# Kapur]. '95'/ February 19. '957 V. C. K. Bus Strviet Ltd v. The Regional Transport il.utlwrity, Coimbator1

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 663
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-07-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 323 and 324 of 1956
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kapur-95-february-19-957-v-c-k-bus-strviet-ltd-v-the-regional-transport-il-1360
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
It was because of the above two contentions raised
by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case
of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed
counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and
drew our attention· to its salient features and to the
discrepancies in the
statements of
witnesses and the
improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied
that
the learned Judges were justified in
coming to the
conclusion
they
did
and
the
view
of the trial
judge was rightly displaced.
Upon a review
of the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come
to
the conclusion
that
the appellant
was
rightly
convicted.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment
of the High . Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.
ti.
THE
REGIONAL
TRANSPORT
AUTHORITY,
COIMBATORE.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS AND
GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Road Transport-Permit for stage
carriage-Renewal-W he th er
a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject to implied
condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58.
The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the
Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate
authority, the
Central Road Traffic Board, by
the unsuccessful applicants the
order granting
the permit
was set aside and the order of the
Central Road Traffic Board was appro\'ed hy the Government in
re"ision.
The appellant. thereupon. moved the
High Court for a
writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings
of the
Central Road
Traffic Board an<l the Gowrnment.
During the pen<lency of these
proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside
the grant of the permit to the appellant. with the result that he
continued to run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of his
permit.
Before the expiry of the
perio<l
fixed in the original
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur].
'95'/
February 19.
'957
V. C. K. Bus Strviet
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
il.utlwrity,
Coimbator1
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit from the
Regional Transport Authority under s. 58 of the Act.
The High
Court finally dis1nissed the applic:ition for a writ of certiorari and
the question arose as to the validity of tbe renewal of the pennit
in view of the High Court's decision.
]'he 1natter was raised before
the High
Court once again by proceedings under Art. 226 of the
Constitution and the High Court held that the r.:-newal having been
obtained on the
basis of a
pern1it which had been subsequently
cancelled, it c-oul<l not be regarded as a frc!:h permit, that when
the original permit \Vas set asi<le, it 111ust be taken to be non est
for all purposes, and that
thr renc\val must therefore be held to
be a nullity. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held: (1) Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1949, and the rules framed thereunder, a rene\\.·al is a continuation
of the original pennit.
\Vhen the original permit \Vas rent\\'ed in
favoui of the appellant it v.·as subject to the Jecision of the High
Court in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution which
\vere then pending and, therefore, 'vhen the order
granting' the
original permit \Vas finally set aside the renewed permit becan1e
void.
Anjiah \', Regional 1·ransport Officer, Guntul', 1956 i\ndhra
Law Ti1nes, 347, disapproved.
(2) When the appellant applied for a renewal of his permit
under s. 58 of the .-\ct and not merely for a fresh permit the order
of the Regional Transport A'.Jthority granting the renewal rnust
be held to ha\'e
been made subject
to the implied condition that
the right of the appeilant to the original permit is recognized by
the
High Court and that accordingly, in the ever1t that had
happened, the reOC\\'cd pc:nnit ceased to be effective.
Veerappa Pill..1i v. Ran1a11 &, Ram.a; Ltd., (1952) S.C.R. 583,
e

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
It was because of the above two contentions raised
by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case
of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed
counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and
drew our attention· to its salient features and to the
discrepancies in the
statements of
witnesses and the
improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied
that
the learned Judges were justified in
coming to the
conclusion
they
did
and
the
view
of the trial
judge was rightly displaced.
Upon a review
of the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come
to
the conclusion
that
the appellant
was
rightly
convicted.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment
of the High . Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.
ti.
THE
REGIONAL
TRANSPORT
AUTHORITY,
COIMBATORE.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS AND
GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Road Transport-Permit for stage
carriage-Renewal-W he th er
a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject to implied
condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58.
The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the
Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate
authority, the
Central Road Traffic Board, by
the unsuccessful applicants the
order granting
the permit
was set aside and the order of the
Central Road Traffic Board was appro\'ed hy the Government in
re"ision.
The appellant. thereupon. moved the
High Court for a
writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings
of the
Central Road
Traffic Board an<l the Gowrnment.
During the pen<lency of these
proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside
the grant of the permit to the appellant. with the result that he
continued to run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of his
permit.
