# K.S. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1994] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 405
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1994-09-12
- **Bench:** M.N. Venkatachaliah C.J, P.B. Sawant, S.C. Agrawal, R.M. Sahai, S.P. Bharucha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/k-s-p-aripoornan-v-state-of-kerala-and-others-12479
- **Pages:** 84

## Headnote

A
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23( 1-A)-Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Award of additional amount
payable under s.23( 1-A) in pending proceedings before the reference C
court--H eld, (per majority) S.23 ( 1-A) confers substantive right to additional
amount, and is prospective-Reference court may not award additional
amount in pending proceedings except to the extent provided in S.30( 1) of the
amending Act-Transitional provisions in amending Act, held, is integral part
of amended provisions-Zora Singh, held, reversed-Transitional Provisions--: D
Prospectivity.
Interpretation of Statutes:-Retrospectivity-Land Acquisition Act,
1894-S.23(1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-
Held, (per majority) statute is retrospective if it operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement, and affects, even if for future E
only, past transactions or other conduct-Held further, statute dealing with
substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it expressly or by necessary
implication has retrospective effect-S.23(1-A), held, is prospective, and does
not apply to pending proceedings except to extent provided by the statute.
Interpretation of Statutes-Extrinsic aids-Statement of Objects and F
Reasons and speeches in Parliament-Held, (per majority) cannot be used as
aids to constrnction of statute.
Constitution of India-Article 14-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-S.23( 1A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Limited retrospecG
tivity--Provisions having effect from date of-original Bill being introduced in
Lok Sabha-Held, not arbitrary-Constitutionality upheld-Interpretation of
Statutes.
Constitution of India-Article 31A(1) Proviso-Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23 (1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) H
405
406
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Held, (per majority) object of Article 31 A is to facilitate
agrarian reforms-l'rincipal law not relating to agrarian reform, Article 31A
has no bearing on· the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.
In Union of India v.Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673 decided by a three
B Judge Bench, it was held that the payment of additional amount @12% per
annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) of the Land Acquisition Act
1894 ('Act'); inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984
('amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where reference was pending
before the reference court on the date of commencement of the amending
C Act even· though the award of the Collector was made prior to April 30,
1982. The correctness of this view was doubted by a two Judge bench and
the matter was referred to a larger bench, for considering the correctness
of the decision in Zora Singh Case.The question referred for examination
by the larger bench was whether the additional amount payable @12% per
D annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) is restricted to matters
referred to in s.30(1)(a) and (b) of the amending Act or is to be awarded
in every case where the reference .was pending before the reference court •
on September 24, 1984 (the date of commencement of the amending Act)
irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector.
E
While urging that Zora Singh lays down the correct law, it was inter
alia contended for the claimants that S.23(1~A) does not involve giving
retrospective effect only because a part of the requisites for its action is
drawn from events antecedent to its passing; that the language used in
S.23(1·A) being clear, its scope cannot be limited by the Transitional
F
Provisions in s.30(1) of the amending Act; that where a reference has been
made under the Act, the acquisition proceedings do not terminate with
the making of the award by the Collector; and the object of the amending
Act shows that it was Parliament's intention to remove the hardship
caused by pendency of acquisition proceedings for lon

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K.S. P ARIPOORNAN
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS
SEPTEMBER 12, 1994
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH C.J., P.B. SAWANT, S.C. AGRAWAL,
R.M. SAHAI AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]
A
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23( 1-A)-Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Award of additional amount
payable under s.23( 1-A) in pending proceedings before the reference C
court--H eld, (per majority) S.23 ( 1-A) confers substantive right to additional
amount, and is prospective-Reference court may not award additional
amount in pending proceedings except to the extent provided in S.30( 1) of the
amending Act-Transitional provisions in amending Act, held, is integral part
of amended provisions-Zora Singh, held, reversed-Transitional Provisions--: D
Prospectivity.
Interpretation of Statutes:-Retrospectivity-Land Acquisition Act,
1894-S.23(1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-
Held, (per majority) statute is retrospective if it operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement, and affects, even if for future E
only, past transactions or other conduct-Held further, statute dealing with
substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it expressly or by necessary
implication has retrospective effect-S.23(1-A), held, is prospective, and does
not apply to pending proceedings except to extent provided by the statute.
