# KAMAL KANTI DUTTA AND ORS v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS - **Citation:** [1980] 3 S.C.R. 811 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1980-04-23 - **Bench:** Y. V. Ciiandrachud, N. L. Untwaua, P. S. Kailasam, D. A. Desai, E. S. Venkataramiah - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kamal-kanti-dutta-and-ors-v-union-of-india-and-ors-8217 - **Pages:** 44 ## Headnote Review of Judgments of the Supreme Court of India under Airticle 137 1 of A B ihe Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution indirectly invoking the review ·c iurisdiction and seeking a revie1v of earlier decision of the'· Courts Held, there is no substance in the request. With a view to imp:roving the Income-tax administration, the Government of India in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission decided to -reconstitute then existing income-tax services, Class I and II. Under the scheme of reorganisation of the services set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 D of the Government of India Finance Department, the central service Class I was to consist of (i) Commissioners of Income-Tax (ii) Assistant Commis- ·sioners of Income-Tax; (iii) lncome.-Tax Officers Grade I and (iv) Income-Tax Officers Grade-II. Thus Income-Tax Officers Class I were to be of two grades, Grade I and II; while Income-Tax Officers Class II were to consist of one grade, namely, Grade III. Clauses (a) to (e) of paragraph 2 of the letter, prescribed the mode of recruitment to the various posts in Class I and Class II, E Under Clause (d) recruitment to Class I Grade II was 20% by promotion from Class II, Grade III and 80% by direct recruitment via Indian Audit and Accounts Service etc. examination. Rules regulating recruitment to the Income-Tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) service ''liable to alteration from year io year" were published on May 26, 1945, by a resolution of the Finance (Central Revenues) Department. Rule 3 provided that recruitment to Class I, Grade !I's service shall be made (I) by competitive examination held in India F in accrnlance with Part-II of the Rules and (ii) by promotion on the basis of selection of Grade ill (Class II service, in accordance with Part lII of the :Rules. By Rule 4 of the Government was to determine, subject to the provi• sioos of Rule 3, the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of ·filling any particular vacancies, or such vacancies as may be required to be filled during any particular period, and tho number of candidates to be recruited by such method. Part ill of the Rules called (Recruitment by Promotion) G provided by paragraph 21 that "recruitment by promotion shall be made by selection from Grade-Ill Income-Tax Officers (Class II service) after consuli•tion with the Federal Public Service and that no officer shall have any claim to such promotion as of right". 1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits; (b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who comH pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r. A, B c D Er F: G ll: 812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. On October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of Income·Tax titled "Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (ClassI service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the vacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined. competitive examination and the remaining 33 and 1/3 per cent on the basis of selection by promotion from Grade-III (Class-II service). Any surplus vacancies which could not be filled by promotion for want of suitable candidates would be added to the quota of vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment. By a letter dated September 5, 1952 the Government of India revised with a retrospective effect the Rules of Seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950. Rule 1 (f)(iii) as framed on January 24, 1950 which was to the effect that "the promotees who have been certified by the comm~s sion in any calendar year sha.11 be senior to all direct recruits who complete their probation during that yea ## Text _Characters 0–39,916 of 126,892. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39916 for what follows._ 811 KAMAL KANT! DUTTA AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. April 23, 1980 [Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., N. L. UNTWAUA, P. S. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] Review of Judgments of the Supreme Court of India under Airticle 137 1 of A B ihe Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution indirectly invoking the review ·c iurisdiction and seeking a revie1v of earlier decision of the'· Courts Held, there is no substance in the request. With a view to imp:roving the Income-tax administration, the Government of India in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission decided to -reconstitute then existing income-tax services, Class I and II. Under the scheme of reorganisation of the services set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 D of the Government of India Finance Department, the central service Class I was to consist of (i) Commissioners of Income-Tax (ii) Assistant Commis- ·sioners of Income-Tax; (iii) lncome.