# KAPUR CHAND .JAIN v. B. S. GREW AL & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1965] 2 S.C.R. 36
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-11-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 833 of 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kapur-chand-jain-v-b-s-grew-al-others-3415
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

KAPUR CHAND .JAIN
v.
B. S. GREW AL & OTHERS
November 6, 1964
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J.; K. N. WANCHOO AND
M .
M. HIDAYATU.LLAH, JJ.]
The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953), ss. 9(l)(ii) and
. !4.A(i) and (ii)-Non-payment of rent-Whetlier without sufficient cause-
.IJetermination--If conduct prior 10 Act can be considered.
The appellant and respondent were the tenant and land-lord of certain
agricultural lands to which the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Ac~ 1953,
applied.
The appellant tried to avoid payment of rent for each year of
the lease period (1951-1955), under one pretext or the other, and for
every year recoveries of rent were only made through the court.
After
the period of lease expired, the appellant continued to h<>ld over without
paying rent.
So the respondent filed two applications to the appropriate
authorities, one for arrears <>f rent under s. 14A(ii) and the other for
eviction under S, 14A(i). on the ground, inter alia, specified in s. 9( 1) (ii)
that the a;>pellant had failed to pay the rent regularly, with<>ut sufficient
cause.
On the application for rent, the appellant was asked to pay the
arrears which he did within the time fixed.
The application for eviction
was dismissed, but on appeal by the respondent, the appellant was ordered
to be evicted.
The appellant's further appeal application for revision and
petition to the l-ligh Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the C~onstitution were
>tll dismissed.
In the appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that, (i) s. 9( I) (ii)
applies only prospectively and therefore the conduct of the tenant, prior
10 the enactIT'.ent of ·s. 14/\ in 1955, could not be taken into account for
Jeterrnini!'lg that there was not sufficient c::use for non-payment, and (ii)
as the app~llant had paid the arre:1rs w·ithin the time fL"{ed he could not be
evicted.
HELD : Though the appellant could not he evicted under s. 14A(ii I
his case wiu ~"vercd liy s. J 4A(i) and his eviction could be ordered because,
the irrc~u!arity in payment was patent and there was no sufficient cause.
142 A]
The necessary condition for the application of s. 9( I) (ii) may comn1ence even . before the Act came into force and past conduct which is as
• relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act,
cannot he overlooked.
A statute is not applied retrospectively
merely
because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a mo~enl
prior to its passing. [41 A-C]
The scheme of the Act shows that els. (i) and (ii) of s. 14A are
entirely different and that there is no inconsistency between them. Clause
(ii) deals with eviction as punishment for non-compliance with an order
to deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment. whereas
cl. (i) deals with eviction for any of the reasons given in s. 9(1), one
of which is nonwpayment of rent regularly without sufficient cause, under
1. 9(1) (ii) [41 D-El

## Text

KAPUR CHAND .JAIN
v.
B. S. GREW AL & OTHERS
November 6, 1964
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J.; K. N. WANCHOO AND
M .
M. HIDAYATU.LLAH, JJ.]
The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953), ss. 9(l)(ii) and
. !4.A(i) and (ii)-Non-payment of rent-Whetlier without sufficient cause-
.IJetermination--If conduct prior 10 Act can be considered.
The appellant and respondent were the tenant and land-lord of certain
agricultural lands to which the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Ac~ 1953,
applied.
The appellant tried to avoid payment of rent for each year of
the lease period (1951-1955), under one pretext or the other, and for
every year recoveries of rent were only made through the court.
After
the period of lease expired, the appellant continued to h<>ld over without
paying rent.
So the respondent filed two applications to the appropriate
authorities, one for arrears <>f rent under s. 14A(ii) and the other for
eviction under S, 14A(i). on the ground, inter alia, specified in s. 9( 1) (ii)
that the a;>pellant had failed to pay the rent regularly, with<>ut sufficient
cause.
On the application for rent, the appellant was asked to pay the
arrears which he did within the time fixed.
