable.
Section 23 in the same Chapter says that no court ~hall
take cognizance of an offence punishable under s. 16 or s. 17 or
under s. 19(2)(aJ. unless there is a complaint made by an order of
or under authonty from the Deputy Commissioner.
The Hicrh
C<;>urt was, therefore, not right in saying that all offences coi':im1tted under the various provisions contained in the Act would
be cognizable owing to the general powers conferred on police
officers by s. 23.6.
Indeed that section gives only a limited
power to the police officer to effect arrest if an offence is comm.itted in his presence. There is authority for the view that this
will not make an offence cognizable within the meaning of s. 4(f)
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S C.R.
of the Criminal Procedure Code; vide Public
Prosecutor(') v.
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A. V. Ramiah. In the. absence of any express provision in s. 220
with which we are· concerned we doubt whether the offence committed under it would be cognizable and a police officer could
carry on investigation in respect of it under Chapter XIV of the
Criminal Procedure Code and finally submit a charge sheet under
s. 173 of that Code.
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It may also be pointed out that in the present case we are not
concerned with the powers which a police officer can exercise in
respect of an offence committed under s. 220 of the Act. What
has to be seen is whether a private person or an individual could
file a complaint. In the presence of Rule 16 ahd for the reasons
given in K. M. Kanavi v. State of Mysore( 2 ) we are of the opinion
that it was the Secretary of the Panchayat who alone -was competent to file the complaint. It must be remembered that it would
be the panchayat that would be largely interested in taking action
against any· of its members and employees for the contravention
of s. 220.
The· Secretary would, therefore, be entitled to file a
complaint on behalf of the panchayat. The difficulty felt by the
High Court that a Secretary who is subordinate to the Chairman
may find it embarrassing to file a complaint against him can
hardly be accepted as a serious hurdle in the way of coming to
the conclusion at which we have arrived. The Secretary has to
act on behalf of the panchayat and it is the panchayat that would
be vitally interested in preventing and stopping any contravention
of provisions like s. 220 of the Act. The Secretary acts on behalf
of the panchayat and the question of his subordination to any
of its office .bearers is of no consequence.
In the view we have taken the appeal is allowed and the
conviction and sentence imposed on each of the appellants i~ set
aside.
G.C.
(I) A.LR. 1958 A.P. 392.
(2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821.
Appeal allowed.
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