# KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2019] 17 S.C.R. 599
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-11-14
- **Bench:** Ranjan Gogoi, A. M. Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra, R. F. Nariman, Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kantaru-rajeevaru-v-indian-young-lawyers-association-thr-its-general-secretary-33666
- **Pages:** 62

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art. 137 and Arts. 12, 14, 15, 17,
25(1), 25(2)(b), 26, 32, 51A, 73(2), 75(4), 99, 164(3) & 188 r/w
Third Schedule, 129, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145(3), 154(2)(a),
162, 266, 258(2), 277, 301-304, 307, 329(b), 353(b), 356(1)(a),
357(1)(b), 372(1) - Sabarimala temple case - Review Petitions
filed u/Art.137 r/w Or. XLVII of 2013 Rules - Fresh writ petitions
also filed u/Art.32- Held: Per Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and
A.M. Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra, JJ.) - Debate about
constitutional validity of practices entailing into restriction of entry
of women generally in the place of worship is not limited to this
case, but also arises in respect of entry of Muslim women in
Durgah/Mosque; Parsi women married to a non-Parsi into the holy
fire place of an Agyari - Another seminal issue pending
consideration in Supreme Court relates to female genital mutilation
in Dawoodi Bohra community - Issues arising in such pending
cases may be overlapping and covered by the judgment under
review - Prospect of the issues arising therein being referred to
larger bench cannot be ruled out - Further, conflict between
decision of the Seven Judges bench in Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur
Mutt (Shirur Mutt) reported as [1954] SCR 1005 and the subsequent
view of Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed
Hussain Ali & Ors. reported as [1962] 1 SCR 383 requires
consideration by a larger bench - Larger bench may also consider
it appropriate to decide all issues, including the question as to
whether the 1965 Rules govern the temple in question at all -
 [2019] 17 S.C.R. 599
599
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
Review petitions and the writ petitions may remain pending until
determination of the questions, as indicated, by a Larger Bench
as may be constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India -
Per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
(Dissenting) Only thing that is before this Court is the narrow
question as to whether grounds for review and for filing of the
writ petitions have been made out qua the judgment under review
in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala
reported as [2018] 9 SCR 561 - What a future constitution bench/
larger bench, if constituted by the Chief Justice of India, may or
may not do when considering the other issues pending before this
Court is not before this Court at all - In the five-Judge Bench
Indian Young Lawyers Association's case, four majority judgments
had clear consensus on the issues- (i) that the devotees of Lord
Ayyappado not constitute a separate religious denomination and
thus, cannot claim the benefit of Art.26 or the proviso to s.3 of
the 1965 Act; (ii) aforesaid four judgments specifically grounded
the right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, excluded from
practicing their religion, u/Art.25(1) emphasizing the expression
"all persons" and the expression "equally" occurring in that
Article, so that this right is equally available to both men and
women of all ages professing the same religion and; (iii) that s.3
of the 1965 Act traces its origin to Art.25(2)(b) and would apply
notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, to enable Hindu women
the right of entry in all public temples open to Hindus, so that they
may exercise the right of worship therein and as a concomitant,
r.3(b) of the 1965 Rules is violative of Art.25(1) and ultra vires
s.3 of the 1965 Act - Further, observations of Chandrachud, J.
on Art.17 cannot be said to be a material error manifest on the
face of the record undermining the soundness of the three
conclusions reached by all the majority judgments - On whether
the exclusion of women from Hindu temples is an essential part of
the Hindu religion, three Judges clearly held that it is not - There
is no error apparent here again - Also, "constitutional morality"
has now reached the level of stare decisis, and has been expla

## Text

_Characters 0–39,964 of 146,064. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39964 for what follows._

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
599
KANTARU RAJEEVARU
v.
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION THR. ITS
GENERAL SECRETARY AND ORS.