Before the expiry of the
perio<l
fixed in the original
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur].
'95'/
February 19.
'957
V. C. K. Bus Strviet
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
il.utlwrity,
Coimbator1
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit from the
Regional Transport Authority under s. 58 of the Act.
The High
Court finally dis1nissed the applic:ition for a writ of certiorari and
the question arose as to the validity of tbe renewal of the pennit
in view of the High Court's decision.
]'he 1natter was raised before
the High
Court once again by proceedings under Art. 226 of the
Constitution and the High Court held that the r.:-newal having been
obtained on the
basis of a
pern1it which had been subsequently
cancelled, it c-oul<l not be regarded as a frc!:h permit, that when
the original permit \Vas set asi<le, it 111ust be taken to be non est
for all purposes, and that
thr renc\val must therefore be held to
be a nullity. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held: (1) Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1949, and the rules framed thereunder, a rene\\.·al is a continuation
of the original pennit.
\Vhen the original permit \Vas rent\\'ed in
favoui of the appellant it v.·as subject to the Jecision of the High
Court in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution which
\vere then pending and, therefore, 'vhen the order
granting' the
original permit \Vas finally set aside the renewed permit becan1e
void.
Anjiah \', Regional 1·ransport Officer, Guntul', 1956 i\ndhra
Law Ti1nes, 347, disapproved.
(2) When the appellant applied for a renewal of his permit
under s. 58 of the .-\ct and not merely for a fresh permit the order
of the Regional Transport A'.Jthority granting the renewal rnust
be held to ha\'e
been made subject
to the implied condition that
the right of the appeilant to the original permit is recognized by
the
High Court and that accordingly, in the ever1t that had
happened, the reOC\\'cd pc:nnit ceased to be effective.
Veerappa Pill..1i v. Ran1a11 &, Ram.a; Ltd., (1952) S.C.R. 583,
explained and Jistinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
323 and 324 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and orders dated April
27, and July 13, 1956, of the Madras
High Court in
Writ Appeals Nos. 42 and 88 of 1956 arising· out of the
orders dated March 2.3, and
July 9, 1956, of the said
High Court in
Writ
Petitions Nos. 333 and 564
of
1956.
A.V. Viswanatha
Sastri, /. B.
Dadachanji,
S.
N.
Andley and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganpathy Iyer and R. Gopalkrislman, for respondents
Nos.
3 and 4.
•
_,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
1957. February 19. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are appeals against
the judgment of the
High Court of Ma<lras on a certificate given under Art. 133 ( 1) ( c) of the
Constitution,
and they raise a question of some importance as to the
true legal character of a permit when · it is renewed
under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles
Act, 1939
(IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the
Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties,
it is necessary to state the material facts leading up to
the present dispute.
Towards
the end of
1952, the
appropriate authorities under the Act decided to grant
two additional
permits
for
stage
carriages
in the
Ondipudur-Agricultural College route
in
the town of
Coimbatore in the State of Madras, ancj invited applications therefore under s. 57 of the Act.
There
were as
many as 39 applicants, and by his order dated December 3, 1952, the
Regional
Transport Authority granted
one permit to
applicant No. 24, the
Thondamuthur
Trading Company Ltd., and another to applicant No.
30, the V.C.K.
Bus Service.
There were appeals by
some of the unsuccessful applicants to the Central Road
Traffic Board, which by its order dated February
19,
1953, set
aside the order of the
Regional
Transport
Authority
and
granted the
permits, one to
Stanes
Transports
Ltd.,
and
another to
Thirumalaiswami
Goundar.
Revisions were preferred against this order
by the aggrieved applicants under s. 64-A of the
Act,
and by its order dated July 9, 1953, the
Government
confirmed the grant of the permit to Stanes Transports
Ltd., but set aside the permit given to
Thirumalaiswami Goundar, and granted it instead to Annamalai
Bus Transport Ltd.
Thereupon, applicants Nos. 24 and 30 moved the
High Court of Madras under Art. 226 for a writ of
certiorari to quash the order of the Central Road Traffic
Board dated
February
19, 1953
and of the
Governmrnt dated July 9,
1953; but the applications
were
dismissed by
Rajagopala
Ayyangar J. on
March 8,
1954.
Against the orders of dismissal, Writ
Appeals
Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were preferred, and they were
1957
V. C. K. Bus Service
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
Authoriry,
Coimbatore
Venkalarama
Ayyar J.
