# KARPAGATHACID AND ORS v. NAGARATHINATHACID

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 335
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-03-10
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J.C. Shah, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/karpagathacid-and-ors-v-nagarathinathacid-3491
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Partition between co-widows-Whether right of
survivorship can be relinquished-If repugnant to Transfer of Pro•
perty Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) s. 6(a)-Onus.
Two co-widows divided their husband's property and each entered
into separate possession of her share. On the death of one of the
widows her daughter the respondent took possession of her mother's
share. The appellant the surviving widow filed a suit against '.he
respondent claiming possEssion of that share. The Trial Court decreed
the suit, which on appeal was set aside by the High Court. In appeal
by certificate:
HELD: (i) Under the Hindu Law the widows were competent
to partition the properties and allot separate portions each, and incidental to such allotment each could agree to relinquish her right of
survivorship in the portion allotted to the other. Such an arrangement was not repugnant to s. 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. [337 C-D].

## Text

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KARPAGATHACID AND ORS.
v.
NAGARATHINATHACID
March 10, 1965
385
[K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Hindu Law-Partition between co-widows-Whether right of
survivorship can be relinquished-If repugnant to Transfer of Pro•
perty Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) s. 6(a)-Onus.
Two co-widows divided their husband's property and each entered
into separate possession of her share. On the death of one of the
widows her daughter the respondent took possession of her mother's
share. The appellant the surviving widow filed a suit against '.he
respondent claiming possEssion of that share. The Trial Court decreed
the suit, which on appeal was set aside by the High Court. In appeal
by certificate:
HELD: (i) Under the Hindu Law the widows were competent
to partition the properties and allot separate portions each, and incidental to such allotment each could agree to relinquish her right of
survivorship in the portion allotted to the other. Such an arrangement was not repugnant to s. 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. [337 C-D].
Case law referred to.
(ii) Mere partition of the estate between the two widows does
not destroy the right of survivorship of each to the properties allotted to the other. The party who asserts that there was an arrangement
by which the widows agreed to relinquish the right of survivorship
must establish this arrangement by clear and cogent evidence.
[338 B].
The respondent, in the instant case, had failed to discharge this
onus. [338 B-C].
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No. 998
of
F
1963.
Appeal from the judgment and
decree dated January 12.
1962 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 292 of 1958.
A. V. Viswanatlza Sastri, V. S. Ramaswami Iyengar and
R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants.
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S. V. Gupte, Solicitor General, and R. Ganapathy Iyer,
for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byBachawat, J. One Sivasubramania Pillai died in the year
1924 leaving him surv;ving his mother, two widows, Thialaiachi
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and Karpagathachi, and a daughter. Nagarathinathachi (respondent herein) born of Thialaiachi. The two widows
inherited the
properties left by Sivasubramania. In July 1927. they divided the
bltlk of the properties and each entered into separate pos,ession
and enjoyment of the properties allotted to her. The partition is
evidenced by two partition lists called parti.tion deeds. Exs A-~ I
and B-45 dated July 14. 1927 and signed by both of them. Under
this partition, two ve/is of land were set apart for the maintcnanC'·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c,ii.
~f Sivasubramania's mother, to be enjoyed by her during her life.
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tune, and on her death, to be taken and enjoyed by the two widows
in separate portions as mentioned in the partition lists. On August
26, 1954, Thialaiachi died, and upon her death, the respondent
took possession of the properties allotted to Thialaiachi under the
partition of July, 1927. On December 8, 1954, Karpagathachi in·
stituted against the respondent the suit, out of which this appeal
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arises, claiming possession of the suit propert'es. The respondent
resisted the suit claiming that under the partition each widow gave
up her right of survivorship in respect of the properties allotted to
the other, and consequently on the death of Th'alaiachi, the respondent as her daughter was entitle\! to take her share as her heir
and to en joy the same during the life of Karpagathachi. By his
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judgment dated AJgust 18, 1958, the District Judge, East Thanjavur, ·rejected the defendant's contention. and held that the division between the two w'dows was for convenience of enjoyment
only, and decreed the suit in respect of the properties held by
Thialaiachi under the partition of July,
1927.
On appeal, the
Madras High Court by its judgment dated January, 12, 1962 held
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that under the partition each widow gave up her life interest in the
properties allotted to the other and 'consequently Karpagathachi
was not entitled to recover possession of the properties allotted to
Thialaiachi, set aside the decree of the District Judge, and dismissed the suit. Karpagathachi and several other persons impleaded as
party respondents in the appeal before the High Court now appeal
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under a certificate granted by the High Court to .this court under
Art. 133 of the Constitution.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastry appearing on behalf of the appellants
contends that: (!) the right of survivorship of each widow in respect of her husband's estate is the chance of the surviving widow
to take the entire estate of her husband on the death of the cowidow, and in view of s.6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
the w'dows were not competent to enter into an arrangement transferring or relinquishing their right of survivorship; (2) the partition
lists, Exs. A-I and B-45 not being registered, are not admissible in evidence; (3) the partit'on between the widows was for con·
venience of enjoyment only, and the respondent has failed to establish that each co-widow gwe up her right of survivorship in respect
of the properties allotted to the other. The learned· Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the respondent disputed these contentions.
