# K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 576
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-04-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2253 of 2025
- **Bench:** Sudhanshu Dhulia, Prashant Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/k-p-tamilmaran-v-the-state-by-deputy-superintendent-of-police-38363
- **Pages:** 44

## Headnote

Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction
and sentence of A-15 under Sections 217, 218, Penal Code, 1860
and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and modifying the conviction
and sentence of A-14, while upholding the conviction and sentence
of the other co-accused.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
ss.3(2)(i), 4 - Murder of a young couple in the name of honour
killing where the girl belonged to the Vanniyar community and
the boy was a Dalit - Eventually, 11 accused were convicted
and sentenced by the High Court wherein A-14 and A-15 were
the police officers who were convicted by the Trial Court
u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment - However, High Court
modified the conviction and sentence of A-14 by acquitting
him for offences u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 but, maintained his conviction u/s.4, SC/ST Act
and s.217, IPC; the conviction and sentence of A-15 was
upheld - Present appeal by eleven accused:
Held: A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15 (Inspector-IO) both committed
the offences u/s.217, IPC and s.4, SC/ST Act as they did not register
the FIR at the first instance with the intention to save the culprits - In
addition, A-15 was the main architect behind the FIR which falsely
implicated the four members of Schedule Caste community -
Further, A-15 was in-charge of the investigation which led to the
filing of the charge-sheet against the innocent persons belonging
to Dalit community - A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve the
culprits belonging to the Vanniyar community of their complicity
* Author
1866
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in the crime, and he knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated
some of the Dalits in an offence punishable with death - A-15 also
manufactured the extra-judicial confessions and evidence - High
Court rightly upheld the conviction of A-15 u/ss.217, 218, IPC and
ss.4, 3(2)(i), SC/ST Act and the sentence of life imprisonment -
Impugned judgment not interfered with. [Paras 74, 75]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.154 - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - ss.3(2)(i), 4 - Murder
of a young couple in the name of honour killing - A-14 and
A-15 were the police officers who were convicted by the Trial
Court u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment - High Court upheld the
conviction of A-14 but modified his sentence by acquitting
him of charges u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 however, the conviction and sentence of A15 was
not modified - One of their defence was that nobody came
forward to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR:
Held: Such defence is unacceptable in light of the law as well as
the facts of the case and was rightly disbelieved by High Court -
s.154, CrPC should not be misunderstood to mean that the police
is empowered to register FIR only in cases where some informant
comes forward and provides information regarding the commission
of a cognizable offence to the police - Once the police gets
information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence,
whether it is through any informant/complainant or otherwise,
police is empowered to register the case and proceed with the
investigation - In the present case, A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15
(Inspector-IO) had the information regarding the incident on the
day of the incident itself - However, they still did not register the
FIR. [Para 69]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.156, 157(1) - Police
Act, 1861 - ss.23, 24 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 r/w 149,
217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - ss.3(2)(i), 4:
Held: The purpose of an investigation is to reach to the truth -
Duty of an Investigating Officer is to lawfully collect eviden

## Text

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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1865 : 2025 INSC 576
K.P. Tamilmaran
v.