(Review Petition (Civil) No. 3358/2018)
In
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373/2006)
NOVEMBER 14, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR,
INDU MALHOTRA, R. F. NARIMAN AND
DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Constitution of India - Art. 137 and Arts. 12, 14, 15, 17,
25(1), 25(2)(b), 26, 32, 51A, 73(2), 75(4), 99, 164(3) & 188 r/w
Third Schedule, 129, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145(3), 154(2)(a),
162, 266, 258(2), 277, 301-304, 307, 329(b), 353(b), 356(1)(a),
357(1)(b), 372(1) - Sabarimala temple case - Review Petitions
filed u/Art.137 r/w Or. XLVII of 2013 Rules - Fresh writ petitions
also filed u/Art.32- Held: Per Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and
A.M. Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra, JJ.) - Debate about
constitutional validity of practices entailing into restriction of entry
of women generally in the place of worship is not limited to this
case, but also arises in respect of entry of Muslim women in
Durgah/Mosque; Parsi women married to a non-Parsi into the holy
fire place of an Agyari - Another seminal issue pending
consideration in Supreme Court relates to female genital mutilation
in Dawoodi Bohra community - Issues arising in such pending
cases may be overlapping and covered by the judgment under
review - Prospect of the issues arising therein being referred to
larger bench cannot be ruled out - Further, conflict between
decision of the Seven Judges bench in Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur
Mutt (Shirur Mutt) reported as [1954] SCR 1005 and the subsequent
view of Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed
Hussain Ali & Ors. reported as [1962] 1 SCR 383 requires
consideration by a larger bench - Larger bench may also consider
it appropriate to decide all issues, including the question as to
whether the 1965 Rules govern the temple in question at all -
 [2019] 17 S.C.R. 599
599
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
Review petitions and the writ petitions may remain pending until
determination of the questions, as indicated, by a Larger Bench
as may be constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India -
Per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
(Dissenting) Only thing that is before this Court is the narrow
question as to whether grounds for review and for filing of the
writ petitions have been made out qua the judgment under review
in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala
reported as [2018] 9 SCR 561 - What a future constitution bench/
larger bench, if constituted by the Chief Justice of India, may or
may not do when considering the other issues pending before this
Court is not before this Court at all - In the five-Judge Bench
Indian Young Lawyers Association's case, four majority judgments
had clear consensus on the issues- (i) that the devotees of Lord
Ayyappado not constitute a separate religious denomination and
thus, cannot claim the benefit of Art.26 or the proviso to s.3 of
the 1965 Act; (ii) aforesaid four judgments specifically grounded
the right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, excluded from
practicing their religion, u/Art.25(1) emphasizing the expression
"all persons" and the expression "equally" occurring in that
Article, so that this right is equally available to both men and
women of all ages professing the same religion and; (iii) that s.3
of the 1965 Act traces its origin to Art.25(2)(b) and would apply
notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, to enable Hindu women
the right of entry in all public temples open to Hindus, so that they
may exercise the right of worship therein and as a concomitant,
r.3(b) of the 1965 Rules is violative of Art.25(1) and ultra vires
s.3 of the 1965 Act - Further, observations of Chandrachud, J.
on Art.17 cannot be said to be a material error manifest on the
face of the record undermining the soundness of the three
conclusions reached by all the majority judgments - On whether
the exclusion of women from Hindu temples is an essential part of
the Hindu religion, three Judges clearly held that it is not - There
is no error apparent here again - Also, "constitutional morality"
has now reached the level of stare decisis, and has been explained
in several Constitution Bench judgments, reliance thereon cannot
be said to suffer from any error apparent- Extreme arguments that
belief and faith are not judicially reviewable by courts, and that
this Court cannot interfere by stating that a particular section of
persons shall not hold a particular belief and act in accordance
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
601
thereto, not only do not constitute "errors apparent", but are
arguments that fly in the face of Art.25 - Given the consensus on
the three issues by the four majority judgments, no ground for
review of the majority judgments made out - Review petitions
dismissed - Writ petitions also dismissed as not being maintainable
- State of Kerala to give wide publicity to this judgment through
the medium of television, newspapers, etc. - Organised acts of
resistance to thwart the implementation of the judgment be put
down firmly - State government to ensure that the rule of law is
preserved - Supreme Court Rules, 2013 - Or.XLVII - Kerala Hindu
Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 - s.3
- Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Rules,1965-r.3(b)-Doctrine of stare decisis - Public Interest
Litigation - Principle of Res Judicata.
Directing that the subject Review Petitions as well as the
Writ Petitions may remain pending until determination of the
questions, as indicated, by a Larger Bench as may be constituted
by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, the Court
HELD: Per Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and
for A. M. Khanwilkar and Indu Malhotra, JJ.)
1.1 Concededly, the debate about the constitutional validity
of practices entailing into restriction of entry of women generally
in the place of worship is not limited to this case, but also arises
in respect of entry of Muslim women in a Durgah/Mosque as
also in relation to Parsi women married to a non-Parsi into the
holy fire place of an Agyari. There is yet another seminal issue
pending for consideration in this Court regarding the powers of
the constitutional courts to tread on question as to whether a
particular practice is essential to religion or is an integral of the
religion, in respect of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra
community. It is time that this Court should evolve a judicial
policy befitting to its plenary powers to do substantial and
complete justice and for an authoritative enunciation of the
constitutional principles by a larger bench of not less than seven
judges. The decision of a larger bench would put at rest recurring
issues touching upon the rights flowing from Articles 25 and 26
of the Constitution of India. It is essential to adhere to judicial
discipline and propriety when more than one petition is pending
on the same, similar or overlapping issues in the same court for
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
which all cases must proceed together. Indubitably, decision by
a larger bench will also pave way to instil public confidence and
effectuate the principle underlying Article 145(3) of the
Constitution- which predicates that cases involving a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution should
be heard by a bench of minimum five judges of this Court. [Paras
3, 4] [617-E-H; 618-A-B]
1.2 The issues arising in the pending cases regarding entry
of Muslim Women in Durgah/Mosque (being Writ Petition (Civil)
No.472 of 2019); of Parsi Women married to a non-Parsi in the
Agyari (being Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18889/2012);
and including the practice of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi
Bohra community (being Writ Petition (Civil) No.286 of 2017)
may be overlapping and covered by the judgment under review.
