# KARAM CHAND THAPAR & BROS. (COAL SALES) LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 25
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-07-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 928 and 929 of 1975
- **Bench:** A. C. Gupta, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/karam-chand-thapar-bros-coal-sales-limited-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-6912
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

Central Sales Tax Act (74. of 1956), s. 9(1), proviso-Scope of.
25
U.P. Sales Tax Act .• 1948, S. 22-0rder of rectification passed within 3 years
tJf original order, but served beyond 3 years-If barred by limitation.
'
Under s. 3 (b), Central Sales Tax Act, 19 56, a sale or purchase of goods
A
B
is deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commer~e if the
sale or purchase is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods
C
-during their movement from one State to another. Section 7(3) provides that
on the application of the dealer the prescribed authority shall register the
applicant and grant him a registration certificate which shall specify the
-class or classes of goods for the purpose of s. 8 ( 1); and the Form prescribed
by r. 3, Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, for application for registration, requires the purposes for which the goods were purchased
.by the dealer to be specified, re-sale beiug one· such purpose.
Section 8 ( 1) (b)
provides that every dealer who, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
D
selJs, to a registered dealer other than the Government; goods of the description
referred to in sub-s. (3) shall be liable to pay 3% of his turnover ~s tax
under the Act; whereas, under s. 8(2), the tax payable with respect to goods
which do not fall within sub-s. (I) shall be, in t:lm case of declared goods,
at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate
State and in the case of other goods 10%, or the rate applicable in the State,
whichever is higher. Prior to April 1, 1963, s. 8 (3) stated, that the goods
referred to in s. 8 (1 )(b), " (a) in the case of declared goods, are goods of the
class or classes specified in the certificate of the registered dealer purchasing
E
the goods as being intended for re-sale by him; and (b) in the case of goods
other than declared goods are goods of the class or classes specified in the
certificate of registration of the registered dealer purchasing the goods as being
intended for re-sale by him."
By the Amendment Act (8 of 1963), cl. (a)
was omitted and the opening words in cl. (b), "in the case of goods other
than declared goods" were also omitted; so that, after April 1, 1963, the goods
referred to in s. 8(1)(b) are specified in sub-s. (3) as goods of the class or
classes specified in the certificate of registration of the registered dealer purchasiug
F
the goods as being intended for re-sale by him. Section 8(4)(a) says that
the provisions of s. 8 ( 1) shall not apply to any sale in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes to the prescribed
authority in the prescribed manner, a declaration in the prescribed. Form, duly
filled and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold containing
the prescribed ·particulars. Section 9(1) contains a general rule that the tax
payable by any dealer on sales effected in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce would be levied by the Government of Ind_ili and collected in the
State from which the movement of the goods commenced.
The proviso to the
G
sub-section qualifies this rule in the case of a subsequent sale which is not
exempted from tax under s. 6(2), and states, that the tax on such subsequent
sale would be levied and collected in the State from which the registered dealer
effecting thel subsequent siale obtained, or
could have obtained,
the
Form
prescribed for the purpose of s. 8(4)(a). Coal is one of the declared goods
having been declared under s. 14 to be of special importance in inter-State
trade or commerce.
The appellant was a Company carrying on business as coal agents and was
H
Tegistered in U.P. under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the Central Sales
Tax Act. The appellant arranged for the supply of. coal from collieries in
W. Bengal and Bihar to consumers in U.P.
The collieries sent the coal by
4-1003 SCT/76
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,715 of 69,971. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39715 for what follows._

KARAM CHAND THAPAR & BROS. (COAL SALES)
LIMITED
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
July 21, 1976
[A. C. GUPTA AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
Central Sales Tax Act (74. of 1956), s. 9(1), proviso-Scope of.
25
U.P. Sales Tax Act .• 1948, S. 22-0rder of rectification passed within 3 years
tJf original order, but served beyond 3 years-If barred by limitation.
'
Under s. 3 (b), Central Sales Tax Act, 19 56, a sale or purchase of goods
A
B
is deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commer~e if the
sale or purchase is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods
C
-during their movement from one State to another. Section 7(3) provides that
on the application of the dealer the prescribed authority shall register the
applicant and grant him a registration certificate which shall specify the
-class or classes of goods for the purpose of s. 8 ( 1); and the Form prescribed
by r. 3, Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, for application for registration, requires the purposes for which the goods were purchased
.by the dealer to be specified, re-sale beiug one· such purpose.