-Tax Officers Grade I and (iv) Income-Tax Officers Grade-II. Thus Income-Tax Officers Class I were to be of two grades, Grade I and II; while Income-Tax Officers Class II were to consist of one grade, namely, Grade III. Clauses (a) to (e) of paragraph 2 of the letter, prescribed the mode of recruitment to the various posts in Class I and Class II, E Under Clause (d) recruitment to Class I Grade II was 20% by promotion from Class II, Grade III and 80% by direct recruitment via Indian Audit and Accounts Service etc. examination. Rules regulating recruitment to the Income-Tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) service ''liable to alteration from year io year" were published on May 26, 1945, by a resolution of the Finance (Central Revenues) Department. Rule 3 provided that recruitment to Class I, Grade !I's service shall be made (I) by competitive examination held in India F in accrnlance with Part-II of the Rules and (ii) by promotion on the basis of selection of Grade ill (Class II service, in accordance with Part lII of the :Rules. By Rule 4 of the Government was to determine, subject to the provi• sioos of Rule 3, the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of ·filling any particular vacancies, or such vacancies as may be required to be filled during any particular period, and tho number of candidates to be recruited by such method. Part ill of the Rules called (Recruitment by Promotion) G provided by paragraph 21 that "recruitment by promotion shall be made by selection from Grade-Ill Income-Tax Officers (Class II service) after consuli•tion with the Federal Public Service and that no officer shall have any claim to such promotion as of right". 1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits; (b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who comH pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r. A, B c D Er F: G ll: 812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. On October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of Income·Tax titled "Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (ClassI service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the vacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined. competitive examination and the remaining 33 and 1/3 per cent on the basis of selection by promotion from Grade-III (Class-II service). Any surplus vacancies which could not be filled by promotion for want of suitable candidates would be added to the quota of vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment. By a letter dated September 5, 1952 the Government of India revised with a retrospective effect the Rules of Seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950. Rule 1 (f)(iii) as framed on January 24, 1950 which was to the effect that "the promotees who have been certified by the comm~s sion in any calendar year sha.11 be senior to all direct recruits who complete their probation during that year or after and are confirmed with effect from a date in that year or after" was revised on September 5, 1952 as "officers promoted in accordance with the recommendations of .the Departmental Promotion Committee before the next sitting of the Departmental Promotion Committee shall be senior to all direct recrui:ts appointed on the results of the examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission during the calendar year in which the Departmental Promotion Committee met during the three previous years". Rule l(f)(iv) of the 1952 Rules dealt with a special situation in \Vhich an officer initially appointed to Class Il service was given seniority in thei same manner as a departmental promotee, if subsequent to bis passing the departmental examination he was appointed to Class I on the results of the competitive examination. Rule 4 of Chapter IX of the Rules of Promotion of the Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual states that the pres· cribed n1inimum service for an officer of Class-I, Grade-TI for promotion to Grade-I is 5 years gazetted service including one year in Class-I, Grade-Il. For a promotee from Cass-II the minimum period of service for promotion t'o Class-I, Grade-I would be actually 4 years service in Class-II and one year service in Oass-1, Grade--11. In an appeal arising out of Writ Petition No. 189-D af 1962 filed by one S. G. Jai Singhani (who is respondent No. 358 in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 and respondent No. S in Writ Petition No. 4146 of 1978), a constitutional Bench of this Court held : {i) Rules I (f)(iii) and (iv) of the Seniority Rules framed ~·1952 did not violate Articles 14 and 16 since they·were·based on a reasonable classification; (ii) Rule 4 of Chapter IX of the Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual did not lead to any discrimination as between direct recruits and promotees, since the object of the rule was· really to carry out 'the policy of Rule I (f) (iii) of the Rules of Seniority and not allow it to be defeated by the recruitment of 5 years' service in Oass-I, · Grade-Il itself, before a person could be considered for promotion to Class-I, Grade-I; (iii) Rule 4 of the Income-Tax Officers (Clas~I, Grade-II) Service Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule to which a statutory duty was cast on the Government to determine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling of the vacancies and the number of candid;ites to 'be recruited by. each method; and that though in the letter of the Government of India dated October 18, 1951 there was no specific reference to Rule 4, the quota fixed by that letter must be deemed to have been fixed in exercise of the statutory power gi~en by Rule 4. There was, therefore, no discretion left to the Government of K. K. DUTTA V. UNION 813 !India to alter that quota according to the exigencies of the situation or to .cJeviate from the quota in any particular year at its own wilt and pleasure. The ..quota rule) according to the Court, was linked up with the Seniority Rule and unless it was strictly observed in practice it would be difficult to hold that the :seniority rule contained in rule 1 (f) (iii) was not unreasonable and did not offend Article 16 of the Constitution. The Court suggested that for future years the 'foster system should be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for \Vorking out the quota between the direct recruits and the promotees and that a roster should be maintained indicating the order in which appointments \Vere made -by direct recruitment and by promotion in accordance with the percentages fixed under the statutory rule for each method of recruitment. Thus the direct ;recruit.3 succeeded substantially in their contentions, the quota rule acquired statutory force, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota became bad and it became obligatory for the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list. Promotees found to have been appointed in excess of the quota admissible to ·promotees had naturally to go down in the final gradation of seniority. On July 15, 1968 the Govcrnn1ent prepared a fresh seniority list and filed it .in the Supreme Court. That list failed to satisfy promotees as well as direct recruits. Whether this seniority list was correct and in accordance with the mandan1us which was issued by this Court in S. G. Jai Singhani's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 came up for consideration in four appeals which '\Vere disposed of by a common judgment dated August 16, 1972 reported as Bishan Sarup Gupta v: 'Union of India (first Gupta"s case) in [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 491. The Court was also called upon to examine the correctness of seven principles enumerated iri the Government letter dated July 15. 1968 governing seniority. The first principle was accepted as good. The second and the third principles were held to be partially incorrect in so for as they excluded reference to all the promotees of 1952. The Court held that the promoteesi of 1952 should be referred to 'in the seniority list whether they are affected or not, the object being the ascertainment of excess promotions. This Court further held that the rule dated October 18, 1951 was not concerned with the ~onstitution of the cadre but "was concerned with how permanent vacancies were to be filled" and, therefore, the promotees would be entitled to l/r3 of the vacancies in any particular year whether or not there was direct recruitment by competitive examination in that year. This ratio of 2 : 1 between the direct recruits and the promotees. could not be made to depend on whether any direct recruits were appointed in any particular year. It, therefore, became essential to detennine th'e actual vacancies in the cadre but the Government put forward the plea even in this ·case as in Jai Singhani's) that it was impossible for them to give the exact figure of vacancies in any particular year. According to the Court, when the quota rule referred to vacancies it was implicit that the vacancies are those which the Government wanted to fill up '\Vhatever may be the actual number of vacancies available for being filled up. Any number of posts among the promotees more than 1 /3 of the total number of appoint,ments in the particular ·year was considered to be in excess of the quota available for promotees. The Court rejected the argument that the quota rule which is co-related to vacancies of permanent posts only and not to those in temporary posts. While upholding the weightage allowed under Rule I (!)