# ) ) ___ ,,/ KAMLESHKUMAR ISHWARDAS PATEL ETC. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC - **Citation:** [1995] 3 S.C.R. 279 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1995-04-17 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 764-65 of 1994 - **Bench:** A.M. Ahmadi, S.C. Agrawal, S.P. Bharucha, K.S. Paripoornan, Sujata V. Manohar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kamleshkumar-ishwardas-patel-etc-etc-v-union-of-india-and-ors-etc-etc-13125 - **Pages:** 30 ## Headnote ConseTVation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Ac4 1974-Sections 3 and JI. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Sub- ' stance Act, 198lf-Sections 3 and 12-Detention Orde,-.Detenu's right to make representation-To whom representation is to be made-Who is empowered to revoke the detention order. B c Constitution of India, 1951>-Article 22(4) and (5)--Preventive Deten- D tiorr-Nature and scope of rights of Detenue. The common question arising for consideration in the appeals was when an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, E whether the said officer is required to consider the representation sub· milted by the detenue. Answering the question in affirmative; allowing the appeals on behalf of the Detenues and dismissing the appeals of the Union of India, this Court F HELD : 1. The Constitution prescribes certain safeguards in Article 22 for the protection of persons detained. One is contained in sub-clanse o (a) of Clanse (4) of Article 22 and the other in Clause (5) of Article 22. The former requires that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than' three months G unless an Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said --i period of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention. The latter provides that where any person is detained in pur· suance of an order made under any law providing for Preventive Detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to H 279 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A such person on the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. [284·H, 285-A, B, CJ . B 2. Article 22(5) must be construed to mean that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention not only to the Advisory Board but also to the detaining authority i.e. the authority that has made the order of detention of the order for continuance of such detention, wh.o is competent under law to revoke the order for detention and thereby give relief to the person detained. The right to make a repre· sentatim; carries within it a corresponding obligation on the authority C making the order of detention to inform the person detained of his right to make a representation against the order of detention to the authorities who are required to consider such a representation. [289-H, 290-A] State of Bombay v.Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] SCR 161;Abdul Karim and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1969) 3 SCR 479; Pankaj Kumar D Chakrabarty and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 1 SCR 543; Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 225 and Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 39, referred to. 3. The power to revoke an order of detention that is conferred on the E Central Government and the State Government under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (COFEPOSA) Act and Section 12 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PIT NDPS) Act is in addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention. The F conferment of the said power on the Central Government and the State Government does not detract from the power that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention to revoke it. [293-F, El 4. The use of the words "without prejudice to the provision of Section G 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897" in sub· section (1) of Section 11 of the CO~'EPOSA Act and sub-section (1) of section 12 of the PIT NDPS Act preserve the power of the officer making the order under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to revoke th ## Text _Characters 0–39,983 of 70,116. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39983 for what follows._ I ) ) ... ___ ,,/ KAMLESHKUMAR ISHWARDAS PATEL ETC. ETC. A v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC. APRIL 17, 1995 [A.M. AHMADI, CJ, S.C. AGRAWAL, S.P. BHARUCHA, K.S. PARIPOORNAN AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.] ConseTVation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Ac4 1974-Sections 3 and JI. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Sub- ' stance Act, 198lf-Sections 3 and 12-Detention Orde,-.Detenu's right to make representation-To whom representation is to be made-Who is empowered to revoke the detention order. B c Constitution of India, 1951>-Article 22(4) and (5)--Preventive Deten- D tiorr-Nature and scope of rights of Detenue. The common question arising for consideration in the appeals was when an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, E whether the said officer is required to consider the representation sub· milted by the detenue. Answering the question in affirmative; allowing the appeals on behalf of the Detenues and dismissing the appeals of the Union of India, this Court F HELD : 1. The Constitution prescribes certain safeguards in Article 22 for the protection of persons detained. One is contained in sub-clanse o (a) of Clanse (4) of Article 22 and the other in Clause (5) of Article 22. The former requires that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than' three months G unless an Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said --i period of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention. The latter provides that where any person is detained in pur· suance of an order made under any law providing for Preventive Detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to H 279 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A such person on the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. [284·H, 285-A, B, CJ . B 2. Article 22(5) must be construed to mean that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention not only to the Advisory Board but also to the detaining authority i.e. the authority that has made the order of detention of the order for continuance of such detention, wh.o is competent under law to revoke the order for detention and thereby give relief to the person detained. The right to make a repre· sentatim; carries within it a corresponding obligation on the authority C making the order of detention to inform the person detained of his right to make a representation against the order of detention to the authorities who are required to consider such a representation. [289-H, 290-A] State of Bombay v.Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] SCR 161;Abdul Karim and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1969) 3 SCR 479; Pankaj Kumar D Chakrabarty and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 1 SCR 543; Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 225 and Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 39, referred to. 3. The power to revoke an order of detention that is conferred on the E Central Government and the State Government under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (COFEPOSA) Act and Section 12 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PIT NDPS) Act is in addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention. The F conferment of the said power on the Central Government and the State Government does not detract from the power that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention to revoke it. [293-F, El 4. The use of the words "without prejudice to the provision of Section G 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897" in sub· section (1) of Section 11 of the CO~'EPOSA Act and sub-section (1) of section 12 of the PIT NDPS Act preserve the power of the officer making the order under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to revoke the order made by him. [294-E] 5. It is not correct to say that Article 22(5) does not confer a right to H make representation to the officer specially empowered to make the order. \ / (- K.l. PATEL v. U.0.1. 281 The right or the person detained to make a representation against the order A ,I or detention envisaged by Article 22(5) comprehends the right to make such a representation to the authority whi,ch can grant such relier i.e. the authority \!filch can revoke the order or detention and set him at liberty and since the officer who has made the order or detention is competent to revoke it, the person detained has the right to make a representation to the officer B who made the order or detention. [285-G, 285-H, 286-A] State of Maharashtra v. Smt. Sushi/a Ma/at/a/ Shah and Ors., [1988] 4 sec 490, disapproved. Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 3 SCC 198 and John C Martin v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 3 SCC 836, distinguished. Ibrahim Bac/iu Ba/an v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1985] 2 SCC 24, relied on. 6. The premise that the Government which bas empowered the officer D , to make the order or detention becomes the detaining authority since there .J is deemed approval by the Government or the order made by the officer specially empowered in that regard frum the time or its issue, runs counter to the scheme or the COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act which differs from that or other prevention detention laws, namely, the National Security E Act, 1980. The Maintenance or Internal Security Act,1971 and the Preven· live Detention Act 1950. [297-G, H, 298-A] 6.1. The COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act do not require the approval or an order made by the officer specially empowered by-the State Government or by the Central Government. The order passed by such an F officer operates on its own force. All that is required by Section 3(2) or COFEPOSA Act and PIT NDPS Act is that the State Government shall' within 10 days forward to the Central Government a report in respect or an order that is made by the State Government or an officer specially empowered by the State Government. An order made by the officer spe· cially empowered by the State Government is placed on the same footing G as an order made by the State Government because the report has to be forwarded to the Central Government in respect or both such orders. No such report is required to be forwarded to the Central Government in respect or an order made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government. Requirement regarding forwarding or the report contained H 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1995] 3 S.C.R. A in Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act cannot, therefore, afford the basis for liolding that an order made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government or the State Government acquires deemed approval of that government from the date of its issue. [298-E, F, G, H, 299-A] B 6.2. Merely because the order of detention has been made by the officer who has been specially empowered for that purpose would not justify the inference that the said order acquires deemed approval of the government that has so empowered him, from the date of the issue of the order so as to make the said government the detaining authority. [299-D, El C 6.3. Since the detention of the person detained draws its legal sanction from the order passed by such officer, the officer is the detaining authority in respect of the said person. The officer specially empowered for that purpose continues to be the detaining authority and is not displaced by the concerned government after he has made the order of D detention. Therefore, by virtue of his being the detaining authority he is required to consider the representation of the person detained against the order of detention. [299-F, 300-B, CJ E F Kavita v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 3 SCC 558 and Smt. Masuma v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 3 SCC 566, distinguished. 