# Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

- **Citation:** 2024 INSC 289
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2024-04-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
- **Bench:** Aniruddha Bose, Sanjay Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/karikho-kri-v-nuney-tayang-and-another-37580
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

In the year 2019, appellant-KK an independent candidate emerged
victorious in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu
(ST) Assembly Constituency. The issue arising for consideration
is as to the validity of the High Court's findings that grounds u/ss.
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of
the election of KK.
Headnotes
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - ss. 100(1)(b), 100(1)
(d)(i), 123 - Election - Filing of nomination - Submission of
material particulars - Non-disclosure of three vehicles - High
Court held non-disclosure of vehicles as corrupt practice -
Correctness:
Held: The High Court was of opinion that appellant's failure
to disclose the three vehicles (two scooty and van), that stood
registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted
to a corrupt practice - The High Court assumed that the nondisclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
undue influence - One scooty was in name of wife of the appellant,
DW5 deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold
it to DW6 - DW6 confirmed the same - In relation to other two
vehicles in question, there were actual documents of conveyance
and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 being duly filled in by wife and son of appellant
- Form No. 29, relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle
by the registered owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect
of each of these vehicles but despite the same, the transferees
did not do the needful to get their own names registered as the
owners - Once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
395
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by
KK, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by
KK's wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the
Act of 1988 - However, the High Court did not take note of this
distinguishing factor in the case on hand - The vehicles were
not owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family
members of KK at the time of the filing of his nomination - Nondisclosure of three vehicles cannot be held against KK - Such
non-disclosure cannot be treated as an attempt on his part to
unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. [Paras 20,21,22,25,27,28]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Election - Filing of
nomination - Non-disclosure of three vehicles - Vehicles sold/
gifted - The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding
vehicles were sold/gifted, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of the dependent wife and son of KK - In
consequence, upon considering the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2 SCR 572,
it was held that vehicles were owned by the dependent wife
and son of KK but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in
Form No. 26 filed by him - Correctness:
Held: The High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
(Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others) was rendered in the
context of and for the purposes of the Act of 1988 and not for
general application - The judgment itself made it clear that despite
the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants
should not be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was
the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the
sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by the authorities
concerned by registering the name of the subsequent owner, be
it for whatever reason - Further, vehicles being goods, their sale
would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
and the same make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the
vehicle would stand concluded upon e

## Text

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* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 394 : 2024 INSC 289
Karikho Kri
v.
Nuney Tayang and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023)
09 April 2024
[Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
In the year 2019, appellant-KK an independent candidate emerged
victorious in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu
(ST) Assembly Constituency. The issue arising for consideration
is as to the validity of the High Court's findings that grounds u/ss.
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of
the election of KK.
Headnotes
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - ss. 100(1)(b), 100(1)
(d)(i), 123 - Election - Filing of nomination - Submission of
material particulars - Non-disclosure of three vehicles - High
Court held non-disclosure of vehicles as corrupt practice -
Correctness:
Held: The High Court was of opinion that appellant's failure
to disclose the three vehicles (two scooty and van), that stood
registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted
to a corrupt practice - The High Court assumed that the nondisclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
undue influence - One scooty was in name of wife of the appellant,
DW5 deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold
it to DW6 - DW6 confirmed the same - In relation to other two
vehicles in question, there were actual documents of conveyance
and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 being duly filled in by wife and son of appellant
- Form No. 29, relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle
by the registered owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect
of each of these vehicles but despite the same, the transferees
did not do the needful to get their own names registered as the
owners - Once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
395
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by
KK, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by
KK's wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the
Act of 1988 - However, the High Court did not take note of this
distinguishing factor in the case on hand - The vehicles were
not owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family
members of KK at the time of the filing of his nomination - Nondisclosure of three vehicles cannot be held against KK - Such
non-disclosure cannot be treated as an attempt on his part to
unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. [Paras 20,21,22,25,27,28]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Election - Filing of
nomination - Non-disclosure of three vehicles - Vehicles sold/
gifted - The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding
vehicles were sold/gifted, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of the dependent wife and son of KK - In
consequence, upon considering the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2 SCR 572,
it was held that vehicles were owned by the dependent wife
and son of KK but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in
Form No. 26 filed by him - Correctness:
Held: The High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
(Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others) was rendered in the
context of and for the purposes of the Act of 1988 and not for
general application - The judgment itself made it clear that despite
the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants
should not be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was
the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the
sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by the authorities
concerned by registering the name of the subsequent owner, be
it for whatever reason - Further, vehicles being goods, their sale
would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
and the same make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the
vehicle would stand concluded upon execution of the document of
sale/transfer and registration of the new owner by the authorities
concerned would be a post-sale event - Mere failure to get
registered the name of the new owner of an already registered
vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand
invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed
over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
396
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
treated as still being in the possession and control of the former
owner.[Paras 23, 27]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - ss. 100(1)(b), 100(d)
(i) - Election - Filing of nomination - Submission of material
particulars - Non-submission of the 'No Dues Certificate'
in respect of the Government accommodation occupied by
appellant during his earlier tenure as an MLA was held against
him - High Court held that his nomination was defective and
in consequence, the acceptance by the Returning Officer was
improper - Correctness:
Held: In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were
no actual outstanding dues payable by KK in relation to the
government accommodation occupied by him earlier - His failure
in disclosing the fact that he had occupied such accommodation
and in filing the 'No Dues Certificate' in that regard, with his
nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import
- More so, as he did submit the relevant documents of 2014
after an objection was raised before the Returning Officer - His
explanation that he submitted such Certificates in the year 2014
when he stood for re-election as an MLA is logical and worthy
of acceptance - The most important aspect to be noted is that
there were no actual dues and the failure of KK to disclose that
he had been in occupation of government accommodation during
the years 2009 to 2014 cannot be treated as a defect that is of
substantial character so as to taint his nomination and render its
acceptance improper. [Para 42]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Election - Filing of
nomination - Non-disclosure of taxes due - The High Court
held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by KK
and his wife was a defect of substantial character and the
same tainted his nomination:
Held: The failure on the part of KK to disclose the dues of municipal/
property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same cannot be
held to be a non-disclosure, inasmuch as he did disclose the
particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did not do
so in another part. [Para 49]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Election - Filing
of nomination - Whether every defect in the nomination can
straightaway termed to be of such character as to render its
acceptance improper:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
397
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
Held: Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed
to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and
each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar
as that aspect is concerned - This Court has always drawn a
distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed
to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one's candidature or
the result of an election - The very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act
of 1951 speaks of the Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination
unless he is of the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature
demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in mind and
there is no absolute mandate that every non-disclosure, irrespective
of its gravity and impact, would automatically amount to a defect
of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the
election or amounting to 'undue influence' so as to qualify as a
corrupt practice. [Para 40]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Voter's right to know
- Absolute or not:
Held: A blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay
his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate is not
accepted - His 'right to privacy' would still survive as regards
matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to
his candidature for public office - In that respect, non-disclosure of
each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to
a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character - It is not
necessary that a candidate declare every item of movable property
that he or his dependent family members owns, unless the same
is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect
upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be
disclosed - Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities
and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when
the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate
would amount to a defect of a substantial character. [Para 44]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - s.100(1)(d)(iv) -
Election invalidation under:
Held: In the instant case, the High Court linked all the nondisclosures attributed to KK to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 but
ultimately concluded that his election stood invalidated u/s. 100(1)
(d)(iv) thereof - There is no discussion whatsoever on what were
the violations which qualified as non-compliance with the provisions
of either the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders
398
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
framed thereunder, for the purposes of s.100(1)(d)(iv), and as to
how the same materially affected the result of the election - For
the election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., s.100 (1)(d)
(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby - Though there
are some general references to non-compliance with particular
provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder, there
are neither adequate pleadings nor proof to substantiate and satisfy
the requirements of s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 - Therefore,
it is clear that NT (unsuccessful candidate) tied up the improper
acceptance of KK nomination, relatable to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the
Act of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to s.100(1)(d)(iv)
thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach
or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as
it concerned the returned candidate, KK - It was not open to NT
to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail and adduce
sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that would
attract s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 - The finding of the High
Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason and
cannot be sustained. [Paras 45, 46, 48]
Case Law Cited
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others
[1955] 1 SCR 1104 : (1954) 2 SCC 881; Association for
Democratic Reforms and another v. Union of India and
others [2024] 3 SCR 417 : WP (C) No. 880 of 2017,
decided on 15.02.2024 - followed.