(iii) ro Class· II officers ·promoted to Class-I. Grade-II, the Court also held .that even after 1956, the Government was entitled by reason of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules of I 945 to follow the quora rule of 1951 as a rough guideline, "without going through the trouble of putting the same on record in so many words" and A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. that in the normal course the Government was entitled to prepare the seniority list till the end of 1958 in accordance with the quota rule of 195.1. In regard to the position after year 1958 the Court came to the conclusion that the quota rule ceased to apply and came to an end on January 16, 1959, when the sanction to upgrade 100 t'emporary posts in Class-II, Grade-III t0Class-I, Grade-II was given by the President. The seniority rule then fell with quota rule. On these considerations the Court held that the seniority list' was valid in regard to promotions made up tu January 15, 1959 to the extent that it was prepared on the basis of the quota rule dated October 18, 1951 read with Seniority Rule l(f) (iii). As a corollary, the Court set aside the seniority list of July 15_, 1968 and directed the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list. The List for the· years 1955 to January 15, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the quota rule of 195 l read with Seniority Rule l(f) (iii). The List to be effective from January 16, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the rules to be made afresh by the Government. On February 9, 1973 the President made rules called the fncome-Tax (Class-I) Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1973 under Article 309 of the Constitution giving retrospective effect from January 16, 1969. In pursuance of the liberty reserved to the parties under the Judgment in the first Gupta's case the validity of the new seniority rules was challenged by the· promoteeS once again. The challenge was considered and repelled by the Court in Bishan Swamp Gupta etc. v. Union of India and Ors., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 104, second Gupta's case~ When the new list of seniority was prepared. by the Government, in accordance with these rules, the Government had on its hand 7'5 promotees who though appointed earlier between 1956 and 1958 had no quota post, for their absorption. The 73 promotees described as "spill-overs on January 15, 1959'', as also those who were promoted subsequently had to be absorbed in the Service, which could only be done by a special rule framed in that behalf. The new seniority rule contained a formula for the absorption of all promotees with effect from January 16, 1959 in posts allocated to them, ir determined their seniority intel' se and last but not the least it determined their seniority qua the direct recruits appointed from 1959. The. Court overruled' the objection of the '73' spill-over promotees that since in the first Gupta's case the cCourt had directed that they should be absorbed on a ';priority basis··. all of them should have been shown in the seniority list as having been appointed on January 16, 1959' en bloc and the direct recruits for that year should have been shown thereafter. It was explai Jed that by use of the expression "priority basis" what was· meant by the Court was that the position of the spill-over promotees as senkirs should not be prejudiced by claims made by later promotees on the ground tha.t since the spill-over promotees were recruited in excess of the quota, the later promotees whose promotion did not violate the quota rule had higher rights than, those 73. The Court further held that, when the 73 spill-over appointments were made, there were no allocated or earmarked posts to which those promotees could have been validly appointed, the ordinary consequence of which would have been their reversion to Cla.ss II po11ts which they originally held.' So long as the· quota rule was in i!xistence. appointments in excess of the quota, though invalid when n1ade, were atleast Jiable to be regularised in subsequent years when vacancies were· avai1ableto the promotees as a C-Onsequence of the quota rule. Bur once the quota rule ceased to exist on JanuarY 16, 1959, any possibility of the excess appointments of the promotees being regularised vanished. It \Vas in order ' ~ I r{ K· K. DUTTA V. UNION 815 to overcome this injustice to the promotees, that the new rule was framed A by the Government. The new rule was thus not only the direct outcome of the judgment of the Court in the !st Gupta case, but it was founded on the very principles on which the Income-tax Service had been constituted. The Court finally said that it had also to be remembered that promotees appointed from January 16, 1959 onwards w·ere appointed on an officiating or adhoc basis with notice that the question of their seniority was still undecided. 