Section 8 ( 1) (b)
provides that every dealer who, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
D
selJs, to a registered dealer other than the Government; goods of the description
referred to in sub-s. (3) shall be liable to pay 3% of his turnover ~s tax
under the Act; whereas, under s. 8(2), the tax payable with respect to goods
which do not fall within sub-s. (I) shall be, in t:lm case of declared goods,
at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate
State and in the case of other goods 10%, or the rate applicable in the State,
whichever is higher. Prior to April 1, 1963, s. 8 (3) stated, that the goods
referred to in s. 8 (1 )(b), " (a) in the case of declared goods, are goods of the
class or classes specified in the certificate of the registered dealer purchasing
E
the goods as being intended for re-sale by him; and (b) in the case of goods
other than declared goods are goods of the class or classes specified in the
certificate of registration of the registered dealer purchasing the goods as being
intended for re-sale by him."
By the Amendment Act (8 of 1963), cl. (a)
was omitted and the opening words in cl. (b), "in the case of goods other
than declared goods" were also omitted; so that, after April 1, 1963, the goods
referred to in s. 8(1)(b) are specified in sub-s. (3) as goods of the class or
classes specified in the certificate of registration of the registered dealer purchasiug
F
the goods as being intended for re-sale by him. Section 8(4)(a) says that
the provisions of s. 8 ( 1) shall not apply to any sale in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes to the prescribed
authority in the prescribed manner, a declaration in the prescribed. Form, duly
filled and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold containing
the prescribed ·particulars. Section 9(1) contains a general rule that the tax
payable by any dealer on sales effected in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce would be levied by the Government of Ind_ili and collected in the
State from which the movement of the goods commenced.
The proviso to the
G
sub-section qualifies this rule in the case of a subsequent sale which is not
exempted from tax under s. 6(2), and states, that the tax on such subsequent
sale would be levied and collected in the State from which the registered dealer
effecting thel subsequent siale obtained, or
could have obtained,
the
Form
prescribed for the purpose of s. 8(4)(a). Coal is one of the declared goods
having been declared under s. 14 to be of special importance in inter-State
trade or commerce.
The appellant was a Company carrying on business as coal agents and was
H
Tegistered in U.P. under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the Central Sales
Tax Act. The appellant arranged for the supply of. coal from collieries in
W. Bengal and Bihar to consumers in U.P.
The collieries sent the coal by
4-1003 SCT/76
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
rail, the railway receipts either in the name of the appellant or in the name of
the consumer in U .P., and sent the bills and invoices to the appellant's head
office in Calcutta. The appellant forwarded the railway receipts 1:0 the consumers in cases where the receipts were in the names of the consumers, and in
cases where the receipts were in the appellant's name also endorsed them in
favour of the consumers. There was thus, in the latter cases, a subse:quent sale of
goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce by the transfer of documents of title by the appellant to the consumers in U.P. For tb.e assessment
year 1966-67 the appellant claimed that the turnover in cases where the railway
receipts had been subsequently endorsed in favour of the consumers in U .P.
was noUaxable in U.P. · Tue Sales-tax Officer by order dated March 27, 1971,
accepted the contention, relying on a decision of the High Court. But, in
subsequent decisions, the High Court held that in cases where a regisetred
dealer effected a second sale. in the course of inter Stare trade and commerce,
sales tax on the turnover was to be realised in the State whern the dea}er
effecting the sale was registered; and in one of the decisions it was observed
that the decision on which the Sales-tax Officer relied had overlooked the proviso
to s. 9 (1) of the Central Act. The Sales-tax Officer accordingly proposed to
rectify the error committed by him and after following the procedu:re prescribed
for rectification of errors apparent on the face· of the record in >. 22 of the
U.P. Act, passed an order on March 26, 1974, rectifyifli.g the mistake and
served it on the appellant on March 31, 1974. The appellant challenged the
order unsuccessfully in the High Court.
In appeal to this Court it was contended :
(1) That the declaration prescribed under s. 8 ( 4 )(a) is necessary when
s. 8 (1 )' was applicable, but that, after the omission in s. 8 ( 3), reference to
'declared goods' is omitted in that section, so that when s. 8 ( 1 )(b) refers to the
sale of goods mentioned in s. 8 (3) the reference is only to good!: other than
declared goods and hence, when a dealer ~ells declared goods, he could not
have obtained the prescribed declaration and so the proviso to s. 9( l) did not
apply;
(2) Section 22 of the U.P. Act was not applicable as there wa1. no mistake
apparent on the face of the record; and
(3) The order under s. 22 was barred by limitation, because it was effective
only when it was served on the appellant.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The 1971-a~essment order was wrong. [46 GJ
The Act and the rules and the prescribed Forms make no distinction between
declared goods and other goods, except for the purpose of the rate of tax.
Under s. 7 (3) the registration certificate granted to a dealer has to specify
the class or classes of goods for the purposes of s. 8(1) and ii. makes no
distinction between declared goods and other goods.
