# KANWAR LAL GuPTA v. AMAR NATH CHAWLA & ORS.· - **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 259 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1974-10-03 - **Bench:** P. N. Bhaowati, R. S. SARKAlUA J - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kanwar-lal-gupta-v-amar-nath-chawla-ors-6294 - **Pages:** 58 ## Headnote 259 , . · Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) ss. 77(1) and 123(6)-&· penses incurred by party sponsoring candidate in excess of the prescribed limit-If aild when a corrupt practice-Reform of election law suggested. ,. Section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, ·1951, provides that every candidate at an election shall, either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct account of all expenditure,· in connection with the election, Incurred or· authorised by him or by his election agent between the date of the pubJi. cation of the notification calling the election and the date of declaration of result thereof, botli dates inclusive; and s. 77(3) says that the total of the said expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be preScribed. Tho objects of enacting a ceiling on the expenditure which may legitimately .be incurred in connection with an election are : .. (a) It should be open to any individual or to any political parcy, however small, to be able to contest an election on a footing of equality with any other indi• vidual or political party, however rich and well financed it may be, and no indivi· dual or political party should be able to secure an advantage over others by reason of its superior financial strength. The democratic process can function efficiently and effectively, for the benefit of the common good and reach ·out the benefits of &elf-government to the commo.n man only if it brings about a participatory democracr in which every man, howsoever lQwly or. humble he may be, should be able to participate on a footing. of eq_uality witll others. Now money plays an important part in the successful prose<;11tion of an election campaign by buying advertisement and canvassing facilitieS, by providing the means for quick and speedy communi· cations and movements and sophisticated campaign techniques, and also by the emploxroent of paid workers where volunteers 1¥re found to be insufficient. Therefore, if one political party or indiVidual has larger resources available to it than another the former would certainly, under the present system Of conducting elect· ions, have an .advantage over the latter in t~e electoral process. [265C-F] · · · (b) The other objective at limiting expenditure is to eliminate, as far as possible, the influence of big money in electoral process. If there were no limit on expenditure political parties would go all out for eollecting contributions and obvi· ously the largest contributions would be from the rich and the affluent who consti· tute but a fraction of the electorate. It is likely that some elected representatives would tend to share. the views of the wealthy supporters of their political parcy, either because of shared backj!fOund and association, increased access or subtle influences which condition their thinking. In such an event, the result would be 'that though ostensibly the political parties which receive such contributions may · profess an ideology acceptable to the common man, they would in effect and substance be the representatives, of a certain economic class, and their policies and decisions would be shaped by the interests of that economic class. Persons of a particular class wl'.lo have eitclusive governmental power, even if they tried to act objectively, would tend to overlook the interests of other classes or view those interests dif. ferently. To this natural tendency may be added the fact that office bearers and elected representatives may quite possibly be inclined, though unconsciously and imperceptibly, to espouse the policies and decisions that will attract campaign contributions from affluent individuals and groups. Pre-election donations would be likely to operate as post-election promises resulting ultimately in the casualty of the interest of the common man. The small man's chance is the essence of Indian - democracy and th .. at would be stultified if large contributions from rich and affluent . Individuals or g ## Text _Characters 0–39,804 of 200,408. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39804 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H KANWAR LAL GuPTA v. AMAR NATH CHAWLA & ORS.· October 3, 1974 [P. N. BHAOWATI AND R. S. SARKAlUA J.J.] 259 , . · Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) ss. 77(1) and 123(6)-&· penses incurred by party sponsoring candidate in excess of the prescribed limit-If aild when a corrupt practice-Reform of election law suggested. ,. Section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, ·1951, provides that every candidate at an election shall, either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct account of all expenditure,· in connection with the election, Incurred or· authorised by him or by his election agent between the date of the pubJi. cation of the notification calling the election and the date of declaration of result thereof, botli dates inclusive; and s. 77(3) says that the total of the said expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be preScribed. Tho objects of enacting a ceiling on the expenditure which may legitimately .be incurred in connection with an election are : .. (a) It should be open to any individual or to any political parcy, however small, to be able to contest an election on a footing