The prospect of the issues arising in those cases being referred
to larger bench cannot be ruled out. The said issues could be:
(i) Regarding the interplay between the freedom of religion
under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and other provisions
in Part III, particularly Article 14; (ii) What is the sweep of
expression 'public order, morality and health' occurring in Article
25(1) of the Constitution; (iii) The expression 'morality' or
'constitutional morality' has not been defined in the Constitution.
Is it over arching morality in reference to preamble or limited
to religious beliefs or faith. There is need to delineate the
contours of that expression, lest it becomes subjective; (iv) The
extent to which the court can enquire into the issue of a
particular practice is an integral part of the religion or religious
practice of a particular religious denomination or should that be
left exclusively to be determined by the head of the section of
the religious group; (v) What is the meaning of the expression
'sections of Hindus' appearing in Article 25(2)(b) of the
Constitution; (vi) Whether the "essential religious practices" of
a religious denomination, or even a section thereof are afforded
constitutional protection under Article 26 and; (vii) What would
be the permissible extent of judicial recognition to PILs in
matters calling into question religious practices of a
denomination or a section thereof at the instance of persons who
do not belong to such religious denomination?
In a legal framework where the courts do not have any
epistolary jurisdiction and issues pertaining to religion including
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
603
religious practices are decided in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code or Article 226/32 of the
Constitution the courts should tread cautiously. This is time
honoured principle and practice. In this context, the decision of
the Seven Judges bench of this Court in Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) holding that what are
essential religious practices of a particular religious
denomination should be left to be determined by the
denomination itself and the subsequent view of a Five Judges
bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer vs. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.
carving out a role for the court in this regard to exclude what
the courts determine to be secular practices or superstitious
beliefs seem to be in apparent conflict requiring consideration
by a larger Bench. While deciding the questions delineated
above, the larger bench may also consider it appropriate to
decide all issues, including the question as to whether the Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules,
1965 govern the temple in question at all. Whether the aforesaid
consideration will require grant of a fresh opportunity to all
interested parties may also have to be considered. [Paras 5-8]
[618-D-H; 619-A-G]
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt
(Shirur Mutt) [1954] SCR 1005 ; Durgah Committee,
Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 383
- referred to.
Per R. F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y.
Chandrachud, J.) (Dissenting)
1.1 What this Court has before it is review petitions arising
out of this Court's judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association
and Ors. v. State of Kerala W.P. (C) No.373 of 2006, which was
delivered on 28 September, 2018, with regard to the Sabarimala
temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. What a future constitution
bench or larger bench, if constituted by the learned Chief Justice
of India, may or may not do when considering the other issues
pending before this Court is, strictly speaking, not before this
Court at all. The only thing that is before this Court is the review
petitions and the writ petitions that have now been filed in
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
relation to the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association
and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September, 2018. As and
when the other matters are heard, the bench hearing those
matters may well refer to the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers
Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September,
2018, and may either apply such judgment, distinguish such
judgment, or refer an issue/issues which arise from the said
judgment for determination by a larger bench. All this is for
future Constitution benches or larger benches to do.
Consequently, if and when the issues that have been set out in
the learned Chief Justice's judgment arise in future, they can
appropriately be dealt with by the bench/benches which hear the
petitions concerning Muslims, Parsis and Dawoodi Bohras. What
is before this Court is only the narrow question as to whether
grounds for review and grounds for filing of the writ petitions
have been made out qua the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers
Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala. [Para 2] [620-E-H; 621A-B]
Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of
Kerala [2018] 9 SCR 561 - referred to.
1.2 On a reading of the four majority judgments it emerges
that there is a clear consensus on the following issues:
(i) The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a
separate religious denomination and cannot, therefore, claim the
benefit of Article 26 or the proviso to Section 3 of the Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act,
1965 ["1965Act"].
(ii) The four majority judgments specifically grounded the
right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, who are excluded
from practicing their religion, under Article 25(1) of the
Constitution, emphasizing the expression "all persons" and the
expression "equally" occurring in that Article, so that this right
is equally available to both men and women of all ages professing
the same religion.