Sub-sections 8 fl) and (3)
als0 show that all sales to a registered dealer other than the Government,
whether of declared goods or other goods, are covered by s. 8(1). Clause (a)
was omitted from s. 8(3) presumably because it was considered unnecessary
to retain it when cl. (b) apparently covered all goods both declared and
other than declared. The declaration referred to ins. 8(4)(a) iS necessary for
the dealer to avail himself of the benefit of the rate of tax mentiQnecl in s. 8 (1).
There is no valid reason why the appellant could not have obtained the declaration in the prescribed Form as required by the .proviso to s. 9(1). Since no
claim for exemption under s. 6(2) is made by the appellant, the first. order
of assessment was contrary to the proviso of s. 9(1) and the sales in question
were taxable within the respondent-State, where the appellant was registered as
a dealer. [45 D-Hl
(2) The 197~-ord~r of assess~ent was patently erroneo'!s in that it ff\iled
to take into cons1derallon the proviso to s. 9 ( l). Therefore, 1t could be rectified
under s. 22, U.P. Act. [46 G]
. r{"
't
KARAM CHAND V. U,P,
27
(3) The order rectifying the mistake was recorded within 3 years of the
date of the original order as required qy s. 22 of the U.P. Act. The fact that
the order was communicated, to the appellant on March 31, 197 4 could not
make any difference.
The order of r.ectification is deemed to be made on the
date of communication only for the purpose of counting the period of limitation
for filing the appeal, under s. 9 of the U.P. Act. Therefore, in the instant case,
the appellant was not affected by the order under s. 22 being communicated to it
after the expiry ,of 3 years from the date of the original order. [ 47 B; 48 BJ
Raja Barish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Office~
[1962] 3 S.C.R. 676 and Madan Lal v. State of U.P. [1975] 3 S.C.C. 779
explained & distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 928 and
929 of 1975.
(From the Judgment and.Order dated 8-10-1974 of the Allahabad
High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 2169 and 2276 of 1974).
F. S. Nariman, D. N. Misra and 0. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
S. C. Manchanda and 0. P. Rana, for the respondents.
ARGUMENTS
APPELLANTS
I. Civil Appeal No. 928 of 1975.-In this Appeal three questions
arise for determination :
.
.
( i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case
the proviso to s. 9 ( 1) of the Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956 was applicable so as to enable the State
of Uttar Pradesh to levy and collect Central Sales
Tax in respect of the subsequent sales of coal effected by the Appellants to consumers in the State of
U.P.?
(ii) Whether the Sales
Tax
Officer,
Moradabad
had
no jurisdiction to rectify the assessment for the year
1966-67 as there was no error apparent on the
face of the record of the original assessment (s. 22
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948)?
(iii) Whether the order
of
rectification
passed
under
s. 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act on 26th March,
1974 (for the assessment year 1966-67) and communicated to the Appellants on 31st March, 1974
was barred by limitation as it could not be said
to be "within three years from the date of'' the
original assessment order dated the
27th
March,
1971 ?
I~. Re: W~ether in the facts and circumstances of the case the prov1s<:.._ to Sectzon 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was applicable
so as to enable the State of Uttar Pradesh to levy and collect 'Central
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1977] 1 S.C.R.
A· Sales Tax il.z respt!Ct of the subsequent sales of coal effected by the
Appellants to consumers in the State of U.I'. ?
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(a) The proviso to s. 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
. does not apply either :--
(i) to subsequent sales (in the course of inter-Slate
trade or commerce) of declared goods-i.e. goods
declared in s. 14 to be of special importance in
inter-State trade or commerce; or
(ii) to sale of goods to persons other
than
registered
dealers;
(b) The argum1Cnt in support of lhc submission that the
proviso to s. 9 (I ) does not apply to declared goods 1s as
follows :-
Section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Central Sales
Tax
Act, 1956 deals separately with two types of goods,
name! y, ( i) goods of the description referred to in
sub-section
(3)
[see
s. 8(1) (b) and (ii)] declared goods [see s. 8(2) (a)].
The rates of tax
for the two types of goods have been
and
are
differently prescribed in sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2)
of s. 8-especially since the Amending Act VIII
of 1963. The expression "goods of the description
referred to in sub-section ( 3)" in s. 8 (1) originally included declared goods intended for re-sale [see
s. 8(3) (a)] as originally enacted in
the
Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956 (reproduced in Chaturvedi's
Central Sales Tax Act, 4th Edition, p. 548). Subsection ( 3) of s. 8 then read as follows :
"(3) The goods referred to in sub-section (l)-
( a) in the case of declared goods, are goods of
the class or classes specified in the certificate
of registration of the registered dealer purchasing the goods as being intended for resale by
him; and
(b) in any other case, are goods of the class or
classes specified in the certificate
o~ registration of the registered dealer
purchasing
the
goods as being intended for re-sale by him or
for use by him in the manufacture of goods for
sale or for use by him in the execution of a11y
contract;
and in either case include the containers or other
materials used for the packing of goods
of
the
class or classes of goods so specified."