of equality with any other indi• vidual or political party, however rich and well financed it may be, and no indivi· dual or political party should be able to secure an advantage over others by reason of its superior financial strength. The democratic process can function efficiently and effectively, for the benefit of the common good and reach ·out the benefits of &elf-government to the commo.n man only if it brings about a participatory democracr in which every man, howsoever lQwly or. humble he may be, should be able to participate on a footing. of eq_uality witll others. Now money plays an important part in the successful prose<;11tion of an election campaign by buying advertisement and canvassing facilitieS, by providing the means for quick and speedy communi· cations and movements and sophisticated campaign techniques, and also by the emploxroent of paid workers where volunteers 1¥re found to be insufficient. Therefore, if one political party or indiVidual has larger resources available to it than another the former would certainly, under the present system Of conducting elect· ions, have an .advantage over the latter in t~e electoral process. [265C-F] · · · (b) The other objective at limiting expenditure is to eliminate, as far as possible, the influence of big money in electoral process. If there were no limit on expenditure political parties would go all out for eollecting contributions and obvi· ously the largest contributions would be from the rich and the affluent who consti· tute but a fraction of the electorate. It is likely that some elected representatives would tend to share. the views of the wealthy supporters of their political parcy, either because of shared backj!fOund and association, increased access or subtle influences which condition their thinking. In such an event, the result would be 'that though ostensibly the political parties which receive such contributions may · profess an ideology acceptable to the common man, they would in effect and substance be the representatives, of a certain economic class, and their policies and decisions would be shaped by the interests of that economic class. Persons of a particular class wl'.lo have eitclusive governmental power, even if they tried to act objectively, would tend to overlook the interests of other classes or view those interests dif. ferently. To this natural tendency may be added the fact that office bearers and elected representatives may quite possibly be inclined, though unconsciously and imperceptibly, to espouse the policies and decisions that will attract campaign contributions from affluent individuals and groups. Pre-election donations would be likely to operate as post-election promises resulting ultimately in the casualty of the interest of the common man. The small man's chance is the essence of Indian - democracy and th .. at would be stultified if large contributions from rich and affluent . Individuals or groups are not divorced. from the electoral process. 2-M255SupCit7S [266E-P, 267C·D, E-P, o-Hl 260 SUPREME, COURT Rl!POR.TS [1975) 2 S._Q.R,, Under &, 123(6) not only fo the lnc11rrlng of expendlture In excess of the pres. crlbed limit a corrupt practice but also the author/1/111 ot such expenditure. Autho· rlslna: may be lmj>lied or express, and whether a particular expenditure was lmpll~dly authorued by the candidate would depend upon the facts and circumstances of eacl:T case as appearing frorn the evidence adduced before the court. [264H·26SB] The reasonable interpretation of the provision, which would carry out Its object and lntendment and suppress the mischief and advance the remedy' by purifying the election process· and ridding it of the perilicious and baneful influence of big money, is, that the legislature could never have intended that what the individual candidate cannot do the political parties sponsoring him, or his friends and supporters, should be free to do. When a political party sponsoring a candidate incurs expenditure specifically in connection with his election, as distinguished from eJ1Penditure on general party propaganda, and the candidate knowingly takes advanta~ ·Of it or participates in the programme or activity or consents to it or acquiesces in it, it would be reasonable to infer, save in special circumstances, that he impliedly authorised the political party to incur such expenditure; and he cannot escape the rigour of the ceiling by saying that he has not incurred expenditure but his political party· has done so. The party candidate does not stand apart from his political party and if the political party does not want its candidate·to incur the disquaJifi. cation it must exercise control over the expenditure which may· be incurred by it directly to promote the poll prospects of the candidate. The same proposition must hold good In case of expenditure Incurred by friends and supporters directly in co11nection with the election of the candidate. lf a candidate were to be subject to the limitation of the cellina: but the/olltlcal party sponsorlna: him or his friends and 'supporters were to be free to spen as much as they like in connection with his election, the object of .imposins a ceiling would be completely frustrated and the benefleent provision enacted in the Interest of purity and genwneness of the demo· . cratlc process would be wholly emasculated. [268A·FJ Ranajaya Slngh.v. Baijnath Singh & Ora. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671, Ram Dayal v. BrljrQJ Singh & OrB. [1970] 1 S.C'.R. 530, Magraj P11todla v. R. K. Bir/a & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118 and B. Rajagopala Rao v. N. G. Rangti, A.l.R. 1971 S.C. 266, referred to. In the present case, the fjrst respondent's election to the Lok Sabha was challenged by the petitioner on various grounds, one of which was that the first respondent Incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed ·Jimit of Rs. 10,000 in contravention of s. 77 and committed corrupt practice under s. 123(6). The High Court dismissed the election petition. · Allowing the appeal to this Court, Beld : (I) The total ex.penditure proved to have been Incurred or authorised by the first respondent exceeded the prescribed limit and therefore his election snould be set aside on the ground of corrupt practice defined ins. 123(6). [316F] (a) A chart was furnished to the ~titioner giving Information as to the dates and places of the public meetingli held in connection with the election of the first respondent and the names of the speakers wh<> spoke at those public meetings. This chart we.!: prepared in compliance with the directions of the trial court from the official records in the possession of the J.G. of Police. Therefore it is relevant and admissible in evidence under the first part of s. 35 of the Evidence Act. Though it is a weak type of evidence, and standing by itself cannot be regarded sullicient to establish thi~ holding of a public meeting by the first respondent, it can be relied upon as a corroborative piece of evidence which ll)ay be considered along with other ·evidence in the case. The oral evidence thus corroborated, disclosed that in addition to the 23 public meetings admitted by the first respondent, 9 further public meetings were held on his behalf at v.arious places. The first respondent not only. suppressed the expenditure on these nine additional public meetings, but, also he suppressed the real expenditure on the admitted 23 public meetings. [281G-282C, G-283A, 293A·C, 301A-l3] (b) If the Court comes to the conclusion that an item of exj>eDditure hbs. been suppressecl in the return of election expenses, the mere fact that there is no sufficient evideI1ce about the amount that must have been spent is no ground for iJnorina the matter. It is the duty of the Court to assess all expenses as best as it A B c D E F G H A B c D E G H K. L. GUPTA v. A. N. CHAWLA (Bhagwati; /.) 261 can though the court should not enter into the reiiion of speculation or nierely try to guess the amount that must have been spent. Generally it would be possible to arrive at an amount of expenditure on a conservative basis, and where it is possible to arrive at such an estimate, such estimated amount should be held as not shown by the candidate in his election account. [300E-G] Magraf Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118 -and P. C. P. Reddiar · v. S. Perumal, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 646 referred to. (c) The first respondent owned the responsibility for expenses in respect of the 23 public meetings admitted by him. He also admitted in his evidence that he "bore the expenses of all the election meetings in my constituency". Therefore,. there is no scope fot the argument that the expenses of any of these additional 9 public meetings were met by any· organisation or individual other than the first respondent. Even if the expenses of some of these nine public meetings were .incurred by the District Pradesh Congress Committee or any other branch of the Congress organisation which sponsored his candidature, or by any other friend ot supporter, such expenses must be held to have been authorised by the first respondent because, he knowingly took advantage of such public meetings by participating in them and consented to, or at any rate, acquiesced in such expenses. [292E-H] (2) Ii is not uncommon to find that during elections, posters and handbills . are printed without complying with the requirement of section 127A, and some-. times containing scandalous material about rival candidates. There should there· fore be some independent semi-judicial instrumentality set up by law, which. would immediately investigate, even while the election fever is on and propaganda and· canvassing are in. progress and the evidence is raw and fresh, how the offending handbills and poste~ have come into existence. [314A-D] Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. C.A. 816 of 1973, decided on August 8, 1974, followed. · CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIO~ : Civil Appeal No. 1549 of 1972. Appeal from the Judgment & Order dated the 19th May, 1972 of the D~lhi High Court in E.P. No. 2of1971. S. N .. Marwaha, A. K. Marwaha and K. C. Dua, for the appellant. M. N. Phadke, V. P. Nanda, N. S. Dass Bahl and D. N. Mishra, for respondmt No. L The Judgment of the Court was delivered by · BHAGWATI, J.~The controversy in this appeal relates to the validity of election to the Lok Sabha from the Sadar Parliamentary Cc.nstituency in the Union Territory of Delhi. Eleven candidates originally offered themselves for election from this constituency but out c,f them six withdrew their candidature with the· result tliat c nly five rc:mained in the field as contesting .cand:dates. They were the petitioner and respond~nts Nos. 1 to 4. The petitioner was put up as a candidate by the Jan Saugh, while the candidature .of the first respondent wa~ sponsored by the Congress, which at that time, on account of the spht in the organisation was known as the ruling Congress or the new Congress. RP.spondmts Nos. 2 to 4 were ind,~pendent candidates. Though there were nominally five candidates, the real coi;itest was between the petitioner and the first respondent. The pollmg tcok place on 5th March, 1971 and the result of the poll was