1957
V. C. K. Bus Sernic.
Ltd.
v.
Tht Regional
Tra,isport
Authority,
Coimbatore
f'o1!ataramt1
A_Y.7ar J.
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
dismissed
by
Rajamannar
C.
J. and
Panchapakesa
Ayyar J. on March 21, 1956. It should
be mentioned
that the
operation of the
order dated February 19,
1953 was stayed pending the disposal of the revision
under s. 64-A and the writ proceedings in
the
High
Court, with the result that both Thondamuthur Trading
Company Ltd. and V.C.K. Bus Service which had been
granted permits by the Regional
Transport Authority
on December 3, 1952, continued to run their buses notwithstanding cancellation of those permits on
February
19, 1953.
It should also be
mentioned that in
June
1954 the business of the V.C.K. Bus Service which
was the grantee of one of the
permits under the order
of the Regional Transport Authority dated Decemher
3, 1952, was taken ·over by a Company called the V.C.K.
Bus Service Ltd., which i's the appellant before
us, and
by an order of the Regional Transport Authority dated
July 7, 1954, it was
recognised as the transferee of the
permit granted to V.C.K. Bus Service.
To continue the narrative, the permit which was the
subject-matter of the
litigation aforesaid
was for a
period of one year and a half, and it expired on
June
30, 1954.
Before its expiry,• the appellant applied
on
April 15, 1954, for a renewal thereof for a period
of
three years.
This application was duly notified under
s. 57, and objections to the
grant
were preferred by
both
Stanes
Transports Ltd., and
Annamalai
Bus
Transport Ltd. On September 5, 1954,
the
Regional
Transport
Authority granted a permit to the appellant
for a period of one year from July 1, 1954 to
June 30,
1955, obviously in the expectation that
Writ
Appeals
Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954
would by then
have
been
decided.
On
March
19, 1955, the
appellant
again
applied for a renewal of the permit, and that was also
notified under s. 57,
and
no objections having
been
filed to the grant
thereof,
the
Regional
Transport
Authority by his order dated June 23, 1955,
renewed
the permit for a period of three years from July 1, 1955
to June 30, 1958.
It is this permit that
forms
the
subject-matter of the present litigation.
It has been already stated that Writ Appeals
31 and 32 of 1954 were dismissed on
March 21,
Nos.
1956.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Apprehending that the Regional Transport Authority
might, in view of the judgment of the
High Court,
cancel the permit which was
renewed on June 23, 1955,
the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 for a
Writ of Prohibition restraining the
Regional Transport
A'.uthority from
cancelling the permit, and that
was
dismissed by
Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on the ground
that when the original permit was set aside, the renewal
thereof fell to the ground.
The
appellant filed
Writ
Appeal No. 42 of 1956 against this order, and that was
heard
hy
Rajamannar
C.
J.
and
Panchapakesa
Ayyar J. who by their judgment dated
April 27, 1956,
held, following a previous decisio11 of that
Court' in
K. M 11t/11tvadivelu v. Regional Transport Officer(') that
the renewal having
been obtained on the basis of a
permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it could
not be regarded as a fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it must be taken to be 11011 est
for all
purposes, and
that the renewal must therefore
be held to be a nullity.
In the result, they dismissed
rhe appeal, but granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c),
observing that
the
case raised a point
of
general
importance, which was stated by them in these terms :
"When an application for renewal of a permit is
made and granted and eventually it is held that the
original
permit was itself wrongly granted, does the
renewed permit subsist for the period for
which it was
renewed, or does it automatically cease to be in force
when it is finally decided that the original permit was
not granted validly ?''
This matter now comes before us in Civil Appeal No.
323 of 1956.
After the
High
Court delivered its judgment in
Writ
Appeal No. 42 of 1956 on April 27, 1956, the
respondents herein, viz., Stanes Transports Ltd. and
Annam:ilai Bus Transport Ltd., :ipplied to the
Regional
Tramport Authority to grant them permits in accordance with the decisions of the High Court, and on ~fay
5, 1956, the
Regional
Tr:insport
Authority
cancelled
the permit granted
by him on June 23, 1955,
in farnur
(1) A.LR, 1956 !\fad. q3,
1957
I', C, K Bus Sertiu
Ltd,
v.
Tk Rcgio11a/
Transport
Authority,
Coimbatore
i ·enkatarmna
A)yar].