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2
SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1; Santosh Yadav v. Narender
Singh [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160;
Harsh Kumar v. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat and others
(2003) 7 SCC 709; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala v. K.T.C. Automobiles
[2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82; Surendra Kumar
Bhilawe v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2020] 7 SCR
39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224; Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun
Dattatray Sawant and others [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014)
14 SCC 162; Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra
and others [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32; Kamta
Prasad Upadhyaya v. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
399
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
(1969) 3 SCC 622; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash
Kushanrao Gorantyal and others [2020] 7 SCR 180 :
(2020) 7 SCC 1; Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v.
Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and others [2018]
9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1; Resurgence India v.
Election Commission of India and another [2013] 9 SCR
360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189; Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms and another [2002] 3 SCR 696 :
(2002) 5 SCC 294; Lok Prahari through its General
Secretary S.N. Shukla v. Union of India and others [2018]
2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699; S. Rukmini Madegowda
v State Election Commission and others [2022] 12 SCR
1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218; Mairembam Prithviraj
alias Prithviraj Singh v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh
[2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487; People's Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another v. Union of India
and another [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399;
Sambhu Prasad Sharma v. Charandas Mahant [2012]
6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390; Mangani Lal Mandal
v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3
SCC 314; L.R. Shivaramagowda and others v. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs and others [1998] Supp.
3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666 - referred to.
List of Acts
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Election; Nomination; Disclosure of material particulars; Disclosure
of vehicles; Ownership transfer of vehicle; Corrupt practice; Undue
influence; Government accommodation; Non-due certificate;
Defective nomination; Dues of municipal/property taxes; Improper
acceptance; Election invalidation; Voter's right to know.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023 of the Gauhati High
Court at Itanagar Bench in Election Petition No. 01 (AP) of 2019
With
Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023
400
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
C.A. Sundaram, Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Advs., Simranjeet Singh,
Pulkit Gupta, Gautam Talukdar, Raushal Kumar, Ms. Apurbaa Dutta,
Lovenish Jagdhane, Zafar Inayat, Amol Chitale, Mrs. Pragya Baghel,
Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Vishal Banshal, Karma Dorjee, Abhishek
Roy, Dechen W Lachungpa, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Sushil Balwada, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Ms. Tatini Basu, Boboy
Potsangbam, Gamso Billai, Kumar Shashank, Byrapaneni Suyodhan,
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Kumar, J
1.
In the year 2019, Karikho Kri, an independent candidate, Dr.
Mohesh Chai, candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and Nuney
Tayang, candidate of the Indian National Congress, contested
the election to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from
44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency. The election was held on
11.04.2019 and Karikho Kri emerged victorious with 7538 votes,
while Dr. Mohesh Chai secured 7383 votes and Nuney Tayang
secured 1088 votes.
2.
Nuney Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram
and Arunachal Pradesh, seeking a declaration that the election of
Karikho Kri was void on the grounds mentioned in Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1951'). He also sought a
consequential declaration that he stood duly elected from the said
constituency.
3.
By judgment and order dated 17.07.2023, a learned Judge of the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court allowed the election petition in
part, declaring the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, but rejecting
the prayer of Nuney Tayang to declare him duly elected, as he
had not led any evidence to prove the allegations levelled by him
against Dr. Mohesh Chai, the candidate with the second highest
number of votes.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
401
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
4.
Aggrieved thereby, Karikho Kri filed Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
before this Court and Nuney Tayang filed Civil Appeal No. 4716 of
2023. These appeals were filed under Section 116A of the Act of 1951
5.