declared on 11th March, 1971. The petitioner secured 55305 votes, while the first SUPRBME COURT Rl!PORTS [1975] 2 s.p.1. respondent polled 98108 votes. The first respondent thus won by a large !lllljority and was declared elected. The petitioner thereupon filed an election petition challenging the validity of the election of the first respondent on various grounds. The election petition was contested by the first respondent and, as the voluminous mass of record shows, it was fought out to a bitter and with great industry and thoroughness on both sides. Mr. Justice Andley of the Delhi High Court, who heard the election petition, found in an elaborate judgment that none of the grounds on which the election was sought to be invalidated was established and he accordingly dismissed the election petition with costs. The present appeal preferred by the petitioner impugns this judgment of Mr. Justice Andley. The election petition wa.c; based on numerous grounds which were summarised in paragraphs and subseq\lently el11borated in paragraphs 12, 14, 18 to 21and24 to 26. The ground set out in paragraph 12 was that the elector rolls, on the basis of which the election had been held, were imperfect and defective, and that vitiated the election. Paragraph 14 alleged the invalidity of the amendment in rule 56 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961 and paragraphs 18 and 19 challenged the· validity of the election on the ground that about a lac or more ballot papers, which had been chemically_ trQated, were fraud'Ulently introduced and that had materially affected the result of'the election. The charge in paragraphs 20 and 21 was that the first respondent was guilty of corrupt practice, in that the first respondent, his election agent and othe~ parsons with his consent, including the first respondent, had printed and published a handbill· an8 a poster, containing statements in relation to.the personal character or conduct of the petitioner which were false and which the first respondent did no~ believe to be true, and which were reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the petitioner's election .. Paragraph 24 also charged a similar corrupt practice on the aHegation that these statements were repeated by the first a.nd the fifth res.pondents in' public meetings as also during the course of canvassing. And lastly, it was alleged in· paragraphs 25 a~d 26 that the first res~ndei;it ~ad, incurred or ~uthorised expendi· ture m exce~s of the prescnbed hllllt of Rs. 10,000 m contravention of section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. These were broadly the grounds on which the election of the first respondent was sought to be declared void by the petitioner. Though the first, sec1:>nd and fifth respondents filed their respective written statements, the collitest was only on behalf of the first and fifth respondents. The second respondent supported the petitioner·: his support was however n.ot of much value sinr.e he did not take any active part in the petition. Respondents 3 and 4 were obviously not interes~ed in the petition and they did not even care to appear or file any written statement. The first and fifth respondents raised in their written statements certain preliminary objections and also denied the various allegations made in the petition and contested the grounds on which the petitioner claimed to set .aside the election of the first respondent. We shall deal with the contents of these written state 111CDtS ~ little later whiin we examine tho specific charges levelled agains A B c D E F G H A B c D le. L. GtJPTA v, A· N. CHAWLA (Bhagwad, /,) 26 3 the first respondent.. Suffice it to state for the present that on the basis of the preliminary objections raised in the written staiements, the learned. Trial Judge framed four preliminary issues and they were decided by an order dated 6th August, 1971. So far as the first preliminary issue is concerned, the learned Trial Judge held that paragraphs 9, 12, 18 to 21 and 24 to 26·did not suffer from lack of concise statement of material facts, but they did not give full particulars of the allegations and. he accordingly. directed . the petitioner to furnish further )'articulars with respect to paragraphs 18 to 21, 24 and 25 as specified m the . schedule to the order. The second and the fourth preliin.inary issues do not survive for consideration : they were decided against the petitioner and the petitioner· does not challenge the decision in appeal. The third preliminary issue was decided in favour of the petitioner but it is now meaningless to discuss it because the petitioner is not pressing the ground set out in paragraohs 18 and 19 in support of the appeal. Pursuant to the aforesaid. order dated .6th August, 1971, the petitioner furnished particulars of the allegations contained in paragraphs 18 to 21, 24 and 25 by an affidavit dated 19th August, 1971. A reply to these particulars was given· by the first respondent on 26th August, 1971. We shall have occasion to refer to these particulars and the reply made to them when we examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. · . The learned Trial Judge then framed issues on the merits by an order dated 3rd September, 1971. Issues 1 to 7 of these issues relate .. to the ground set out in paragraphs 18 and 19. It is not necessary to refer to them since they were decided against the ·petitioner by the E ··.learned Tria!Judge and the· correctness'ofthis decision iS not assailed on behalf of the petitioner iD the present appeal. Issue 8 raised the question whether the first respondent, his election agent and other persons with the consent of the first respondent or his election agent committed the corrupt practices charged in paragraphs 20 and 21 and Issue 9 raised a similar question in regard to the corrupt practices set out in paragraph 24. The question whether the first respondent inF curred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed limit of ·Rs. 10,000/- in contravention of section 77 as alleged in paragraph 25, . was put in issue iri Issue 10. Issues 11, 12 and 13 raised certain s~b sidiary questions but it appears from the judgment of the Je11rned Trial Judge that they were not pressed by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner before the Trial Court.· We need not, thereG fore, spend any time on these issues. The last issue was issue 14 which was directed against the fifth respondent who was alleged to have committed corrupt practices. B There was enormous oral as well as documentary evidence Jed on behalf of both sides. This evidence discloses certain curious and unusual features to which we shall advert in course of tiin.e, but there can be no doubt that it evidences very careful and thorough preparation of the case on either side. Not an inch of ground appears to have been conceded by one.side to the other and every move in this long and bitter contest, from one· side or the other, seems to have been well thought 264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [197 SJ 2 s.c.R. out and relentlessly pursued. The learned Trial Judge, on a consid!ration of the evidence presented before him, came to the conclusion that issues 8, 9 and 10 were not established by the petitioner and there was also no satisfactory proof in regard to issue 14 and accordingly, by a judgment d1ted 19th Mey, 1972 he rejected the charges of corrupt practice against the first and fifth respondents and dismissed the election p!tition wjth costs. The petitioner being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Trial Judge preferred the present appeal under section 116 A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The p::titioner assailed the correctness of the judgment ·of the learned Trial Judge on.Iy on issues 8, 9, 10 and 14. The judgment, in so far as it related to issues 1 to 7 and 11 to 13 was accepted by the petitioner and it is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the facts in so far as they bear on those issues. We shall confine ourselves only to such of the facts a~ are relevant to issues 8, 9, 10and14 and instead of setting them out in a narrative form before .commencing discussien of tha arguments, what w::i propose to do is to refer to the _relevant facts while discussing each particular issue. We shall proceed in the order in which these issues were argued before us. We first take up issue 10. The charge against the first respondent under this issue was that he incurred or authorised exi:endit-ure in excess of the prescribed limit of Rs. 10,000 in contravention of section 77 and thereby committed the corrupt practice defined in section 123(6) of the Act. Section 123 sets out Various corrupt practices which have the effect of invalidating an election and one of them is the incurring or authorising the expenditure in contravention of section 77 : vide sub-section (6). Sub-section (I) of section 77 provides that "every candidate at an election shall, either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct account of all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorised by him or by his. election agent, between the date of publication of the notification calling the election and the date of declaration of the result thereof, both dates inclusive", while sub-section (3) says that "the total of the said expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed." It was common ground between the parties thlft the expenditure prescribed for a parliamentary constituency in the Union Territory of Delhi . was· , Rs. 10,000. The first respondent.and his election agent were, therefe>te,\ · prohibited by section 77 from incurring or authorising expenditure 'in connection with his election exceeding Rs. 10,000, and if the first respondent or his election agent· incurred or authori'sed such expendi-. ture in excess of Rs. 10,000, it would be a corrupt practice voiding his election under section I 23(6). The question which, therefore arises for consideration is whether the first respondent or his electio~ agent incurred or authorised expenditure in connection with his election exceeding Rs. 10,000. Now, before we proceecl to discuss the evidence bearing on this question, we must clear the ground by pointing out that not only is the incurring of excessive expenditure a corrupt practice, but also the authorising of such expenditure, and authorising may be ill).plied as well as express. Where the authorising is express, there is no d.ifficu.Ity A B c D E F G H A 8 c D • E F G .. H K. L. GUPTA v. A. N. CHAWLA (Bhagwati, I.) 265 in bringing.home the charge of corrupt practice against the candidate. ~ut a somewhat difficult question on facts may arise where the charge 1s sought to be proved agamst the candidate on the basis that the impliedly a~tho:ised excessi~e expenditure. Whether a particular expenditure was 1mphedly authonsed by the candidate must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as appearing from the evidence adduced before the Court. This question would arise in a challenging form where expenditure in connection with the election is incurred, not by t~e c~ndidate, but by the political part.Y ~hich has sponsored him or his friends and supporters. Can the hm1t on the expenditure be evaded by the candidate by not spending any moneys