'fhis circmnstance coupled with the absence of clea.r allocation of posts, made B'. ir impossible for the promotees to lay claim to seniority and contend that they were· deprived of their natural seniority in violation of Article 16. The petitioners who were promotee Income-Tax Officers Class-r, Gradel! prayed for reconsideration of these three decisions S. G. Jai SinJ;hani v. l!nion of India and Anr., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703; Bishan Swarup Gupta v. [Inion of Indio and Ors., \Finl Guptds case). [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 495; Bis/uw C SwarrJp Gupta e1c. v. Cir.ion of India and Ors .• (Second Gupta's case),. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 104- and to the extent S. G. Jai Singhani's case is relied upon in ll11ion of India v. ilfalji Jangamayya etc., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 28, on the following grounds : 1. The Conclusion that Rule 4 of the Income.Tax Officers (Class-I, Grad&-11) Service Recruitment Rules is statutory and, therefore, the quota pte9albcd by the Government of India for recruitment to Income-Tax Offi· cers Class-I, Grade-II in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 would be statutory, proceeds on an assumption not warranted by the provisions of law bearing on the point and if both Rule 4 and the quota presumably prescribed in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 are not shown to be statutory, the foundation of which the edifice in S. G. Jai Singhanfs c.ase rests is knocked down because it can be demonstrably established that neither rule 4 nor the quota prescribed thereunder .was stautory in character but was at best an administrative instruction. 2. After the Court on an interpretation of the quota rule held that the quota \Vas ielated to vacancies arising in the grade every year, the conclusion reached did not conform to this finding but accommodated the so-called inability (now shown to be factually incorrect) of the Government of India to give information to the Court about .the' vacancies ;in the grade every year with the result that the .whole calculation of spill-over is vitiated. 3. The mandamus issued in Jai Singllani's'case was misinterpreted by the Government because even if the quota was statutory it was operative only between 1951 and 1956 but the Government interpreted the mandamus w be operative beyond 1956 and upto 1967 which misinterpretation has been pointed D E F out .ia the first Gupta's case. G 4. Jn the first Gupta's case while holding that the mandamus directing to treat the quota statutory beyond 1956 was not justified yet till January 16, 1959, the Court itself indirectly accepted the quota rule as a guideline anrl treated that there was a spill-over of 73 promotees. If Rule 4 was not statutory and consequently the quota prescribed in exercise of the power which had outlived. its prescribed span of life in 1956 could not be brought in to treat any appoiatment as invalid on the ground that there was no allocated post for those H appointeet treated as spill-over because under Rule 4 itself the Government harl power to-detern1ine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of 816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. A filling in particular vacancies or such vacancies as may be required to be· filled in during any particular period and the number of candidates·. to be recruited ( by each method. '!'- 5. The action of the Government of upgrading 214 posts between 1959 and 196-Z from Class-II, Grade-II to Class I, Grade II was not open to question as at that stage there was no quota rule and Rule 4 enabled the Government to B make recruitment from either of the two sources in exercise of its executive power. In regard to the second Gupta's case the Court introduced quota rule retrospectively by the back door which is impermissible and its operation manifestly establishes its utter unfairness inasmuch as a direct recruit nor any where in the department or may be a student may secure a march~over a promotee \vhich has been working in Class-I, Grade-II. D E F II Dismissing the petitions the Court, HELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N. L. Untwalia, P. S. Kailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ. and himself). (Majority view) l. A consideration of certain historic fa.cts in this case makes it clear that there is no &ubstance in the request made for a review of the de.cisions in Jai Singhani v. [Inion of India and Ors., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703; Bishan Swarup Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. (1st Gupta's case) [1975] supplementary S.C.R .. 