(iii) Section 3 of the 1965 Act traces its origin to Article
25(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, and would apply
notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, to enable Hindu
women the right of entry in all public temples opento Hindus,
so that they may exercise the right of worship therein. As a
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
605
concomitant thereof, Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 ["1965
Rules"] is violative of Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India
and ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act. [Para 9] [629-B-H]
2. The majority judgments of Dipak Misra, CJI,
Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman, J. did not find it necessary to opine
on Article 15(2) and Article 17 of the Constitution in view of their
findings on various other points. Nariman, J. alone referred to
Article 15(1) of the Constitution when it came to striking down
Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. The observations of Chandrachud,
J. on Article 17 of the Constitution cannot be said to be a
material error manifest on the face of the record which
undermines the soundness of the three conclusions reached by
all the majority judgments supra. Further, since the view of
Chandrachud, J. on Article 17 of the Constitution is a possible
view, it cannot be a subject matter of review. The interpretation
of Article 15 and Article 17 of the Constitution were not treated
as central issues in the present case by at least three learned
Judges, namely, Dipak Misra, C.J., Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman,
J. In this view of the matter, these arguments have necessarily
to be rejected. [Para 14] [632-E-F]
3. It is reiterated that the majority Judges have correctly
held that the views of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.P. Mittal v. Union
of India (1983) 1 SCC 51 are dissentient, as was recognized by
Chinnappa Reddy, J. himself. This point also has to be rejected
as there is no error, let alone material error, manifest on the
face of the record of the majority view. [Paras 16-17] [633-C-D;
634-B]
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983]
1 SCR 729 - referred to.
4. Three of the majority Judges held that religious practice
of excluding women between the ages of 10 to 50 from the
shrine at Sabarimala could not be held to be an essential
religious practice. Here again, it cannot be said that there is any
error apparent. What has to be seen in the judgments of this
Court is whether such practice is an essential practice relatable
to the Hindu religion, and not the practice of one particular
temple. Nothing was shown, as was correctly pointed out by the
learned Chief Justice, from any textual or other authorities, to
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
show that exclusion of women from ages 10 to 50 from Hindu
temples is an essential part of the Hindu religion. This again is
a ground that must be rejected, both because there is no error
apparent, and because the same ground that was argued in
extenso before the original judgment was delivered, is being
reargued in review. [Para 18] [634-C-E]
5. Apart from the fact that "constitutional morality" has
now reached the level of stare decisis, and has been explained
in several Constitution Bench judgments, reliance thereon
cannot be said to suffer from any error apparent. Constitutional
law and constitutional interpretation stand on a different footing
from interpretation of statutes. Constitutional law keeps
evolving keeping in view, among other things, the felt
necessities of the time. As has been explained in some of the
judgments, "constitutional morality" is nothing but the values
inculcated by the Constitution, which are contained in the
Preamble read with various other parts, in particular, Parts III
and IV thereof. This again is a mere rehash of what was argued
earlier, and can by no means be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record. [Para 19] [634-G-H; 635-A]
6. Extreme arguments were made stating that belief and
faith are not judicially reviewable by courts, and that this Court
cannot interfere by stating that a particular section of persons
shall not hold a particular belief and act in accordance thereto.