of his own but leaving it to the political party or hi&.Jj:iends and supporters to spend an amount far in excess of the limit ? l'he object of ~he provision limiting the expenditure is two-fold. In the first place,, it should be open to individual or any political party, howsoever small, to be able to contest an election on a footing of equality with any other individual or political party, howsoever rich and well financed it may be, and no individual or political party should be able to secure an advantage over others by reason of its superior financial strength. It can hardly be disputed that the way elections. are held·in our count.ry, money is bound to play an important part in the successful prosecution .of an election campaign. Mbney supplies "assets for. advertising and other forms of political solicitation that increases the candidate's exposure to the public." Not only can money buy advertising and canvassing facilities such as hoardings, posters, handbills, brochures etc. and. all the other paraphernalia of an election campaign, but it can also provide the means for quick and speedy communications and movements and sophisticated campaign techniques and is also "a substitute for energy" in that paid workers can be employed where volunteers are found to be insufficient. The availability .!bf large funds does ordinarily tend to increase the number of votes a candidate will receive. If, therefore, one political party or individual has larger resources available to it than another individual or political party, the former would certainly, under the present system of conducting elections, have an advantage over the latter in the electoral proceEs. The former would have a significantly greater qpportunity for the propagation o~ its program!'le while the latter mayqnot be able to make even an effective psernntat1on of its views. The availability of disproportio~ately larg~'. rernurce<, is also likely to lend itself to misuse or abuse for securing to ty political party or individual possessed of such resources, undue adva1'1:t· age over other political parties or individuals. Douglas pomts out m his book called Ethics in QQ:vernment at page 72, "If one party ever attains overwhelming supJrfority in money, newspaper support, and (government) patronage, it will be almost,impo.ssible, barring ~n eccnomic collapse, for it ever to be defeated.' This produces anti-democratic ·effects in that a political party or individual backed by .the affluent and wealthy would be able to secure a greater representation than a political party or individual who is without any links with affluence · or wealth. This would result in serious discrimination between one political party or individual and another on the b~'js of. money power and that in its turn would mean that "some voters are dcmed an· 'equal' 266 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS (1975] 2 s.c.R. · voice and some candidates are denied an "equal chance". .It is ele· mentary that each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation ii;i .the political process of the l~gisla~ure~ and this requires that each clti?fn sho~d have equally ~ffect1ve V?Ice Ill ~he election of the members or the legislatures. That 1s the basic reqwre· ment of the Constitution. This equal effective voice-equal oppor· tunity of participation in the electoral process-would be deni¢ if affluence arid wealth are to tilt the scales in tavour of one political party or individual as against another. The democratic process can function efficiently and effectively for the benefit of the common good and reach out the benefits of self-government to the common man only ifit brings about a participatory democracy in which every m.an, howsoever lowly or humble he may be, should be able to participate on a footjng ·of equality with others. Individuals with grievances, men and women with ideas and vision, are the sources of any society's :(>Ower to improve itself. Government by consent means that such individuals must eventually be able to find groups that will work with them and must be able to .make their voices heard in these groups and no group should be insulated from competition and criticism. It is only by the mainte· nance of such conditions that democracy can thrive and prosper and this can be ensured only by limiting the expenditure which may be incurred in connection with elections, so that, as far as possible, no one single political party or individual can have unfair advantage over the other by reason of its larger resources and the resources available for being 11tilised in the electoral process are within reasonable bounds and not unduly disparate and the electoral contest becomes e-venly matche.d. Then alone the small man will come into his own and will be able to secure proper representation in our legislative bodies. The other objective of limiting expenditure is to eliminate, as far as possible, the influence of big money in the electoral process. If there were no limit on expenditure, political parties would go all out for collecting contributions and obviously the largest contributions would be from the rich and affluent who constitute but a fraction of the electorate. The pernicious influence of big money would then play a decisive role in controlling the democratic process in the country. This would inevitably lead, to the worst form of political corruption and that in its wake is _bound to. prod.uce other _vices at all ~evels. This danger has been pointed out m tellmg words m the followmg passage from the notes in Harvard Law.Review, Vol. 66, p. 1260: "A less debatable objective of regulating campaign funds is the elimination of dangerous financial pressures on elected officials. Even if contributions are not motivated by an expected return in political favours, the legislator cannot overlook the effects of his decisions on the sources of campaign funds." . It is 4ifficult to gene~alise. about ~he degree o_f jnfluence which the large contnbutors. may wield m shapmg the pohc1es and decisions of the political party which they finance. It is widely acknowledged, however, that, at the very least, they would have easy access to the leaders and representatives of the political party. But itwould be naive to suggest A B c D E F G H B c D E F G H L L, GUPTAV. A· N• CIL\WLA (Bhagwati, J,) 267 that the influence ends with mere access. It may. safely be assumed that hardly any politicians "would consciously sell their votes"; the result may be nearly the same, if one accepts Herbert Alexander's analysis of the subtle factors that influence a political party's actions: "Many politicians-who do what they honestly think is right, never realize that they are mere spokesmen for their financial supporters. Alegislator can avoid a conflict of interest by investing in government bonds, but he cannot change the conditioning that }eads him to believe that what is good for his former company or present backers is gocd for the country." · lt is likely that some· elected representatives would tend to share the views qf the wealthy supporters of their political party, either be· cause of shared background and associations, increased access oNubtle influences which condition their thinking. In such event the result would be that though· ostensibly the political parties which receive such contributions may profess an ideology acceptable to ~e common man, they would in effect and· substance be representative of a certain ec6nomic class and their policies and decisions would be shaped by the interests of that economic class. It was over a hundred years ago that John Stuart Mill observed that persons of a particular class who have exclusive governmental power, even if they try to act objectively, will tend to overlook the interests of other classes, or view those interests differently. And to this natural tendency may ~ adde~ the fact that office bearers and elected representatives may quite poSSI· bly be inclined, though unconsciously and imperceptibly, to espouse policies and decisions that will attract campaign contributions from a4ftuent individuals and groups. .It was said of the electoral process in the United States of America : "Members of the Rockefeller and Du Pont families invest in the election of a Republican President because they sense that if that party takes over the White House, their interests will gain more sympathetic attention-" "The central objective of contributions is access to the power of the elected official..:...." "For a gift pf a few hundred dollars an individual may gain, in return, the intercession of a Congressman that will get him a governinent contract or a tariff provision that will ultimately net him or his business tens of thousands of dollars." It is obvious that pro-election donations would be likely to operate as post-election promises resulting ultimately in the casualty of the interest of the conu:non man, not so much ostensibly in the legislative process as in the implementation of laws and administrative or policy decisions. The small man's chance is the essence of Indian democracy and that would be stultified if large contributions from i:ich and affluent indviduals or groups are not divorced from the electoral process. It is for this reason that our Legislators, in their wisdom, enacted a ceiling on the expenditure whi~ may legitimately be incurred in connection with an election. This background must inform the court in the. interpretation of this vital and significant provision in the election Jaw of our country. 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s.c.R. Now, if a candidate were to be subject to the limitation of the ceiling, but the political party sponsoring hii;n or his friends and supporters were to be free to spend as much as they like in connection with his election, the object of hnposing the ceiling would be completely frustrated and tho beneficent provision enacted in the interest of purity and genuineness of the democratic process would be wholly emasculated. The mischief sought to. be remedied and the evil sought to be· suppressed would enter the political arena with redoubled force and vitiate the political life of the country. The gn:at democratic ideal of social, economic and political justice and equality of status and opportunity enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution would remain merely a distant dream eluding our grasp. The legislators could never have intended that what the individual candidate cannot do, the political party sponsoring him or his friends and supporters should be free to do. That is why the legislature wisely interdicted not only the incurring·but also the authorising of excessive expenditure by a candidate. When the political party . .sponsoring a candidate incurs exp~ndi ture in connection with his election, as distinguished from expenditure on general party propaganda, and the candidate knowingly takes advantage of it or participates in the programme or activity or fails to disavow tho expenditure or consents to it or acquiesces in it, it would be reasonable to infer, save in .special circumstances, that he impliedly authorised the political party to incur such expenditure and he cannot escape the rigour of the ceiling by saying · that he has not incurred the expenditure, but his politil