Interpretation of Statutes-Extrinsic aids-Statement of Objects and F
Reasons and speeches in Parliament-Held, (per majority) cannot be used as
aids to constrnction of statute.
Constitution of India-Article 14-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-S.23( 1A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Limited retrospecG
tivity--Provisions having effect from date of-original Bill being introduced in
Lok Sabha-Held, not arbitrary-Constitutionality upheld-Interpretation of
Statutes.
Constitution of India-Article 31A(1) Proviso-Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23 (1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) H
405
406
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Held, (per majority) object of Article 31 A is to facilitate
agrarian reforms-l'rincipal law not relating to agrarian reform, Article 31A
has no bearing on· the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.
In Union of India v.Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673 decided by a three
B Judge Bench, it was held that the payment of additional amount @12% per
annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) of the Land Acquisition Act
1894 ('Act'); inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984
('amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where reference was pending
before the reference court on the date of commencement of the amending
C Act even· though the award of the Collector was made prior to April 30,
1982. The correctness of this view was doubted by a two Judge bench and
the matter was referred to a larger bench, for considering the correctness
of the decision in Zora Singh Case.The question referred for examination
by the larger bench was whether the additional amount payable @12% per
D annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) is restricted to matters
referred to in s.30(1)(a) and (b) of the amending Act or is to be awarded
in every case where the reference .was pending before the reference court •
on September 24, 1984 (the date of commencement of the amending Act)
irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector.
E
While urging that Zora Singh lays down the correct law, it was inter
alia contended for the claimants that S.23(1~A) does not involve giving
retrospective effect only because a part of the requisites for its action is
drawn from events antecedent to its passing; that the language used in
S.23(1·A) being clear, its scope cannot be limited by the Transitional
F
Provisions in s.30(1) of the amending Act; that where a reference has been
made under the Act, the acquisition proceedings do not terminate with
the making of the award by the Collector; and the object of the amending
Act shows that it was Parliament's intention to remove the hardship
caused by pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods rendering
~e scale of compensation to be unrealistic.
G
For the Union of India and the States it was contended that since
the insertion of S.23(1·A) imposes an ad«!itional amount by way of com·
pensation, it can only apply to proceedings for acquisition initiated sub·
sequent to the coming into force of the amending Act, except to the limited
H extent of retrospectivity given by S.30(1) of the amending Act.
KS. P ARIPOORNAN v. STAIB OFKERAIA
407
Disposing of the reference, this Court
A
HELD : (Per Majority Venkatachaliah CJ., Agrawal & Bharucha JJ.)
1. In respect of the acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the payment of the additional amount payable under S.23(1-A) of the Act will be B
restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1)
of S.30 of the Amending Act. Insofar as Zora Singh holds that the said
amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the
reference court on September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date on which
the award was made by the Collector, it does not lay down the correct law. C
(443-D, E]
Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Sing, (1992) 1 SCC 673, reversed.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989] 3 SCR 316, followed.
K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, D
(1985) 2 SCR 914, affirmed
Bhag Singh v. Union Tenitory of Chandigarh, (1985) Suppl. 2 SCR
949, reversed.
Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR (1986) E
Kar 179; Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR
(1967) Bom 214; The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata Seshamma, AIR
(1987) AP 136 and Maya Devi v. Union Tenitory of Chandigarh, 1988 Punj.
W.189, overruled.
Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, (1989) Supp. 2 SCR 336, F
affirmed.
R. v. St. Mary Whitechapel, (1848) 12 QB. 120 116 E.R. 525; Master
Ladies Tailor Organisation v. Minister of Labour & National Service, (1950)
2 All E.R. 525; In re A Solicitor's Clerk, (1957) 1 W.L.R.1219; Alexander v.
Mercouris, (1979) 3 All E.R. 305; Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964] 1 G
SCR 631; Kapur Chand Jain v. B.S. Grewal, (1965] 2 SCR 36; T.KL. Iyer v.