6.4. The decision in Sushi/a Mafat/al Shah (supra) in so far as with holds that where an order of detention is made by an officer specially empowered for this purpose representation against the order of detention was not require to be considered by such officer and it is only to be considered by the appropriate Govt. empowering such officer does not lay down the correct law. [300-G, HJ 7. Where the detention order has been made under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act by an officer specially empowered for that purpose either by the Central Government or the State GovernG ment the person detained has a right to make a representation to the said officer and the said officer is obliged to consider the said representation and the failure on his part to do so results in denial of the right conferred \ on the person detained to make a representation against the order of \- detention. [301-C, DJ H 7.1. This right of the detenue is in addition to his right to make the ) 283 representation to the State Government and the Central Government A where the detention order has been made by an officer specially authorised by the State Government and to the Central Government where the detention order has been made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government, and to have the same duly considered. (301-E] 7.2. This right to make a representation necessarily implies that the B person detained must be informed or his right to make a representation to the authority that has made the order or detention at the time when he is served with the grounds or detention so as to enable him to make such a representation and the failure to do so results in denial or the right or the person detained to make a representation. [301-f] C 8. The failure on the part or the officer who made the order of detention to consider the representation of the detenue renders the detention illegal and without authority of law. This illegibility is not cured by consideration or the representation by the appropriate authority in the Central Government. [303-D] D Smt. Santosh Anand v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCC 420, relied on. Satpa/ v. State of Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 12 and Rajkishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, [1982] 3 SCC 10, distinguished. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos. 764-65 of 1994 Etc. Etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 16/19.9.94 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.W.P.No. 284 of 1994. Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. H. Wahi, Ms. N. Mukherjee and Ms. S. Hazarika for the AppF its in Cd.A.Nos. 764-65/94. R.K. iain, Manoj Goel and Ms. Meenakshi Arora for the Appellant E F in Crl.A.No. 553195 G K.T.S. Tutsi, Additional Solicitor General, Y.P. Mahajan, V.J. Francis, V.K. Verma, Krishan Mahajan and D.S. Mehra for the Union of India. Ram Jethmalani, B. Kumar and K.K. Mani for the Respondent in Crl.A. No. 850/94. H 284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A AS. Bhasme for the Respondent in No. 3 and 4 in Crl.A.No. 553/95. B R.K. Jain, P.H. Parekh, Ms. Sunita Sharma and N.K. Sahoo for the intervener in Crl.A.Nos. 764-65/94. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.C. AGRAWAL, J. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 282/94. When an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, is the said officer required to consider the representation C submitted by the detenu? This is the common question that arises for consideration in these appeals in the context of orders for preventive detention passed by officers especially empowered by the Central Government under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 [for D short 'COFEPOSA Act'] and the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [for short 'PIT NDPS Act']. There is divergence in the decisions of this Court on this question. In Amir \ Shad Khan v. L. Hming/iana and Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 39, (decided by a bench of three Judges), it has been held that where an officer of the State E Government or the Central Government has passed any detention order and on receipt of a representation he is convinced that the detention needs to be revoked he can do so. In State of Maharashtra v. Smt Sushi/a Mafatlal Shah & Ors., [1988] 4 SCC 490, (decided by a bench two Judges), a different view has been expressed. It has been held that if an order of detention is made by an officer specially empowered by the Central F Government or a State Government the representation of the detenu is \.- _ required to be considered only by the Central Government or the State Government and it is not required to be considered by the officer who had made the order. G The question posed has to be considered in the light of the provisions relating to preventive detention contained in Article 22 of the Constitution as well as the provisions contained in the relevant statutes. ' The Constitution, while permitting Parliament and the State Legisla- \- lures to enact a law providing for preventive detention, prescribes certain H safeguards in Article 22 for the protection of the persons so detained. One I ~-! KI. PATEL v. U.0.1. 285 such protection is contained in sub- clause (a) of Clause (4) of Article 22 A which required that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months unless an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a high Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for detention. The other safeguard is contained in clause ( 5) of Article 22 which provides as under: "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for Preventive Detention, the authority making B the order shall, as Soon as may be, communicate to such person C the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order". This provision has the same force and sanctity as any other provision D relating to fundamental rights. [See : State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951) SCR 167, at p.186). Article 22(5) imposes a dual obligation on the authority making the order of preventive detention: (i) to communicate to the person detained as soon as may be the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; and (ii) to afford the person detained E the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Article 22(5) thus proceeds on the basis that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention and the aforementioned two obligations are imposed on the authority making the order of detention with a view to ensure that right of the person detained to make a representation