# K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 997
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-08-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025
- **Bench:** Dipankar Datta, Prashant Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/k-prabhakar-hegde-v-bank-of-baroda-38660
- **Pages:** 53

## Headnote

(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared
by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank (which merged with the
respondent in the year 2019) to conduct such inquiry, who happened
to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the
regular inquiry that followed against the appellant; (ii) whether
the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question
the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in
the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer
Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, vitiated
the inquiry; (iii) whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible
course of action under the 1981 Regulations.
Headnotes†
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 - Appellant dismissed from service -
Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by
the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry,
who happened to be the sole management witness, was
sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against
the appellant:
Held: In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that
no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by
the inquiry officer - Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report
to the appellant is inconsequential - However, an argument that
has been made is that the non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report has caused prejudice to the appellant because such nonfurnishing of the report disabled him to effectively cross-examine
the witness - Argument cannot be accepted - Since the appellant
* Author
1998
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was duly provided with the deposition of the witness as per the
rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the basis of
the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed no
reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the
statements of such witness recorded during chief examination
and cross-examination - Therefore, there is no violation of the
principles of natural justice - Also, no prejudice has been caused
to the charged officer for non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report. [Paras 27-29]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) - Appellant dismissed from
service - Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer
to generally question the appellant on the circumstances
appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry; whether
continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action
under the 1981 Regulations:
Held: The Inquiry Officer by not generally questioning the
appellant on the circumstances available in the evidence, which
were unfavourable or adverse to such officer, failed to perform
a mandatory duty - In the present case, the appellant did not
raise any objection in this behalf before the disciplinary authority
but raised the point, generally, of non-adherence to Regulation 6
before the appellate authority - Be that as it may, the appellant
is justified in voicing a grievance that he had not been extended
fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in
terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn, infringed his right protected
by Article 14 of the Constitution - In normal circumstances, the
obvious direction that could follow the foregoing discussions is a
remand to the disciplinary authority to re-start the inquiry from the
stage the same stood vitiated, i.e., requiring the Inquiry Officer to
scrupulously follow Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations -
However, there are circumstances that impede an order for
remand - The foremost being the lack of accessibility to the records
because of the merger of Vijaya Bank with the respondent and
the distance of time since the disciplinary proceedings came to
a close - It i

## Text

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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1997 : 2025 INSC 997
K. Prabhakar Hegde
v.
Bank of Baroda
(Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025)
19 August 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared
by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank (which merged with the
respondent in the year 2019) to conduct such inquiry, who happened
to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the
regular inquiry that followed against the appellant; (ii) whether
the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question
the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in
the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer
Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, vitiated
the inquiry; (iii) whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible
course of action under the 1981 Regulations.
Headnotes†
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 - Appellant dismissed from service -
Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by
the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry,
who happened to be the sole management witness, was
sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against
the appellant:
Held: In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that
no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by
the inquiry officer - Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report
to the appellant is inconsequential - However, an argument that
has been made is that the non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report has caused prejudice to the appellant because such nonfurnishing of the report disabled him to effectively cross-examine
the witness - Argument cannot be accepted - Since the appellant
* Author
1998
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was duly provided with the deposition of the witness as per the
rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the basis of
the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed no
reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the
statements of such witness recorded during chief examination
and cross-examination - Therefore, there is no violation of the
principles of natural justice - Also, no prejudice has been caused