State of Madras, (1968] 3 SCR 542; Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan Modale, (1985) 2 SCR 20~Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh, (1992]
Suppl. 1 SCC 191; Warbwton v. Loveland, (1832) VI Bligh N.S.I, 5 E.R. 499
and Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. Assistant Collector of Estate Duty, (1980) H
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
2 SCR 315, referred to.
B
2. S.23(1-A) deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive
right to claim an additional amount. The applicability of the said provision
to proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of coming
into force of the said provisions has, therefore, to be examined keeping in
view the aforesaid nature of the provisions. [ 432-B, C]
3. A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute
which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie
C prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have
retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure
or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as
retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not . the
intention of the legislature. A statute is regarded as retrospective if it
operates on cases or fact coming into existence before its commencement
D in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or
consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past
conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospectivity of laws
dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by
reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently
E
F
imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently
conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of
the law, whether relating to form or substance. Similarly, provisions in
which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities
in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relive
persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations
was not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of
provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. These principles are equally
applicable to amendatory statutes. [432·D to HJ
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and
G 926, referred to.
Crawford' Statutory Constntction, pp. 622-23, relied on.
4. The question whether a particular statute operate prospectively
only or has retrospective operation also will have to be determined on the
H basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obligations, whether it
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKEPALA
409
creates new obligations or imposes new duties or levies new liabilities in A
relation to past transactions. For that purpose it is necessary to ascertain
the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute itself. (433-F]
The Queen v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 Q.B. 120, 116 E.R. 525,
distinguished.
Alexander v. Mercouris, [1979) All E.R. 305, referred to.
5. In relation to pending proceedings, the approach of the Courts
B
in India is similar to the courts in England which is that they are unaffected by the changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination C
' of substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary
intention in the amendment, the substantive rights of the parties to an
action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action was
commenced and this is so the whether the law is changed before the
hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending.
[433-H, 434-AJ D
Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44 para 922 referred to.
United Provinces v.Atiqa Begum, [1940) FCR 110; Garikapatti Ve"aya
v. N. Subbiah Chaudhury, [1975) SCR 488, relied on.
6. In order that the provisions of a statute dealing with substantive
right may apply to pending proceedings the court has insisted that the law
must speak in language which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in
even pending matters. [434-G]
E
Smt. Dayawati and Anr .. v. Inderjit and Ors., [1966) 3 SCR 275 and F
Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan Modak, [1985] 2 SCR 202, relied .
on.
Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, reversed.
7. For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent G
the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in S.23 by the amending Act
are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of commencement of the amending Act it is necessary to read S.23 (1-A) along with the
transitional provisions continued in sub-section (1) of S.30 of the amend-
~~~~
H
A
B
.C
D
E
F
G
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
Francis Bennion, Statutory interpretation, 2nd Edn., p.213; Thornton
on Legislative Drafting, 3rd Edn., 1987, p. 319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary
of State, (1991] 2 All E.R. 726, relied on.
8. In Zora Singh the Court has laid stress on the word "also" in
S.30(1) and has held that apart from the retrospectivity flowing from the
provisions contained in s.23 (1· A) further retrospectivity is given to these
provisions in cases where no proceedings were pending on the date of
commencement of the amending Act. This would mean that Parliament has
made two provisions for giving retrospectivity to section 23(1-A), one in
section 23(1-A) itself and the other in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act.
The is no sound basis for this construction. This approach has been
disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh on the ground
that the terms in which s.30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the
benefit. [436-GH, 437-A, B]
Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh, (1992] 1 SCC 673, reversed.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316, relied on.
Union of India v. Filip -Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
affirmed.
Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal Gowada, AIR (1986)
Karnataka 179; Jaiwant Laxman P.Sardesai v. Govt. of Goa, Daman And
Diu, AIR (1967) Born 214; The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata
Seshamm, AIR (1987) AP 136, overruled.
9. Merely because the provision regarding scope of the retrospec·
tivity in regard to pending matters is contained in a separate provision
and is not found in the amended provision would not justify treating the
said provisions independent of each other. The provisions contained in
s.30 of the amending Act are to be treated as an integral part of the
amended provisions of the principal Act to which they relate. (437-F]
Warburton v. Loveland, [1832] VI Bligh N.S.1, 5 E.R. 499 and Special
Reference No. 1 of (1974 -1975] 1SCR504, distinguished.