is a real right and he is able to take steps for F redress of a wrong which he thinks has been committed. Article 22( 5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the representation is to be made. Since the object and purpose of the representation that is to be made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain relief at the earliest opportunity, the said representation has to be made to the authority which can grant such relief, i.e., the authority which can revoke the order of G detention and set him at liberty. The authority that has made the order of detention can also revoke it. This right is inherent in the power to make the order. It is recognised by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 though it does not flow from it. It can, therefore, be said that Article 22( 5) postulates that the person detained has a right to make a representation H 286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A against the order of detention to the authority making the order. In addition, such a representation can be made to any other authority who is empowered by law to revoke the order of detention. B The learned Additional Solicitor General has urged that the representation envisaged by Article 22(5) has to .be made to the Advisory Board referred to in Article 22( 4) since the only right that has been conferred on the person detained is to have the matter of his detention considered by the Advisory Board. The learned Additional Solicitor General drew support from the words "making a representation against the order" in Article 22(5) for this submission and contended that the use of the word "a" in C singular indicates that only one representation is to be made and that representation has to be made to the Advisory Board because that is the only authority contemplated under the Constitution which is required to consider such representation. We are unable to give such a restricted meaning to the words "making a representation against the order" in Article D 22(5) which is in the nature of a fundamental right affording protection to the person detained. As stated earlier, the object underlying the right to make a representation that is envisaged by Article 22( 5) is to enable the person detained to obtain immediate relief. If the construction placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General is accepted relief may not be available to the detenu till the matter is considered by the Advisory Board E and that would depend upon the time taken by the appropriate Government in referring the matter to the Advisory Board. Moreover reference is required to be made to the Advisory Board only in cases where the period of detention is going to be longer than three months and it is not obligatory to make a reference to the Advisory Board if the period of detention is F less than three months. In such a case the right to make a representation under clause (5) of Article 22 would be rendered nugatory. A construction which leads to such a result must be eschewed. We ma}, in this context, briefly refer to some of the decisions of this Court relating to consideration of the representation of the person G detained under Article 22(5). InAbdul Karim and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1969]3 SCR 479, it was urged on behalf of the State Government that since the Advisory Board 1 - had been constituted to consider the case of the detenues and to report to H the State Government whether there was sufficient cause for the detention K.I.PATELv. U.0.1.[AGRAWAL,J.] 2S7 there was no obligation on the part ~f the State Government to consider A ·the representation. Rejecting the said contention, it was said : 'The right of representation under Article 22 is a valuable constitutional right and is not a mere formality. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of the respondent that tne State Government is not under a legal obligation to consider the repreB sentation of the detenu or that the representation must be kept in cold storage in the archives of the Secretariat till the time or occasion for sending it to the Advisory Board is reached. If the viewpoint contended for by the respondent is correct,the constitutional right under Article 22(5) would be rendered illusory. Take C for instance a case of detention of a person on account of mistaken identity. If the order of detention has been made against A and a different person B is arrested and detained by the police authorities because of similarity of names or some such cause, it cannot be reasonably said that the State Government should wait for the report of the Advisory Board before releasing the wrong D person from detention." [p.487] The decision in Abdul Karim (supra) was reaffirmed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [ 1970] 1 SCR 543, wherein it was observed : E "It is true that cl.(5) does not in positive language provide as to whom the representation is to be made and by whom, when made, it is to be considered. But the expression "as soon as may be" and "the earliest opportunity" in that clause clearly indicate that the grounds are to be served and the opportunity to make a repreF sentation are provided for to enable the detenu to show that this detention is unwarranted and since no other authority who should consider such representation is mentioned it can only be the detaining authority to whom it is to be made which has to consider it. Though cl. 5 does not in express terms say so it follows from its G provisions that it is the detaining authority which has to give to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to consider it when so made whether its order is wrongful or contrary to the law enable it to detain him." [p.548] [Emphasis supplied] H A B c D 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. Again in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970)3 SCR 225, decided by the Constitution Bench, this Court has held : "Broadly stated, four principles are to be followed in regard to representation of deteilus. First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. It is true that no hai:d and fast rule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State. Fourthly, the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before the sending the case