The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
(Criminal Appeal No. 2253 of 2025)
28 April 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction
and sentence of A-15 under Sections 217, 218, Penal Code, 1860
and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and modifying the conviction
and sentence of A-14, while upholding the conviction and sentence
of the other co-accused.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
ss.3(2)(i), 4 - Murder of a young couple in the name of honour
killing where the girl belonged to the Vanniyar community and
the boy was a Dalit - Eventually, 11 accused were convicted
and sentenced by the High Court wherein A-14 and A-15 were
the police officers who were convicted by the Trial Court
u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment - However, High Court
modified the conviction and sentence of A-14 by acquitting
him for offences u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 but, maintained his conviction u/s.4, SC/ST Act
and s.217, IPC; the conviction and sentence of A-15 was
upheld - Present appeal by eleven accused:
Held: A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15 (Inspector-IO) both committed
the offences u/s.217, IPC and s.4, SC/ST Act as they did not register
the FIR at the first instance with the intention to save the culprits - In
addition, A-15 was the main architect behind the FIR which falsely
implicated the four members of Schedule Caste community -
Further, A-15 was in-charge of the investigation which led to the
filing of the charge-sheet against the innocent persons belonging
to Dalit community - A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve the
culprits belonging to the Vanniyar community of their complicity
* Author
1866
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Supreme Court Reports
in the crime, and he knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated
some of the Dalits in an offence punishable with death - A-15 also
manufactured the extra-judicial confessions and evidence - High
Court rightly upheld the conviction of A-15 u/ss.217, 218, IPC and
ss.4, 3(2)(i), SC/ST Act and the sentence of life imprisonment -
Impugned judgment not interfered with. [Paras 74, 75]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.154 - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - ss.3(2)(i), 4 - Murder
of a young couple in the name of honour killing - A-14 and
A-15 were the police officers who were convicted by the Trial
Court u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment - High Court upheld the
conviction of A-14 but modified his sentence by acquitting
him of charges u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 however, the conviction and sentence of A15 was
not modified - One of their defence was that nobody came
forward to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR:
Held: Such defence is unacceptable in light of the law as well as
the facts of the case and was rightly disbelieved by High Court -
s.154, CrPC should not be misunderstood to mean that the police
is empowered to register FIR only in cases where some informant
comes forward and provides information regarding the commission
of a cognizable offence to the police - Once the police gets
information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence,
whether it is through any informant/complainant or otherwise,
police is empowered to register the case and proceed with the
investigation - In the present case, A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15
(Inspector-IO) had the information regarding the incident on the
day of the incident itself - However, they still did not register the
FIR. [Para 69]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.156, 157(1) - Police
Act, 1861 - ss.23, 24 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 r/w 149,
217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - ss.3(2)(i), 4:
Held: The purpose of an investigation is to reach to the truth -
Duty of an Investigating Officer is to lawfully collect evidence - In
the present case, the Investigating Officer (A-15) not only covered
evidence but fabricated his own - Instead of collecting evidence,
he created evidence and tried to implicate the innocent and set the
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
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K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
guilty loose - In order to fulfil his wicked design, he deliberately
and willfully violated the mandate of ss.154 and 157(1), CrPC as
well as ss.23 and 24, Police Act, 1861. [Para 67]
Criminal Jurisprudence - Hostile witness - Meaning - Evidence
Act, 1872 - ss.154, 3, 155:
Held: The phrase 'hostile witness' is used for a witness who gives
a statement contrary to the story of the side for which he/she is a
witness - Only because a witness has supported some, though
not all, aspects of a case, it would not automatically mean that this
witness has to be declared 'hostile' - A party can cross-examine
its own witness u/s.154 even without getting a declaration of
'hostility' - The only restriction to cross-examination u/s.154 is
that the party, who seeks to cross-examine its own witness, must
obtain the leave of the Court - If part of the evidence of a hostile
witness corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of
the evidence is admissible - Once a prosecution witness has been
declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, then
it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony - There
can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and the court
must also look into these factors while evaluating the evidence given
by a hostile witness - The purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the
truth of the matter - Whatever evidence is there before the Court
must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary),
before a verdict can be finally given. [Paras 31, 36]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.311 - Evidence Act,
1872 - s.165 - Power to summon material witness, or examine
person present - Judge's power to put questions or order
production - Powers of Court u/s.311 and s.165, Evidence Act:
Held: Power u/s.311, CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial,
even after the closing of the evidence - Powers of the Court u/s.165,
Evidence Act are complementary to s.311, CrPC - Powers u/s.311,
CrPC can either be exercised on an application moved by either
side to the case or suo moto by the Court - In case a person is not
listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but later, the prosecution
desires to bring that person as an additional prosecution witness,
then the prosecution can move an application to bring this person
as a prosecution witness - It is then for the Court to decide whether
such a person is required as a witness or not - If the Court finds
that such a person should have been examined as a prosecution
witness then the Court may allow the application and such a
1868
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
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person can be examined as a prosecution witness - Thereafter,
the normal course of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc.
would follow - On the other hand, when the Court calls a person
as a Court witness, he can be cross-examined by either side but
only with the leave of the Court - Further, the cross-examination is
to be restricted only to what was stated by this witness in his/her
reply to the questions of the Court, and a Court witness cannot be
contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police
i.e. statements u/s.161 of CrPC - However, the special powers of
the Court u/s.165, Evidence Act are not impaired or controlled by
the provisions of s.162, CrPC - Courts are not barred from putting
questions which may contradict the witness with the previous
statements made before the police. [Paras 48, 51]
Words and Phrases - 'may', 'shall' - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - s.311 - Discussed.