While ordering notice in both the appeals on 31.07.2023, in exercise
of power under Section 116B(2) of the Act of 1951, this Court directed
that an election should not be held for the subject Constituency
which was represented by Karikho Kri and permitted him to enjoy
all the privileges as a Member of the House and of the constituted
committees but restrained him from casting his vote on the floor of
the House or in any of the committees wherein he participated as
an MLA.
6.
Thereafter, during the course of the hearing of these appeals, Karikho
Kri filed I.A. No. 73161 of 2024, as a fresh schedule for election to
the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was
notified on 16.03.2024 and he wished to contest in the election that
is proposed to be held on 19.04.2024. He sought leave to contest
as a candidate in the upcoming assembly election in the State of
Arunachal Pradesh during the pendency of this appeal. By order
dated 20.03.2024, this Court opined that a strong prima facie case
had been made out by him and, in the light of the said fact, stayed
the operation of the impugned judgment. This Court also made it
clear that any steps taken by Karikho Kri in view of the stay order
would be subject to the final decision that would be taken upon
conclusion of the hearing of these appeals.
7.
In his election petition, Nuney Tayang claimed that the nomination
submitted by Karikho Kri was improperly accepted by the Returning
Officer, Tezu, as he did not disclose material particulars in his Affidavit
filed in Form No.26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules,
1961. The High Court framed nine issues for determination in the
election petition and ultimately held against Karikho Kri on Issue
Nos. 1 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7 and 8. Issue No.9 pertained to the
relief claimed by Nuney Tayang. The relevant 'Issues' read as under:
'1.
Whether there has been a non-disclosure of
ownership of Hero Honda CD Dawn Motorcycle
owned by the returned candidate, Shri Karikho
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-2446; Kinetic
Zing Scooty owned by the wife of the returned
candidate, Smti. Bagilu Kri bearing registration No.
402
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
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AR-11-4474; Van, Maruti Omni Ambulance owned
by the wife of the returned candidate, Smti. Bagilu
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11A-3100 and TVS
Star City Motorcycle owned by Shri Goshinso Kri,
the son of the returned candidate Shri Karikho Kri
bearing registration No. AR- 11-6581, as is required
to be disclosed under Clause 7(vi) of the Conduct
of Election Rules, 1961, rendering the nomination of
the returned candidate invalid?
4.
Whether there has been a non-submission of no
dues certificate with regard to Electricity Charges
required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(b) of
Form No. 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961,
as the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of MLA
Cottage No. 1 at 'E' Sector, Itanagar, from the year,
2009- 2014, while the respondent No. 1 was an MLA
of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during the year,
2009-2014?
5.
Whether the statements made by the respondent No.
1 about the liability of himself and his wife in respect
of Municipal Tax, Property Tax, due and grand total of
all govt. dues against Serial No. 6 & 8 of the table in
Para-8(A) of the affidavit in Form No. 26 appended
to the nomination paper of the respondent No. 1
has rendered the nomination of respondent No. 1,
defective?
6.
Whether the non-disclosure of assets both movable
and immovable belonging to the respondent No. 1,
his wife, his mother and his two sons in the affidavit
in Form No. 26 appended to the nomination paper
amounted to commission of corrupt practice of undue
influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
7.
Whether the election of respondent No. 1 to the
44- Tezu(ST) Assembly Constituency is liable to
be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
403
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
8.
Whether the nature of non-disclosure alleged by the
Election petitioner is of a substantial nature effecting
the election of the returned candidate/respondent
No. 1?
9.
What consequential relief the petitioner is entitled
to, if any?'
8.
Nuney Tayang examined 7 witnesses, including himself as PW7.
Karikho Kri examined 39 witnesses, including himself as DW1A. Dr.
Mohesh Chai did not choose to contest the case before the High Court,
despite service of notice. Before us, however, he is duly represented
by learned counsel and also filed his replies in both the appeals.
9.