We are of op'nion that the first contention of Mr. Viswanatha
Sastry should be rejected. Under the Hindu law as it stood in 1924,
two widows inheriting their husband's properties took together one
estate as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and equal benefi·
cial enjoyment. They were entitled to enforce a partition of those
propert'es so that each could sep3rately possess and enjoy the portion allotted to her, see Bhugwan Deen Doobey v. Myna Baee ('),
(') [1867] ll M.I.A. 487
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ILARPAGATIIACHI v. NAflARATIIINA'l'RACl!I (Bachawat, J.)
337
Gawi Nath Kakaji v. Gaya Kuar('). Neither of them could without the consent of the other enforce an absolute partition of the
estate so as to destroy the right of ,survivorship, see Commissicner
of Income-tax v. Smt. Indira Balakrishna('). But by mutual consent they could enter into any ar;·angement regarding their respective rights in the properties during the continuance of the widow's
estate, and could absolutely divide the properties, so as lo preclude
the right of survivorship of each lo the prn tion ailotted to the
other. See Ramakkal v. Ramasami Nm'ckan('); Sudalai Ammal v.
Gomathi Amma/('). Likewise, two dau:<hters suc~eedirn• to their
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father's estate as joint tenants with r'.ghts of survivorship could
enter into a similar arrangeme;it. See Kailash Chandi'a Chuckerbutty v. Kashi Chandra Chutkerbuffy(')
Subbammal v . . Lakshmana Iyer ('), Ammani Am ma/ v. Per;asami U dayan('). Such an
arrangement was not repugnant to s.6fa) of the Transfer of Proper'y
Act, 1882. 'f.he interest of eac~1 widow in the properties inherited
by her was proputy, and this prC1perty together with the incidental right of survivorsliip could )le law!Qlly transferred. Section 6(a)
of the Transfer of Property Ad' pl'l>hibits the transfer of the bare
chance of the surviving widow 'tPk.ingi'tie entire estate as th·~ ne.>.t
heir of her husband on the dea,tll of1he co-widow, but it does not
prohibit the transfer by the w1dow of- her present interest in the
properties inherited 'by her together with the incidental right of
survivorship. The widows were competent to partition the properties and allot separnte portionS'i:l> eacb. and incidental to S11ch an
allotment, each could a"ree to ~inquisli her right of survivorship
in the portion allotted to the otlier. The first contention (}f Mr.
Viswanatha Sastry must be rejected.
The secon:i contention of ,Mr· Vhwanatha Sr»try mu· t also
be rejected. A partition may ht effected ora!:y. By an oral partition, the two widows could adjust their diverse rights in the entire
estate, and as part uf.tl1is arrangement, each could orally ag:ee to
relinquish her right of survivmship to the portion aiiotted :o the
other. In the trial Court, the suit wc;S t"ried on the footing that the
partition was oral. and that the two partilion lists wern mere'y pieces of evidence of the oral partition, and no objection was raised
with regard to their admissibility in eyidence. In th\'!_ High Court,
the. appellants raised the contention fiJ.f i.he first time that tte two
partition lists were required to be registered. The point could not
be decided without further inverrigatiot) into questions of fact, ar.d
in the circumstances, the High Court r)ghtly ruled that this new
contention could not be raised for the 'first -time in
appeal. We
(') [1928] L.R. 5.5 I.A. 299.
(') [1960] 3 S.C.R. 513, 517.
(') [1899) I.L. ll .. 22 Macl. 522.
(') [1912] 23 M.L.J. 3fi5.
(') [I 897] I.L.R. 24 Cal. 33~.
(') [1914] 26 M.L.J. 479.
(') [1923] 45 M.L.J. I.
338
'SuPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 S.C.R,
think that the appellants ought not to be allowed to raise this new
contention.
We think that the third contention of Mr. Viswanatha Sastry
is sound and should be accepted. Mere partition of the estate between the two widows does not destroy the right of survivorsh'p of
each to the properties allotted to the other. The party who asserts
that there was an arrangement by which the widows agreed to relinquish the right of survivorship must establish this arrangement
by clear and cogent evidence. The respondent has failed to discharge this onus. It is common case that the part'iion is evidenced
by Exs. A-1 and B--45. Exhibit B-45 is the list showing the
properties allotted to Thialaiachi. The relevant portion of Ex.
B-45 reads : -
"In accordance with the chit cast. Theiyalai Achi, wife
of S'vasubramania Pillai, residing at Karuppur, shall take
the nanja, punja. house and ground, cattle-shed, cattle,
pathway for men, cattle and cart and shed where dried
dung cakes are stored mentioned in the list and shall pay
the Government kist for the aforesaid properties from the
current fasli 1337 and enjoy them."
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Exhibit A-1 showing the properties
allotted to Karpagathachi
contains similar words. Now the two lists show that each widow is
to "take .and enjoy" the properties allotted to her. The corresponding Tamil words are "adainthu anubavithu." These words do not
either expressly or by necessary intendment exclude the right of
survivorship of the other widow. the Tamil words "Sarva Swantantra Badyamayum" and "Sant hat hi pravesamoyurn" and bther
words indicating relinquishment of the right of survivorship are conspicuous by their absence. The words used in the two partition lists
are wholly insufficient to show that the two widows relinquished
their right of survivorship inter se. The fact that two separate partition lists were drawn up and each was signed by the two widows
does not carry the matter any further. The two partition lists show
that the two velis of land kept separately for the maintenance of
the mother-in-law were to be divided by metes and bounds on her
death between the two widows. The division of the two velis on
the death of the mother-in-law was agreed upon to avoid future
disputes. The fact that Thialaia{;hi had a daughter and was older
than Karpagathachi by 20 years does not show that Karpagathachi
mush have agreed that Thialaiachi's daughter should enjoy th.e
properties allotted to Thialaiachi after her deat_h. After the yartition, the pattas in respect of all the lands contmued to be m th~
joint names of both the widows. If there. was an absolute par!Ition between the two widows, it is not explained why there was no
separate mutation· in the name of each widow in respect of the
lands allotted to her.
The deeds executed by Thialaiachi, Exs. B-3. B-4. B-6,
B-7 and B-8 to B-43 rec'te the partition, but !~ey do not use
words indicating that there was an absolute part1110n. The sale
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IURPAGATIIACHI v. NAGARATHINATHACHI (Bachawat, J.)
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deeds, Exs. A-3, A-4, and A---6 executed by both the widows
are in respect of undivided properties and throw no light on the
question at issue. The evidence on the record does not show clearly whether the sale deed, Ex. B--44, executed by both the widows
relates to undivided properties, or whether it relates to properties as
separately allotted to Thialaiachi. From time to time, Thialaiachi
executed three wills, Exs. B-1, B-2 and A-5 giving to the
legatees and particularly the respondent certain properties absolutely with full powers of aEenation. The first two wills, Exs. B-1 and
B-2, refer separately to Thialaiachi's separate properties and to the
properties obtained by her on partition. The recitals in the two
wills do not indicate that Thialaiachi obtained her husband's properties on partition with absolute rights. The third will, Ex. A-5,
does not purport to dispose of specifically the properties obtained
by her on part;tion. Karpagathachi knew that Thialaiachi had
iexecuted the wills, but it is not shown that she knew of the contents of the wills. By Ex. A-2, both Thialaiachi and Karpagathachi made a free gift of some of the properties allotted to Thialaiachi. D.W. 1 is unable to explain why Thiala;achi joined in this
deed. By sale deed, Ex. B-5, Thialaiachi sold absolutely some of
the properties allotted to her and a notice, Ex. A-22, regarding
the proposed transfer of the patta in the name of the vendee was
served upon Karpagathachi. It is not clear if the patta was actually transferred in the name of the vendee. The explanat~on of Karpagathachi that she protested against the transfer and ultimately received one half of the sale price has not been believed. But assuming that Karpagathachi did not object to the transfer, this single
circumstance does not establish that at the time of the partit'on,
she had agreed to give up her right of survivorship in respect of
the properties allotted to Thialaiachi.
Karpagathachi <P.W. I) denied that there was an absolute partition. She was not shaken in cross-examination. Nataraja Pillai
(P. W. 2) said that there was no talk that each should take the properties absolutely and it was agreed taht each would enjoy separately. We find nothing in the evidence of P.W. 2 to show that the
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widows agreed to partition the properties
absolutely so as
to destroy the right of survivorship. Manickam Pillai (D.W. I) said
that at the time of the partition, Thialaiachi said that she had a
daughter and if what was allotted for her share was given to her ab,
solutely she would agree to the partition and Karpagathachi also
wanted to have absolute rights. The District Judge rightly rejected
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evidence of D.W. I. The partition lists were drawn up after consulting lawyers. D.W. 1 is unable to explain why words indicating absolute partition were not used in the partition lists. D.W. 1 had been
in management of the properties of the respondent, yet he falsely
denied this fact. He had intimate dealings with Thialaiachi and the
respondent. On a meticulous examination of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned District Judge rejected the respondent's case that the widows had orally agreed to relinqu;sh their
L/B(N)3SCI-9
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960) 3 s.c.ii.
right of survivorship. We think that this finding is correct, and the
High Court was in error in reversing this finding.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree and judgment
passed by the High Court are set as'de and those of the trial Judge
restored. In all the circumstances, we direct that the parties will
pay and bear their own costs throughout, in this Court and also in
the Courts below.
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Appeal allowed.
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