Evidence - Hostile witness - Position in India vis-à-vis under
English law - Discussed. [Para 30]
Case Law Cited
Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975) 3 SCC 562; Sat Paul v. Delhi
Administration [1976] 2 SCR 11 : (1976) 1 SCC 727; Neeraj
Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 5 SCR 104 : (2023) 4 SCC
731; Paulmeli v. State of T.N. [2014] 6 SCR 420 : (2014) 13 SCC
90; Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. [2012] 6 SCR 688 : (2012) 5
SCC 777; Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR 37 :
(2012) 4 SCC 327; Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. [2021] 14 SCR
767 : (2021) 13 SCC 716; State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa [2006] 2
SCR 200 : (2006) 4 SCC 512; Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State
of Maharashtra [1967] 3 SCR 415 : 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19;
Rama Paswan v. State of Jharkhand [2007] 5 SCR 83 : (2007)
11 SCC 191; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat
& Ors. [2006] 2 SCR 1081 : (2006) 3 SCC 374; Mahabir Mandal
& Ors. v. State of Bihar [1972] 3 SCR 639 : (1972) 1 SCC 748;
Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [2019]
6 SCR 701 : (2019) 16 SCC 547; Raghunandan v. State of U.P.
[1974] 3 SCR 92 : (1974) 4 SCC 186; Ram Chander v. State of
Haryana [1981] 3 SCR 12 : (1981) 3 SCC 191; Lalita Kumari v.
Govt. of U.P. [2013] 14 SCR 713: (2014) 2 SCC 1 - referred to.
Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259;
Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7 -
referred to.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1869
K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Police Act, 1861.
List of Keywords
Sections 217, 218 of the Penal Code, 1860; Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989; Honour killing; Double murder; Vanniyar Community;
Dalit Community; Poisoned; Caste-based abuses; Delay in
trial; Conviction and sentence modified; Hostile witness; Crossexamination; Cross-examine own witness; Declaration of hostility;
Prosecution witness; Court witness; Testimony of prosecution
witness; Impeach credibility of own witness; falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus; Related witnesses; Interested witnesses; Eyewitness;
Duty on court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine any
person as witness; Not listed as witness in charge-sheet; Additional
prosecution witness; examination-in-chief; Court witness cannot be
contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police;
Wrong and misleading investigation; Extra-judicial confession;
Implicate the innocent; Not only covered evidence but fabricated;
Commission of cognizable offence; Registration of FIR obligatory;
Neglected duties and disobeyed law; Knowingly and deliberately
falsely implicated Dalits; Victim compensation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2253 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 626 of 2021
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259-2260
and 2261 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ratnakar Dash, M. Sathyanarayanan, Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
Siddharth Aggarwal, S. Nagamuthu, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Advs.,
K. Balu, Avinish K Saurab, S. Thananjayan, Poornachandiran R,
1870
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Ajith Williyam S, Ms. Puspita Basak, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Karuppaiah
Meyyappan, Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Tushar Srivastava,
Shourya Dashupta, Nirnimesh Dube, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian,
Raghunatha Sethupathy B, Ms. Arshiya Ghose, S. Sabari Bala
Pandian, Pariksheet Bishnoi, Yusuf, Muthalagu, Naveen, G
Anandan, G Jai Singh, Muthu Ganesa Pandian, M. A. Gouthaman,
Dr. Ram Sankar, Mrs. Harini Ramsankar, Mrs. Usha Prabakaran,
Maheswaran Prabakaran, M/s. Ram Sankar & Co, C. Paramsivam,
Nishant Sharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Promila, Deepak Reddy,
Pradum Kumar, Neeraj Dubey.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Arkaj Kumar,
B K Satija, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Anukalp Jain, Madhav Sinhal,
Rohit Khare, Ms. Sunanda Shukla, Ishaan Sharma, Arvind Kumar
Sharma, Rahul Shyam Bhandari, Ms. G Priyadharshni, Satyam
Pathak, Prabhakar Pahepuri, Harsh Vardhan, K Kesavan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
The challenge before this Court in all these Appeals is to the decision
of the Madras High Court dated 08.06.2022. Before proceeding to
the impugned judgment, it is necessary to trace the trajectory of this
case from the Trial Court onwards, since it has passed through a
maze of facts.