·
10. The provisions of S.23(1-A) have been given limited retrospec·
tivity by s.30(1). In relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to
H the date of commencement of the amending Act S.23(1-A) would be ap-
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA
411
plicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of clauses (a) and A
(b) of sub-section (1) of s.30 of the amending Act. Even where the statute
is clearly intended to be retrospective to some extent, it is not to be
construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language
renders necessary. [439-E, F]
There is no scope' for extending the ambit of retrospective operation B
of sub-section (1-A) of s.23 beyond the limits specified in s.30(1) of the
amending Act so as to apply it all proceedings initiated prior to this date
of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the
civil court on reference under s.18 of the principle Act irrespective of the
date on which the award was made by the Collector. [439-G]
C
Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) SCC 673, reversed.
Union of India v. Filip tiago De Gama, [1989) Supp. SCR 336,
affirmed.
Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928)
PC 128, distinguished.
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924, referred to.
10. Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to a bill cannot be
used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and
the state of affairs leading to the legislation but it cannot be used as an
aid to the constructfon of the statute. [441-C]
D
E
Asvini Kumar v.Arbinda Bose, [1953) SCR 1; State of West Bengal v. F
Subhash Gopal Bose, [1954) SCR 587 and State of West Bengal v. Union of
India, [1964) 1 SCR 371, relitd on.
12. Speeches made by the members in the House at the time of
consideration of the Bill are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the inter- G
pretation of the statutory provisions though the speech of the mover of the
Bill may be refetred to for the purpose of finding out the object intended
to be achieved by the Bill. [441-D]
. State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952) SCR 1112
andAswini Kumar v.Arbinda Bose, (1953) SCR 1, relied on.
H
A
B
412
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
13. The Bills of 1982 and 1984 show that they did not contain the
provisions found in s.23 (1-A) of the principal Act and s.30(1) of the
amending Act. These provisions were inserted when the 1984 Bill was
under consideration before Parliament. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons does not, therefore, throw any light on the circumstances in which
these provisions were introduced. [441-E]
14. Merely because Parliament has decided to give a limited
retrospectivity so as to cover awards that were made by the Collector
during the period from April 30, 1982 when the original Bill was introduced
in Lok Sabha till the date of the commencement of the amending Act would
C not result in the said provisions being infected with the vice of arbitrariness. The choice of April, 30, 1982, the date on which the original Bill was
introduced in parliament, cannot be said to be arbitrary and confining the
ambit of retrospectivity so as to exclude awards made by the Collector
prior to April 30, 1982, would not render the provisions of s.30(1) of the
D amending Act unconstitutional. [ 442-B, C]
15. Article 31A (1) proviso has no bearing on the interpretation of
sub-section (1-A) of s.23 and s.30(1) of the amending Act. The object
underlying Article 31 A is to facilitate agrarian reforms and it extends
protection to laws bringing about such reforms. The principal Act is not
E a law relating to agrarian reform as contemplated in Article 31 A of the
Constitution. It is pre-constitutional legislation which was saved by Article
341 (5) (a) from any attack on the ground of violation of the right
conferred by Article 31(2) of the Constitution. [443-C, B]
F
Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1SCR887, relied on.
Per Sawant J., (dissenting);
1. Section 23(1-A) like the one for solatium in sub-section (2) of
section 23, is a substantive one. Unless, therefore, there is a statutory
G ·mandate, neither of these provisions can be given retrospective. [448-D]
2. S. 30(1) deals exclusively with the powers of the Collector and it
has no bearing on the powers of the Reference Court under s.23. Also,
s.30(1)(a) is not retrospective in operation. It speaks of power of the
. Collector in the proceedings pending before him on April 30, 1982 in which
H 'he ltas yet to make an award. It .is only clause (b) of the said section which
/
KS. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA
413
gives a limited retrospectivity to the power of the Collector when it enables A
him to reopen the award made by him before the commencement of. the
amending Act which is September 24, 1984 in proceedings started after
April 30, 1982. [ 451-C to E]
3. S.23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition proceedings
pending before the reference court on September 24, 1984 between those B
which bad commenced prior to April 30, 1982 and those which had com·
menced thereafter. If the proceedings are pending before the reference
court on the date of the commencement of the Act which is September 24,
1984 the plain language of s.23 enjoins upon the reference court to give the
benefit of s.23(1-A) in all such proceedings without making any distinction. C
When the reference court does so, it gives prospective effect to S.23(1· A).