The application for eviction
was dismissed, but on appeal by the respondent, the appellant was ordered
to be evicted.
The appellant's further appeal application for revision and
petition to the l-ligh Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the C~onstitution were
>tll dismissed.
In the appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that, (i) s. 9( I) (ii)
applies only prospectively and therefore the conduct of the tenant, prior
10 the enactIT'.ent of ·s. 14/\ in 1955, could not be taken into account for
Jeterrnini!'lg that there was not sufficient c::use for non-payment, and (ii)
as the app~llant had paid the arre:1rs w·ithin the time fL"{ed he could not be
evicted.
HELD : Though the appellant could not he evicted under s. 14A(ii I
his case wiu ~"vercd liy s. J 4A(i) and his eviction could be ordered because,
the irrc~u!arity in payment was patent and there was no sufficient cause.
142 A]
The necessary condition for the application of s. 9( I) (ii) may comn1ence even . before the Act came into force and past conduct which is as
• relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act,
cannot he overlooked.
A statute is not applied retrospectively
merely
because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a mo~enl
prior to its passing. [41 A-C]
The scheme of the Act shows that els. (i) and (ii) of s. 14A are
entirely different and that there is no inconsistency between them. Clause
(ii) deals with eviction as punishment for non-compliance with an order
to deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment. whereas
cl. (i) deals with eviction for any of the reasons given in s. 9(1), one
of which is nonwpayment of rent regularly without sufficient cause, under
1. 9(1) (ii) [41 D-El
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 833 of
1962.
Appeal by special leave from the order, dated March 9, 1961
of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 291 of 1961..
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KAPUR CHAND v. GREWAL (Hidayatul/ah, J.)
37
A
B. R. L. Iyengar and T. S. Venkataraman, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
Hidayatullah, J.
The appellant obtained on lease from the
4th respondent (Raja Charanjit Singh) 208 canals of agricultural
land for five years commencing from Rabi 1951 to Kharif 1955
on an annual rent of Rs. 7,500. The lease deed was registered
and was executed on November 20, 1950. The appellant paid a
sum of Rs. 7,500 as advance rent for one year. There was a
C tube well on the land and one of the terms of the lease was that
the Raja would put the tube well into working order and the
lease was to commence on the day this was done. The tube well
was repaired on July 11, 1951 and the lease is said to have commenced on that day. According to the appellant the tube well did
not deliver the right quantity of water and that led to certain
D
disputes.
The appellant did not pay rent for the subsequent years. On
August 15, 1952 the Raja filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 7,500
as rent for Rabi and Kharif, 1951. He claimed that Rs. 7,500
paid to him was to be retained as deposit to be adjusted towards the
E
final payment. The appellant resisted this demand mainly on the
ground that the tube well was not functioning as required by the
lease deed. This suit was decreed on March 23, 1957 and an
amount of Rs. 859-4-0 ·was found due. This was because on April
15, 1953 the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 came
into force and under s. 12 of that Act the maximum rent payable
F by a tenant for any land held by him was not to exceed I/3rd of
the crop of such land or of the value of the crop determined in
the manner to be pr~cribed by Rules. For this period an amount
of Rs. 4,313 was held to be the value of the produce and after·
making deduction for sundry payments to the Raja the decree was
for the amount stated. The appellant paid that amount forthwith.
G The appellant did not pay the rlnt for the years 1952, 1953 and
1954 and on January 5, 1955 the Raja brought another suit for the
recovery of Rs. 22.500 as arrears of rent for these three years and
on October 8, 1956 filed a revised application under s. 14-A(ii)
added from 19 5 5 to the Act. During the pendency of this suit
the appellant was asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 7 ,000 which he
H
did on January 22, 1957. Later, the amount payable under s. 12
of the Act was found to be Rs. 13,378-2-0 and on June 21, 1957
the appellant deposited the balance. The appellant did not pay
•
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R..
rent for the year 1955 and though his lease expired with Kharif.