3.
A total of fifteen accused had faced trial, and the Trial Court ultimately
convicted thirteen of them. Amongst them, A-1 to A-3, A-5 to A-8, A-10
to A-13 were convicted primarily under Sections 302 read with 149
of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'). They were all sentenced
to life imprisonment, except A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), who was given
death sentence by the Trial Court. A-14 and A-15 were the police
officers, who were convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 217,
218 of IPC and Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'SC/ST Act'), and
both of them were sentenced to life imprisonment. A-4 (Ayyasamy)
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1871
K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
and A-9 (Gunasekaran) were acquitted by the Trial Court, and no
appeal against their acquittal was filed before the High Court.
4.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court has modified the conviction
and sentence of A-14 (Sub-inspector K.P. Tamilmaran), acquitting him
for offences under Section 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and Section 218
of IPC, but maintaining his conviction for offences under Section 4
of the SC/ST Act and Section 217 of IPC, and thus reducing the
sentence imposed from life imprisonment to two years rigorous
imprisonment. The conviction and sentence of another police officer
(A-15, Inspector M. Sellamuthu) has been upheld. In the case of A-2,
the conviction by the Trial Court has been maintained but the sentence
was changed from death penalty to life imprisonment. The High Court
has also acquitted two other accused, i.e. A-3 (Rangasamy) and A-13
(Chinnadurai). The remaining appeals of all other co-accused were
dismissed, and their conviction and sentence was upheld.
5.
No appeal has been filed against the acquittal of the above-mentioned
accused by the High Court. Before us, now the remaining eleven
accused i.e. A-1, A-2, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-12, A-14, A-15, have
challenged their conviction and sentence.
6.
At this stage, it is necessary to bring a few crucial aspects of this
case, in order to have a better perspective.
7.
This is a case of a dastardly murder of a young couple, Murugesan
and Kannagi, who were only in their early twenties, when they were
killed. Both of them were administered poison in full view of a large
number of villagers. The masterminds and the main perpetrators of
this macabre act were none other than the father and the brother of
the girl Kannagi. The reason behind the murder of this young couple
was that Kannagi, belonging to the 'Vanniyar' community, had dared
to marry Murugesan, who was a 'Dalit' from the same village. So,
at the root of this crime is the deeply entrenched hierarchical caste
system in India, and ironically, this most dishonorable act goes by
the name of honour-killing!
8.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
i.
Kannagi and Murugesan, both residents of village 'Pudukoorapettai'
in District Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu, were in love. Murugesan had
just completed his B.E. (Chemical Engineering) from a college
in Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu, and was employed in Bangalore,
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whereas Kannagi was completing her B.Com. studies from the
same college. Knowing well that the Vanniyar community, to
which Kannagi's family belonged, would never allow their union,
the two got secretly married before the Registrar of Marriage
at Cuddalore on 05.05.2003, and got their marriage registered.
The marriage certificate was marked as Exhibit P-1 before the
Trial Court.
ii.
After performing their marriage, the two returned to their village
and were leading a normal life with their respective families,
but then in the first week of July, 2003, both left their village
quietly without attracting any attention.
iii.
On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), brother of Kannagi,
reached the house of PW-1 Samikannu (father of Murugesan),
with a big sickle in his hand, and ordered PW-1 to bring his
son back to the village. The reason why he was looking for
Murugesan, A-2 said, was that Murugesan had borrowed money
from him which he was now refusing to return. Samikannu (PW-1)
leaves his house the same day to look for Murugesan. He goes
to his sister-in-law's house in the village Rasapalayam where
he met Murugesan and asked Murugesan to send Kannagi to
her parents. Thereafter, PW-1 returned to his house that day.
After a gap of four days, on 07.07.2003, A-2 again comes to
the house of PW-1 and threatens him for the second time to
bring Murugesan back to the village. On 07.07.2003, PW-1
again goes in search of Murugesan but he returns only on
08.07.2003, and by that time, his son and Kannagi had already
been murdered. It is further on record that, on 07.07.2003, A-2
also threatened A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was made an accused
by the prosecution, though he was the uncle of Murugesan. A-2
repeats the same false story of Murugesan borrowing money
from him, which he had refused to return and therefore he was
on a lookout for him.
iv.
