# Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

- **Citation:** 2024 INSC 898
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2024-11-26
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024
- **Bench:** B.R. Gavai, Sandeep Mehta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kali-charan-and-others-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-37641
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated
development plan of 'Yamuna Expressway" undertaken by
respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and
17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified
in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State
Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the correct
proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of
Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down
in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings
in question.
Headnotes†
Land acquisition - Present acquisition if a part of the integrated
development plan of 'Yamuna Expressway" undertaken by
respondent No.3-YEIDA:
Held: Yes - Development of land parcels for industrial, residential,
and recreational purposes is complementary to the construction
of the Yamuna Expressway - The objective of the acquisition is
to integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway's
construction, thereby promoting overall growth serving the public
interest - Thus, the Expressway and the development of adjoining
lands are considered to be inseparable components of the overall
project - Appeals filed by the landowners dismissed, while that of
the YEIDA are allowed. [Para 38]
* Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1065
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.17 (1), (4) - Application of
ss.17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if was
legal and justified in the instant case, justifying the decision
of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under
s.5-A of the Act:
Held: Yes - The invocation of ss.17(1) and 17(4) was legal and
justified in this case - The urgency clause was applied in accordance
with the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held
in the decision of this Court in Nand Kishore. [Para 38]
Land acquisition - View taken by the Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the
questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore, if lays
down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division
Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying
the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing
the acquisition proceedings in question:
Held: Kamal Sharma extensively considered the factual matrix
and also examined the original records of the State Government
to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the urgency
clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition in
question - High Court also exhaustively considered the entire
sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted
in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings
and directing the grant of additional compensation - The view of
the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma, which relied upon Nand
Kishore is the correct proposition of law - Judgment of the High
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam is not a
correct legal interpretation - Shyoraj Singh set aside as it does
not lay down good law and is per incuriam as it was passed
overlooking the earlier precedents - Kamal Sharma has already
granted additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners,
to be offered as 'No Litigation Bonus' in consonance with the
Government order dated 04.11.15, thus there is no scope for
further enhancement in compensation - 64.7% enhancement
in compensation to apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits
to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
[Paras 38, 43, 44]
1066
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports

## Text

_Characters 0–39,796 of 72,617. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39796 for what follows._

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064 : 2024 INSC 898
Kali Charan and Others
v.
State of U.P. and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024)
26 November 2024
[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated
development plan of 'Yamuna Expressway" undertaken by
respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and
17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified
in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State
Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the correct
proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of
Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down
in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings
in question.
Headnotes†
Land acquisition - Present acquisition if a part of the integrated
development plan of 'Yamuna Expressway" undertaken by
respondent No.3-YEIDA:
Held: Yes - Development of land parcels for industrial, residential,
and recreational purposes is complementary to the construction
of the Yamuna Expressway - The objective of the acquisition is
to integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway's
construction, thereby promoting overall growth serving the public
interest - Thus, the Expressway and the development of adjoining
lands are considered to be inseparable components of the overall
project - Appeals filed by the landowners dismissed, while that of
the YEIDA are allowed. [Para 38]
* Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1065
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.17 (1), (4) - Application of
ss.17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if was
legal and justified in the instant case, justifying the decision
of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under
s.5-A of the Act:
Held: Yes - The invocation of ss.17(1) and 17(4) was legal and
justified in this case - The urgency clause was applied in accordance
with the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held
in the decision of this Court in Nand Kishore. [Para 38]
Land acquisition - View taken by the Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the
questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore, if lays
down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division
Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying
the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing
the acquisition proceedings in question:
Held: Kamal Sharma extensively considered the factual matrix
and also examined the original records of the State Government
to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the urgency
clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition in
question - High Court also exhaustively considered the entire
sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted
in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings
and directing the grant of additional compensation - The view of
the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma, which relied upon Nand
Kishore is the correct proposition of law - Judgment of the High
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam is not a
correct legal interpretation - Shyoraj Singh set aside as it does
not lay down good law and is per incuriam as it was passed
overlooking the earlier precedents - Kamal Sharma has already
granted additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners,
to be offered as 'No Litigation Bonus' in consonance with the
Government order dated 04.11.15, thus there is no scope for
further enhancement in compensation - 64.7% enhancement
in compensation to apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits
to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
[Paras 38, 43, 44]
1066
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. Writ-C No. 30747 of
2010 - held not good law; per incuriam.
Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial
Development and Ors Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 - held good law.
Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and others SLP(C) No. 15782 of
2023; Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; Radhy
Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; Dev Sharan
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 3 SCR
728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769; Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9
SCC 164; Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of
NCT of Delhi and Others [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327;
Anand Singh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
[2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242; Narendra Road Lines
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010 :
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009; Yogesh Kumar v.
State of U.P. CMWP No.10782/2013; Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru.
Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors. Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010 : SLP(C)
No. 014705-014710 of 2011; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana
[2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539; Savitri Devi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21;
Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 11 SCC 339; Noida Industrial Development
Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and Others [2022] 1 SCR 1113 :
(2022) 13 SCC 468; Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v.
Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society [2022] 5 SCR 1034 :
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 655 - referred to.
List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,
1976.
List of Keywords
Land acquisition; Acquisition proceedings; Integrated development
of lands abutting the Yamuna Expressway; Acquisition of
the abutting lands; Integrated development plan of 'Yamuna
Expressway"; Development of adjoining lands; Integrated project;
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1067
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA);
Urgency clause; Jewar Airport; Master Plan; Industrial, residential,
and recreational purposes; Objective of the acquisition; Integrate
land development with the Yamuna Expressway construction; Public
interest; Land parcels; Enquiry; 'in rem'; Additional compensation;
Enhancement in compensation; Landowners; Policy for Planned
Development along the Taj Expressway.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.05.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 56629 of 2011
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 13120, 13121-13122, 13123-13124, 13125,
13126, 13127, 13128, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134,
13135, 13136, 13137, 13138-13139, 13140-13141, 13142-13143,
13144-13157, 13158-13162, 13163, 13164, 131165, 13166,
13167, 13168, 13169, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174
and 13175 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, AAG,
Jayant Bhushan, Niranjan Reddy, V.K. Shukla, Chinmoy Pradip
Sharma, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Jain, Rajive Bhalla, Mohd Shoeb Alam,
Sr. Advs., Anand Mishra-1, Ms. Vandita Nain, Ms. Ayushi Rajput,
Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Pranav Tanwar, Mohit Sharma,
Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh,
Vineet Nagar, Kshitiz Ahuja, Shekhar Bhatia, Kapil Chaudhary,
Samyak Jain, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Vandana Anand, Anurag Rawal,
Amit Singh, Akash Nagar, Jaibir Singh Nagar, Suresh Chand Nagar,
Ms. Ruchi B Nagar, Kuldeep Nagar, Nafees Chaudhary, Surender
Kumar, Yashpal Bbhati, Vijender Kumar, Ankit Bhati, Arvind
Tanwar, Siddhartha Jha, Rakesh Mishra, Pankaj Dubey, Ms. Rishu
Mishra, D.N. Dubey, Ambuj Sharma, Sanjay Sarin, Tarun Rana,
Ms. Gagan Deep Kaur, Ms. Lavanya Paul, Dinkar Kalra, Susheel
Tomar, Sanjeev Malhotra, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Yogesh Tiwari,
Sarthak Nema, Abhinav Singh Parihar, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Syed
Imtiyaz Ali, Aftab Ali Khan, Moazzam Khan, Ms. Sheetal Rawat,
Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Phaguni Bajpayi,
1068
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Mansur Ali Khan, Rahat Ali Chaudhary, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Siddharth
Thakur, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah, Sharanya Singh, Mustafa Sajad,
Abhinav Parihar, Ms. Neema, Vikrant Singh Bais, Vikas Upadhyay,
Mrs. Ankita Kashyap, Ms. Nimisha Swarup, Nitin Gaur, Arjun
Singh Tomar, Alok Shankar, Vivek Sharma, Deepesh Srivastava,
Ms. Rachana Sharma, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Mehta, J.