A
1955 he continued holding over and did not pay rent for Rabi
1956. The Raja made an application on October 10, 1956 under
s. 14-A(i) for the eviction of the appellant on the ground inter alia
that he had failed fo pay rent regularly without sufficient cause.
Under s. 14-A(i) the application for eviction lay before an Assistant Collector, First Grade, while under s. 14-A(ii) the application
B
for recovery of arrears of rent (to which category belonged the
revised application dated October 8,
1956, which we have
mentioned before) lay before an Assistant Collector Second Grade.
As a result the question of the eviction of the tenant on the ground
that he was irregular in payment of rent was tried in one court and
C
the recovery proceedings were tried in another court. The pro-
. ceedings under s. 14-A(i) temtinated in favour of the appellant
on December 24, 1958, the Assistant Collector, First Grade,
Jullundur holding that the tenant had sufficient cause not to pay
rent fixed by the lease deed and the Raja could not clait;n ejectment on that ground. The Raja appealed. The Collector, Jtlllundur
D
District, on May 20, 1959, reversed the order and direded that
the appellant be evicted. An appeal by the appellant before the
Commissioner, Jullundur Division failed as also an applici!,tion for
revision before the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The ~ppellant
then moved the High Court of Punjab at ChandigarJ!. under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. His petition was sumE
marily dismissed by a Division Bench on March 9, 1961. The
appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.
Section 14-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act,
19 5 3 reads as follows :-
" 14-A. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force,
and subject to the provisions of section 9-A,-
( i) a land-owner desiring to eject a tenant under this
Act shall apply in writing to the Assistant Collector,
First Grade, having jurisdiction, who shall thereafter
proceed as provided for in su.b-section (2) of section IO
of this Act, and the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of the
said section shall also apply in rell)tion to such application, provided that the tenants' rights to compensation,
and acquisition of occupancy rigQ_ts, if any, under the
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), shall not
be affected;
(ii) a land-owner desiring to recover arrears of rent
from a tenant shall apply in writing to the Assistant ColF
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KAPUR CHAND v. GREWAL (Hidayatullah, !.)
39
lector, Second Grade, having jurisdiction, who shall
thereupon send a notice, in the form prescribed, to the
tenant either to deposit the rent or value thereof, if payable in kind, or give proof of having paid it or of the fact
that he is not liable to pay the whole or part of the rent,
or of the fact of the landlord's refusal to receive the same
or to give a receipt, within the period specified in the
notice.
Where, after summary determination, as provided for in sub-section ( 2) of section I 0 of this Act,
the Assistant Collector finds that the tenant has not paid
or deposited the rent, he shall eject the tenant summarily
and put the land-owner in possession of the land
concerned;
(iii) (a) if a land-lord refuses to accept rent from
his tenant or demands rent in excess of what he is entitled
to under this Act, or refuses to give a receipt, the tenant
may in writing inform the Assistant Collector, Second
Grade, having jurisdiction of the fact;
(b) on receiving such application the Assistant Collector shall by a written notice require the landlord to
accept the rent payable in accordance with this Act, or
to give a . receipt, as the case may be, or both, within
60 days of the receipt of the notice."
In this connection we may quote the relevant provisions of s. 9 :
"9 ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, no land-owner shall
be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant-
( i) is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or
is a tenant of a small land-owner; or
(ii) fails to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause;
or.
(iii) is in arrears of rent at the commencement of this
Act; or
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (iii), a
tenant shall be deemed to be in arrears of rent at the
40
SUPREME COURt REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
commencement of this Act, only if the payment. of
A
arrears is not made by the tenant within a period of two
months from the date of notice of the execution of
decree or order, directing him to pay such arrears of
rent."
Section 10 provides the procedure which has to be followed when B
,
the landlord makes an application. That section, however, need
not be quoted because no question about .the right procedure
arises here.
·
It will be noticed that the first clause of s. 14-A is general.