The prosecution story then proceeds to state that on 07.07.2003,
A-4 leaves his village Pudukoorapettai for the house of PW15 (Tamilarasi), sister of Murugesan, in Vannangudikadu
village, where Murugesan was hiding. A-4 brings Murugesan
back to Pudukoorapettai village and presents him before A-1
(Duraisamy) and A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), father and brother of
Kannagi, respectively.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1873
K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
v.
By the time Murugesan was brought to the village, it was evening
(on 07.07.2003). Thereafter, as per the prosecution story, A-1
to A-13 undressed Murugesan, tied him to a post and then he
was mercilessly beaten by the mob including A-1 to A-13. This
was done in full view of many villagers who were present there,
yet there was no attempt to stop this savage brutality. A-1 to
A-13 continued to torture Murugesan compelling him to reveal
the whereabouts of Kannagi. After much physical torture and
beating, when Murugesan was unable to bear it any longer, he
finally revealed that Kannagi was in PW-23 Saroja's house (who
was the mother-in-law of A-4). Immediately a Tata Sumo car was
arranged by A-1, which was driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan), in
which A-4 to A-11 climbed and proceeded to Moongilthuraipattu
village where PW-23's house was located, with the intention of
getting Kannagi back to Pudukoorapettai village.
vi.
Kannagi was finally brought to her village, and by this time it was
about 5:30 AM in the morning (of 08.07.2003). Both Kannagi
and Murugesan were then taken to a cashew grove near the
village. Once there, A-1 gets Nuvacron1 (insecticide/poison) in
a steel tumbler and gives it to his son A-2, and orders him to
administer that to his daughter Kannagi.
vii. A-2 then forced Nuvacron down Kannagi's throat which caused
her death in minutes. The prosecution story here though also
suggests that A-2 tried to administer the remaining Nuvacron
to Murugesan but when Murugesan resisted, this task was
assigned to A-4. All the same, we must note that this version of
prosecution, that A-4 administered or tried to administer poison
to Murugesan, was not accepted in view of the evidence of
PW-49 (Chinnapillai, step-mother of Murugesan) who had said
that she saw A-2 administering poison to her son Murugesan.
Like Kannagi, Murugesan too died minutes after being forced to
drink the poison. PW-49 is an eye-witness who has stuck to her
deposition that it was A-2 who had administered poison to her
son Murugesan, and not A-4. A-4 has ultimately been acquitted
by the Trial Court and as stated above, no appeal against his
acquittal was filed before the High Court. We will deal with this
1
Insecticide with common name "Monocrotophos". Considered highly toxic by all routes of exposure. The
ingestion of even 120 mg of Monocrotophos can be fatal.
1874
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
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aspect in greater detail at a later point in this judgment. We
must also point out here that PW-49 was not mentioned in the
charge-sheet as one of the prosecution witnesses. It was only
in the middle of the trial that an application was moved under
Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
'CrPC') by the prosecution to bring PW-49 as a witness.
viii. Returning to the facts of the case. The two bodies were then
burnt in different places-Kannagi in the village cremation ground
and Murugesan at a place nearby.
ix.
Meanwhile, as per the prosecution case, A-14 and 15 (police
officers) not only knew about these events but they had also
visited the crime scene, according to some of the witnesses
on 08.07.2003 itself, and yet they did not lodge an FIR, which
was their statutory duty under Section 154 and Section 157
CrPC. Not only this, but when PW-49 goes to the police station
to lodge an FIR on 08.07.2003, she was rebuffed and abused
at the police station, and practically thrown out of the station.
x.
It was only after a gap of nine days, when some leaders
belonging to the Dalit community raised this issue through Press
and Media and a support was gathered from the public, that
a case was finally registered on 17.07.2003 as Crime No.356
of 2003 under Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC at police station
Virudhachalam. The FIR, however, was registered on the basis
of the extra-judicial confession of A-1 before PW-32 (Ashokan),
who was the Village Administrative Officer. In this FIR, eight
accused were named, four belonging to the Dalit community and
the other four belonging to the Vanniyar community. The Dalits
included PW-1 (Samikannu), who was none other than the father
of the deceased Murugesan; A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was the uncle
of Murugesan and who allegedly brought Murugesan back to
Pudukoorapettai village from his sister's house; Ilayaperumal,
another uncle of Murugesan, and Kannadasan, who ultimately
became a prosecution witness as PW-33. The four Vanniyars
who were made accused were A-1, A-2 (who were the father
and brother of Kannagi, respectively), A-3 and Anbalagan, who
later became a prosecution witness as PW-29.
xi.