It does not give retrospective effect to the said section merely because the
proceedings in question had started to prior to April 30, 1982. [ 464-D to F]
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 4, para 221; Queen v.
Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 QB 120; Rao Shiv Bahadur D
Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394; T.K Lakshmana Iyer
v. State of Madras, [1968) 3 SCR 842; Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v.
Assaram Hiraman Pati~ AIR (1966) SC 1758 and Bishun Narain Misra v.
State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 1567, relied on.
4. This interpretation is also in conformity with the object of the
legislation. The Act was amended to deal with the long delays which
occurred very often, and which affected the land owners materially as the
market value of the land is to be deterpiined unde(' s.23 of the principal
Act with reference to the date of the notification issued under S.4(1).
[454-D, 455-B]
All India Report on Agricultural Census, 1985-86 (1992); Law Commission Report, (1958) and (1970) Report, relied on.
E
F
It was, therefore, clearly the intention of the legislature in enacting
the amending Act and in particular s.23(1-A) to give additional amount to G
the deprived land owners in all the proceedings which were pending before
the Collector on April 30, 1982 and before the reference court on Septem·
ber 24, 1984 i.e. the date of commencement of the Act. But for the
provisions of s.30(1), the Collector would not have been able to give the
benefit of S.23(1-A) in the proceedings referred to therein. This would have H
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A defeated the object of the Act in those cases which had not travelled or
could not travel to the reference court and had or would become final with
the Collector's award. If the Collector could give the said benefit in
proceedings pending before him on April 30, 1982 although started prior
to that date, where he had not made his award, it will be against the scheme
B
of the Act to contend that the reference court could not give the same
benefit in the proceedings pending before it because the acquisition
proceedings had started prior to April 30, 1982. [457-C, D, H, 458-A]
5. S.30(1) of the amending Act is confined to spelling out the powers
of the Collector. It has no reference to and bearing on the power of the
C reference or the appellate court. Also Ss. 30(1) and 30(2) deal with different benefits and speak of powers of different tribunals. It is not permis·
sible to read the provisions of S.30(2) of the amending Act into S.30(1)
thereof and thereby in s.23(1·A). The provisions of S.30(2) are exclusively
concerned with Ss.23(2) and 28 and have no relation to the provisions of
D S.23(1-A). [458-B to D]
Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
partly affirmed and partly reversed.
·
The reference under S.23 has no power to reopen the award made by
E it before September 24, 1984 to give the benefit of S.23(1-A), since the
provisions of S.23(1·A) have no retrospective effect. The retrospective
effect is given only to the powers of the Collector to reopen the awards
made by him before September 24, 1984. [459-H, 460-A]
Union of India &Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, partly reserved.
F
K.S. Paripooman v. State of Kerala, [1992] 1 SCC 684, reversed.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316, endorsed.
K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
G [1985) 2 SCR 914, affirmed.
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 949,
reversed.
Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
H partly approved, partly reversed.
_
....
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA
415
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, [1986] 1 SCC 365, referred to.
A
6. It is not possible to accept the view that the word 'award' occurring
in s.23(1-A) is used there not as a noun but as a verb. Although the word
'award' is .not defined in the Act, the legislature has used the said word in
various provisions of the Act with a specific intention and meaning and
hence there cannot be any mistake that the said expression has been used B
even in s.23(1-A) as a noun. Inconvenient words, expressions and language,
when their intendment and meaning are plain, cannot be got over by either
mutilating them or by attributing to them unnatural and unwarranted role.
Such an exercise is against the canons of the interpretation of statutes.