1957
V. C. K. Bus Stroiu
Ltd.
v.
T ht Rttional
Transport
.Authorit)",
Coimbatort
V tnkatarama
Ayya,J.
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
of the appellant, and granted
permits
instead to the
respondents.
Thereupon,
the
appellant
filed
Writ
Petition No. 554 of 1956 for a writ of certiorari to quash
the onle1 dated May 5, 1956, on the grounds which had
been put forward in Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 and
Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956.
That petition was dismissed by
Rajagopalan J. on July 9, 1956, and the
Writ
Appeal No. 88 of 1956 filed against that order
was dismissed
by
Rajamannar C. J.
and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. on July 13,
1956.
Leave
to
appeal
against
that
judgment
was also
given
under Art.
133 ( 1) ( c ), as the subject-matter thereof was the same
as that of Writ
Appeal No. 42 of 1956 in respect of
which leave had already been granted.
Civil
Appeal
No. 324
of 1956 relates to this matter.
Thus, both the
appeals relate to the same matter, and
raise the same
point for determination.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha
Sastri, learned counsel
who
appeared in support of the appeals, contends that the
view taken by the learned Judges of the
High Court
that when a permit is set aside by higher authorities,
it should be
treatell as
wholly non-exi.\tent, and that,
in consequence, a renewal thereof must be held to be
void, is not sound, that on a correct interpretation of
ss. 57 and 58, a renewal is practically in the nature of
a new grant, that the permit which was granted to the
appellant for the period July l, 1955 to June 30, 1958,
though styled a
renewal, was in substance a fresh
permit, and that the fact that the old permit was set
aside -did not therefore affect the right of the appellant
under this permit.
He also argues that the
Act and
the rules framed thereunder contain
elaborate
provi-.
sions as to when a permit could be cancelled, forming
in themselves a complete code on the subject, that the
cancellation of the original
permit is not one of the
grounds on which a renewed permit could be set aside,
and that the order of the Regional
Transport Authority dated May 5, ~1956, was therefore ultra vires.
The
contention
of the learned
Solicitor-General
for
the
respondents is that when a permit
is renewed, the
renewal is, on a true. construction of the
provisions of
the Act, in substance .. as in name a cdntinuation of the
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
previous permit, and that, in conseque!lce,
when the
grant of a permit is set aside
by a
higher authority,
the renewal thereof must also stand automatically set
aside, and that further even if a renewed permit is not
to be regarded as a continuation of the original permit,
seeing that it is granted on the basis of that permit it
should be held to be subject to an implied term that it
should cease if the original
permit
is cancelled.
The
two points that arise for
decision on these contentions
are : ( 1) when a permit is renewed, is it a continuation
of the original permit, or is it, in fact, a new one ? and
(2) if a renewed permit is not a
continuation
of the
original permit, is the grant of it subject to the implied
condition that it is liable to be cancelled, if the original
permit is cancelled?
On the first question, it is necessary to refer to certain
provisions
of the
Act material thereto.
Section 57
prescribes the procedure to be followed in the grant of
stage carriage permits.
Under sub-s. (2), applications
therefor have to be made not less than six weeks before
the date appointed by the Regional Transport Authority
therefor. Sub-section (3) requires that they should be
published in the prescribed manner, and
provision is
made for
representations
being made in
connection
therewith.
When any
representation is so
received,
sub-s. (5) provides that the person making it is to
be
given an opportunity of being heard thereon in person
or by a duly authorised representative,
and
that
the
application for permit is to be disposed of at a public
hearing.
Section 58 deals with
renewals,
and is as
follows:
( 1) "A permit
other
than a temporary
permit
issue<l under
section 62 shall
be
effective
without
renewal for such period, not less than three years and
not more than five
years, as the
Regional
Transport
Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit :
Provided that in the
case
of a permit issued or
renewed within two years of the commencement of this
Act, the permit shall be effective
without
renewal for
such period of less than three years as the
Provincial
Government may prescribe.
1957
V. C: K. Bus Servia
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
Authority,
Coimbatore
V tnkatarama
A)yar ].
19.37
V. C. K. Bus S1·n·ia
Ltd.
v.
T Ju Rr[~iumil
Tra11:.Jpo11
Autf;oril)',
Coiinbatou
i'enkatnrmnt1
Ayyar ].
670
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
f1957J
(2) A permit mav be
rwewed on an application
made and dispo,cd of as if it were an application for
a permit :
Provided that, other
conditions
being equal, an
application for renewal shall be given preference over
new applications for permits."
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
based on s. 58 (2) is that under the Act an application
for renewal is to be dealt with exactly as an application
for a new permit, that it is to be notified under s.
57
and representations have to be called for in connection
therewith and
considered at a public
hearing,
that·
though the grant of the previous permit
furnishes a
ground of
preference, it is
subject to the limitation
that the other
conditions are equal and is thus only
one of several factors to he taken into account,
and
that therefore when a renewal is actually granted, it is
on an independent consideration of the merits and it
cannot be distinguished
from a
fresh
grant.
It was
further argued that the proviso to s. 58(2) meant little,
because it wa' well established
that the g'rJnt of a
permit was not a matter of right, . and the authorities
under the
Act would be acting within their
powers if
they refu>ed an
application for
renewal and granted a
fresh permit to a new apiilicant. It was also contended
that though the statute spoke of a renewal of a permit,
that expression did not accurately
bring
out
the true
position, became in legal terminology, renewal imports
that the t:ansaction which is renewed, as for
example,
a lease. i, to operate for a further period
but on the
same terms. hut
that when a permit was renewed,. it
was open to the authorities to impose new
conditions,
to alter the period during which it was to operate and
generally to modify
its terms. and
that therefore
the
use of the word "renewal"
should
not
lead to
the
inference that it was the original permit that was being
continued.
There is force in these contentions,
but there are
other provisions
bearing on this question, and when
they are reviewed as a whole, it is abundantly
clear
that the intention of the legislature
was to treat a
renewal as a continuation
of the previous permit.
To
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
start with, s. 58(1) enacts that a permit sh::ill be effective
for the period specified therein, but this is qualified by
the words "without renewal".
Therefore,
when there
is a renewal, the
effective period is not the
original
period specified, bu_t the period up to which the renewal
is granted.
That indicates that the life of a renewed
permit is
one and
continuous.
The matter is placed
bevond doubt when we turn to the rules which have
been framed
under the
Act.
Rule
184 ( 1) provides
that when a renewal is granted, it shall be endorsed on
the permit itself, and Form No. 33, which 1s prescribed
therefor is as follows :
"This permit is hereby
renewed up to
the ..... .
day of. ..... 19 ...... ".
Thus,
\~hat
is
renewed
is "this
permit".
In
this
connection, reference must be made to the definition of
"permit" in s. 2(2) of the
Act as "the document issued
by a
Provincial or
Regional
Transport
Authorit:/'.
Rule 185 is very material for the purpose of the present
rfocussion, and it runs as follows :
''If an application for the renewal· of a permit has
been made in
accordance
with
these rules and the
preocribcd fee paid hy the prescribed date, the permit
shall continue to he effective until orders are passed on
the application or until the expiry
of
three
months
from the <late of receipt of the application
whichever
is earlier.
If orders on the application
are not passed
within three months from· the date
of receipt of the
application, the permit-holder shall be entitled ro have
the permit renewed by the Transport Authority for the
period specified. in the application
or
for one year
whichever is less and the
Transport
Authority sha 11
call upon the permit-holder to produce the registration
certificate or certificates and
Part B or Parts A and R
of the permit, as the case may be, ancl
endorse the
renewal in Parts A and B of the permit
accordingly
and return them to the permit holder".
Under this rule, when
an application
for renewal
is
made, the permit already
granted
is to be in forcr
until an order is passed thereon,
and what is
more
important, if no order is passed within three
months,
19.'\7
V. C. J;. Bu-. Srrvfrt
Ltd.
v.
Th<" Rrgiona/
T ran~Oort
Autho~it·"·
CuimhatO..e
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
1957
r. C. K. Bus Service
Ltd.
v.
Th, Rtgiona!
Tran.:.port
Authorjty,
Coimbatore
V enkatarama
Ay;•a, J.
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f19571
the permit hccomes
automatically
renewed
for the
period mentioned in the rule.
This goes a long way
to support
the contention of the respondents that on
the scheme of the Act, renewal is a continuation of the
original permit.
It should also be mentioned that the
rules provide for different forms for an application
for
fresh permit ;md one
for renewal,
and the fee to be
paid along with those applications
is also
different.
A reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and of
the rules leads
indubitablv
to the
conclusion
that a
renewal is a continuation · of the
permit
previously
granted.
The fact that the grant of renewal is not a
matter of course, or that it is oprn to the authorities
to impose fresh conditions at the time of renewal does
not,
when the permit is in fact
renewed,
alter its
character as a renewal.
We shall now consider
the authorities
cited
by
learned
counsel for the appellant as supporting
the
view that a renewal
under
the
Act is in the same
position as a fresh permit.
In Mahabir Motor
Co. v.
Bilzar State('), the point for decision
was whether an
appeal lay under s. 64 (f) against an order granting a
renewal of a permit.
The contention before the
Court
was that the
Act made a distinction between the grant
of a permit and a renewal thereof, and that as s. 64 (f)
provided only for an appeal against an order granting
a permit, no appeal lay against an
order
granting a
renewal.
In repelling
this
contention
the
Court
observed:
"Both grant
and renewal stand more or less on
the same footing by reason of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the
Motor Vehicles Act. ....... ".
This observation has reference to the procedure to be
followed in the renewal of a permit and the right of
appeal given
under s.
64 as
part of that procedure.
It has no bearing on the character of a permit
when
it is renewed.
Another decision on which the appellant
strongly relied is Anjiah v. Regional Tra11sport
Officer,
Gu11t11r(' ). There, the
facts
were that
an order of
suspension had
been passed for breach of one of the
(1) f1956J l.L.R. 34 Patna 429.
(~) [1956) An<lhra Law Tin1es 347.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
conditions of the permit.
The correctness of the order
was challenged before higher authorities, but without
success.
Meantime, the period
fixed
in the permit
had expired, and it had been renewed.
The question
was whether the period of suspension could be enforced
against
the
renewed
permit. It was held
by
the
Andhra
High Cou_rt that it could not
be,
because
the renewal was, in essence, a new permit and not a
mere continuance of the old one.
The reason for this
decision was thus stated in the judgment :
"There is no
right of renewal as such and when
a permit is renewed, there is no right either, on the
part of the permit-holder to insist upon the continuance
of the old terms.
It would be undesirable that there
should be any such restrictions upon the right of the
authorities to grant the permit to anybody they choose
or subjecF to any conditions that they think it to be
necessary to impose, provided that they are acting all
the time in the
public
interest and subject to the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles
Act and the Rules
made thereunder."
These considerations, though not without force,
cannot, in our opinion, outweight the inference to be drawn
from 1:he other provisions
to which we have made
reference and for the reasons already
given, we are
unable to agree with this decision.
In the view that we have taken that under the
provisions of the Act and the rules, a renewal is a
continuation of the original
permit, there can
be no
doubt as to what
the rights of the
appellant
are.
When the proprietor of V. C. K. Bus
Service
was
granted a permit by the Regional Transport. Authority
on December 3, 1952,
that grant was subject · to the
result of the decision of the higher authorities.
On
September 5, 1954, when the
permit was renewed in
favour
of the appellant,
that
was
subject
to the
decision of the
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of
1954, which was then pending.
When the renewed
permit dated September 5, 1954, was
again renewed
on June 23, 1955,
that was likewise
subject
to the
result of the decision in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954.
When the High
Court by its judgment dated March
6-79 S, C, India/59
1957
V. C. K. Bus Smie1
Ltd.
v.
Tk&gjMipl
Tronsporl
~hori(y,
Coimbator1
VenkataratQO
AJ.)'ar J.
1957
Y. -C. K. Bus ·Se,,,k.
Ltd.
v.
Tiii Rtgi<na/
Transpcrt
Authoril;,,
Coimb01or1
Y1nkatarama
AY.)'ar ].
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
21, 1956, passed in the said
Writ Appeal upheld the
cancellation of the permit
which had been granted by
the
Regional
Transport
Authority on
December 3,
1952 to V. C. K. Bus Service, the
permit renewed on
June 23, 1955, became ineffective at least as from that
date.
The Regional Transpon Authority was therefore
right in treating
it as having become void, and granting by his order dated
May 5, 1956, permits to the
respondents.
The second question arises on the alternative contention advanced by the respondents that even if the
renewal is to be regarded, not as a continuation of the
original permit but as an independent grant, it must
be held to have
been sul:iject to an implied
condition
that if the original permit is ultimately set aside, the
renewal thereof
should come to an end.