Based on this FIR, an investigation was done by the local
police and a charge-sheet was filed on 16.09.2003 against all
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K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
the eight above-mentioned accused under Sections 147, 302,
201 of IPC.
xii. Meanwhile, the questionable manner in which the entire
investigation was carried out by the local police, compelled the
family of the deceased Murugesan to seek interference from the
Madras High Court where a petition was filed with a prayer that
the investigation in this case must be handed over to the Central
Bureau of Investigation (for short 'CBI'). The High Court, by its
order dated 22.04.2004, allowed this application and directed
that the investigation be handed over to CBI.
xiii. On 21.05.2004, the CBI again registered its FIR under Sections
147, 302, 201 of IPC and started the investigation. A chargesheet was filed on 14.10.2005 against fifteen accused, which
included two Dalits i.e. A-4 (Ayyasamy) and A-9 (Gunasekaran),
two police officers i.e. A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M.
Sellamuthu). The remaining accused belong to the Vanniyar
community. As we have already stated in the beginning, A-4
and A-9 were acquitted by the Trial Court, while accused A-3
and A-13 were later acquitted by the High Court in Appeal.
xiv. There has been an inordinate delay caused in this case. The
incident is of 7th and 8th July, 2003, and the Trial was concluded
only on 24.09.2021. The delay on account of the belated filing
of the FIR, etc. we have already discussed above, but the case
was only committed to Sessions on 15.03.2010 i.e. after more
than seven years. The proceedings again remained stalled till
charges were ultimately framed on 14.07.2017. An additional
charge under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was framed by the
Trial Court against A-14 and A-15 in 2020.
As noticed by the High Court, the reason for this long and
inordinate delay was because of the multiple petitions filed by
the accused for one reason or the other primarily as a challenge
to the proceedings itself.
9.
As mentioned in the beginning, the High Court in appeal, by the
impugned judgment, modified the sentence of A-2 from death penalty
to life imprisonment, while upholding his conviction. A-3 and A-13
were acquitted by the High Court. A-14 was acquitted for offences
under Section 3 of SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC.
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10. The eleven accused who stood convicted and sentenced by the High
Court are now before us. Their defence is based primarily on the
alleged weaknesses of the prosecution theory, the inconsistencies
and frequent contradictions in the statements of key prosecution
witnesses, including its star witness PW-49 (Chinnapillai), etc. The
learned senior counsels for the appellants, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Mr.
Ratnakar Dash, Mr. M. Sathyanarayanan, Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal
and Mr. S. Nagamuthu have tried to convince this Court that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unreliable and there
has been a total failure on the part of the prosecution to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt.
11. The contention on behalf of A-14 and A-15 (the two police officers-
K.P Tamilmaran and M. Sellamuthu, respectively), raised by
learned senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr. Gopal
Sankaranarayanan, respectively, is that none of the witnesses have
specifically identified them as the officers at the police station who
refused to lodge the FIR when apprised of the incident. It is the
contention of A-15, additionally, that merely because he had filed
the charge-sheet against persons belonging to both the Dalit and
Vanniyar community, the investigation conducted by him cannot be
said to be motivated by a desire to falsely implicate members of
the Dalit community.
12. We have heard learned senior counsels for the accused as well as
the learned counsel, Mr. Rahul Shyam Bhandari, for the family of
Murugesan and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor
General representing CBI.
13. In order to appreciate the sequence of events and the role of
the accused, it is important to look at the testimonies of PW-1
(Samikannu-father of Murugesan), PW-2 (Velmurugan-younger
brother of Murugesan), PW-3 (Palanivel-second younger brother
of Murugesan), PW-15 (Tamilarasi-sister of Murugesan), and PW49 (Chinnapillai-step-mother of Murugesan), who are the main
prosecution witnesses.