Table of Contents*
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................
4
BATCH NO. 1 - LANDOWNERS' APPEALS @ SPECIAL
LEAVE PETITIONS .....................................................................
5
BATCH NO. 2 - YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS ................................................................................
6
BRIEF FACTS .............................................................................
6
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS
(APPELLANTS IN BATCH NO. 1) ..............................................
15
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.
3 IN BATCH NO. 1) ....................................................................
26
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS .................................................
38
CONCLUSION ............................................................................
44
1.
Delay in filing application(s) for setting aside of abatement is
condoned.
2.
Abatement is set aside.
3.
Delay in filing the application(s) for substitution is condoned.
4.
Application(s) for substitution is allowed.
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1069
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
5.
Application(s) for transposition is allowed.
6.
Application(s) for intervention/impleadment is allowed.
7.
Leave granted.
INTRODUCTION
8.
The present batch of civil appeals @ special leave petitions arise out
of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent No.1-State
of Uttar Pradesh1 for planned development in the District Gautam
Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, through respondent No.3-Yamuna
Expressway Industrial Development Authority2 by invoking 'urgency
provisions' incorporated in Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 18943.
9.
Arguments on all the appeals @ special leave petitions have been
heard analogously and are being disposed of vide this common
judgment.
10. In total, 35 civil appeals @ special leave petitions are preferred
both by landowners and YEIDA which can be categorized into two
batches as mentioned below:
BATCH NO. 1 - LANDOWNERS' APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS
11. A total of 29 civil appeals @ special leave petitions have been filed
by the landowners challenging the decision of the Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in "Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P.
thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors4". The
appeal @ special leave petition titled "Kalicharan v. State of U.P.
and others5" is being treated as the lead matter in this batch.
BATCH NO. 2 - YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS
12. The YEIDA has filed 6 appeals @ special leave petitions challenging
various decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
1
hereinafter being referred to as 'State'
2
hereinafter being referred to as 'YEIDA'
3
hereinafter being referred to as "the Act"
4
Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as 'Kamal Sharma'
5
SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023
1070
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
invalidating the self-same land acquisition proceedings for integrated
development of notified areas including the decision in "Shyoraj
Singh and Others v. State of U.P.6". The appeal @ special leave
petition titled "YEIDA v. Shyoraj Singh and Ors.7" is being treated
as the lead matter in this batch.
BRIEF FACTS
13. The chronology of events leading to the filing of these civil appeals
are as follows.
14. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the factual context as
noticed in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled as "Kamal Sharma v. State
of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors.8
(lead matter in Batch No.1)filed before the Allahabad High Court.
15. Upon receipt of a proposal from the Director, Land Acquisition
Directorate, Rajswa, Uttar Pradesh, with prior approval of the State
Government, a notification dated 26th February, 2009 was issued
under Section 4(1)9 read with Sections 17(1)10 and 17(4)11 of the
Act for the acquisition of the tracts of lands in question for planned
development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid notification is extracted below: -
"Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the Governor hereby
6
Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as 'Shyoraj Singh'
7
SLP(C) Nos. 19512-19513 of 2023
8
Supra, Note 4
9
4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. -
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to
be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the
Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in
the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to
be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving
of such public notice , being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)].
10
17. Special powers in case of urgency. -
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no
such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice
mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such
land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances.
11
17. Special powers in case of urgency. -
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions
of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the
provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section
6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4,
sub-section (1).
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1071
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
notifies for the information of the general public that the
land mentioned in the Schedule below shall be earmarked
for public purposes, namely, the Yamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority in District Gautam Budh
Nagar for Planned Development.
Because the Governor is of the opinion that the
provisions or sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said
Act apply to the said land, because the said land is
urgently needed for planned development in district
Gautam Buddha Nagar through Yamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority and in view of this
urgency, it is also necessary that the possible delay in
conducting the Investigation under Section 5-A of the
said Act should be avoided. Therefore, the Governor
also directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the
said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said
Act shall not apply."
(emphasis supplied)
16. Since the land was sought to be acquired by invoking urgency
provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the landowners
made representations to the Chief Executive Officer('CEO') of
YEIDA requesting that their land may not be acquired because the
status of the land was 'Abadi Bhoomi' which was being used by
the landowners as dwelling units and for rearing their cattle. The
functionaries/authorities concerned did not accede to the request
of the landowners and the State Government issued the notification
dated 19th February, 2010 under Section 6 of the Act.
17. The landowners challenged the acquisition of their lands by filing
numerous writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, primarily
seeking the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings undertaken
by invoking Sections 4 and 6 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of
the Act on several grounds which may be broadly categorized as
below:-
(i)
That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section 17(1) and
Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived the landowners of their
valuable right to raise objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
1072
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
(ii)
That a bare reading of the notification issued under Section
4 would reflect that there was no material with the State
Government for invoking the urgency clause in the matter of
acquisition of land for planned development.
(iii) That there was no genuine public purpose behind the acquisition
and thus, the impugned action was illegal, arbitrary and
unjustified.
18. These writ petitions were decided by the Allahabad High Court
taking divergent views which are assailed in these appeals by
special leave.
19. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court vide judgment dated
24th April, 2017 allowed the Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 titled Shyoraj
Singh and quashed the land acquisition notifications in question
holding that the grounds being taken in the impugned notifications
for invocation of the urgency clause were arbitrary and bad in law.
The learned Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh summoned the original
records from the State Government and perused the same to arrive
at the following conclusions: -
(i)
The Division Bench referred to two letters issued by the
authorities of the District Gautam Budh Nagar, the details of
which are as follows:
(a) A letter justifying the invocation of the urgency clause
signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer of Yamuna
Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, and Lekhpal. The
relevant extract from the said letter is as below: -
"Yamuna expressway urgently needs the
proposed land for planned industrial development.
In the event of delay in the acquisition, there is a
strong possibility of increasing encroachment on
the proposed land, due to which public interest
project of planned industrial development will
adversely be affected."
"Hearing and disposal of written/oral objections
will definitely take years and there will be
unexpected delays which will stall the planned
development."
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1073
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
(b) A letter issued in 2010 by the District Magistrate, recording
a satisfaction that the prevailing facts and circumstances
justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of
the Act for dispensing with the hearing of objections under
Section 5-A of the Act. The relevant extract from the said
letter is as below:
"Due to the need to complete the project without
delay in the acquisition of the said land, it is
necessary to take possession of the proposed
land with immediate effect. In the case of using
Section 17 of LAA, the provisions of Section
5-A of the Act become extinct and I fully agree
with the justification of ending the opportunity
of hearing to the land owners."
With reference to the aforesaid letters, the Division Bench
observed that the two grounds mentioned for invoking urgency
clause were: (1) That there are chances of unauthorized
construction/encroachment on the said land. (2) Large number
of landowners would be affected by the acquisition and hearing
such large number of landowners would delay the project.
The Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh held that the above-noted
factors did not furnish legally acceptable justification for the
exercise of power under Section 17(1) of the Act by the State
Government because the acquisition was primarily meant to
cater to private interests in the name of industrial development
of the District and no material was produced on record to show
that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities
of the State were intending to establish industrial units on the
acquired tracts of land. Further, the justification for invoking
urgency provisions, that the land will be encroached on, had
no substance as the land was already in possession of the
recorded tenure holders.
(ii)
The Division Bench also observed that the notification under
Section 4 of the Act was published on 26th February, 2009
but thereafter, the State Government took nearly one year to
publish the notification under Section 612 of the Act. The time
12
Published on 19th Feb, 2010.
1074
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
of one year consumed by the State Government in publishing
the notification under Section 6 of the Act was by itself sufficient
to infer that there was absolutely no urgency that could have
justified the invocation of the urgency clause, thereby depriving
the landowners of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A
of the Act.
20. However, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while
dealing with a batch of 73 writ petitions challenging the very same
land acquisition proceedings took a different view from Shyoraj
Singh and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners, the
lead matter being Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled "Kamal Sharma
v. State of U.P.". The Division Bench while upholding the acquisition
proceedings held that it could not be accepted that the entire exercise
for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no
material with the State for recording the subjective satisfaction to
this effect. The reasons assigned by the Division Bench in Kamal
Sharma were as follows: -
(i)
A perusal of the Master plan and the facts established that
the land required for development of Yamuna Expressway
['Planned development through Yamuna Expressway'] was
for an integrated project. The land was initially acquired for
the Yamuna Expressway and, thereafter, for developing land
parcels alongside the Expressway as townships.
(ii)
The original record of the State contains a categorical statement
that the State Government, after scrutinizing the record had
accepted the proposal applying mind to the fact that, in case
the objections under Section 5-A of the Act were invited, it would
adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the project
of public importance. The said decision was made looking at
the enormity of the project which required the acquisition of
the lands spread over a large area of 18,000 hundred acres
(approx.) comprising 16 villages. The development of the village
'Abadi Bhoomi's by YEIDA was also linked to the development
of the land alongside the Expressway. It was not the case of
non-application of mind and no fault in the decision-making
process could be demonstrated.
(iii) There was no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in two or
three acquisition notifications, which were the subject matter of
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1075
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
challenge in the present writ petitions, wherein one year time
has been consumed in the issuance of the Section 6 notification,
the delay has beenduly explained by the State.
21. In Kamal Sharma, the Division Bench distinguished Shyoraj Singh
noting that the said judgment failed to consider the fact that the
acquisition was proposed for an integrated project and that the
Division Bench did not deal with the argument that looking at the
large number of tenure holders, the hearings would have resulted
into the project of tremendous importance being delayed. Further,
it was noted that the reasons given for justifying the invocation of
the urgency clause had not been examined in the context in which
they were made, and also the decision of this Court in the case of
Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others.13 was not considered.
22. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while delivering the
judgment in Kamal Sharma, validated the acquisition proceeding in
question and granted an enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the
landowners.
23. During the course of arguments, this Court was apprised of the fact
that out of total 410 writ petitioners(landowners) before the High
Court, only 96 have challenged the judgment in Kamal Sharma by
filing civil appeals @ special leave petitions in Batch No. 1.
24. It is in this backdrop of the conflicting decisions rendered by the
Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court, that the two batches
of civil appeals @ special leave petitions i.e. Batch No.1 and Batch
No.2, have been preferred by the landowners and YEIDA before
this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS
IN BATCH NO. 1): -
25. Learned counsel representing the landowners implored the Court to
grant relief in favour of the appellants as prayed for in Batch No.1
wherein lead matter is "Kalicharan and others v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh and others14" and negate the challenge to the judgment in
13
[2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; hereinafter referred to as 'Nand Kishore'
14
supra
1076
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Shyoraj Singh. They advanced the following pertinent submissions
for assailing the questioned land acquisition proceedings:-
(i)
That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while
rendering the judgment dated 26th May, 2023 in Kamal Sharma,
in effect sat in appeal over the judgment dated 24th April, 2017
in Shyoraj Singh rendered by a coordinate bench of the same
High Court which dealt with an identical controversy both in
facts and law. It was fervently contended that the Division Bench
of Allahabad High Court, while dealing with the subsequent
batch of writ petitions in Kamal Sharma should have followed
the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as a matter of judicial
discipline.
(ii)
That if at all the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma was of a
view that Shyoraj Singh did not lay down the correct position
of law, then the question of law should have been referred to
a larger Bench rather than taking a divergent view in a Bench
with a composition of same number of Judges.
(iii) That the land acquisition notifications under Sections 4
and 6 of the Act were dated 26th February, 2009 and 19th
February 2010, respectively. The above-mentioned dates
demonstrate that about one years' time was taken by the State
Government for issuance of the final declaration notification
under Section 6 after the proposal under Section 4 of the
Act was issued and thus, there was pre and post notification
delay which could not have been ignored and had to be taken
into account. In this background there could not have been
any justification for the dispensation of few weeks' time to the
landowners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, on
the ground of urgency. On this aspect, reliance was placed upon
Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others,15 wherein this Court observed as
follows: -
"82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the
proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the
level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of
15
[2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; hereinafter referred to as 'Radhy Shyam'
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1077
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
survey and preparation of documents by the end of
December 2006 but it took one year and almost three
months for the State Government to issue notification
under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4).