Mr. Sastri,
learned counsel for the appellant, disputes the correctness of this contention.
He argues that when
there
is a document . embodying the terms of a contract,
it
is not permissible to imply therein a condition, if thatwill contradict or vary any terms contained in it, that
to read into the permit a condition that it is to cease
if the decision of the
High Court went against the
appellant, would be to modify the terms
contained
therein that it is to be effective
upto June 30, 1958,
and that
it could not therefore be implied.
He also
relies on the following observation of Lord Parker in
F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company Limited v. AngloMexican Petroleum Products Company Limited('):
"This principle is one of contract law, depending
on some term or condition to be implied in the contract
itself
and
not on
something
entirely
dehors
the
contract which brings the contract' to an end.
It is,
of course, impossible to imply in a contract any term
or condition inconsistent with its
express
provisions,
or with the intention of the parties as gathered from
those provisions."
It is undoubted law that when the terms of a contract
or grant are reduced to writing, no condition can be
implied therein, which will be inconsistent
with its
express terms.
But
th~ contention of the respondents
(1) [1916) • A.C. 397, tn
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
involves no conflict with this principle.
They do not
seek to obtain any modification or alteration of the
terms of the permit, leaving it
to operate
subject to
such
modification or alteration.
They want that the
whole permit with all its terms as to duration and
otherwise should be held to have become inoperative.
What they are pleading i5 a condition
subsequent on
the happening of which the permit will cease, and to
that situation the observation
quoted
above
has no
application.
Reference may be made in this connection to . the following observation
occurring later in
the speech of Lord Parker in F. A, Tamplin Steamsh~p
Company Limite{l v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products
Company, Limite'd (supra) :
"Moreover, some conditions can be more readily
implied than others.
Speaking
generally, it seems to
me _easier to imply a condition precedent defeating a
contract before its execution has
commenced than a
condition subsequent defeating
the contract when it
is part performed."
Thus, there is no legal obstacle to implying a condition
that the renewal should stand cancelled if the right of
the appellant to the original pen;nit was negatived by
the High Court.
That brings us on to the question of fact, whether
on an examination of the permit and of the circumstances under which it came to be granted,
we can
infer that it was the intention of the
Regional Transport
Authority to renew the
permit
subject to the
result of the decision of the
High Court in the appeal
which was then pending before it.
The r-ermit granted
to the V. C. K.
Bus Service on December 3, 1952, had
been cancelled on February 19, 1953, and it was only
by reason of the stay orders that the bus was permitted
to run.
When the
app~llant applied for renewal on
April 15,
1954, there was
opposition to the
grant
thereof from both the
respondents
herein,
based on
the decision of the
Government dated
July 9, 1953,
and it was in view of their objection that the
Regional
Transport
Authority renewed the permit for one year
from
July 1, 1954 to
June 30, 1955.
It is: true that
195?'
V. Cc 1'. Bus Servi&1
Ltd.
-v.
Tr .. &givnal
Transport
Authority,
Coimbator1
-
Ymkataramn
AY.Yar J.
1957
Y. C. IC. Bus Sm;,.
Lit!.
v.
T Iv Reginal
T 14n1port
AMlhorily,
Coi""'4tort
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
when the appellant applied again for renewal on March
19, 1955, the respondents did not raise objection thereto, but as the appeals in the High Court were still
pending, they had good reason
to
believe that
the
renewal
would not affect whatever rights might be
declared in their favour
by the
High Court.
As all
the papers relating to the grant of the original
permit
and the
subsequent
proceedings
were part
of the
record before the
Regional Transport Authority when
he renewed the permit on June 23, 1955, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that he really intended
to renew the permit only subject to the decision of the
High Court.
It is of the utmost importance in this connection to
bear in mind that the appellant applied not for a fresh
permit but for a renewal, and in sanctioning it, the
Regional Transport Authority expressly acted in exercise of his powers under
Rule 134-A read with s. 58 of
the Act, and if he did not expressly provide that it was
subject to the decision of the High Court, it must be
because he must hav•: considered that that was implicit
in the fact of its being only a renewal.
That that is
how the appellant understood it is clear beyond doubt
from the proceedings taken by it immediately after the
High Court pronounced its judgment.
But it is argued for the appellant on the strength of
the decision in Veerappa
Pillai v.