By the Amending Act VIII of 1963 (which raised the
rate of tax under s. 8(1) to 2 per cent), clause (a) of
s. 8 ( 3) stood deieted.
The effect of this deletion was
.'{
t
t. ~
't
+
KARAM CHAND V. U.P.
29
that since 1963 declared goods fell outside the purview of
A
s. 8 ( 3). Sectio1i 8 ( 4) only applies to sales of goods of the
description referred to in sub-s. ( 3) , since the provisions
of that sub-section have express reference to the provisions
of s. 8 (1). For the proviso to s. 9 ( 1) being applicable it
is necessary that the registered dealer effecting the subsequent sale obtained or could have obtained the form prescribed in s . .8(4) (a)-i.e. Form 'C' prescribed under rr.
B
12 and 13 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 (see pages 25 and 27 of Chaturv.edi's
Central Sales Tax Act, Fourth Edition).
In the present case, the appellants neither obtained nor
could have obtained Form 'C' from their purchaser since
s. 8(4) [read withs. 8(1) and (3)] did
not
(a[ter
1963) apply to declared goods.
h is submitted that to accept the arguments urged on
behalf of the Respondents that s. 8( 4) (a)
[read
with
s.
8 ( 1) and ( 3)] dealt with declared goods as well,
would be to give no meaning to the provisions contained in
s. 8(2). Besides, as held by Their Lordships in State of
Tamil Nadu v. Sitalakshmi Mills & Others C [1974] 4 S.C.C.
408 at 412 para 6), s. 8 deals with three different classes of cases-declared goods do not fall within the class
mentioned in s. 8 (1).
The argument that the charging s. 6 does not make any
differentiation between declared and undeclared goods is of
no avail.
Section 6(1) itself commences with the words
"Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act ..... .
. . . . ". If the effect of any other provision is to take away
liability to pay sales tax, effect would have to be given to
that other provision notwithstanding the charging section
[see State of Mysore v. L. Setty 16 S.T.C. 231, 239 (S.C.)].
Declared goods are clearly intended by the
framers
of
Central Tax Act, 1956 to receive preferential treatment not
only in respect of local sales tax on local sales (see s. 15),
but also Central Sales Tax in sales effected
during
the
course of inter-State trade or commerce [sees. 8(2)] .
.
(c) Even assuming that s. 8(4)(a) [read with s. 8(1)
and (3)] include within its
purview
"declared
goods",
the proviso to s. 9 (I) is still inapplicable for the following reason :-
For the proviso to s. 9 ( 1) to be applicable and for
the State of. U.P. to have jurisdiction to levy and
collect the Central Sales Tax on subsequent sales,
it is necessary that the registered dealer effecting
the subsequent sales (by endorsement of documents
of title like Railway Receipt during the course of
the movement of the goods from one State to another) either "obtained or as the case may
be
c
D
E
F
G
11
30
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
could have obtained" the Form prescribed
in
s.
8 ( 4 )(a) in connection with the purchase of such
goods involved in the subsequent
sale.
Such
a
form could only be
obtained
under s. 8(4)(a)
from the appellants' purchasers if the appellants'
sales
were to
be •"a registered
dealer"
[see
s. 8(1)(b)].
Admittedly in the present case
the appellants though registered dealer for the relevant year in question did not sell coal
to
any
registered deafor [see the averments in para 11 of
the Writ Petition, page 62 Vol. 2 which have 1wt
been denied in the Affidavit in
Reply
(para 8
page 109 Vol. 2].
Therefore, even assuming that
the provisions of s. 8 ( 4) (a) [read with s. 8 (1) and
( 3) ] were applicable to declared goods (even after
the Amending Act VIII of 1963), the sales
resulting in the turnover of Rs. 5,59,172.38 not being
to registered dealers, the provisions of s. 8 (1) (b)
were not attracted. Consequently the form prescribed
under s. 8(4)(a)-Form 'C'-could not have been
obtained by the appellants' purchaser from the prescribed
authority.
Consequently
the
appellants
could not obtain from their purchaser such form
under s. 2(4)(a). Accordingly the last part of the
proviso to s. 9 (1) not being satisfied, the State ot
U.P. had not jurisdiction to levy and collect Central
Sales Tax from the Appellants.
·
E
III. Re : Whether the Sales Tax Officer, Moradabad had no jurisdiction
to rectify the assessment for the year 1966-67 as there was no
error apparent on the face of the record of the original assessment
(Section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948) ?