If this much time was consumed between the receipt
of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of
notification, it is not possible to accept the argument
that four to five weeks within which the objections
could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A
and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry
under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have
defeated the object of the acquisition."
Reliance in this regard was also placed on Dev Sharan and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,16 wherein this
Court observed as below: -
"37[Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. Thus
the time which elapsed between publication of
Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section
6 declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months
and 23 days i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at
which the government machinery had functioned in
processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there
was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant
invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.
38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly
stated that there was a time gap of more than 11
months between Section 4 and Section 6 notifications,
which demonstrates that there was no urgency in the
State action which could deny the petitioners their right
under Section 5-A. In the counter which was filed in
this case by the State before the High Court, it was
not disputed that the time gap between Section 4
notification read with Section 17, and Section 6
notification was about 11 months."
16
[2011] 3 SCR 728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769
1078
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance
on Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others,17 wherein, this Court, while dealing with a
post-notification delay of almost two years, held as follows:
"28. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is clear that this Court, vide its order dated
17-8-2004 [(2011) 12 SCC 572], has issued a direction
to the respondents to relocate the bone mills and
allied industries causing environment pollution and
health hazards as per the recommendations of CPCB
and, inter alia, the respondents were also directed
to identify the area for relocation. Pursuant to this,
the respondents have filed an affidavit in the month
of December 2004 specifying the construction of
the Leather City Project at Hapur in Ghaziabad.
Subsequently, it was only after the lapse of two years,
the State Government had issued a Notification under
Section 4 on 3-7-2006 and the same was published
on 4-7-2006. Thereafter, the State Government took
more than 17 months in order to make a declaration
of the notification under Section 6 from the date of
publication of the notification under Section 4 of the LA
Act. In view of the above circumstances, it is crystal
clear that the government functionary has proceeded
at very slow pace at two levels, that is, prior to the
issuance of the notification under Section 4 and post
the issuance of the notification under Section 4, for
acquisition of the land for construction of the Leather
City Project, which undoubtedly is a public purpose.
Therefore, the above series of the events amply
exhibit the lethargical and lackadaisical attitude of
the State Government. In the light of the above
circumstances, the respondents are not justified in
invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of
the LA Act, thereby, depriving the appellants of their
valuable right to raise objections and opportunity of
17
[2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 SCC 164
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1079
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
hearing before the authorities in order to persuade
them that their property may not be acquired.
Further reliance was placed on the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal
(Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others,18
wherein,this Court observed as below:
"36. It needs no emphasis that majority of the
projects undertaken by the State and its agencies/
instrumentalities, the implementation of which
requires public money, are meant to benefit the
people at large or substantially a large segment of
the society. If what the High Court has observed
is treated as a correct statement of law, then in all
such cases the acquiring authority will be justified
in invoking Section 17 of the Act and dispense with
the inquiry contemplated under Section 5-A, which
would necessarily result in depriving the owner of his
property without any opportunity to raise legitimate
objection. However, as has been repeatedly held by
this Court, the invoking of the urgency provisions can
be justified only if there exists real emergency which
cannot brook delay of even few weeks or months. In
other words, the urgency provisions can be invoked
only if even small delay of few weeks or months
may frustrate the public purpose for which the land
is sought to be acquired. Nobody can contest that
the purpose for which the appellants' land and land
belonging to others was sought to be acquired was a
public purpose but it is one thing to say that the State
and its instrumentality wants to execute a project of
public importance without loss of time and it is an
altogether different thing to say that for execution of
such project, private individuals should be deprived
of their property without even being heard."
(iv) That one of the grounds taken by the State for invoking the
urgency clause was that there were chances of unauthorized
18
[2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327
1080
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
construction/encroachments on the land subject to acquisition.