Raman &
Raman
Ltd.( 1) that the mere
knowledge
on the part of the
authorities that the
rights of the parties were under
litigation is not a sufficient ground to import a condition in the permit that it is subject to the result of that
litigation, when in its
terms it is unconditional.
We
do not read that decision as
authority for
any
such
broad contention. There, the question related
to five
permits, which had
been originally
granted
to
one
Balasubramania.
Raman and Raman Ltd. obta1ried a
transfer of the relative buses, and applied to the fransport authorities for transfer of the
permits to itself.
Then,
Veerappa
having
subsequently
obtained
a
transfer
of
the
same
buses
frnm
Balasubramania,
(1) [1950) S.C.R. 583.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
applied to have the permits transferred in
his name.
On October 3, 1944, he also instituted a suit in the Sub.
Court, Kumbakonam, to establish his title to the buses
against Raman and Raman Ltd., and that was decreed
in his favour on
May 2, 1946.
Raman and
Raman
Ltd. appealed against this decision to the Madras High
Court, which by its judgment dated September 2, 1949,
reversed the decree of the Sub-Court and held that it
was entitled
to the buses.
While these
proceedings
were. going on, the transport authorities suspended on
March 28; 1944, the permits which had been granted to
B;ilambramania an<l instead, they
were issuing temporary permits from time to time to Veerappa, who had
been appointed receiver m the suit in the
Sub-Court,
Kumbakonam.
On March 29, 1949, the
Government
decided to disc'.:>ntinue the policy of granting temporary
permits
indefinitely, and accordingly
granted permanent permits, to Veerappa. Then on October i4, 1949,
Veerappa applied
for
renewal
of
_these permanent
permits, and that was granted by the
Regional Transport Authority on January 3, 1950.
The question
was
whether this
order was bad on the ground that it was
inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that
it was Raman and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a
valid
title to the
buses.
This Court held
that the
ownership of the buses was only one of the factors to
be taken into account in granting
the
permits, and
that as the Regional Transport Authority granted the
renewal on an appreciation of all' the facts, his decision
was not liable to be questioned in proceedings
under
Art. 226.
It should be noted that the renewal which
was granted on January 3,
1950, was
of permanent
permits granted in
pursuance of
the
order of
the
Government dated
March 29, 1949,
which had quite
plainly declared as a matter
of policy
that
notwithstanding the pendency of litigation between the parties,
permanent
permits
should
be granted
to Veerappa.
There can be no questi1>n of
implying thereafter a
condition that they were subject to the decision of the
Court.
Moreover, the renewal was granted on January
3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2,
1949, and any attack on that
order
could only be by
19~7
v. c. x. Bw Smlict
/;fi.
v.
T!Y Stci01!Gl
Trtw~
~.
c.imballWf
V...,.,_11
..W•J·
fg57
V. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1
Ltd.
"
Tht Re-gionttl
Transport
Au.tlwritJ
Coimbatore
VuJoatarama
Ayy11r].·
February 1 g,
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(i957]
way of appeal against it, and that had not been done.
We are of opinion that the decision in
Veerappa Pillai
v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1
) is of no assistance
to the
appellant.
In the result, we affitm the decision of the High
Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June
23, 1955, is a continuation
of the permit granted
on
December 3, 1952,
and
must fall to the ground when
that stood finally set aside
by the
judgment
of the
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March
21, 1956, and on the ground
that it was an implied
condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to
the decision of the
High
Court in that appeal, and that
in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be
effective.
These appeals fail, and are
dismissed
with costs in
Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.
Apf!eals dismissed ..
ASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA
"·
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(BHAGWATI,
]AGANNADHAOAS,
JAFER
IMAM,
GOVINDA
MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
Crirninal trial-Enactment providinK for speedy trial-Specified
offences made tn'able only by Special fudges empotvcred td atvard
heavier sentences-If violates equality' befo1'e the larv-Pendency ofC.'iminal !.Aw Amendment Act, (XLVI of
1952)-Constitution of
India, Art. 14.
The appeilant
and four others
were being tried before the
Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with
116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the
Indian Penal
Code.
During the pendency of the trial
the Criminal
Law
Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament
and came into force on July 28, 1952. The Act provided for ,the
trial of all offences punishable unc!er ss. 161, 165 or 165-A, of the
Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s. 5, of the
Prevention
of
Corruption Act, 1947 exclusively by Special Judges and directed
the transfer of all such trials pending on the date of the coming
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.