491; Bishan Swarup Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.; Second Gupta's case [1975] I S.C.R. 104 and Union of lndia v, Malji Jangamayya [1977] 2 S.C.R. 28. [840 E-FJ For nearly a- decade after 1950, appointments of promotees were made far in excess of the quota available to them. So long as· the quota rule operated, it \vas possible to regularise their appointments when posts within thCir quota became available in later years. But a ~omewhat unprecedented situation arose by the upgrading of Class II posts to Class I grade II-100 of them on January 16, 1959 and 114 en December 9, 1960. This massive upgrading of posts brought about a colla-pse of the quota rule. Subsequent absorption in posts which became available for being filled up later really mearui rngularisation of appointments, which is possible provided there is no excessive: deviation from the quota rule. [840 G-H, 841 AJ It is true that no blame can be laid at the doors of the promotees on the score that they were appointed in excess of the quota avail~ able to them. Perhaps, their appointments must even have enabled the· administration to tide over administrative stale-mate. But the tough problem which the administration has to face is that whereas it is necessary to recognUe and protect the claims of promotees who were appointed in excess of their quota, it is equally necessary to ensure that the direct recruits do not suffer an undlle set-back in service on account of the appointments of promotees. The conflicting claims of the two components of Service, both having an importance of their own, have therefore to be reconciled. It was with that object that the rules have been modified from time to time. The judgments rendered ~y this Court in the aforesaid four cases show, without a. shadow doubt, bow every effort was made to ensure that no hardship or injustice is caused to lh~ pro~ n1ctees merely because their appointments exceeded their quota. (841 A..C] 2. It is not correct to say that the judg:meilt in Jai Singhani was based on a concession or that the Court felt compelled to draw the particular conclusions f < K. K. DUTTA V. UNION 817 therein because of the inability or refusal of the Financei lVIinistiy to produce A the relevant files. The Court adopted what it considered in the circumstances .to be a satisfactory and scientific method of ascertaining the number of vaca.ll-.. cies available for being filled up. lt came to the conclusion that the1 number .,of actual appointments should determine the number of vacancies available which ¥.ras a perfectly legitimate conclusion to draw. In the grey area where service rules operate, more than one view is always possible to take without "Sacrificing either reason or con1monsense but the ultimate choic~ has to be neces· B sarily conditioned by serveral considerations ensurin_g justice· to as many as possible and injustice· to as few. There was no error in the conclusion in Jiti Singlzani that Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules was a statlltory rule Subse- ,quent decisions V.'ould show that there was hrirdly ooy dispute between the -parties, at later stages at any rate, that Rule 4 was a statutory rule. (841 D-G] 3. No doubt, the. pron1otees should not be penalised for the mere rOO::Son C that those of them who were appointed after Ja-nuary 16, 1959 were appointed on an officiating or ad hoc basis and had clear notice that the question of their ·seniority was still undecided. The circumstances attendant upon their appoint~ ments cannot, ho\vever, be wholly overlooked in determining whether the constitutional constraints have been over-stepped. [841 H. 842 A] 4. It is not safe to test the constitutionality of a service rule on the iouch stone of fortunes of individuals. No matter With what care, objectivity and foresight a rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice is bound to result to some members of the service. The paramount consideration is the reconciliation of conflicting claims of two important constituents of :Service, one of v,ihich brings fresh blood and the other mature experience. [842 A-CJ D 5. Though the promotees submitted in the Second Gupta case that the new E ·seniority rule was unfair to them, they were unable to put forward any rational alternative. On the contrary the counter-affidavit dated August 31,. 1973 filed in the Second Gupta case by Shri Mehra·, the· Deputy secretary Finance, shows the fullness with which the Government had consulted all possible interests ·while framing the impugned rules of seniority. The gamut of reasonable l)O~ibilities is fairly covered by the four alternatives referred to in Shri Mehra's affidavit The inconveniences and disadvantages flowing from the first three F alternatives would be far greater than those flowing from the fourth. Tha.t is why the choice ultimately fell on the fourth alternative Under which the seniority 'between promotees and direct recruits was fixed alternately on a roster system, vacancies being equally divided between promotees and direct recruits, for the ·entire period frnm 1959 up.to-date. The observation of the Court in the ·second Gupta's case at page· 119 shows how difficult it is to solve the jig-s5W' :puzzle of service disputes. [842 C-H] G 6. The report of the 'Committee on petition9' of the Rajya Sabha, howso~ ·ever, sincerely rnotiva-ted and fuJly dra\.\'Il cannot be given the importance1 which the promotees seem to attach to it. Jn paragraph 16 of its Report the Com~ mittee does refer to certain files but those files appear to contain some notings in regard to the direct recruitment only. The Committee has given a table of ·comparative appointments in paragraph 19 of its Report but it had to speculate on an important aspect of the matter, M is shown by its own language, that the table shows the number of direct recruits which the Government wanted to iake and "on the basis of which the promotees ,nust have- beeri given promoH A B c D E 818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R. tions''. If indeed t~ relevant files were produced before the Committee, it would not have expressed its sense of deep shock and resentment at the disappearance of the files. Further para 32 of the Report shows that the C.Ommittee had to grope in the dark and indulge in a certain amount of speculation on matters under its consideration. In the circumstances it has done as good a job as a Committee can and no f11ult need to found with it. But nevertheless the said Corun1ittee's report cannot displace the Court's judgments. [842 H, 843 A-C] Even on n1erits there is no justificatio~ for considering lhe judgments already rendered by this Cburt inasmuch as no fresh facts were brought to notice by way of discovery of ncv,i and imJXlrtant evidence which would justify reconsideration of the decisions already rendered by this Court after the most careful examination of the competing contcn~ions. The report of the Rajya Sabha Committee on petitions shows that the relevant files are still not trace~ able. [843 E-F, G-H, 844 A] Per Desai, J. {contra) 1. While, n0 doubt, the Supreme Court has constitutional po\ver tOt review its decision, it is a power to be sparingly exeircised because any such review has the tendency to unsettle que5tions which may' have been finally determined. The Supreme Court does not lightly undertake retview of its decisions more especially where conflicting claims have been setUed by the decision of this. Court and the whole gamut may have to be gone through over again on a reconsideration of the decision. While exercising inherent power to reconsider and review its earlier decision, the Suprme Court would naturaJly 1 lik.e to impose cerWl.in reasonable limitations and 'vould be reluctarnt to entert3in plea for reconsideration and review all its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It -is general judicfal experience that in ma-tters of la'v involving questions of construing stntutory or constitutional provisions, t\\'O views are often reasonably possible and when judicial appronch has to make a choice between the two reasonable possible views, the process of decision making- is often very difficult and delicate. [846 A-B, 847 C, G-H, 848 A-BT F In deciding 'vhether a reviev." is necessary, when two views. are po6Sible it G would not necessarily b~ an adequate reason for such review and revision to bold that though the earlier view is reasonably possible view the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. The Court's discretion should be· guided by such considerationl whether in the interest· of public good or for any other va·lid or compulsive reason it is necessary that: the· earJier decision should be revised. [848 B~C] Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 931; Kcsliav fllillJ Co .. Ltd. v. Com1nissioner of lncon1e Tax, Bon1bay North, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 908 & 921; Manganese ()re (India) Ltd. v. The, Regional Assistant Cornmissioner of Sales Tax, labalpur, [19761 3 S.C.R. 99 applied. 2. Jai Singhani case proceeds on a concession that Rule 4 and the quota. prescribed by the Government referable· to the power conferred by Rule 4 were, R statutory in character. [848 D-E] Income-tax service was reconstltuted on September 29, 1974. The Govern-· ment of India classified the existing income-ta:ii::· service as Class I and Clas!I Il. ·-r-· -+ K. K. DUTTA V. UNION 819 The scheme provided for recruitment of income-tax officers Class I grade II partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment. The scheme was set out in ·Ute Government of India Fmance Department (Central Revenues) letter dated September 29, 1944. The quota prescribed therein has undergone a rev.Won at a later dale. The rules being Pre-constitution Rules, their source muSt be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 241 of the 1935 Act made provision for recruitment and conditions of service. Section 241 makes it cleiar that the power to make appointments in the case of service of Federation and posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation was. conferred on the Governor-General or such person as he may direct. The power to 1nake rule~ in this behalf was confen·ed by sub-section 2 on tfie Govemor-Genera·l or by some person or persons authorised by the GovernorGcneral to n1akc the rules for the purpose. But, the rules ware not made either by the Goyemor-General or such person authorised by him. The rules were made by the Finance Department and no material was placed to show that the persons or the persons \Vho made the rules were authorised by the GovemorGeneml, under Section 241(2) of the 1935 Act in