[460-G, H, 461-A]
C
7. But for the provisions of S.30(1), the Collector would not have
been able to give the benefit of S.23(1-A) in the proceedings.referred to
therein. This would have defeated the object of the Act in those cases which
had not travelled or could not travel to the reference court and had or
would become final with the Collector's award. The legislature, therefore, D
wanted to give the power to the Collector in addition to the reference court
to take care of such cases. It was aware that many cannot and did not go
to the reference court to get their due compensation. Any other interpretation will be a distortion of the plain language, meaning and intendment of
the relevant provisions. It will also amount to reading limitation on the
powers of the Collector and the courts where the legislature intended to E
expand them. (463-D to F]
8. Neither the reference court nor the appellate court, whether High
Court or the Supreme Court can grant the benefit of S.23(1-A) in any
proceeding in which the reference court has made its award prior to
September 24, 1984. The grant of such benefit by the courts is not warranted by the transitional provisions of S.30(1). [464-H, 465-AJ
Per Saha~ J. (Dissenting)
F
1. S.23(1-A) is not a procedural or declaratory law, but is substantive G
in nature and prospective in operation. The section is not robbed of its
prospectivity because for the exercise of right the calculation of compensation has to be made on facts which ·come into existence prior to the date
of the amending Act. [471-F, 474-D]
Kapur Chand v. B.S.Grewal, Financial Commissioner, AIR (1965) SC H
416
SUPREME COURTREPORTS !1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
1491 and Master Ladie.1· Tailm:1· Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Se1vice, [1950) I All ER 525, relied on.
B
c
Union of India & A11r. v. Zora Singh, [1992) I SCC 673 and
K.S.Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a, [1992) 1 SCC 684, discussed.
The right to receive additional compensatio~ at the rate of 12 %
under S.23(1-A) operates in future, i.e., it confers benefit of additional
compensation from the date it came into force and not from a date prior to
coming into force of the provisions. If the legislature does not use any
expression to indicate that the law made by it shall apply to any cause of
action or incident taking place only after coming into force of the Act, then
the law has to be applied in praesenti, i.e., to matters pending before it even
if it those matters had arisen before the coming into force of the Act.
[473-H, 474-A, 471-G)
Halsbwy's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 4, para 221; Queen v.
Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 QB 120; Rao Shiv Bahadur
D Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394; T.K. Lakshmana Iyer
v. State of Madras, [1968) 3 SCR 842; Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v.
Assaram Hiraman Patil, AIR (1966) SC 1758 and Bishun Narain Misra v.
State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 1567, relied on.
E
F
Principles of interpretation are only the guideline, they are not con·
elusive. The sure and safe way is to interpret the provision on the necessity
and requirement as appears from the objective of the Act and the words
used by the legislature. [ 473-C]
Alexander v. Mercowis, [1979) 3 All E.R. 305, distinguished.
S.23(1-A) come into force on September 24, 1984, and requires the
court to pay additional compensation in every case. The ambit of the section
cannot be narrowed by confining its operation to those cases where notifica·
ti on is issued after coming into force of the amending Act. [ 476-E]
G
Union of India v. Ragltubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316; Union of India v.
Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989) Supp. 2 SCR336 andKS.Paripooman v. State
of Kerala, [1992) 1 SCC 684, distinguished.
Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, referred to.
H
2. By calculating compensation for the period between the notifica·
-
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA
417
tion under S.4(1) and publication under S.6, the right to receive additional A
compensation is not taken into the past. The right operates from the date
the amending Act came into force. [ 475-G]
Union of India v. Zora Singh, [1992] 1 SCC 673, affirmed.
Literally or even constructionally the law requires the Court deterB
mining compensation under S.18 of the Act, to pay additional compensation in every case coming before it after the amendment comes into force.
[477-D]
3. Necessity to construe a provision by taking recourse to adding or
substracting words may arise if the provision is otherwise ambiguous or C
it may lead to disastrous consequences. In this case, the expression in
S.23(1-A) is "the Court shall in every case" award the amount. The word
"shall" has been used to impart it mandatory character. This obligation
the court has to discharge in every case. In absence of any expression
limiting the exercise of power in only those cases where notification is D
issued after September 24, 1984 or making it retrospective so as to apply
to every case in which proceedings for acquisition had started before the
Act came into force, the provision has to be applied to every case which
was pending for award of compensation on and after the date when the
section becomes operative. [477-F of HJ
Union of India and Anr. v. Zora· Singh, [1992] 1 SCC 673 and K.S.