along with the detenu' s representation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will release the detenu the Government will not send the matter to the Advisory Board. If however the Government will not release the detenu the GovernE men! will send the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board." (p.232] (Emprasis supplied). All these cases related to orders of detention made by the District Magistrate under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 which specifically F provided [in Section 7(1)] that the authority making the order of detention shall afford to the person detained the earliest opporti;nity of making a representation against the order "to the appropriate Government" and for that reason there are observations by the court that the representation should be considered by the "State Government" though the orders of detention were made by the District Magistrate under Section 3(2) of the G Preventive Detention Act. Although in these cases the focus was only on the question whether the representation should be considered by the State Government or the Advisory Board, and the court was not required to consider whether the detaining authority should also consider the representation, yet we find that in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty (supra) the court H has said that the "detaining authority" must consider the representation I ' _.../ K.l.PATELv. U.0.l.[AGRAWAL,J.) 289 when so made. Similarly, in Jayanarayan Sukut (supra) the court has used A the expression "appropriate authority'' in the first three principles as distinct from the expression "appropriate Government" used in the fourth principle. The expression "detaining authority" would mean the authority which has made the order of detention and the authority which has made an order for continuance of such detention. B In Amir Shad Khan (supra) it has been held: "The right to make a representati01~·against the detention order thus flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 22(5) which casts an obligation on the authority to ensure that the C detenu is afforded an earliest opportunity to exercise that right, if he so desires. The necessity of casting a dual obligation on the authority making the detention order is obviously to acquaint the detenu of what had weighed with the Detaining Authority for exercising the extraordinary powers of detention without trial con- D ferred by Section 3( 1) of the act and to give the detenu an opportunity to point out any error in the exercise of that power so that the said authority gets an opportunity to undo the harm done by it, if at all, by correcting the error at the earliest point of time. Once it is realised that Article 22( 5) confers a right of representation, the next question is to whom must the representation be E made. The grounds of detention clearly inform the detenu that he can make a representation to the State Government, the Central Government as well as the Advisory Board. There can be no doubt that the representation must be made to the authority which has the power to rescind or revoke the decision, if need be." [p.46] F Article 22(5) must, therefore, be construed to mean that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention which can be made not only to the Advisory Board but also to. the detaining authority, i.e., the authority that has made the order of detention or the order for continuance of such detention, who is competent to give imme- G diate relief by revoking the said order as well as to any other authority which is competent under law to revoke the order for detention and thereby give relief to the person detained. The right to make a representation carries within it a corresponding obligation on the authority making the order of detention to inform the person detained of his right H · 290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A to make a representation against the order of detention to the authorities who are required to consider such a representation. B c D E F G H Having thus defined the nature of the right to make a representation recognised by Article 22(5) we may now proceed to examine the relevant provisions in the COFEPOSA Act and PIT NDPS Act. Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act confers the power to make orders detaining certain persons and provides as under: , "Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (1) The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any :nanner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from-. (i) smuggling goods, or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detaintd. Provided that no order of detention shaH be made on any of the grounds specified in this sub-section on which an order of detention may be made under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit \ 1- I K.l.PATELv. U.0.1.[AGRAWAL,J.] 291 Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 A or under Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 (J.& K. Ordinance 1 of 1988). (2) When any order of detention is made a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State GovernB ment shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order. (3) For the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detenC tion order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention." Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, providing for revocation of detention orders, is in the following terms ; "Section 11. Revocation of detention orders.- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 D (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or E modified- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government. F (2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making G of another detention order under Section 2 against the siune person. 11 Section 3 of the PIT ND PS Act is on the same lines as Section 3 of COFEPOSA Act. There is slight difference in sub-section (l)but sub-sections (2) and (3) are identical. Section 12 of the PIT NDPS Act makes H 292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R. A provision for revocation of detention orders and is in the same terms as Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. ,_ The provisions in COFEPOSA Act and PIT NDPS Act