The High Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation to
three out of the four vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing
No. AR-11/4474 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100,
both registered in the name of Bagilu Kri, his wife, and the TVS Star
City Motorcycle bearing No. AR-11/6851, registered in the name of
Goshinso Kri, his second son. The High Court was of the opinion that,
notwithstanding the sale of the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No. AR11/4474 in 2009 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100
in the year 2017 and the gifting of the TVS Star City Motorcycle
bearing No. AR-11/6851 in 2014, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri, the dependent wife
and son of Karikho Kri, on the relevant date. Upon considering the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, 'the Act of
1988') and the decision of this Court in Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay
Kumar and others1, the High Court concluded that the person in
whose name the motor vehicle stood registered should be treated as
the owner thereof. In consequence, it was held that, as on the date
of presentation of his nomination on 22.03.2019 and its scrutiny on
26.03.2019, the above three vehicles were owned by the dependent
wife and son of Karikho Kri but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit
in Form No. 26 filed by him.
10. On Issue No. 4 with regard to non-submission of a 'No Dues
Certificate' in the context of electricity and water charges, etc., that
was required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(B) of Form No. 26,
1
[2018] 2 SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1
404
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
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the High Court noted that Karikho Kri had occupied government
accommodation in MLA Cottage No.1 at 'E' Sector, Itanagar, from
2009 to 2014, as the MLA of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during
those years. According to Karikho Kri, he lost the election in 2014
and vacated the said accommodation. He claimed that when he
filed his nomination for the Assembly Election in 2014, he obtained
a 'No Dues Certificate' after clearing the dues and submitted it. As
there were no outstanding dues thereafter and he did not occupy
government accommodation, he stated that he did not disclose the
same. As Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in
Form No. 26, the High Court held against him on this count.
11. As regards Issue No. 5, pertaining to the liability of Karikho Kri and
his wife in respect of their dues of municipal and property taxes,
the High Court found that Karikho Kri had disclosed the taxes due
and payable by him and his wife in one part of the Affidavit in Form
No.26 submitted by him, but failed to do so in another part thereof.
He disclosed the dues in Part A, Clause 8 (vi) and (viii), but failed to
disclose it in Clause 9 in Part B. Though the High Court held against
Karikho Kri even on this count, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned
senior counsel, appearing for Nuney Tayang, fairly stated that he
would not be pressing this ground as there was disclosure of the
dues at least in one part of the Affidavit in Form No. 26.
12. As regards Issue No. 6, i.e., whether non-disclosure of the three
vehicles, registered in the names of his dependent wife and second
son, by Karikho Kri in his Affidavit in Form No. 26 amounted to
commission of a corrupt practice as per Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951, the High Court referred to case law and held that such
non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning
of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.
13. The High Court then considered Issue No. 7, i.e., whether the election
of Karikho Kri was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)
(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 and opined that when the nomination of the
returned candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted
by the Returning Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that
the election was 'materially affected'. As the High Court was of the
opinion that the nomination of Karikho Kri had, in fact, been improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer, Tezu, his election was held liable
to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
405
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
14. On Issue No. 8 - as to whether the non-disclosures by Karikho Kri were
of a substantial nature affecting his election, the High Court observed
that disclosure of information as per Form No. 26 of the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961, was fundamental to the concept of free and fair
elections and, therefore, the solemnity thereof could not be ridiculed
by offering incomplete information or suppressing material information,
resulting in disinformation and misinformation to the voters.
15. Coming to Issue No. 9, i.e., as to what consequential relief Nuney
Tayang would be entitled to, if any, the High Court noted that Nuney
Tayang had secured the least number of votes out of the three
candidates and though he made allegations to the effect that Dr.
Mohesh Chai had failed to disclose the properties belonging to his
mother in his Affidavit in Form No. 26, the High Court found that Nuney
Tayang had failed to lead any evidence in proof of this statement
and, as such, there was no material to hold that Dr. Mohesh Chai's
mother was even his dependent. On that basis, the High Court held
that no judgment could be pronounced against Dr. Mohesh Chai,
solely on the basis of the pleadings and allegations made by Nuney
Tayang in his election petition. In consequence, Nuney Tayang was
held disentitled to relief by way of a declaration that he had been
duly elected from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency.