This stand was questioned by placing reliance on Radhy
Shyam, wherein this Court observed that it is highly unlikely
that the recorded tenure holders would encroach or allow
encroachments on their own land when they are admittedly
in the possession of the same. The relevant extract as relied
upon is quoted hereinbelow: -
"83. The apprehension of the respondents that
delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous
encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the
comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to
think that the landowners would encroach their own
land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned
industrial development of the district."
(v)
That there was no material before the State Government to
show the existence of any unforeseeable emergency warranting
invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4)
of the Act, thereby denying the landowners of their right to file
objections against acquisition of their lands.
(vi) That the lands under acquisition were to be utilized for
commercial and residential purposes and such development
work, would take ample time in planning and execution, thus
there could have been no justification for the invocation of
urgency clause. Reliance in this regard was placed on the
following observations in Radhy Shyam:-
"80......Even if planned industrial development of the
district is treated as public purpose within the meaning
of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify
the exercise of power by the State Government under
Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial
development of an area cannot be achieved by
pressing some buttons on the computer screen. It
needs a lot of deliberations and planning keeping in
view various scientific and technical parameters and
environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs,
who are desirous of making investments in the State,
take their own time in setting up the industrial units.
Usually, the State Government and its agencies/
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1081
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
instrumentalities would give them two to three years to
put up their factories, establishments, etc. Therefore,
time required to ensure compliance with the provisions
contained in Section 5A cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be portrayed as delay that will frustrate
the purpose of acquisition."
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Anand Singh
and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,19 wherein
this Court observed as follows: -
"46. As to in what circumstances the power of
emergency can be invoked are specified in Section
17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of
urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the
provision itself. Generally speaking, the development
of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned
development of city, takes many years if not decades
and, therefore, there is no reason why summary
enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may
not be held and objections of landowners/persons
interested may not be considered. In many cases,
on general assumption likely delay in completion
of enquiry under Section 5-A is set up as a reason
for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing
with the enquiry little realising that an important and
valuable right of the person interested in the land is
being taken away and with some effort enquiry could
always be completed expeditiously."
(vii) That the judgment of this Court in Radhy Shyam holds the
field on the issue of invocation of urgency clause in acquisition
proceedings for planned development for commercial, residential,
industrial purposes and the decision in Kamal Sharma has been
rendered while glossing over the law settled in Radhy Shyam.
(viii) That the right to be heard as provided under Section 5-A of the
Act is in the nature of a fundamental right and the same cannot
be dispensed with, so as to justify the lackadaisical approach
of the State Government. It was also contended that Section
19
[2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242
1082
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
5-A is not to be superseded ipso facto even if the provisions of
Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act are being invoked. Reliance
in support of this contention was placed upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Dev Sharan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others,20 wherein it was held that even in cases
of 'urgency' or 'unforeseen emergency', enquiry contemplated
by Section 5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with and even
if the case is covered under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section
17, sub-Section (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply.
The relevant extracts relied upon are as below:-
"32. In a recent judgment of this Court in Essco Fabs,
(2009) 2 SCC 377, this Court, after considering previous
judgments as also the provisions of Section 17 of the
Act held: (SCC P. 839, para 41)
"41. Whereas sub-section (1) of Section 17
deals with cases of 'urgency', sub-section (2)
of the said section covers cases of 'sudden
change in the channel of any navigable river
or other unforeseen emergency'. But even in
such cases i.e. cases of 'urgency' or 'unforeseen
emergency', enquiry contemplated by Section
5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with which
is clear from sub-section (4) of Section 17 of
the Act."
This Court, therefore, held that once a case is covered
under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17, subsection (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply:
(SCC P. 395, para 54)
"54. In our opinion, therefore, the contention
of the learned counsel for the respondent
authorities is not well founded and cannot be
upheld that once a case is covered by subsections (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act,
sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily
apply and there is no question of holding inquiry
20
(2011) 4 SCC 769
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
1083
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
or hearing objections under Section 5-A of the
Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding
of this argument will make sub-section (4)
of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant and
nugatory."
(ix) That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court committed
grave error in law while placing reliance upon the judgment of
Nand Kishore, for denying relief to the landowners.