to the charged officer for non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report. [Paras 27-29]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) - Appellant dismissed from
service - Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer
to generally question the appellant on the circumstances
appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry; whether
continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action
under the 1981 Regulations:
Held: The Inquiry Officer by not generally questioning the
appellant on the circumstances available in the evidence, which
were unfavourable or adverse to such officer, failed to perform
a mandatory duty - In the present case, the appellant did not
raise any objection in this behalf before the disciplinary authority
but raised the point, generally, of non-adherence to Regulation 6
before the appellate authority - Be that as it may, the appellant
is justified in voicing a grievance that he had not been extended
fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in
terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn, infringed his right protected
by Article 14 of the Constitution - In normal circumstances, the
obvious direction that could follow the foregoing discussions is a
remand to the disciplinary authority to re-start the inquiry from the
stage the same stood vitiated, i.e., requiring the Inquiry Officer to
scrupulously follow Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations -
However, there are circumstances that impede an order for
remand - The foremost being the lack of accessibility to the records
because of the merger of Vijaya Bank with the respondent and
the distance of time since the disciplinary proceedings came to
a close - It is also to be noted that the disciplinary proceedings
were continued beyond the date on which the appellant attained
the age of superannuation - Because of the ultimate order this
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
1999
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
Court propose to make, this Court has not dealt with the third
question in the three broad issues framed and such question is
kept open - No useful purpose, therefore, would be served in
ordering a remand. [Paras 55, 58, 72]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) - Appellant dismissed from
service - Whether the proposed punishment of compulsory
retirement could have been altered to dismissal from service
based on the Central Vigilance Commission recommendation:
Held: The proposed punishment of compulsory retirement could
not have been altered to dismissal from service based on the CVC
recommendation without furnishing the same to the appellant - To
this extent, the appellate order is legally flawed and cannot be
sustained. [Para 71]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) - Appellant dismissed from
service - Directions issued by the Supreme Court:
Held: Considering the age of the appellant (he is now an
octogenarian) as well as the fact that there were other disciplinary
proceedings pending against him which were not taken to its logical
conclusion because he stood dismissed from service, in considered
view of this Court, interest of justice would be sufficiently served if
this Court makes the following directions: (i) the appellant shall not
be entitled to any terminal benefits except to the extent indicated
hereafter; (ii) he shall only be entitled to a lump-sum amount equal
to the quantum of gratuity which would have been payable to him
had he not been fastened with the order of dismissal; (iii) such
lump-sum amount may be released in favour of the appellant within
a period of eight weeks from date; (iv) no amount on account of
interest shall be payable to the appellant on the said amount; (v)
however, interest @ 9% p.a. shall be payable on such amount if
not released within the period stipulated above; and (vi) the order
of dismissal, in the circumstances, shall stand quashed. [Para 73]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 - Regn.6(17) - All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1969 - R. 8(19) - The use of 'may' and 'shall':
Held: Regn.6(17) as well as r.8(19) refers to both 'may' and
'shall' - While the first part of reg.6(17) refers to 'may', the second
2000
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
part refers to 'shall' - To enable the charged officer to explain
circumstances in the evidence appearing against him, the provision
confers a discretion on the Inquiry Officer as well as imposes a
mandatory duty on him - It is discretionary for the Inquiry Officer,
to put questions to the charged officer if he is himself a witness
for the defence, whereas, if the charged officer has not examined
himself as a witness for the defence, the mandate of the law is
that the Inquiry Officer shall generally question the charged officer
on the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him -
The use of 'may' and 'shall' in the same provision does imply that
Regn. 6(17) means what it says - The words 'may' and 'shall'
have been used to mean 'may' and 'shall', respectively, and we
cannot possibly conceive of any rule of construction which would
lead us to assume that the framers intended that 'shall' in the
second part of Regn. 6(17) should also be read and understood
as 'may' - Use of the word 'shall', is deliberate to denote that it
is not interchangeable with 'may'; if it were so, the framers would
have straightaway used 'may' instead of 'shall' having known that
'may' has been used in the first part - Couching of the provision
in such language with 'may' and 'shall' having distinct connotations
and consequences and bringing about different outcomes in the
course of one and the same inquiry unhesitatingly signals that while
the first part of regn.6(17) is directory, the second part thereof is
mandatory. [Paras 53, 54]
Service Law - Departmental inquiry - Preliminary inquiry
report - When it is to be provided to the delinquent employee:
Held: i) A preliminary inquiry is conducted for the purposes of
determining whether regular disciplinary proceedings are called
for or not; ii) A preliminary inquiry report is an internal document;
iii) A preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein cannot be
used to come to conclusions recorded in the report of inquiry if
such preliminary inquiry report/findings are based on oral and/
or documentary evidence which are obtained behind the back of
the charged employee and such oral/documentary evidence are
not presented in the inquiry in the presence of such employee;
iv) If a preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein are sought