14. But before we do that, it may be necessary to say a few words about
some essential aspects of this case, in order to set the context for
the examination of testimonies of these key prosecution witnesses.
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K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
Delay in Trial and evidentiary value of so-called "hostile witness"
15. The long and inordinate delay which has been caused in this case,
right from the lodging of the FIR, speaks volumes about the gross
inefficiency at the hands of the prosecution on the one hand and
dilatory tactics employed by the defence on the other hand, which
together led to a slow trial.
16. The second and more crucial aspect is that many of the prosecution
witnesses in this case have turned, what has come to be known
as 'hostile'; a fact which has been strongly pressed by the defence
in their favour. The defence would also argue that the Trial Court
and High Court have mainly relied on the testimonies of the family
members of Murugesan, who are interested witnesses.
17. In our opinion, there is no force in these arguments and as will be
seen, there was enough material placed by the prosecution before
the Trial Court, which was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. When a witness, produced on behalf of prosecution, deposes against
the prosecution version and goes against his/her own previously
recorded statements, the prosecution can request the Court to
declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission from the
Court to cross-examine its own witness. This is the procedure
followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case, there are
as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses and it is also a fact that
many of them have turned hostile by turning against their earlier
statements made before the police under section 161 CrPC, and
even before the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC, in some cases.
This phenomenon is not new, in fact it is sadly a common occurrence
in our criminal Courts today, much to the despair and frustration of
the prosecution. This case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this,
however, there are witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1,
PW-2, PW-3, PW-15 and PW-49, whose evidence, in the form of
their testimonies before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict
the present appellants. A word here about the evidentiary value of
a so-called hostile witness.
19. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter 'Evidence Act') allows a
party, with the leave of the Court, to cross-examine its own witness.
Section 154 of the Evidence Act originally read as follows:
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"154.Question by party to his own witness The Court
may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness
to put any questions to him which might be put in crossexamination by the adverse party."
20. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor 1925 SCC
OnLine Cal 259, while interpreting Section 154 of the Evidence Act,
held that "When a witness who has been called by the prosecution is
permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution under
the provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence Act, the result of that
course being permitted is to discredit that witness altogether and
not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony".
21. But this judgment in Khijiruddin was overruled by a five-Judge bench
of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor
1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7. The High Court was answering a reference
from a Division Bench regarding the specific question of whether
the testimony of a witness, who was cross-examined by the party
which produced him/her, should be discarded totally, partially, or
not discarded at all. Chief Justice Rankin, speaking for three other
Judges and himself, answered the reference in the following terms:
"24. In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt with
under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, even when under
that Section he is "cross-examined" to credit, in no way
warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law
to place no reliance on his evidence, or that the party who
called and cross-examined him can take no advantage
from any part of his evidence. There is, moreover, no
rule of law that if a jury thinks that a witness has been
discredited on one point they may not give credit to him
on another. The rule of law is that it is for the jury to say.
Of the seven questions stated by the Division Bench I
propose that we should answer four, viz.-
(3) whether the evidence of a witness treated as "hostile"
must be rejected in whole or in part;
(4) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of
the party calling the witness;
(5) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of
the opposite party.
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K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
These three questions I would answer in the negative.
(6) Whether the whole of the evidence so far as it affects
both parties favourably or unfavourably, must go to the
jury for what it is worth.
25. To this question, I would be content to answer "yes," ..."
22. Justice Buckland, in the above case, in his concurring opinion holds
that there is no law which states that the evidence of a witness, who
has been cross-examined by its party, should be entirely rejected.
In his opinion, it is for the jury (or the Judge) to form an opinion
regarding the value of the testimony of such a witness.
23. All the same, later this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975)
3 SCC 562 held to the contrary and approved the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Khijiruddin. This is what was said in Jagir
Singh by Justice Bhagwati:
"7. Now, it is apparent from the judgment of the High Court
that the conviction of the appellant rested entirely on the
evidence of Pritam Singh (P.W. 10) and Sajjan Singh
(P.W. 13). Swaran Singh (P.W. 11) was also examined on
behalf of the prosecution but his evidence is of no help
to the prosecution because he went back on the story of
the prosecution and was permitted to be cross-examined
on behalf of the prosecution. It is now well settled that
when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution,
is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the
prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to
discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid
of a part of his testimony. See Khijiruddin v. Emperor...."