F
G
It has been stated in the order of rectification dated the 26th March,
1974 passed under s. 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 that (page 96,
Vol. 2) :
.:r
:,
"In the present case of the assessee this error is apparent
because if this fact that it was registered under the Central
Sales Tax Act had been placed before the Hon'ble Allahabad
High Court in the case of Karam Chand Thapar & Bros.
(Coal Sales) Ltd., Moradabad for the year 1965-66 the decision would have been against them as have been happened
in the abovementioned two cases.)
The error apparent on the face of the record, which is a condition
precedent to invoking the rectification provision (s. 22) is that the appellants were treated as unregistered dealers by the High Court in the
decision for the earlier assessment year 1965-66 (the judgment of the
H
High Court has been extracted at pages 71-78 of Vol. 2. But in
s. 22 the error has to be an "error apparent on the face of the record"
of the assessment-i.e. for the assessment year 1966-67. This assess~
ment order is dated 27th March, 1971 and a copy of it is at pages
·(
r
KARAM CHAND V. U.P.
31
79-83 of Vol. 2. In that order it is specifically mentioned (page 79
A
viz).:
"10. Whether registered or not : Yes".
Thus it was known to the Sales Tax Officer passing the original
assessment order that the appellants were in fact registered dealers.
An error apparent on the face of the record .must be an error which
is "glaring and obvious" [se,e 34 I.T.R. 143, 150 (S.C.) ]. Besides,
there is a distinction between a mere erroneous de~ision and a decision
which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A rectification is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is re-heard and corrected. It lies only for
patent error
(see Thungabhudra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh
[1964] 5 S.C.R. 174, 186) where the expression "error apparent on the
face' of the record" in 0.47, r-1, C.P.C. was interpreted by the Supreme
Court). In that case was also said that an error apparent on the face
of the record was one where "without any elaborate argument one
could point to the error" (page 186). This is also the view expressed
in a Sales Tax Case-Master Construction Co. 17 S.T.C. 360, 365-366
(Subba Rao, J.).
In the present case, it is submitted that the view of the Sales Tax
Officer, Moradabad who passed the original assessment order dated 27th
March, 1971 following the decision of the Allahabad High Court dated
the 24th July, 1970 in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 4356 of 1969
(pages 71 to 78) was not patently erroneous. As a matter o[ fact the
correctness of the subsequent decisions of the Allahabad High Court is
being doubted in the present Appeal and there is no pronouncement of
your Lordships on the question viz., interpretation of the proviso to
s. 9 (1). Besides, it cannot be said that at the time when the original
assessment order was passed there was a manifest error. Moreover,
even as a result of the subsequent decisions of the Allahabad High
Court it cannot be said that what was not an error on 27th March, 1971
became an error on 26th March 1974 (the date of the rectification order
under s. 22). In any event, even assuming that there was fill error,
that error is not apparent on the face of the record of the original assessment-it is a matter in which the arguments, to say the least, are evenly
balanced and a decision of the Highest Court is now awaited.
In the circumstances there was no jurisdiction in the Sales Tax
Officer, Moradabad to rectify and set aside vhe original order of assessment.
IV. Re: Whether the order of rectification passfd under Seetion 22
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act on 26th March, 1974 (for the assessment year 1966-67) and communicated to the Appellants on
31st March, 1974 was barred by limitation as it could not be said
to be "within three years from the date. of" the original assessment order dated the 27th March, 1971 ?
It is submitted that the period of limitation under s. 22 of the U.P.
Sales Tax Act, 1948, runs from the date on which the order of rectification is communicated to the assessee-which would enable the
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
assessee to file an appeal under s. 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
The period of limitation for filing an appeal is 30 days from the date of
service of the copy of the order appealed against. It is submittd that an
order of rectification is not complete as against the assessee unless it
is duly "communicated to him.
The order of rectification affects the
rights and liability of an assessee and it is essentially fair and just that
it should be communicated to the party as stated by Your Lordships in
a case under the Land Acquisition Act where the phrase "date of the
Collector's award" was being considered. Your Lordships observed :
" .... If the award is treated as an administrative decision
taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the
property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision
ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and
in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected
by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential
element which must be satisfied before the decision can be
brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award
cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award
or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it
must involve the communication of the said award to the party
concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is
pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the
date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to
the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to
the said party even if the said party is not actually present on
the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of
the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a
party is not present the award can be said to be made when it
is communicated to the party later.
The knowledge of the
party affected by the award, either actual or constrnctive, being
an essentia~ requirement of fair-play and
natural
justice
the expression 'the date of award' used in the proviso must
mean the date when the award is either communicated to the
party or is known by him either actually or constructively.