to be relied on, the witnesses whose evidence was relied on in
preparing the same ought to be brought before the inquiry officer
and the charged officer afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2001
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
them; v) If a preliminary inquiry report is sought to be relied upon
in the inquiry report, then such preliminary inquiry report must be
provided to the delinquent employee; vi) Once a charge-sheet is
drawn up and has been provided to the charged officer detailing
the charges, the preliminary inquiry report is of no consequence
and need not be provided to him. [Para 25]
Service Law - Dismissal from service - Principle of Natural
Justice - When CVC recommendation is considered by the
disciplinary authority for the purpose of deciding punishment:
Held: The CVC recommendation weighed heavily enough upon
the disciplinary authority so as to convince him to alter the
proposed punishment of compulsory retirement to dismissal of the
appellant - Receipt of the CVC recommendation behind the back
of the appellant and no opportunity having been provided to him
to plead for a lesser punishment, the inquiry stood vitiated - The
CVC recommendation constituted material which was considered
by the disciplinary authority at least for the purpose of deciding
on the punishment that needed to be imposed on the appellant -
Once such recommendation fell for consideration of the disciplinary
authority, a copy of the same could not have been denied to the
appellant - Compliance with the principles of natural justice - A
charged officer cannot be denied any material that the disciplinary
authority looks into for imposing punishment. [Para 64]
Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Non-disclosure of
the CVC recommendation - Claim of privilege:
Held: In the instant case, the claim of privilege made by the appellate
authority in defending non-disclosure of the CVC recommendation
to the appellant - The claim of privilege was utterly misconceived -
The claim of privilege cannot be invoked as a matter of reflexive
recourse but must be limited to instances wherein an actual concern
to public interest is envisaged - Each instance must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis and the State must be wholly convinced
that the disclosure of the documents would cause grave harm and
injury to public interest - The recommendation of the CVC did not
have anything to do with the "affairs of the State" or, if one were
not to be guided by Section 123 of the Evidence Act, anything to
do with national security. [Paras 66, 70]
2002
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR
51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985]
Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Champaklal Chimanlal
Shah v. Union of India [1964] 6 SCR 190 : 1963 SCC OnLine
SC 42; ECIL v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 576 : (1993)
4 SCC 727 - followed.
SBI v. D.C. Aggarwal [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 956 : (1993) 1 SCC
13; Mohd. Quaramuddin v. State of A.P. (1994) 5 SCC 118; State
of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 SCR 371 : 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 38; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India
[2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 2 SCC 476 - relied on.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC
379; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh [2025] 5 SCR
275 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State
of West Bengal & Ors. [1980] 3 SCR 179 : (1980) 3 SCC 304;
Union of India v. Alok Kumar [2010] 5 SCR 35 : (2010) 5 SCC
349; Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP [1996] Supp. 8 SCR
544 : (1996) 11 SCC 599; Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh
Gururao Kurati [2006] 1 SCR 920 : (2006) 3 SCC 150; UCO
Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [2007] 7 SCR 543 : (2007) 6 SCC
694; K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin [1955] 2 SCR
1057 : AIR 1956 SC 241; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of
W.B. [1969] 2 SCR 104 : AIR 1969 SC 381; Tara Singh v. State
[1951] 1 SCR 729 : (1951) SCC 903; Krishna Chandra Tandon v.
Union of India (1974) 4 SCC 374; Chandrama Tewari v. Union
of India [1988] 1 SCR 1102 : (1987) Supp. SCC 518; Narayan
Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8
SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC 299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat
[2013] 5 SCR 200 : (2013) 4 SCC 301; Manoj Kumar v. State of
U.P. (2018) 13 SCC 161; Rama Shankar Singh v. State of West
Bengal [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : AIR 1962 SC 1239; Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 :
(1984) 4 SCC 116; Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand [2020]
9 SCR 482 : (2020) 10 SCC 108; Haryana Financial Corporation v.
Kailash Chandra Ahuja [2008] 10 SCR 222 : (2008) 9 SCC 31;
Brij Nandan Kansal v. State of U.P. [1988] 3 SCR 79 : (1988)
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2003
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
Supp. SCC 761; Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India, AIR 1964
SC 1658; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain [1975] 3 SCR 333 : (1975)
4 SCC 428 - referred to.
List of Acts
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations,
1981; All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Disciplinary proceedings; Dismissal from service; Irregularities and
lapses committed in approving temporary overdrafts; Punishment
of compulsory retirement; Non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report; Report of preliminary inquiry; Sole management witness;
Regular inquiry; Failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally
question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence; Superannuation; Principles of natural justice;
Failed to perform a mandatory duty; Non-adherence to regn.6(7)
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations,
1981; Not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity
to defend; Recommendation of the CVC; Recommendation was
denied by claiming privilege; s.123 of the Evidence Act, 1872;
Discretion of the Inquiry Officer.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2021 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 975 of 2009
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv., M/S. Nuli & Nuli.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pawan
Shukla, Ms. Tissy Annie Thomas, Rohan Bansla, Arijeet Shukla.
2004
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
Preface
1.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan1 is a landmark decision of this Court,
delivered more than half a century back, delineating the contours
of the principles of natural justice, more particularly the right to be
heard before one is condemned. The supersession of the New
Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it
was in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no show
cause notice was issued before the order of supersession was
passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the
failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all,
if such observance would have made no difference, the admitted
or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. The golden words
of Hon'ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J., speaking for the three-Judge
Bench, rings in our ears:
"24. ... In our view the principles of natural justice know of
no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have
made any difference if natural justice had been observed.
The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to
any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of
denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from
a person who has denied justice that the person who has
been denied justice is not prejudiced. ..."
(emphasis ours)
2.
The above passage from S.L. Kapoor (supra) came to be noticed
in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation2 and met with an unconditional
approval. Hon'ble Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI. speaking for the Bench
(which incidentally included Hon'ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J.) ruled
1
(1980) 4 SCC 379
2
(1985) 3 SCC 545
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2005
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
that the said observations sum up the true legal position regarding
the purport and implications of the right of hearing.
3.
Close on the heels of Olga Tellis (supra), another Constitution
Bench upon a survey of precedents on the point of fair and impartial
hearing observed in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel3 as follows:
"95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be
recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in
Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation
given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the
subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism
runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in
arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where
discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation
of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural
justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article
14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of
natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law
or State action violating them will be struck down. The
principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to
legislation and State action but also where any tribunal,
authority or body of men, not coming within the definition
of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding
a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice
require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially."
(emphasis ours)
4.
In another seminal decision, i.e., A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak4, a
seven-Judge Constitution Bench while acknowledging that it had
committed an error earlier which needed rectification, went on to
assert that:
"55. ... No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the
fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself
renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of
the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. ..."
3
(1985) 3 SCC 398
4
(1988) 2 SCC 602
2006
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
5.
It has recently been held by us in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram
Prakash Singh5 that just as Articles 14, 19 and 21 constitute a
triumvirate of rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality,
freedom and liberty, the trio of the Constitution Bench decisions in
Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra)
form the bedrock of natural justice principles being regarded as part
of Article 14 and, thereby, obviating the need to demonstrate prejudice
if a challenge were thrown on the ground of violation of Article 14.
6.
Reference to these decisions has been made at the inception because
of the particular view we propose to take on consideration of decisions
of a three-Judge Bench in Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West
Bengal & Ors.6 and a coordinate Bench in Union of India v. Alok
Kumar7. Notably, these decisions were relied on by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru8 while insisting
on the requirement to demonstrate prejudice in a claim of breach of
principles of natural justice notwithstanding that the employer before
it had violated a statutory regulation by which it was bound.
The Appeal
7.
The challenge in this civil appeal, by the appellant K. Prabhakar
Hegde, is to the judgment and order dated 14th December, 20219 in
Writ Appeal No. 975 of 2009 (S-DE). Vide the impugned order, the
High Court allowed the writ appeal carried by the respondent here,
Bank of Baroda. Consequently, the judgment and order of the Single
Judge dated 24th February, 2009 in WP No. 27936/2003, which was
under challenge, stood set aside with the result that the writ petition
of the appellant was dismissed.
Brief Facts
8.
The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal are these:
i.
In 1959, the appellant joined Vijaya Bank (which merged with
the respondent in the year 2019) as a clerk.
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 891
6
(1980) 3 SCC 304
7
(2010) 5 SCC 349
8
High Court
9
impugned order
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2007
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
ii.
Between 1959 and 1998, the appellant was promoted several
times. At the relevant time, the appellant was the 'Zonal Head'
of the Delhi Zonal Office of Vijaya Bank.
iii.
On 4th of January, 1999, the appellant was served with a notice
issued by his disciplinary authority. It was alleged that the
appellant was responsible for certain irregularities and lapses
committed in approving temporary overdrafts (TOD) on the
accounts of various parties involving substantial amounts. The
notice also alleged that the appellant had instructed the Assistant
General Manager at the Barakhamba Branch of Vijaya Bank to
grant a TOD of Rs. 15,00,000/- to one M/s Kunal Travels Pvt.
Ltd. via telephone. Another notice was sent on 22nd January,
1999 in respect of a separate incident containing more or less
similar allegations.
iv.
Appellant replied to the said notices through letters dated 1st
February, 1999 and 24th February, 1999.
v.
On 30th January, 2001, disciplinary proceedings under Regulation
6 of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 198110 were drawn up by issuing a charge sheet.
Appellant replied to the said charge sheet vide letter dated 17th
February, 2001 denying the charges.
vi.
The disciplinary authority of the appellant appointed an officer
holding the post of General Manager of Vijaya Bank as the
Inquiry Officer.
vii. The report of the inquiry officer dated 28th November, 2001 was
submitted to the Disciplinary Authority holding that the charges
against the appellant stand proved.
viii. Vide an order dated 17th May, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority
held that though the appellant was due to retire upon
superannuation on 30th June, 2002, disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him vide chargesheet dated 30th January, 2001
would continue. It was further ordered that the appellant shall
not be entitled to any retirement benefits till final orders are
passed in the disciplinary proceedings.
10
1981 Regulations
2008
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ix.
Appellant superannuated from service on 30th January, 2006.
x.
Vide an order dated 4th July, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority
imposed on the appellant the punishment of 'dismissal from
service'.
xi.
Aggrieved by the punishment imposed on him, the appellant
approached the Appellate Authority by presenting an appeal. It
was dismissed vide an appellate order dated 27th March, 2003.
xii. Appellant then challenged this order of the Appellate Authority
before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. A Single Judge of
the High Court allowed the writ petition vide judgment and order
dated 24th February, 2009. The order of dismissal stood quashed
and the appellant held entitled to "consequential benefits on his
having attained the age of superannuation, to which he would
have been entitled in the usual course and in law".
xiii. Vijaya Bank, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single
Judge, carried the same in a writ appeal before the Division
Bench which, as noted above, succeeded. While the appellant's
writ petition stood dismissed, the order of dismissal passed
by the Disciplinary Authority against the appellant was, thus,
confirmed.
Impugned Order
9.
The Division Bench of the High Court framed two issues for its
determination: (i) whether the denial of the preliminary investigation
report prejudiced the charged officer (appellant before us) and
vitiated the proceedings and (ii) whether the stipulation of generally
questioning the charged officer regarding the circumstances appearing
against him in the evidence was a mandatory requirement under
Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations.
10. While deciding issue (i), reliance was placed by the High Court on the
decisions of this Court in Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP11 and
Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati12 to hold that
the preliminary report is only to decide and assess whether it would
11
(1996) 11 SCC 599.
12
(2006) 3 SCC 150.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2009
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
be necessary to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent
officer and it does not form any foundation for passing the order.
The High Court further held that since all the documents relied upon
by the Inquiry Officer had been made available to the appellant
and the appellant's representative having cross-examined the sole
witness for the management in extenso, furnishing of the preliminary
investigation report was not necessary; hence, no prejudice to the
appellant was caused thereby.
11. Regarding issue (ii), the Division Bench held: first, Regulation 6(17)
of the 1981 Regulations is pari materia Rule 8(19) of the All India
Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; hence, the decision of
this Court in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), which has since been
followed by this Court in the decision in Alok Kumar (supra) is
squarely applicable and compliance with such a regulation is merely
directory and not mandatory. Secondly, the High Court held, on
facts, that the Inquiry Officer had asked the appellant if he wished
to make any submission and in pursuance thereof, he did utilise
the opportunity by making detailed submissions; hence, though the
appellant was not generally questioned as required by Regulation
6(17), such provision had been substantially complied with.
12. As a sequitur, the High Court allowed the writ appeal and set aside
the order of the Single Judge.
Contentions of the parties
13. The appellant has laid siege to the impugned order on, inter alia,
the following grounds:
a.
The High Court did not consider the decision rendered by this
Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar13 and UCO Bank v. Rajinder
Lal Capoor14.
b.
The High Court erroneously interpreted the principles of law
laid down in Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (supra).
c.
The High Court did not consider that non-furnishing of the report
of preliminary inquiry has itself caused prejudice to the appellant
13
(1993) 4 SCC 727.
14
(2007) 6 SCC 694.
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as the appellant was unable to defend himself in respect of the
charges against him.
d.
Reliance placed by the High Court on Sunil Kumar Banerjee
(supra) was misplaced. The said decision, rendered by a threeJudge Bench referred to coordinate Bench decisions in K.C.
Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin15 and Bibhuti Bhusan
Das Gupta v. State of W.B.16 without, however, noticing an
earlier decision of a four-Judge Bench in Tara Singh v. State17
where it was held to be important to faithfully and fairly observe
Section 342 of the 1898 Code, the object whereof was to
afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining
the circumstances which appear against him. Though it was
held that every error or omission would not vitiate a trial and
that the question in each case would depend on the degree
of the error and upon whether prejudice had been occasioned
or likely to have been occasioned, in the present case, the
degree of error was at its peak since the Inquiry Officer did
not put a single question to the appellant in respect of the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and the
High Court failed to consider that calling upon the appellant to
place his version does not in any manner amount to compliance
of Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, not to speak of
substantial compliance.
e.
The authorities could not have considered the appellant to be
"deemed to be in service" post superannuation and ordering him
to be dismissed from service in the absence of any regulation
in the 1981 Regulations permitting such course of action is
absolutely illegal.
f.
The actions of the appellant of giving oral sanctions for the TOD
was normal practice and was done in good faith.
14. Based on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Nuli, learned senior counsel
for the appellant ably assisted by Ms. Akhila Wali, learned counsel
urged that the entire disciplinary proceedings including the order of
15
AIR 1956 SC 241
16
AIR 1969 SC 381
17
(1951) SCC 903
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K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
dismissal and the appellate order be set aside and the respondent
be ordered to release to the appellant full benefits as if he had never
been dismissed.
15. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent, defended the administrative actions challenged in
the writ petition and the impugned order on, inter alia, the following
grounds:
a.
The High Court rightly decided that since the report of preliminary
inquiry was only to assess and decide whether disciplinary
proceedings should be initiated or not and had not formed the
foundation for passing the order of dismissal from service, denial
of the same to the appellant did not prejudice him.
b.
The author of the preliminary inquiry report was the sole witness
for the management in the inquiry and whatever was recorded
by such witness in the preliminary inquiry report was spoken to
by him in course of the inquiry; whereafter the appellant had
cross-examined extensively. There was, thus, no question of
the appellant to feel aggrieved by non-furnishing of the report
of preliminary inquiry.
c.
Qua Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, the appellant
has not demonstrated any prejudice; moreover, the appellant
utilised the opportunity of making submissions when called upon
by the Inquiry Officer and, therefore, the High Court was right
in holding that the concerned regulation is not mandatory and
requires only to be substantially complied with.
d.
The appellant did not ever raise any grievance in course of the
inquiry and even subsequently, in his representation against the
inquiry report or the appeal petition that non-compliance with
Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations had prejudiced him
in his defence. For the first time, the appellant raised such a
grievance in the writ petition which is nothing but an afterthought.
e.
The decision in Tara Singh (supra) and Sunil Kumar Banerjee
(supra) operate in different legal domains and, therefore, Tara
Singh (supra) being a decision rendered in the criminal appellate
jurisdiction is not applicable in the present proceedings; on the
contrary, Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) is pat on the point and
propriety demands that we follow the same.
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f.
Continuation of disciplinary proceedings even after the appellant
had attained superannuation cannot be faulted because the
appellant was continued in service till such time the final order
of dismissal from service was passed and this is a permissible
course of action, not warranting interdiction.
Issues
16. Three broad issues emerge for decision:
(i)
Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by
the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry, who
happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient
to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against the appellant?
(ii)
Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally
question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the 1981
Regulations, vitiated the inquiry?
(iii) Whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible course of
action under the 1981 Regulations?
17. If indeed the answer to any or all the aforesaid issues is in favour
of the appellant, the relief that he could be entitled would then fall
for our consideration.
Analysis
18. We begin with issue no.1. Unlike the extensive jurisprudence available
on the furnishing of the final enquiry report, our research reveals that
there is significantly less jurisprudence on the issue of furnishing a
preliminary inquiry report. However, the decisions referred to below
provide sufficient light for us to rule on the question before us.
19. At the outset, we refer to the Constitution Bench decision in
Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India18. The said decision
succinctly delineates the purpose of a preliminary inquiry, albeit in the
context of government employees. Hon'ble K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as the
Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench observed as follows:
18
1963 SCC OnLine SC 42
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K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
"13. Generally therefore a preliminary enquiry is usually
held to determine whether a prima facie case for a
formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very
necessary that the two should not be confused. Even
where government does not intend to take action by way
of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of
bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually
held to satisfy government that there is reason to dispense
with the services of a temporary employee or to revert
him to his substantive post, for as we have said already
government does not usually take action of this kind without
any reason. Therefore when a preliminary enquiry of this
nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or
a government servant holding a higher rank temporarily
it must not be confused with the regular departmental
enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry)
when the government decides to frame charges and
get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of
the three major punishments already indicated may be
inflicted on the government servant. Therefore, so far as
the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question
of its being governed by Article 311(2) for that enquiry is
really for the satisfaction of government to decide whether
punitive action should be taken or action should be taken
under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary
government servant or a servant holding higher rank
temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary
enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard
to the conduct and work of a government servant in which
he may or may not be associated so that the authority
concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant
concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for
inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned
therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex
parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of government,
though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken
from the servant concerned even as such an enquiry. But
at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry
is merely for the satisfaction of the government and it
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is only when the government decides to hold a regular
departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting one of
the three major punishments that the government servant
gets the protection of Article 311 and all the rights that
that protection implies as already indicated above. There
must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries
and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the
government servant one of the three major punishments
indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is
entitled to the protection of that Article. That is why this
Court emphasised in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case [(1958)
SCR 828] and in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1955) 1 SCR 26] that the 'motive or the inducing factor
which influences the government to take action under the
terms of the contract of employment or the specific service
rule is irrelevant'."
20. A coordinate Bench in Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of
India19 incontrovertibly held that there is no requirement to furnish
a preliminary inquiry report when the enquiry officer has not relied
upon the same to reach the conclusions recorded in the inquiry
report after a regular inquiry. The relevant passage reads as follows:
"16. ... It is very necessary for an authority which orders an
enquiry to be satisfied that there are prima facie grounds
for holding a disciplinary enquiry and, therefore, before
he makes up his mind he will either himself investigate or
direct his subordinates to investigate in the matter and it
is only after he receives the result of these investigations
that he can decide as to whether disciplinary action is
called for or not. Therefore, these documents of the
nature of inter-departmental communications between
officers preliminary to the holding of enquiry have really
no importance unless the Enquiry Officer wants to rely on
them for his conclusions. In that case it would only be right
that copies of the same should be given to the delinquent.
It is not the case here that either the Enquiry Officer or
19
(1974) 4 SCC 374
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K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
the CIT relied on the report of Shri R.N. Srivastava or any
other officer for his finding against the appellant. Therefore,
there is no substance in this submission."
21. The concept of a preliminary inquiry and its ramifications have been
neatly summed up in Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India20. There,
a coordinate Bench of this Court held that:
"4. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant and we
have further considered the aforesaid authorities referred
to by the learned counsel for the appellant but we do not
find any merit in the appellant's submissions to justify
interference with the High Court's judgment. Article 311
of the Constitution requires that reasonable opportunity of
defence must be afforded to a government servant before
he is awarded major punishment of dismissal. It further
contemplates that disciplinary enquiry must be held in
accordance with the rules in a just and fair manner. The
procedure at the enquiry must be consistent with the
principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice
require that the copy of the document if any relied upon
against the party charged should be given to him and
he should be afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses and to produce his own witnesses in his defence.
If findings are recorded against the government servant
placing reliance on a document which may not have been
disclosed to him or the copy whereof may not have been
supplied to him during the enquiry when demanded, that
would contravene principles of natural justice rendering the
enquiry, and the consequential order of punishment illegal
and void. These principles are well settled by a catena of
decisions of this Court.