16. It is well-settled that the success of a winning candidate at an
election should not be lightly interfered with (See Santosh Yadav
vs. Narender Singh2 and Harsh Kumar vs. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat
and others3). The issue before us presently is as to the validity of
the High Court's findings that the grounds under Sections 100(1)(b),
100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 were established,
warranting invalidation of the election of Karikho Kri. Further, the
finding of the High Court on Issue No. 6, that Karikho Kri committed
a 'corrupt practice' within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951 also requires to be examined.
17. Section 33 of the Act of 1951 deals with 'presentation of nomination
papers and the requirements for a valid nomination'. Scrutiny of such
nominations is undertaken by the Returning Officers under Section 36
of the Act of 1951. To the extent relevant, Section 36 reads as under:
2
[2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160
3
(2003) 7 SCC 709
406
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
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'36. Scrutiny of nomination:-
'1. On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under
section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one
proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly
authorised in writing by each candidate but no other person,
may attend at such time and place as the returning officer
may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all
reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers
of all candidates which have been delivered within the time
and in the manner laid down in section 33.
2. The returning officer shall then examine the nomination
papers and shall decide all objections which may be made
to any nomination and may, either on such objection or
on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as
he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the
following grounds:-
(a) ..... or
(b) ..... or
(c) .....
3 ......
4. The returning officer shall not reject any nomination
paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a
substantial character.
5. .....
6 The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination
paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if
the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a
brief statement of his reasons for such rejection.
7. .....
8. Immediately after all the nomination papers have been
scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same
have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list
of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates
whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to
his notice board.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
407
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
18. In terms of Section 36(4) above, a Returning Officer is under a
mandate not to reject a nomination paper for a defect unless it is of
substantial character. Significantly, Nuney Tayang raised objections
to the candidature of Karikho Kri by way of his written representation
dated 26.03.2019. Therein, he raised the issue of non-submission of
a 'No Dues Certificate' in respect of the government accommodation
occupied by Karikho Kri during his tenure as an MLA from 2009 to
2014. He also raised the issue of non-disclosure of the vehicles,
mentioned in Issue No. 1. By his reply dated 26.03.2019, Karikho
Kri informed the Returning Officer, Tezu, that the vehicles, viz., the
Kinetic Zing Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van standing in the name
of his wife had already been disposed of as was the TVS Star City
Motorcycle standing in the name of his dependent second son, which
had been gifted away. As regards the non-submission of a 'No Dues
Certificate', Karikho Kri asserted that there were no outstanding
dues against any government accommodation in his name. Karikho
Kri submitted documents with his explanation, including those
pertaining to the transfer of the vehicles in question as well as the
'No Dues Certificates' of 2014. Thereafter, Karikho Kri filed before
the High Court, Certificates issued in 2019 by the Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited; the Department of Power, Government of Arunachal
Pradesh; and the Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Arunachal
Pradesh, confirming that there were no outstanding dues. In effect
and in fact, there were no dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to
the Government accommodation occupied by him earlier.
19. In any event, it appears that the Returning Officer concerned, being
satisfied with the explanation and documents submitted by Karikho
Kri, accepted his nomination. No doubt, this preliminary exercise on
the part of the Returning Officer did not preclude the Election Tribunal,
viz., the High Court, from examining as to whether the acceptance
of Karikho Kri's nomination was improper and, in consequence,
whether it would have an impact on his election under the relevant
provisions of the Act of 1951. Section 100(1) thereof enumerates
the grounds on which an election can be invalidated. To the extent
relevant, it reads as under:
'100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion-
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(a) .....; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a
returned candidate or his election agent or by any other
person with the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or
(c).....; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns
a returned candidate, has been materially affected-
(i)
by the improper acceptance of any nomination,
or
(ii)
by any corrupt practice committed in the interests
of the returned candidate by an agent other than
his election agent, or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote which
is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or
orders made under this Act, the High Court shall
declare the election of the returned candidate
to be void.'