In our opinion,
therefore,
it would
be
unreasonable
to construe the words from the date of
the
Collector's
award used in the proviso to s. 18 in a literal or mechanical
way."
·-,~-:r-r
(A.l.R. 1961 S.C. 1500, 1503-(1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, 683684).
It is submitted that on an analogy of reasoning the words "the date
of any order passed by him" ins. 22( 1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
must be construed to mean the effective date of an order of rectification
viz. the date when it is communicated. In the instan~ case the order
was communicated after three years from the date of the assessment
order and, therefore, the order of rectification is vitiated as being barred
by time.
KARAM CHAND V. U.P.
33
V. Jn Civil Appeal No. 929 of 1975 the only question that arises is
A
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the
proviso to s. 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, was
applicable so as to enable the State of Uttar Pradesh to levy
and collect central sales tax in respect of the subsequent sales
of coal efjected by the appellants to consumers in the State of
U.P.?
The assessment year in question is 1969-70 and the Appellant adopts
the arguments urged in Civil Appeal No. 928 of 1975. With regard to
whether the sales by the appellants (in 1969-1970) during the course
of the movement of the goods from State to State were ta registered
dealers or to consumers, there is
no
indication
in
the
record
as
to whether
the sales effected
to
registered dealers or
to
consumers or unregistered dealers.
In the event of Your Lordships
holding that declared goods are not covered by the proviso to s. 9 ( 1)
this would make no difference because it is admitted that the subsequent
sales effected by the appellants were of declared goods namely coal.
But in the event of Your Lordships· coming to the conclusion that the
proviso to s. 9(1) may include also subsequent sales of declared goods,
then the submission urged is (as in Civil Appeal No. 928 of 1975) that
in any view of the matter it is only subsequent sales to registered dealers
which would attract jurisdiction of the State authorities under the proviso to s. 9(1) and not subsequent sales by -the appellants to unregistered dealers or consumers. The fact would be easy of ascertainment
by the Sales Tax Officer and it is submitted that in that event a direction ought to be given that the State of U.P. could levy and collect
central sales tax under proviso to s. 9 ( 1) in respect of subsequent sales
of coal effected by the appellants only to registered dealers--and not
to unregistered dealers or consumers.
RESPONDENTS :
A. Contention No. 1.
This is the! main contention and is a short
one.
It is as to which State has jurisdiction to tax subsequent sales
made by a registered dealer. In the
instant case, admittedly the
appellant is a dealer registered in U.P. both under the Central and
the U .P. Act.
Therefore, the short questioll' which arises for consideration is as to whether in the instant case the State of U.P. would
have the jurisdiction to tax such subsequent sales effected by
the
enforcement of documents to parties 'in U.P.? Thete is a specific
provision in the Act, which is proviso to s. 9 (1), to cover cases such
as the present case.
Section 9 ( 1) reads :
"The tax payable by any dealer under this Act on sales
of goods effected by him in the course of interstate trade or
commerce, whether such sales fall within
clause (a)
or
clause (b) of s. 3, shall be levied by the Government of
India and the tax so levied shall be collected by that government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2)
in the State from which the movement of goods commence :
Provided that, in the case of a sale of goods during their
movement from one State to another, being a sale subsequent to the first sale in respect of the same goods, the tax
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
shall, where such sale does not fall within sub-section (2)
of section 6, be levied and collected in the State from which
the registered dealer effecting the subsequent sale obtained
or! as the case may be, could have obtained, the form prescribed for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of
section 8 in connection with the purchase of such goods."
Sub-s. (2)
of
s. 9 merely provides that the appropriate
State on behalf of the Government of India shall assess, re-assess,
collect and enforce payment of tax under the Act as if the tax under
the Act was a tax payable under the general sales tax law of the
State.
Therefore, it is that the tax to be collected under the Act is
by the appropriate State for and on behalf of the Government of
India.
In the case of al first sales,
the substantive provisions of
s. 9(1) are clear and unequivocal.
Section 9(1) selects out of several
States one particular State and empowers it to levy' and collect C.S.T.
That State alone ha~ the power to levy the tax and all other States by
implication are debarred.
This was a simple device adopted in order
to fix the forum and jurisdiction of the particular State to make the
assessment in respect of first sales.
A simple test was evolved to
avoid multiplicity of imposition of tax by more than one State in respect
of the same goods and that was to link the tax with the commencement
of the physical movement of the goods on their journey from one State
to another.
This was simple to COJ:l1"prehend -and execute.
Therefore,
the appropriate State was the one from where the movement of goods
started on their interstate journey. That problem does not concern
us here as the States of Bihar and Bengal from where the movement of
coal commenced have duly assessed the tax u/s 9(1) of the Act.