Not only such arguments do not constitute "errors apparent",
but are arguments that fly in the face of Article 25. Article 25,
as has been held by the majority judgments, is not an Article
that gives a carte blanche to one particular section of persons
to trample upon the right of belief and worship of another section
of persons belonging to the same religion. The delicate balance
between the exercise of religious rights by different groups
within the same religious faith that is found in Article 25 has to
be determined on a case by case basis. The slippery-slope
argument, that this judgment will be used to undermine the
religious rights of others, including religious minorities, is
wholly without basis. The ratio of the majority judgments in this
case is only that the exclusionary practice of keeping women
from the ages of 10 to 50 from exercising their right of worship
in a particular Hindu temple falls foul of Article 25 of the
Constitution of Indiain as much as (i) allpersons are equally
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
607
entitled, when they belong to the same religious group, to
exercise their fundamental right of practicing religion; and (ii)
that this is a case covered by Article 25(2)(b), which deals with
throwing open all Hindu religious institutions of a public character
to all classes and sections of Hindus. The majority judgments
have held that Section 3 of the 1965 Act is a legislation in
pursuance of this part of Article 25(2)(b), which expressly comes
in the way of any custom which interferes with the rights of
women from the ages of 10 to 50 from worshipping in a Hindu
religious institution of a public character. Article 25(1) also
contains two other exceptions, namely, that this right is (a)
subject to public order, morality, and health; and (b) is also
subject to the other provisions of Part III, as explained in the
majority judgments. This argument must also, therefore, be
rejected. [Para 20] [635-B-G]
7. References made to the Hindi text of Article 26, and
arguments based on the Hindi expression "sampradaya" as
opposed to the English expression "denomination" is a new
argument, made for the first time in review. This argument cannot
be countenanced for the reason that the Court is bound by a
large number of Constitution Bench decisions on what
constitutes a religious denomination. Having followed the
aforesaid judgments, which are binding, the Court cannot be said
to have committed any error. [Para 21] [635-H; 636-A-B]
8. Emotive arguments as to women between the ages of
10 to 50 are not kept out on account of menstruation as a
polluting agent, but on account of the deity being a Naisthik
Brahmachari, who would be disturbed by the presence of women
between the ages of 10 to 50, as the deity has undertaken a vow
of celibacy, are all arguments that were made at the initial stage,
and were fully dealt with by all the judgments. Re-arguing this
aspect of the matter obviously does not fall within the parameters
of a review petition. One more extreme argument that since
worshippers from all faiths come to Sabarimala, Sabarimala
cannot be held to be a Hindu temple. This argument, again, has
no legs to stand on. A Christian church cannot be said to be any
the less a church on account of allowing persons of all faiths to
enter and worship therein. There is no doubt that the temple at
Sabarimala, being dedicated to a Hindu idol - Lord Ayyappa- is
a Hindu public religious institution, like the other temples
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
dedicated to Lord Ayyappa,which are undoubtedly Hindu public
religious institutions. This argument is also rejected. An
argument was made that there are gender restrictions in other
places of worship, which, being essential religious practices,
have not been interfered with. This is a general argument which
needs to be rejected on the ground of vagueness, apart from
the fact that this is not an argument which could be made in
review. As and when such gender restrictions in other places of
worship are tested, they will be decided on their own merits
keeping in view the provisions of the Constitution. [Paras 2224] [636-B-G]
9. When it comes to important issues as to the
interpretation of the Constitution, which is entrusted by the
Constitution under Article 145(3) to a Bench consisting of a
minimum of five Supreme Court Judges, it is obvious that an
erroneous interpretation of the Constitution by a High Court
(which affects the general public much more than an erroneous
interpretation of a statutory prohibition enacted in public
interest) cannot possibly be res judicata as against a judgment
of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, as a rule of
procedure cannot be exalted over Article 145(3) of the
Constitution of India. By the judgment dated 28.09.2018 of a
Constitution Bench of this Court, this Court has interpreted
Article 25(1) to mean that all persons are equally entitled to
practice the Hindu religion, which would include women between
the ages of 10 and 50. A previous decision by a High Court,
erroneously interpreting Article 25 in an earlier PIL, can
obviously not stand in the way, by resort to a rule of procedure,
of a judgment of five Judges of the Supreme Court declaring the
law of the land on this aspect. This objection also does not
disclose any error apparent on the face of the record. [Para 27]
[638-G-H; 639-A-B]
S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom
Board, Thiruvananthapuram AIR 1993 Ker 4 -
referred to.
10. The majority judgment cannot be used to undermine
the religious rights of others, including, in particular, religious
minorities. Besides, busybodies, religious fanatics, cranks and
persons with vested interests will be turned down by the Court
at the threshold itself, by applying the parameters laid down in
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
609
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. (2010) 3
SCC 402 (at paragraph 181). The fear expressed by the learned
dissenting judge (Indu Malhotra, J.) is therefore quite
unfounded. As has been pointed by Nariman, J. in the majority
judgment (at paragraph 175), the present case raises grave
issues which relate to gender bias on account of a physiological
or biological function which is common to all women. It is for
this reason that a bonafide public-interest litigation was
entertained by the majority judgment, having regard to women's
rights, in the context of women worshippers as a class, being
excluded on account of such physiological/biological functions for
the entirety of the period during which a woman enters puberty
until menopause sets in. Given the consensus on the three
issues delineated above by the four majority judgments, it is
found that no ground for review of the majority judgments has
been made out. The review petitions are hence dismissed.
Equally, all writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution filed directly attacking the majority judgments
dated 28.09.2018, are dismissed as not being maintainable in
view of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (1966)
3 SCR 744 as followed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
(2002) 4 SCC 388 [see paragraphs 7 to 14]. [Paras 28, 29] [639D-H; 640-A]
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra
[1966] 3 SCR 744 ; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
(2002) 4 SCC 388 : [2002] 2 SCR 1006- followed.
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors.
(2010) 3 SCC 402 : [2009] 15 SCR 1276 - relied on.