It enables a land-owner to apply for the eviction of his tenant on
C
any of the grounds stated in the Act in s. 9. The second clause
is designed primarily to enable the land-owner to recover arrears
of rent from a tenant but the tenant may be ordered to be evicted
if after the determination of the rent he does not pay it within the
time fixed by the Collector.
Clause (iii) enables a tenant to
inform the Collector of the landlord's refusal to accept rent from
D
him or of a demand of rent in excess of what it should be under
the Act.
The Rules for the determination of the value of the produce
under s. 12 did not come into existence till May 19, 1953. The
appellant .has taken advantage of this circumstance to plead E
before us that his failure to pay the rent was solely due to his
inability to determine the exact rent in the manner contemplated
in s. 12 and the Rules. Tiris belies his statement that he took the
amount to the landlord but the landlord refused to receive it. His
statement was rightly not believed because if the landlord had
refused to receive pljyment, the appellant would have informed F
the Assistant Collector under s. 14-A(iii) and asked for protection. He did nothing of the kind. It is quite clear that he took
advantage of the new Act to avoid payment of rent. For the first
year be did so on the ground that the tube well was not functioning
according to the agreement. For the subsequent years he avoided G
payment on the ground that he was only required to pay l /3rd
of the produce or its value. For every year a suit had to be filed
and recoveries were only made through the court. This establishes
the very kind of conduct which is contemplated by s. 9(1 )(ii)
aud which furnishes a ground for eviction of the tenant under
s. 14-A(i).
Mr. Iyengar argues that s. 9( 1 )(ii) applies prospectively and
the conduct of the tenant prior to the enactment of s. 14-A cannot
H
KAPUR CHAND v. GREWAL (Hidayatullah, J.)
41
A be taken into account. In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant
prior to the coming into force of the new section can be taken
into account. No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively.
But a statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the
requisites for its action is drawn from a moment of time prior
to its passing. The clause in question makes a particular conduct
B the ground for an applicl\tion for eviction. The necessary condition for the application of s. 9(1 )(ii) may commence even before
the Act came into force and past conduct which is as relevant
for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act,
•annot be overlooked. The Tribunals were therefore right in considering conduct of the appellant prior to the coming into force
C of s. 14-A while determining whether the appellant was irrei,'lllar
in paying the rent.
Mr. Iyengar next contends that as under cl. (ii) of s. 14-A
the appellant was asked to pay the arrears of rent and he paid
them within the time fixed, no eviction can be ordered. Clause (ii)
0
deals with eviction as punishment for non-compliance with the
orders of the court. Clause ( i) deals with evictions for any of the
reasons given in s. 9 ( l ) . One such reason is that the tenant has
failed to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause.
Eviction
under the second clause is for failure to carry out the orders to
deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment and evicE tion under the first clause is a penalty for not paying the rent
regularly without sufficient cause.
The clauses are on different
footing and as the scheme of the Act itself shows different Tribunals deterinine the two issues. The appellant tried to have the
various proceedings consolidated in the same court, but curiously
enough he asked that the proceedings for the recovery of arrears
F of rent should be stayed. His motive is quite apparent. He wanted
to defend himself against liability arising under s. 9 (1 )( i) on the
ground that he could not pay the rent till 1/3rd of the produce or
its value was determined under the Rules. We have said above
that his statement was that he wanted to pay the exact amount
but the landlord did not receive it. It is quite obvious that he
G avoided payment over the years under one pretext or the other
and the Tribunals were right in holding that he had failed to make
out sufficient cause· for non-payment.
Indeed such a finding
given concurrently by the High Court and the three Tribunals
below would be sufficient for the disposal of the case. We have
only allowed the argument to be raised- because Mr. Ivengar
H claimed that conditions on which persons can be evicted under the
two clauses of s. 14-A, were inconsistent. On examination it is
apparent that the reasons for eviction under the two clauses are
L3Sup./65--4
42
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
entirely different. The appellant could not be evicted under tbc
A
second clause of s. 14-A but it is obvious tbat his case is covered
by the first clause.
The irregularity in payment is patent and
there was no sufficient cause.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
B