The question, however, is which is the State which can tax the
subsequent sale in the instant case.
For this purpose the proviso had
to be enacted as admittedly CST is multipoint in nature and there is
no provision for a single point tax. . The only exemption is to be
found in s. 6(2) which is the charging section and if the transaction
does not satisfy all the three conditions of s. 6(2), viz.,
(a) the
purchaser is a registered dealer, (b) who by a certificate of registration is authorised to purchase his goods, and ( c) the selling dealer
furnishes to his assessing authority :-
(i) a certificate duly filled and signed by the registered
dealer from whom the goods were purchased containing the prescribed particulars in a prescribed form
obtained from the prescribed authority;
and (ii) a declaration in C Form duly filled and signed by the
registered dealer to whom the goods were sold.
(see Chaturvedi's 3rd edition, page 383).
No attempt has been made by the appellant-assessee in the instant case
even to allege, what to say of proof, tha~ the afo~esaid three con~itioI?s
were satisfied.
Therefore, s. 6(2) which provides for exempt10n m
respect of subselJUent sales, albeit of declared or undeclared goods,
will have no application.
The position therefore would be that the
KARAM CHAND V. U.P.
35
subsequent sales in the instant case would not be exempt u/s 6(2).
Therefore, the subsequent sales have to be taxed and the only question is which State would have jurisdiction to assess the subsequent
sales.
It was fairly conceded that the subsequent sales - would be
assessable u/ s 9 ( 1) , except sales of declared goods.
The argument
was built up merely on the omission of cl. (a) from s. 8 (3) Qf the
Act with effect from 1-4-1963.
Prior to that date section 8(3) ran
as follows :
"The goods referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1)-
( a) in the case of declared goods or goods of the class
or classes specified in the certificate or registration of the
registered dealer purchasing the goods as being intended for
resale by him .. "
The above was omitted by s. 2(iii) (a) of the C.S.T. Amendment Act
(No. 8 of 1963) with effect from 1st April, 1963. From this omission
it was assumed that it was no longer necessary for declared goods to
be specified in the declaration prescribed under rule 12 and the Form
C.
This assumption is wholly unwarranted and is
contrary to the
provisions of the Amending Act (No. 8 of 1963), The omission of
cl. (a) and certain words in cl. (b) of s. 8(3) was necessitated as the
legislature probably wanted to do away with the distinction between
declared goods and undeclared goods for purposes of s. 8(3). Hence
it deleted clause (a) in its entirety and the words "in the case of goods
other than declareclgoods" from cl. (b) of s. 8(3). Thus with effect
from 1-4-63 so far as mentioning of goods in the certificate of registration of purchasing dealer for purpose of re-sale etc.
are concerned
they made only one category and specified the same rate of tax as
was applicable u/s 8 ( 1) both for declared and undeclared
goods,
provided Form C was duly submitted.
The above interpretation also
finds support from Chaturvedi's Central Sales Tax Law, 3rd edition,
1973 at page 325, paras 7 and 8, which read as :-
"Clause (a) of s. 8(3) was omitted by s. 2(iii) (a)
of
the Amendment Act, 1963 with effect from 1-4-63. Before
that the rate of tax for sales covered in sub-section ( 1) was
1 p.c. and all the sales or purchases of declared goods under
the said Act could be subjected to tax at the rate upto 2 %
by virtue to s. 15 of the principal Act.
"Sales covered under sub.-s. ( 1} could enjoy a concessional rate of 1 p.c. instead of th<l state rate of 2 p.c. But
when by the CST Amendment Act (No. 8 of 1963) the rate
of tax for sales covered by sub-s. ( 1) was enhanced also to
2 p.c. there was no1 use of cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) and it was
omitted.
"In cl. (b) of sub-s. (3), the opening words
'in the
case of goods other than declared goods' were omitted by .
s. 2(iii) (b) of the C.S.T. Amendment Act, 1963 with effect
from 1-4-63."
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977) 1 S.C.R.
Thus it. is manifest tha~ t.hc argument laboriously built up had
no foundation and the om1ss1on of sub-cl. (a) from s. 8(3) if anything, goes against the contention of the assessee and fully 'supports
the contention of the Department as that vividly demonstrates that
if there was ever any intention of the legislature to make any distinction between declared and undeclared goods insofar as the sale of
such goods was made to government or to a regd. dealer that was
done away with after 1-4-63.
The contention for the
Department
was that there was never any distinction made between declared and
undeclared goods e\'en in the Act and the Rules prior to 1963-64 in
the matter of specification of the class or classes of goods in the
application under Form A, the certificate under Form B and the
requisite declaration under Form C under rr. 5 and 12 oi the CST
Rules.