20. The High Court held against Karikho Kri not only under Sections
100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) but also under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of
1951, as it was of the opinion that his failure to disclose the three
vehicles, that still stood registered in the names of his dependent
family members, amounted to a corrupt practice. Insofar as Section
100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 is concerned, the requirement thereof
for the purpose of invalidating the election of the returned candidate
is that the High Court must form an opinion that a 'corrupt practice'
was committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or any
other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election
agent. Section 123 of the Act of 1951 inclusively defines 'corrupt
practices', by stating that what have been enumerated thereunder
shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the Act
of 1951. Insofar as the present case is concerned, Section 123(2)
of the Act of 1951 is of relevance. This provision reads as under:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
409
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
'123. Corrupt practices.-
The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for
the purposes of this Act:-
......
(2)
Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect
interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the
candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the
consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the
free exercise of any electoral right:
......'
21. The High Court opined that non-disclosure of the Kinetic Zing
Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van that had belonged to Bagilu Kri
and the TVS Star City Motorcycle that had belonged to Goshinso
Kri, the dependent wife and son of Krikho Kri, was sufficient in itself
to constitute 'undue influence', thereby attracting Section 123(2) of
the Act of 1951. However, what is of significance is that the High
Court did not doubt that these vehicles had been sold or gifted long
before the submission of the nomination by Karikho Kri in 2019.
This is clear from the observations in Para 13 (xiii) of the judgment,
wherein the High Court observed: '....at the time of presentation of
nomination paper of respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of
the nomination paper on 26.03.2019, notwithstanding the aforesaid
vehicles were gifted/sold to other persons by Smti. Bagilu Kri, wife of
respondent No. 1 as well as Shri. Goshinso Kri, son of respondent No.
1; it has now become imperative to decide as to who was the owner
of the aforesaid vehicles at the time presentation of the nomination
paper by the respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of the
nomination paper on 26.03.2019'. This finding of the High Court has
attained finality as Nuney Tayang did not choose to challenge the
same before this Court.
22. Though it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained
registered in the names of the wife and son of Karikho Kri, the question
that arises is as to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified
the attributing of a corrupt practice to Karikho Kri and the negating
of his election on that ground. The High Court assumed that the
non-disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
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[2024] 4 S.C.R.
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undue influence. In this context, the High Court placed reliance on
the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the decision of this Court in
Naveen Kumar (supra). Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 defines
the owner of a vehicle as under:
' "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle
stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the
guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle
which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an
agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;'
In Naveen Kumar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was
dealing with the issue as to who would be the owner of an offending
vehicle in the context of the Act of 1988 when a claim arises from
an accident involving the said vehicle. 'Owner', as defined under
Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, was considered and it was opined
that the person in whose name a vehicle stands registered would
be the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act. Reference
was made to Section 50 of the Act of 1988, which deals with transfer
of ownership, and to various earlier decisions in that regard and it
was observed thus:
'13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges
from the above decisions is that in view of the definition
of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30), it is the person
in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who,
for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the
"owner"........In a situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but
continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering
Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand
absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced
the definition of the expression "owner" in Section 2(30),
making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in
the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions
of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in
the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim
should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for
compensation ought not to be burdened with following
a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
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Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another
with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would
be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act.
Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the
fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the
first respondent was the "owner" of the vehicle involved
in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The
liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him.
Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.'
(emphasis is ours)
23. Notably, the High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
was rendered in the context of and for the purposes of the Act of
1988 and not for general application. The judgment itself made
it clear that despite the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a
claimant or claimants should not be made to run from pillar to post
to find out who was the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the
accident, if the sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by
the authorities concerned by registering the name of the subsequent
owner, be it for whatever reason. Further, vehicles being goods,
their sale would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1930'), and the same make it clear
that conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded
upon execution of the document of sale/transfer and registration of
the new owner by the authorities concerned would be a post-sale
event. Section 2(7) of the Act of 1930 defines goods, inter alia, to
mean every kind of movable property, other than actionable claims
and money. Chapter III of the Act of 1930 is titled 'Effects of the
Contract' and 'Transfer of property as between seller and buyer'.
Section 18 therein states that where there is a contract for the sale
of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to
the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained.