# K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADRI - **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 691 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1973-03-16 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1971 - **Bench:** A. Alagjriswami, J. D. Dua, C. A. Vaidialingam - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/k-k-chari-v-r-m-seshadri-5924 - **Pages:** 23 ## Headnote M~dras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,-Section 10(3) (a) (i)-Bonafide requirement of land!ord-Co111pron1h.: decreewhether a separate enquiry and satisfaction ap~1rt /roni the cvmpron1ise necessary for passing eviction order. The appellant bought. the suit premises and filed legal proceedings against the respondent, who was a tenant in the suit premisl!s, for eviction on the ground of appellant's bonafide requirements u/s 1()(3) df the Madras Rent Control Act. The tenant contested the Jandlord's ct-aim inter a/ia, on the ground that the appellant's claim was not bona fide, At the trial, the appellant examined himself, and produced voluminous documentary evidence. The appellant was· not cross-exan1ined. The appellant and the respondent then entered into a compro~ise in which the tenant gave up all his defences and was gtven three months'' time to vacate the premises. A decree for eviction was accordingly passed by the Small Causes Court. The respondent did not vacate the premises and when the decree was sought to be executed challenged the decree of eviction principally on the ground that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree only in t.erms of the compromise decree and that Court had a duty to independently satisfy itself about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The High Court held that the order of the Small Causes Court was without jurisdiction. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (i) The true position is that an order of evictiCJ> based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact. namely, the existence of one or more df the .conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court which is a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by judicial findings. It at some stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties in,·it-ed it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction \\'as based. In the instant case, withdrawal of defences by the tenant expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requirement requiring the premises for his O\Vn occupation belr.g bona fied. [704E] (ii) From the particular facts of this case, it can be said that the decree for eviction has not been solely passed on the bas'is of the com· promise. The evidence adduced by the respondent upto the stage at which the compromise was entered into, was enough to establish the land· lord's claim. Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Das [1969] Z S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838, and Ferozi Lal v. Manmal and Others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794, distinguished on facts. 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 S.C.R. Per Alagiriswami, J. An eviction order based op a compromise ~ where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he could ask for possessio~, is valid. [708Dl Barton v. Fincham, [1921] 2 K.B. 291, Babu Ram Sharma v. Pal Singh, [1959] P.L.R. 33, V~cs Dev v. Nikhiram, A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 514 cited with approval. ## Text _Characters 0–39,688 of 61,380. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39688 for what follows._ 0 E f G H K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADRI March 16, 1973 6!H [A. ALAGJRISWAMI, J. D. DUA & C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J M~dras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,-Section 10(3) (a) (i)-Bonafide requirement of land!ord-Co111pron1h.: decreewhether a separate enquiry and satisfaction ap~1rt /roni the cvmpron1ise necessary for passing eviction order. The appellant bought. the suit premises and filed legal proceedings against the respondent, who was a tenant in the suit premisl!s, for eviction on the ground of appellant's bonafide requirements u/s 1()(3) df the Madras Rent Control Act. The tenant contested the Jandlord's ct-aim inter a/ia, on the ground that the appellant's claim was not bona fide, At the trial, the appellant examined himself, and produced voluminous documentary evidence. The appellant was· not cross-exan1ined. The appellant and the respondent then entered into a compro~ise in which the tenant gave up all his defences and was gtven three months'' time to vacate the premises. A decree for eviction was accordingly passed by the Small Causes Court. The respondent did not vacate the premises and when the decree was sought to be executed challenged the decree of eviction principally on the ground that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree only in t.erms of the compromise decree and that Court had a duty to independently satisfy itself about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The High Court held that the order of the Small Causes Court was without jurisdiction. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (i) The true position is that an order of evictiCJ> based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact. namely, the existence of one or more df the .conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court which is a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by judicial findings. It at some stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties in,·it-ed it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction \\'as based. In the instant case, withdrawal of defences by the tenant expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requirement requiring the premises for his O\Vn occupation belr.g bona fied. [704E] (ii) From the particular facts of this case, it can be said that the decree for eviction has not been solely passed on the bas'is of the com· promise. The evidence adduced by the respondent upto the stage at which the compromise was entered into, was enough to establish the land· lord's claim. Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Das [1969] Z S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838, and Ferozi Lal v. Manmal and Others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794, distinguished on facts. 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 S.C.R. Per Alagiriswami, J. An eviction order based op a compromise ~ where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he could ask for possessio~, is valid. [708Dl Barton v. Fincham, [1921] 2 K.B. 291, Babu Ram Sharma v. Pal Singh, [1959] P.L.R. 33, V~cs Dev v. Nikhiram, A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 514 cited with approval. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1971. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 15, 1970 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 797 of 1970. M. C. Setalvad, and K. Jayaram, for the appellant. V, M. Tarkundi:, E. C. Agarwala, A. T. M. Samptith and M. M. L. Srivastava, for the respondent. The Judgment of I. D. DuA and c. A. VAID!ALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by VA!D!ALINGAM, J. A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. gave a separate opinion. VAIDJALINGAM, J .-The short, question that arises for consideration in this appeal, by special leave; is whether ~ order dated March 31, 1969, passed by the Court of Small Causes, Madras, in H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968 directing the eviction of the respondenttenant is a nullity and as such not··executable. The facts leading upto the passing of the order niay be stated : The appellant was occupying a premises in Madras as a tenant His landlady filed an application H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967 seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground that she bona fide required the premises for her own occupation. At that time the suit premises No. 64, Lloyds Road, Royaspettah, Madras-14 was advertised for sale. The appellant for purposes of his occupation purchased the premises on October 23, 1967, as per registered document No. 1633 of 1967 in Sub-Registrar's Office, Mylapore. The respondent was then a tenant of the suit premises under the vendor. After the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant and has been paying rent. An eviction order was passed by consent against the appellant in H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967 on January 27, 1968. He was given time till January 27, 1969, to vacate the premises, of which he was in occupation as a tenant, by virtue of the said decree. On the same day i.e. January 27, 1968, the appellant issued two notices to the respondent, his tenant in respect of the suit premises, terminating tenancy ol the Respondent under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Acter referring to the petition of the landlord.. being under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground of his own <'ccupation, passed the following order :- . "Compromise memo filed and recorded. By consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till 5-6-1969. No cost''. The terms of compromise, which have been already set out, were also incorporated in the order. It will be noted that the respondent had raised substantially the following defence to the application filed by !he appellant, namely- ( 1) he was not a tenant of the premises and that on the other hand, the tenant of the pre.mises was M/s. R. M. Seshadri, a partnership firm; '( 2) the claim of the appellant that he requires the house for the occupation is not bona fide; '(3) the purchase of the premises by the appellant is not lawful; { 4) the tenant, M/s. R. M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts by way of repairs and improvements; and ( 5) the notice determining the tenancy is not in accordance with law.· It was to meet the above defence and also to establish his claim of requiring the premises bona fide for his own occupation, ·the landlord-appellant gave the evidence and also produced about 45 exhibits. It is needless to state that the respondent, who is a retired I.C.S. officer and an advocate, must have been fully aware of the averments made by the landlord, the pleas raised in defence as well as the nature of the evidence led by ihe landlord to meet his defence. The respondent, apart from not having cross-examined the landlord, when he gave evidence, has also by the co111- 696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 s.c.R. promise withdrawn all his defence to the application filed b(y the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. It is with this background that one has to appr~ciate the nature of the decree passed by the Court on March 31, 1969. It is also seen from the records that the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- on March 31, 1969, to the respondent towards the cost of repairs and improvements effected by him during his occupation of the suit premises. On the same date, as the compromise i.e. March 31, 1969, the respondent passed a letter to the appellant. In this letter after referring to the compromise filed B in the court as well as the order passed thereon, he gave an under' taking 'to vacate the premises on or before June 5, 1969. He also acknowledged the receipt of the sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the· C landlord towards the cost of repairs and improvements. The respondent has also further agreed to refund the sum of Rs. 20,000 /- if he does not vacate the premises within time and he has also further agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs. 10,000/ - as damages. We are not concerned with this sum of Rs. 20,000/- or the further agreement of the respondent to pay damages. The respondent has further stated in the sai.d letter that in the event of his failure to vacate the premises within time, the landlord is at liberty to execute the decree of eviction without any further notice to him. The assurance and the undertaking given by the respondent to abide by the compromise decree and to vacate the premisei without raising any objection have proved to be of no avail, as will be seen from the events that followed. When the time lor delivery of property was drawing near, the respondent's son, one S. M. Sundararn, filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that the purchase by the appellant of the suit property was void. The son also obtained an mterim injunction against the appellant from executing the order of eviction passed in H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968 and disturbing his possession. The suit was tried on merits and was ultimately dismiSsed by the City CiV11 Court on December 12, 1969 with costs of the appellant. According to the appellant, this .suit was engineered by the respondent himself in order to put off his eviction ftom the suit property. After the dismissal of the above suit, the appellant filed Execution Petition No. 953 of 1969 in the City Civil Court, Madras (which was the competent Court for purposes of execution) to execute the order of eviction against the respondent in H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968. The respondent filed B. A. No. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that it was a null,ity and inexecutable; and as such he prayed for the warrant of possession issued in Execution Petition to be recalled and to dismis.s the Execution Petition itself., His main plea in this apptt. D F G H • • • A ( n c K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SE_SHADRI (Vaidialingam, /.) 697 cation was that the decree sought to ~~.executed was one based· on comproinise or consent without the Rent Control Court having satisfied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona fide requirement of the property by the landlord for his own occu- · pation; and as such the decree contravened section 10 of the Act. · This application was opposed by the appellant in a lengthy counteraffidavrt. In this counter-affidavit, the landlord, after referring to the various items of evidence adduced before . the court, which have been referred to earlier, has stated that it was when· the respondent found that the pleas raised by him could not be sustained nnd that the landlord's case was true that he unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree. . He has further . pleaded that the decree sought to be executed does noi suffer any infirmity. · The learned City Civil Judge b\y his order dated March 18, 1970, over-ruled the objections· raised 1:zy the respondent and dis- . missed E. A. No: 1314 of 1969 and gave time to the respondent · till April20,' 1970, to vacate and deliver the possession! of the D :property. : The respondent carried the matter to the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 797 of 1970. The High Court by its judgment and· oroer dated September 15,· 1970, has reversed the, · urder. of the City Civil Court and accepted the contentions of the respondent. · The learned Judge has held that the decree for eviction dated March 31; 1969, is solely passed on the basis of the E compromise and the Rent Controller has· not applied his mind to satisfy' himself whether the bona: fide requirement of the landlord has been established. It is the further view of ·the High Court that even if ·there was enough· material before the Rent Control Court, when· it passed the' order' of eviction by consent, the decr.-e will, nevertheless, be void· so long as the Rent Controller has not. F given his dedsion regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide.· .. On this line of reasoning, the learned Judge held that the eviC'lion order is ·a nullity and is·not executable.''" · · • •' , - '• • '_' •' I '• • Mr. M~ c.· Setalvad, learned counsel for the appellant; has urged that the High Court has misunderstood and. mis-interpreted the decisions ·of this Court b~aring on the point. · · He pointed out J:; that the appellant had specifically pleaded that· he required the house bona fide for his own occupation, which is one of the circumstances under which a landlord can claim eviction of the tenant under the Act. The circumstances under which the house was :required by him were also' spoken to by the landlord when he gave evidence and he sought supp9rt by filing as niany. as forty-five H exhibits before the court. The respondent had denied the plea of the landlord in his counter-affidavit. Nevertheless, when the entire evidence was placed before the . court by tli landlord, the tenant did not choose to c'ross-examine him, as he· must have felt 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973] 3 S.C.R. that 1he landlord's claim would be accepted by the court and his defence rejected. It was under ilhose circumstances that the respondent unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction. That conduct of the respondent clearly establi~hes that he has accepted as true the claim of the landlord that be bona fide required the premises for his own use and· occupation. The materials on record also show that the court was satisfied atput the bona fide requirement of the landlord and hence it accep1ed the compromise and made it a decree of court. Under those circumstances, the counsel contended that it cannot hS said that" the decree is one passed only on the basis of the compromise so as to rriake it void. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that the de~ree for evictioh has been passed exclusively on the basis of the compromise entered into by the parties. There is no indication that the court at any stage applied its mind and satisfied itself regarding the premises being required by the landlord bona fide for his own occupation. The relevant provision of the Act, the counsel pointed out, is quite, clear and it makes it mandatory that the court must apply its mind and satisfy itself that the claim for eviction falls within one or other of the provisions which enables · a landlord to get possession. He further pointed out that if the· satisfaction _of the court is not expressed in the decree, the executing Court has no option but to hold that the same is void. as laid down by this Court, and it cannot go into the question whether from the materials on record the Rent Control Court was satisfied or not. Such an enquiry, it is pointed out, will be asking the executing Court also to go into the question wheth~ - the landlord has made out a case for eviction-a question which · falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court. Mr. Tarkunde finally pointed out that the decision of the High Court holding that the decree in question is void is correct, as it is in accordan~e with the decisions of this Court. It is now necessary to refer to the material Provisions of the Act. Section 10 deals with eviction of tenants .. T.he relevant part of section 10, necessary for our purpose, is as follows :- Eviction of tenants. "10( 1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or ~ctions 14 to 16 : x x x x x 2 (a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause ( d), apply to the Controller for an order directB c D ' ~ r- • G ' H B c D E F K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADR! (Vaidialingam, J.) 699 ing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- ' (i) in case it is a residential building if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son and if he or his son is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned; x x x x x (a) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord in bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application : x x x x x Provided further that 'the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate." . Section 10 (1) places an embargo on the right of a landlord to get a tenant evicted except in accordance with the provisions of that section or sections 14 to 16. We are not concerned with sections 14 to 16 in this case. Sub-section 2 enumerates certain circumstances under which a landlord can ask for eviction. We are not also concerned with that provision. Sub-section 3 again enumerates certain other circumstances under which a landlord, subject to the provisions of clause ( d) , can ask for possession of' the building from the tenant. It is accepted by both parties that clause ( d) has no application. Sub-clause ( i), which deals witla a residential building, enables a landlord to ask for possession of a building in the circumstances mentioned therein. Under subclause ( e) , if the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide he may pass an order of eviction. In this case, the landlord has asked for· eviction on the ground that he requires the premises for his own occuoation. The ConG troller can pass an order in his favour only if he is satisfied that his claim is bona fide. The statute says so and that has to be given full effect. The question is whether in the case before us, it can be stated that the Controller was so satisfied when he passed the order of eviction on March 31, 1969. Our attention has been drawn to certain English decisions rendered under the Rent Restrictions Aot, wherein it has b~n held that though the court has jurisdiction to order possession in favour of a landlord only on one or other of the ~pecified statutory 700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 S.C.R. grounds, the court may act on an admission made by a tenant in that behalf and pass an order of eviction without being obliged to hear a case out. It is not· ·necessary for us to refer to those decisions as, in our opinion, the case on hand will have to be decided in accordance with the .principles laid down by this Court. 111ere are three decisions of this Court which require to be considered. In Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass & Anr., (') a decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties, was held, by this Court, to be a nullity as contravening section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The facts therein were as follows :- The tenant and the son of the landlord referred the disputes between them to arbiitration. The landlord was not a party to this agreement. The arbitrators passed an award whereunder the tenant was to give vacant possession of the premises in favour of the landlord within a particular time. This award was made a decree of court. The landlord, who· was neither a party to the award nor to the proceedings, which resulted in the award being made a decree of court, applied for eviction of the tenant on the basis of the award. The tenant resisted execution by raising various objections under section 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the objections, was that the decree. for eviction based upon the award was a nullity as being opposed to the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. This Court held that the decree directing the tenant to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord was a nullity, as it was passed in contravention of section 13 ( 1) of the relevant statute. After quoting the subsection, this Court further held that the decree for eviction passed according to an award, in a proceeding to which the landlord was not a· party, and wrtholl't the court satisfying itself that a statutory ground of eviction existed, was a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. It will be seen from this decision that the decree was held to be a nullity biecause the landlord was not a party thereto, and also because the court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction, as required by the statute, existed. This decision is certainly an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself !hat a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this Court was not faced with such a problem. Jn Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K. L. Bansal,(') the question again arose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity (I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048. A B c D E F G H ' A B K. K. CHARI V, R. M. SESHADRI (Vaidialingam, J.'I 701 of a decree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff therein filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds :- (a) the premises were required for their own use; and (b) the tenant had committed default in payment of reni. The tenant filed a.written statement denying both these allegations. He disputed the claim or' the landlord regarding his requiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also the fact of his being in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and c by which they agreed to the passing of. a decree of eviction against the tenant. Representations to the same effect were also made by the counsel for both parties. The court passed the following order:- D "In view of the statement of the parties' counsel and the written compromise, a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant". The tenant did not vacate the premises within the time mentioned as per the compromise memo. On the other hand, he filed an application under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, pleading that the decree is void as being in contravention of section 13 of the E Delhi statute. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity, as the order was passed solely on the basis of the compromise without indicating that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in section 13 existed. Following the decision in Bahadur Singh & Anr.,(1) this Court upheld the order of the High Court. Here again, it will be seen that the manner in which the court's satisF faction is to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with. A similar question came up again before this Court in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr.(') The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet the premises without obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting, without the consent of the landlord in writing, was one of the G grounds under section 13 ( 1 ) of the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask for eviction. The tenant denied the allegation that be had sublet the premises. B.oth the landlord and the tenant ·entered into a COJllllromise and the court, after recording the same, passed the following order :- H "As per compromise, decree for ejectment and for Rs. 165 /- with proportionate costs is ,passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The parties (I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 43". CZ) A.T.R. 1970 S.C.794 . • 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 s.c:R. shall be bound by the terms of the compromise. The terms of the compromise be incorporated in the decreesheet. ......... " As 'lhe tenant did not surrender possession of ihe properties within the time mentioned in the compromise memo. t!Ie landlord levied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various grounds one of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, being in contravention of section 13 of the Delhf statute. This contention was accepted by the execution Court, as well as by the High Court. This Court, alter a reference to the provisions of section 13, held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one or other Of 'lhe grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, further observed : "From ihe facts mentioned earlier, it is seen 'lhat at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting· complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to. show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That hieing so there can be hardly any doubt 'lhat the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. . Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity". Reference was also made to the two earlier decisions holding such decrees to be void. It is significant to note that this Court in the last mentioned decision referred to the facts leading upto the compromise decree, namely, the basis of the Claim of the landlord, the denial by the tenant and both of them filing a memo of compromise without any reference to the plea of subletting made by the landlord. In the said decision this Court haS held that the compromise decree is void, as there could have been no satisfaction of this Court regarding the statutory requirement in view .of the following three circumstances :- (I) At no stage the Court was called upon to apply itS mind to the question whether .the plea of subletting is tiue or not. ( 2) The order made !:ti' the Court does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place. ( 3) There was no other material on record to show that the court was so satisfied. B c D E F I G B ) { • • • I \ • " A n c D E F K .. K. CHARI .v. R. M. SESHADRI (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 703' The view of this Court further k that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. · In the last decision, in our opinion, there is an indication as tCY how the satisfaction of a court can be expressed or gathered irr a particular case. If a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a ·satutory condition, it may be held that it was so· satisfied .about the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde· that the decree for eviction in the case before. us has been passed solely on. the basis of the compromise arrived at : bet\veen the parties. No dout~ a .. reading of the order of die. court dated March 31, 1969, isolaied from all other circumstances, may give the impressio·n that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. . It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisf:iction that• the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. Jf the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so· satisfied can also be considered from the point· of view whether a stage had beerr reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on record can also .be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was materiaf before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by. consent, from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a. nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, . this view i" .erroneous. We have very exhaustively referred to the plea of the landlord as well as the evidence let in by him regarding his requiring the building bona fide for his own occupation. There is no contto~ versy that if such a plea is established, an order of eviction of the G tenant can be obtained by the landlord under section 10 of the Act. The respondent no doubt at the initial stage denied the claim of the landlord. . The landlord gave evidence on various matters with particular reference to his requiring the house bona fide for his own occupation. · He had also filed, as referre.d by us earlier, as many as 45 exhibits, one of which was the order of eviction H ·obtained against him, being Ext. 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. When the· evidence of the landlord was before the court supported, as it was, bv the innumerable exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been ' ·~ ' 704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973} 3 S.C.R. ~ . readied when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind tri the question whether the plea of the landlord that he required the \ premises for his own occupation was bona fide. There is the further circumstance that the tenant did not cross-examine the plaintiff. On the other hand, he entered into a compromise in ..._and by which he withdrew his defence and suljmitted to a decree ·f for eviction unconditionally. His withdrawal of the defence, after & the plaintiff had given evidence and filed exhibits in support of ,., his plea, clearly shows that he accepted as true the. claim of the .{~landlord that he requires the premises bona fide fqr his own occupa- )"S:1ion. He has accepted the position that the landlord has made [-.,, 'out the statutory requirement, entitling hini to ask for possession '· of the premises. It is this unconditional withdrawal of the defence A B c regarding the statll'lory condition pleaded by the landlord, :md the compromise following it, that was accepted by the court aud a ·decree for eviction passed thereon. Under those circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of the Jandlordr in our opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must- again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the land- . 0 lord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the s·ame. Of course, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court must.decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the fondJord. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of. the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre- <_ requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation •borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was 'called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was suffi- : 1 cient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms· of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. It is no doubt true that before making an order Jor po;;ession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in.fact admits that the landlord is entitleQ, to possession on one or other of the statutory ground, mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to· act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express oi implied. has been made by the tenant about the existence of one-or other of the E F (. II A B c D G H K. K. CHAR! v. R. M. SESHADR! (Vaidialingam, J.) 705 statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact nf. the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position wa~ entirely different. In none of those cases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. For all the reasons mentioned above, it· cannot be held, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered 'into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters Teferred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutable. Mr.