24. However, it is to be noted that Jagir Singh does not refer to the fiveJudge Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar
Sarkar.
25. But then in a subsequent decision (of which Justice Bhagwati was
also a part) i.e., Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC
727, it was held differently. Justice Sarkaria, speaking for the Bench,
clarified the earlier judgment in Jagir Singh, and held that what has
been held in Jagir Singh would only be applicable where a witness
through cross-examination by the party which calls it, is totally
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discredited. It is only in such a situation that the Court, as matter of
prudence, discards his/her evidence in its entirety.
26. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness who has been crossexamined by the party which produced him/her will not stand totally
discredited, and it is for the Court to consider what value should be
attached to this testimony. After referring to a series of judgments
on this point, the Court in Sat Paul held as follows:
"52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that
even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is crossexamined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by
the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of
law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is
for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether
as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction,
the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be
believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge
finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has
not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and
considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with
due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other
evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he
finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,
the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned,
and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
discredited, the Judge should, as matter of prudence,
discard his evidence in toto.
53. It was in the context of such a case, where, as a
result of the cross-examination by the Public, Prosecutor,
the prosecution witness concerned stood discredited
altogether, that this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.) with the aforesaid rule of caution - which is not
to be treated as a rule of law - in mind, said that the
evidence of such a witness is to be rejected en bloc."
(Emphasis Provided)
27. An examination of the cases referred above shows that there can
be no doubt about the fact that the evidence of a witness, who has
been cross-examined by the side which produced him/her, cannot
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K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
be totally discarded [Also see:Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 4 SCC 731].
28. It may also be worthwhile to mention here that by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 2005, sub-section 2 was added to section 154
of the Evidence Act. The amended section 154 of the Evidence Act
now reads as under:
154. Question by party to his own witness.- (1) The
Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls
a witness to put any questions to him which might be put
in cross-examination by the adverse party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so
permitted under sub-section (1), to rely on any part of the
evidence of such witness.
(Emphasis Provided)
29. By way of the above amendment, the position which had been
reiterated by this Court has now come in the statute itself.
30. The word 'hostile' or 'hostile witness' has not been used anywhere
in the Evidence Act. The logic behind this exclusion seems to be
that the declaration of witness as 'hostile witness' carries a specific
significance under the English law, from where this term has been
derived, where liberty is only granted to a side to cross-examine
its own witness when such declaration of 'hostility' is made. The
position in India is different and here it is left to the discretion of the
Court to allow a party to cross-examine its own witness, regardless
of a declaration of 'hostility'. This has been explained by this Court
in Sat Paul:
"38. To steer clear of the controversy over the meaning of the
terms "hostile" witness, "adverse" witness, "unfavourable"
witness which had given rise to considerable difficulty and
conflict of opinion in England, the authors of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 seem to have advisedly avoided the
use of any of those terms so that, in India, the grant of
permission to cross-examine his own witness by a party
is not conditional on the witness being declared "adverse"
or "hostile". Whether it be the grant of permission under
Section 142 to put leading questions, or the leave under
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Section 154 to ask questions which might be put in crossexamination by the adverse party, the Indian Evidence
Act leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the
court (see the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in
Baikuntha Nath v. Prasannamoyi [AIR 1922 PC 409: 72IC
286]). The discretion conferred by Section 154 on the
court is unqualified and untrammelled and is apart from
any question of "hostility". It is to be liberally exercised
whenever the court from the witnesses demeanour, temper,
attitude, bearing, or the tenor and tendency of his answers,
or from a perusal of his previous inconsistent statement,
or otherwise, thinks that the grant of such permission is
expedient to extract the truth and to do justice. The grant
of such permission does not amount to an adjudication by
the court as to the veracity of the witness. Therefore, in
the order granting such permission, it is preferable to avoid
the use of such expressions, such as "declared hostile",
"declared unfavourable", the significance of which is still
not free from the historical cobwebs which, in their wake
bring a misleading legacy of confusion, and conflict that
had so long vexed the English Courts."
(Emphasis Provided)
31. The phrase 'hostile witness' is commonly used in criminal jurisprudence
and court proceedings. We too cannot escape the blame of using the
term 'hostile witness' in our judgment.