11. The expression "authorities" in Article 144 is to be
given the widest possible meaning. The position under the
constitutional scheme is that the Supreme Court of India is the
ultimate repository of interpretation of the Constitution. Once
a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges interprets the
Constitution and lays down the law, the said interpretation is
binding not only as a precedent on all courts and tribunals, but
also on the coordinate branches of Government, namely, the
legislature and the executive. What follows from this is that once
a judgment is pronounced by the Constitution Bench and a
decree on facts follows, the said decree must be obeyed by all
persons bound by it. In addition, Article 144 of the Constitution
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
mandates that all persons who exercise powers over the citizenry
of India are obliged to aid in enforcing orders and decrees of
the Supreme Court. This then is the constitutional scheme by
which we are governed - the rule of law, as laid down by the
Indian Constitution. So far as the Prime Minister and members
of his Cabinet are concerned, not only does the form of oath
contained in the Third Schedule require that all such persons
will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as
by law established, but also that they will do right to all manner
of people, in accordance with the Constitution and the law,
without fear or favour, affection or ill will. The same goes for
the oath taken by the Chief Ministers and Ministers within the
States. Read with Article 144, this would mean that it is the
bounden duty of every Minister, whether Central or State, to
follow Article 144 in letter as well as spirit, and to do what is
right to all manner of people, in accordance with the Constitution
and the law, which means in accordance with the interpretation
of the Constitution declared by the law laid down by the Supreme
Court. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the executive branch of
Government and all MPs and MLAs to faithfully aid in carrying
out decrees and orders passed by the Supreme Court of India
when such decrees and orders command a particular form of
obedience, even where they are not parties to the litigation
before the Supreme Court. Any deviation from this high
constitutional principle is in derogation of the oath taken by
every Minister and Legislator during his term of office. Once
this is clearly understood and followed, the rule of law is
established, and the shameful spectacle of political parties
running after votes, or instigating or tolerating mob violence,
in defiance of decrees or orders passed by the Supreme Court
of India does not reign instead. [Paras 36, 40 and 45] [642-G;
644-C-E; 647-G-H; 648-A-C]
12. The history of democratic nations shows that what our
founding fathers handed to us in the form of the Constitution of
India was the result of centuries of struggle in both England and
the United States of America. The bloody revolutions that took
place in France and Russia against absolute monarchs are a sober
reminder to the people of the world that social transformation,
which took place cataclysmically in rivers of human blood, is to
be eschewed. [Para 46] [648-D-E]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
611
Robert K. Massie, Peter The Great: His Life And World
234-235 (Ballantine Books 1980 ; "Rule of Law" by
Brian Z. Tamanaha ; Second Treatiseof Government
(Chapter XVII, page 400) by John Locke ; "Common
Sense" (Page 34) by Thomas Paine ; "An Introduction
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" (1885) by
Prof. A.V. Dicey ; "Famous Judges, Lawyers and Cases
of Bombay" by P.B. Vachha - referred to.
13.1 Given the chequered history of the open flouting of
judgments of superior courts in the 19thcentury, the 20th century
has witnessed a complete about-turn, as can be seen by the U.S.
Supreme Court judgment in Cooper v. Aaron. Today, it is no
longer open to any person or authority to openly flout a Supreme
Court judgment or order, given the constitutional scheme. It is
necessary to restate these constitutional fundamentals in the
light of the sad spectacle of unarmed women between the ages
of 10 and 50 being thwarted in the exercise of their fundamental
right of worship at the Sabarimala temple. Whoever does not act
in aid of our judgment, does so at his peril - so far as Ministers,
both Central and State, and MPs and MLAs are concerned, they
would violate their constitutional oath to uphold, preserve, and
defend the Constitution of India. So far as the citizens of India
are concerned, the Court would do well to remind them of the
fundamental duties of citizens laid down in Article 51A of the
Constitution. [Para 63] [658-D-F]
Cherokee Nations v. State of Georgia 30 U.S. 1, 43
(1831) ; Worcester v. State of Georgia 31 U.S. 515
(1832) ; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347
U.S. 483 (1954) ; Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537
(1896) ; Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S.1 (1958) ; Ambard
v. Attorney-General for Trinidad And Tobago [1936]
A.C. 322 - referred to.
13.2 The freedom to criticise the judgments of this Court
is not being interfered with. Bona fide criticism of a judgment,
albeit of the highest court of the land, is certainly permissible,
but thwarting, or encouraging persons to thwart, the directions
or orders of the highest court cannot be countenanced in our
Constitutional scheme of things. [Para 64] [659-G-H]
14. The Constitution places a non-negotiable obligation on
all authorities to enforce the judgments of this Court. The duty
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
to do so arises because it is necessary to preserve the rule of
law. If those whose duty it is to comply were to have a discretion
on whether or not to abide by a decision of the court, the rule
of law would be set at naught. Judicial remedies are provided
to stakeholders before a judgment is pronounced and even
thereafter. That, indeed, is how the proceedings in review in the
present case have been initiated. Hence arguments were
addressed, exchanged between counsel and considered with the
sense of objectivity and fairness on which the judicial process
rests. These remedies within a rule of law framework provide
recourse to all those who may be and are affected by the course
of a judicial decision. When the process is complete and a
decision is pronounced, it is the decision of the Supreme Court
and binds everyone. Compliance is not a matter of option. If it
were to be so, the authority of the court could be diluted at the
option of those who are bound to comply with its verdicts. The
State of Kerala to give wide publicity to this judgment through
the medium of television, newspapers, etc. The government
should take steps to secure the confidence of the community in
order to ensure the fulfillment of constitutional values. The State
government may have broad-based consultations with
representatives of all affected interests so that the modalities
devised for implementing the judgment of the Court meet the
genuine concerns of all segments of the community. Organised
acts of resistance to thwart the implementation of this judgment
must be put down firmly. Yet in devising modalities for
compliance, a solution which provides lasting peace, while at the
same time reaffirming human dignity as a fundamental
constitutional value, should be adopted. Consistent with the
duties inhering in it, the State government is expected to ensure
that the rule of law is preserved. [Paras 65 and 66] [660-B-G]
Rajnarain
Singh
v.
The
Chairman,
Patna
Administration Committee, Patna and Ors. [1955] 1
SCR 290 ; Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan
Lal [1967] 3 SCR 377 ; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v.
Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795
- followed.
Sow Chandra Kante and Ors. v. Sheikh Habib (1975)
1 SCC 674 ; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
613
SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25 ; V. Purushotham Rao
v. Union of India & Ors. (2001) 10 SCC 305 : [2001]
4 Suppl. SCR 411 ; Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal
& Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [1970] 3 SCR
830 ; Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr.
AIR 2018 SC 3395 : [2018] 3 SCR 884 ; M.C. Mehta
v. Union of India (2001) 3 SCC 763 ; State of Tamil
Nadu v. State of Karnataka (2016) 10 SCC 617 -
relied on.
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt
(Shirur Mutt) [1954] SCR 1005 ; Durgah Committee,
Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 383 ;
Re Delhi Laws Act [1951] SCR 747 ; Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 520 ; State of Madras v.
Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. [1959] SCR
379 ; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State
of U.P. (1989) Suppl. SCC 504 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR
690 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
In the Judgment of Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and
for A. M. Khanwilkar and Indu Malhotra, JJ.) :
[1954] SCR 1005
referred to
Para 7
[1962] 1 SCR 383
referred to
Para 7
In the Judgment of R. F. Nariman, J. (for himself and
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.) (Dissenting):
[2018] 9 SCR 561
referred to
Para 2
(1975) 1 SCC 674
relied on
Para 3
[2013] 11 SCR 25
relied on
Para 4
[1955] 1 SCR 290
followed
Para 10
[1951] SCR 747
referred to
Para 10
[1955] 1 SCR 520
referred to
Para 12
[1959] SCR 379
referred to
Para 13
[1983] 1 SCR 729
referred to
Para 16
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
AIR 1993 Ker 4
referred to
Para 25
[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 411
relied on
Para 26
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 690
referred to
Para 26
[1970] 3 SCR 830
relied on
Para 26
[2018] 3 SCR 884
relied on
Para 26
[2009] 15 SCR 1276
relied on
Para 28
[1966] 3 SCR 744
followed
Para 29
[2002] 2 SCR 1006
followed
Para 29
[1967] 3 SCR 377
followed
Para 35
[1998] 2 SCR 795
followed
Para 37
(2001) 3 SCC 763
relied on
Para 38
(2016) 10 SCC 617
relied on
Para 39
CIVIL INHERENT/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Review
Petition (Civil) No. 3358 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006.
Petition filed to Review the Judgment and Order dated 28.09.2018
passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 376 of 2016.
With
R.P.(C) No. 3359/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary
Nos. 37946/2018, R.P.(C) No. 3469/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary
No(s).38135/2018, 38136/2018, R.P.(C) No.3449/2018 in W.P.(C) No.
373/2006, W.P.(C) No.1285/2018, R.P.(C) No.3470/2018 in W.P.(C) No.
373/2006, R.P.(C) No.3380/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, R.P.(C)
No.3379/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, R.P.(C) No.3444/2018 in
W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, R.P.(C) No.3462/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006,
Diary No(s).38764/2018, 38769/2018, 38907/2018, R.P.(C) No.3377/
2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary No(s).39023/2018, 39135/2018,
39248/2018, 39258/2018, 39317/2018, W.P.(C) No.1323/2018, 1305/2018,
Diary No(s).39642/2018, R.P.(C) No.3381/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/
2006, Diary No(s).40056/2018, 40191/2018, 40405/2018, 40570/2018,
40681/2018, 40713/2018, 40840/2018, 40885/2018, 40887/2018, 40888/
2018, 40898/2018, R.P.(C) No.3457/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006,
Diary No(s).40910/2018, 40924/2018, 40929/2018, 41005/2018, 41091/
2018, W.P.(C) No.1339/2018, Diary No(s).41264/2018, R.P.(C)
No.3473/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary No(s).41395/2018,
41586/2018, R.P.(C) No.3480/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
615
No(s).41896/2018, 42085/2018, 42264/2018, 42337/2018, MA 3113/2018
in W.P.(C) No. 373/2006, Diary No(s).44021/2018, 44991/2018, 46720/
2018, 47720/2018, 2252/2019, R.P.(C) No.345/2019 in W.P.(C) No. 373/
2006 and Diary No(s).2998/2019.
V. Giri, K. Parasaran, Dr. K.P. Kylasanatha Pillay, Acharya B.L.,
N. Venkatraman, Ravindra Srivastava, P.N. Ravindran, Dr. Abhishek
Manu Singhvi, R. Venkataramani, Shekhar Naphade, Mohan Parasaran,
K. Ramamoorthy, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, C.U. Singh, Vijay
Hansaria, P.N. Raveendran, Ravindra Raizada, B.V. Acharya, Jaideep
Gupta, P.V. Surendranath, Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Advs., Krishna Kumar
Singh, Manav Vohra, Amith Krishnan, Ms. Svadha Shankar,
Md. Sadique T.A., Krishna Dev, Muthucharan, Ms. Akanksha,
Karunesh Kumar Shukla, K.V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan, Ms. Aditi
Dhani, Ashwin Kumar D.S., Mathews J. Nedumpara, A.C. Philip, R.R.
Nair, C.J. Joveson, Rajvardhan Singh, Rabin Majumder, K. V. Muthu
Kumar, Mrs. G.P. Devi, Ms. Savita Singh, Akshay R., J. Sai Deepak,
Suvidutt M.S., Avinash Sharma, Ashutosh, Ms. Smita Pandey, Bosco
Thomas, Debasis Misra, Vishaal S. Jogdand, Binay Kumar Jha, R.S.
Jha, Rajnish Kumar, Beno Bencigar, Parijat Kishore, V.K. Biju, Abhay
Pratap Singh, Hiren Dasen, P.V. Yogeswaran, Krishnadev J.,
Muthucharan Sundresh, Ms. Malini Poduval, Ms. Babita Sant, Manoj
Pillai, A. Venayagam Balan, Bhavanishankar V. Gadnis, Vishwanath B.
Gadnis, Ms. Radni Vishwanath Gadnis, V.S. Lakshmi, Bhavani Shankar
Gadnis, Ms. Radni V. Gadnis, P.R. Kovilan, Ms. Lakshmi K.G., K.G.
Kaverivarman, Mrs. Geetha Kovilan, Gopal Sankara Narayanan,
Ms. Usha Nandini V., Biju P Raman, Sivan Madathil, Ms. Prachi Bajpai,
Sanand Ramakrishnan, Rajeev Mishra, R. Satish Kumar, Prateek Gupta,
Madan M. Bora, Tom Joseph, Jayanth Muthuraj, Biju P. Raman, Deepak
Prabhakaran, Santosh Kumar Pandey, Aditya Sharma, V. Ranjith
Sankar, V. Shyamohan, Surya Prakash, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Amit
Bhandari, Piyush Dwivedi, Ms. Akanksha Mehra, Mrityunjai Singh, G.
Sivabalamurugan, Karuppaih, Vivek Bharati, C.N. Sree Kumar, Amit
Sharma, Ms. Malavika B. Pillai, Renjith B. Barar, Ms. Lakshmi N.
Kaimal, Badusha Sulaiman, Nishi Kurup, Jose Abraham, M.P.
Srivignesh, B. Mathews, Ms. Sarah Shaji, Shaji Sebastian, M. T. George,
K.K. Karunapanakutty, Subash Chandran, Ms. Kavitha K.T.,
C. Rajendran, A. Raghunath (for M/s Mukesh Kumar Singh and Co.),
Ramesh Babu M. R., Ms. Swati Setia, Chandy Oommon, Abhilash
M.R., Sayooj Mohandas M., Sudheesh K.K., Ranjan Kumar, Ms. Anzu.
KANTARU RAJEEVARU v. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.
THR. ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
K. Varkey, N.P.