The only place where the words "declared goods" occur is
in
section 8 (2) (a) which merely provides the rate of tax applicable for
sales without furnishing Form C and not for any other reason.
Thus
the Act, the Rules and the Forms make no distinction between declared
and undeclared goods whatsoever.
The main argument,
therefore,
has no force and in the absence of the condition u/s 6(2) having been
satisfied, declared goods are taxable and the assessee being a regd.
dealer registered in U.P. both under the Central Act and the U.P. Act
and the subsequent sale having been effected by such registered dealer
in the State of U.P. the proviso to s. 9(1) is clearly attracted.
To sum up, in the instant case the State of U.P. would have the
jurisdiction to assess, levy and collect C.S.T. on subsequent
sales
E
effected by the assessee under the proviso to s. 9 (1), provided the
followin~ conditions are satisfied :
( 1) The sale is a subsequent sale made during the movement of
goods from the States of W. Bengal and Bihar to the State of U.P.
This condition was fairly conceded by the- learned counsel for
the
asscssee to he satisfied.
-{
·~
'
1
F
(2) The subsequent sale is in respect of the same goods.
This
_.
G
H
was also conceded.
'
(3) That the goods do not fall within s. 6(2), that is, the sale
was to a registered dealer other than Government, if the goods are of
the description referred to in Sub-section (3) of S. 8.
Such subsequent sale would be exempt provided the
necessary certificate in
Form C is produced.
( 4) The registered dealer effecting the subsequent sale obtained
or could have obtained the form prescribed for purposes of cl. (a) of
sub.-s. ( 4) of s. 8, that is, Form C.
The last two conditions according to the learned counsel do not
require to be satisfied in case of declared goods.
As already stated
there is no express warrant nor does the scheme of the Act support
any distinction for C.S.T. between declared and
undeclared
goods
except in the concessional rate applicable.
...
KARAM CHAND V. U.P.
37
Section 15 only places restrictions and conditions in
regard
to
A
intra-state sales of declared goods.
This has no application to interstate sales and, therefore, the single point tax provided in s. 15 cannot
be imported into the other provisions of the Act.
Therefore, C.S.T.
is multipoint in the absence of any specific provision to make it single
point.
The relevant sections are section 3 which artificially determines
when sale cf goods can be said to take place in the course of interstate trade or commerce.
·
Section 6 is the charging section.
It is significant that it charges
tax on all sales.
Therefore unless there is a specific exemption, sales
of both declared and undeclared goods would be taxable.
It is well
settled that the burden of proof lies heavily on the person who claims
such exemption.
S.:ction 6(2) deals with the charge to be levied in respect of a
subsequent sale effected by transfer of documents to a regd.
dealer
which would be exempt provided the conditions specified in the proviso
thereto are satisfied.
These conditions undoubtedly have not
been
satisfied.
The case of the assessee is that they do not require to be
satisfied in the case of declared goods.
S. 7(3) requires in the certificate of registration under r. 5 and
for the purposes of s. 8 ( 1) the class or classes of goods to be specified
and it is only in respect of those goods so specified that the exemption
or concessional rate is available and not otherwise.
B
c
D
S. 8 merely provides the rates of tax on inter-state sales.
There
E
is a concessional rate of 3 % for sales to regd. dealers provided the
goods are of the description referred to in s. 8 (3) which refers
to
s. 7 (3) and the application in Form A and the certificate in Form B
issued under rr. 3 and 5 of the Rules.
Section 8 (2) refers specifically
to the concessional rate for declared goods vis-a-vis undeclared goods.
For declared goods it is 3% being the rate in the appropriate State, and
10% for undeclared goods.
Beyond this concessional rate there is
F
no other distinction made between declared and undeclared goods.
S. 8(3) refers back to s. 7(3), rr. 3 and 5 and Forms A and B
and only those goods, declared and undeclared, which find a place in
the certificate are entitled to the concessional rate and none others.
The proviso to s. 9 ( 1) specifically covers the instant case.
The
G
assessee is a regd. dealer, and the sales do not fall within the exemption u/s 6(2) and being a regd. dealer in U.P. he could have obtained
the Foon C from the Sales Tax Officer of his Circle. It, therefore,
follows that in the instant case there can be no doubt whatsoever that
the admitted subsequent sales are taxable in the State of U.P. for and
on behalf of the Government of India u/s 9(1) of C.S.T.
B. Contentions 2 and 3. These may be dealt with together. The
argument of the learned counsel for the assessee in short was that
there was no error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore,
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
s. 22 of the U.P. Act read withs. 9(2) of the Central Act could not
be invoked. It must g'e remembered that this point is taken in a writ
under Art.