this behalf. The assumption made, therefore, that Rule 4 of the .Rules are statutory and that the quota prescribed in exercise of the power contfe1Ted by Rule 4 must be statutory is ill-founded. This knocks out the entire foundation of the judgment of this Court in Jai Singhani's case because this Court proceeded to hold that as the quota tvas statutory, any recruitment made in excess of the quota in any given year would be invalid and at bestJ ca·n be regularised by relegating such excess appointments to the quota neix.t year. If Rule 4 and the quota referable to the power conferred by Rule 4 were not statutory but were merely executive instructions, its violation \VOUld not render any appointment in excess of it invalid but ot best would be irregular and in this case on [l! plain reading of Rule 4 it wollid not even be irregular. [848 G-H, 849 A-El 3'. ln P. C. Sethi & Ors. v. U11io11 of India & Ors.' this Court held t:.._1.at in thei absence of any statutory rulels it wasi open to the Government in exercise of its executive power to i~sue administrative instructions \vith regard to constitution and reorganisation of service· as long as· there is no viola4.ion of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ff the. present Rule 4 enables the Governn1ent to preScribe method to be employed for the purpose of filling in any particular vacancy or such v<1cancit:s as may be required to be filled in durin_'( aity parti- . (' cular period n·nd the number of candidates to be' recruited by each method atfd if the ~o-called quota is not statutory but merely a guideline, the Government -.,, when'evt-r 1naking appointments would be acting in exercise of power conferred .. 'f I by -Ruk· 4 w·hich leaves it to the discretion, of the Government to decide from what ·source recruitment should be made and what must be the quantum of vacancies that 1nust be filled in at a given po~nt of 'time and such appointment could ::at be said to be invalid. f849 E-Hl Alternatively, even if the assumption made in Jai Singharzi'.s case that Rule 4 and the quota referable to the exercise of powei::. conferred by Rule 4 is unquestionable yet \vhcn this Court held that the quota is rela-ted to tha vacancies, the decision procecUing on an incorrect plea thar the information about the· nluiiber of vacancies in a year is not available, is unsustainable flor two reasons, namtly, (l) tha·t the files are now produced; (2) in the abseince of information about "the vacancies available the Court could not have invalidated any appoint~ rii.Cnt. on the assu1nption that appointment from the source of promotees was in exte111; of the quota. [850 A-BJ c· E F G A B c D E F G H 820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.R. On a plain reading of Rules 3,, 4 and 5, it is clear that the quota \\'as related to vacancies and at one stage \that was accepted. On this finding unless the fac.t situation is clearly established showing vacancies year to year it ~·ould be impossible· to hold that in a-ny year there was excess in either source. Suppose there \Vere 90 vacancies in a year and the quota was 66-2/3 for direct recruits and 33 113 for pr;o1notees it would be open to the Government to promote 30 persons irrespective of the; fact whether 60 direct recruits have become available or not. The assumption made that the recruitment made in a given yeM front both the sources would furnish information. about the vacancies in a year would lead to a rather unfair conclusion inasmuch as the action of the Government in acting in a- certain manner without due regard to the quota rule \vould work hardship on appointees even though on a correct calculation of vacancies the appointments may be valid and legal. [850 C-E] 4. The Government understood the mandamus issued in Jai Singlzani's case as covering the whole pericxl from 1951 to 1967. When this was questioned in the First Gupta's case this, Court held that the quota rule proprio vigor£' operated between 1951 to 1956 and if there were promotions in any year in excess of rhc quota, those promotions were merely invalid for that year but they were. not invalid for all time and they could be regularised. by being absorbed in the quota for the later years. So adjusting the quota at any,- rate up to 1956, the quota rule on its O\Vll strength evaporated because. it \\138 to rn~ in operation for a period of five years and no fresh quota rule was issued by the Government. Therefore, after 1956 Rule, 4 remained in force- in1 all its rigour and was not hedged in by a-ny quota. Rule 4 permitted the Govelmment to make recruitment from either source without fettering its discretioP.; by any quota rule which it was not bound to prescribe·. On January 16, 1-·19~9 Government in the Ministry of Finance i.nformed the Commissioners. of Income- + tax that the President had sanctioned the upgrading to Class l of one hundrtd temporary posts of Income-Tax Officers Class II. On December 19, 1960· there was further upgrading of 114 posts from Class II to Class I. Betwe