Panpooman v. State of Kera/a, [1992] 1 SCC 684, discussed.
Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexander Troy, AIR (1928)
PC 128, relied on.
When the court proceeds to determine compensation after September 24, 1984, it cannot ignore S.23(1-A). That would be against the plain
and simple language of the section. [ 478-C]
E
F
4. A transitional provision cannot curtail operation of the substantive provision. The field of operation of S.30 being narrow, namely, to G
extend the benefit of S.23(1-A) to all those land owners whose land has
been notified to be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been
made by the Collector, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope
of the main provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands
excluded from S.23 (1-A). [481-B]
H
A
B
c
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
5. The legislative background and purpose of the enactment of the
amending Act was to remove the hardship of the effected parties because
of the delay in payment of compensation. It is the duty of the court to
construe the provisions in such a manner ·that the mischief which the
legislature intended to remove may be suppressed and the avowed objective of the legisla_tion be served. [ 470-E, F]
All India Report on Agricultural Census 1985-86, (1992) Law Commission Report, 1958 and 1970 Report, relied on.
6. The legislature has used different language in S.30(1) and S.30(2).
The construction placed by the Court on S.30(2) cannot furnish basis for
construing S.30(1) in the same manner. [483-F]
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR
949; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316 and K Kamalajammannivaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] ~ SCR 914,
D referred to.
7. S.30(1) does not spell out power of the Collector. Its clauses (a)
and (b) are descriptive of those proceedings to which the benefit of
S.23(1-A) has been extended. They deal with retrospectivity given to S.23(1A). But the Collector should be deemed to have this power, otherwise it
E
would cause injustice where the land owner does not seek a reference for
any reason. This power, however, flows from S.15 of the Act itself. It is also
just and reasonable that the additional compensation is payable even by
the Collector when he is making a award under S.11. [ 483-H, 484-A, B]
F
8. No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on or
before September 24, 1984 either in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
[488~B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
Nos. 5514-17 of 1990 etc. etc.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 4 & 5.10.89 of the Kerala High
Court in L.A.A. No. 119 of 1986.
(With SLP (C) Nos. 5685-88 of 1990, 9215-22 of 1920.
/A.1.taf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, P.S. Poti, AS. Nambiar
H Soli J Sorabjee, Santosh Hedge, Vikram Mahajan, Vellapally Joseph, V.A.
...
..
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.]
419
Bobde, O.P. Rana, V.C. Mahajan, AB. Rohtagi, O.P. Sharma, G. VishA
wanatha Iyer, K.L. Rathi, Rajender Sachar, Ujagar Singh, S.P. Goyal, Ms
ASubhashini, S.N. Terdol, C.V. Subba Rao, Vishnu B. Saharya, Mrs.
Ratna Nair, M.T. George, Dr. Meera Aggarwal, R.C. Misra, Ranbir Yadav
G.K. Bansal, Tripurari Ray, Gopal Jain, Mukul Mudgal, P.N. Gupta, S.M.
Sareen, P.N. Puri, M.K.pua, S. Balakrishnan, K.L. Narsimhan, S. Prasad, B
R.C. Verma, AK. Srivastava, Ambrish Kumar, Manoj Swarup, Pradeep
Gupta, K.K. Mohan, Shivi Sharma, Goodwill Indeevar, K.C. Jain, Atul
Sharma, E.C. Agarwala, Ms. Rekha Palli, Balmokand Goyal, T.V.S.N.
Chari, N.D. Garg, R.C. Pathak, Satish Vig, Arvind Minocha, Sanjeev
Malhotra, Mrs. S. Bagga, R.B. Misra, R.S. Suri, R.N. Kovind, Ms. Madhu
Moolchandani and Ms. Naresh Bakshi for the appearing parties.
C
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. By order dated December 17, 1991, these matters
have been referred to a larger bench to consider the correctness of the
decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 D
(decided by a bench of three Judges). In Zora Singh's case (supra), this
Court has held that the payment of additional amount payable @ 12% per
annum on the market value under sub-section (1-A) inserted in Section 23
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the principal
Act') by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where the
E
reference was pending before the reference cotirt on the date of commencement of the amending Act even though ihe award of the Collector was
made prior to April 13, 1992.
In all these matters preliminary notification under Section 3(1) of
Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 was published on f'4arch 21, 1979 and F
the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was published on May 15,
1979. The Land Acquisition Officer made the award on December 30,
1980. The reference under Section 18 was decided by Ilnd Additional
Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum on December 28, 1985, after the commencement of the amending Act. The amending Act also repealed the Kerala G
Land Acquisition Act, 1961 and extended the principal Act as amended to
Kerala with effect from September 24, 1984. The civil court enhanced the
compensation and awarded interest @12% per annum from March 11,
1981 till the deposit of the excess amount of compensation awarded by it.
The High Court rejected the claim for additional amount at the rate of
12% per annum payable under Section 23(1-A) on the view ~hat the said H
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
provision was not attracted in view of Section 30(1) of the amending Act.
B
The said view is assailed by the petitioners on the basis of the decision in
Zora Singh (supra). Therefore, this reference.
The question which is required to be examined by this Bench is : ·
whether the additional amount payable @ 12% per annum oti the market
value under Section 23 (1-A) is restricted to matters referred to in clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the amending Act or is to
be awarded in every case where the reference was pending before the
reference court on September 24, 1984 (the date of the commencement of
the amending Act) irrespective of the date on which the award was made
C by the Collector.
Section 23 of the principal Act prescribes, in sub-section (1), the
matters which are required to be considered in determining compensation
by the Court on a reference under Section 18. Sub-section (2) of Section
D 23 makes provision for award of a sum, commonly known as 'solatium' in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Prior to the
amending Act, 15% of the market value of the land was required to be
paid as solatium. In Section 28 of the principal Act provision has been
made for payment of interest on the amount which has been awarded as
E
F
compensation in excess of the sum awarded by the Collector. Prior to the
amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum.
Similarly in Section 34 of the principal Act provision is made for payment
of interest on the amount of compensation when the said amount is not
paid or deposited before taking possession of the land. Prior to the
amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum.
Having regard to the recommendations of the Law Commission and the
Land Acquisition Review Committee,
a Bill (Bill No.67 of 1982) for
amending the various provisions of the principal Act was introduced in the
Lok Sabha on April 30, 1982. while the said bill was pending consideration
before Parliament various other proposals for amendment, in the principal
Act were received and after considering these proposals in consultation ·
G with the State Governments and other agencies the said Bill was withdrawn
and another Bill (Bill No. 63 of 1984) was introduced and the same was
enacted as the amending Act which came into force on September 24, 1984.
The amending Act introduced amendments in various provisions of the
principal Act. The amendments relevant for the purpose of the present
controversy are those introduced in Section 23 of the Act. Sub-section
H (1-A) inserted after sub-section (1) in Section 23 reads as under :
....
...
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERA!..A[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.]
421
"(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above A
provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated
at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value
for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication
of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of
such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of B
taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation. - In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the
acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or
injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded."
C
In sub-section (2) of Section 23 solatium was enhanced from 15% to
30%. The rate of interest prescribed in Sections 28 and 34 was enhanced
from 6% to 9%.
Section 30 of the amending Act contains the following transitional D
provisions:
"30. Transitiohal provisions. -
(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the
principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, E
shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in
relation to, -
(a) every proceeding for the ~cquisition of any land under the
principal Act pending on the 30th day of the April, 1982 (the
date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which no award
has been made by the Collector before that date :
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
F
the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not G
an award has been made by the Collector before the date of
commencement of this Act.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28
of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and
Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed H
A
B
c
D
E
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982
(the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.
(3) The provision of Section 34 of the principal Act, as amended
by Section 20 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have
applied also to, in relation to. -
(a) every case in which possession of any land acquired under
the principal Act had been taken before the 30th day of
April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People), and the
amount of compensation for such acquisition had not been
paid or deposited under Section 31 of the principal Act until
such date, with effect on and from the. date; and
(b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or
after that date but before the commencement of this Act
without the amount of compensation having been paid or
deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from
the date of taking such possession."
Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act are interrelated and have to be read together.