# KAUSHALYA RANI v. GOPAL SINGH

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 982
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1962
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kaushalya-rani-v-gopal-singh-3196
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 417(3), (4)-Accused acquitted by Additional Sessions Judge-/lpplication for special leave to
appeal to High Court against acquittal filed after 60 days of
order-Provisions of Limitation Act, s. 5, whether applicable-Spedal law-Limitation Act (9 of 1908) s. 29(2).
The respondent was committed to the
Court of Sessions to
stan<l his trial. However, he \vas acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge on December 31, 1959. The appellant filed on April
22, 1960, an application under s. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in the High Court for
Special
Leave to appeal from
the order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
application for special
leave to appeal \Vas barred by time. It was held that the provisions
of s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were in the nature
of a special law and the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act
were not applicable. The appellant ca1ne to this Court after getting
a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court.
Dismissing the
appeal,
HELD : (i) The special
rule of limitation laid down in s.
417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a special law of limitation· governing appeals by private prosecutors and s. 5 of the
Limitation Act does not apply in view of s. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. A special law 1neans a law enacted for special cases,
in special circu1nstances, in contra~distinction to the general rule of
law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which
general law deals. In that sense, the Code of Criminal Procedure
is a general la\v regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal
cases generally. When it lays down the bar of time in respect of
special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by
s. 417(3) and (4), it is a special law contained within the general
law.
Likewise, the Lin1itation Act is a general law laying dovvn
general rules of li1nitation applicable to all cases dealt with by
the Act, but there may be instances of a special lavv of limitation
laid down in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the
law of Lin1itation.
S. M. Thakur v. The State of Bihar, 30 Pat. 126; Canara Bank
Ltd. v. The
Warden
Insurance Co.,
LL.R. [1952] Bom. 1083;
Mohammad lbmhim v. Gopi Lal, A.LR. (1958) All. 691;
Rajjan
Lal v. State l.L.R. [1960] 2 All. 761; Vistvanathan Chettiar, in re.
(1957) 1 M.L.J. 150; Coimbatore Municipality v. K. L. Naraya·
nan, A.LR. (1958) Mad. 416; P. V. Subbareddi, v. D. Papireddi,
-
•
r-
-
1
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
A.IR. (1957) An<lh. Pra. 406; In re Parchuri Adeshamma, A.LR.
(1958) Andh. Pra. 230; Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatruo
Dudhe, 1.L.R. [1961 J Born. 135, referred to.
CRIMIN'AL APPELLATE JmusOJcTJON Criminal Appeal
No. 126 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October
31, 1%1 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 825 of 1960.
Vidya Dhar lvfahajan, for the appellant.

## Text

1963
September 20
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
KAUSHALYA RANI
v.
GOPAL SINGH
(B. P. SINHA, C; J., J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 417(3), (4)-Accused acquitted by Additional Sessions Judge-/lpplication for special leave to
appeal to High Court against acquittal filed after 60 days of
order-Provisions of Limitation Act, s. 5, whether applicable-Spedal law-Limitation Act (9 of 1908) s. 29(2).
The respondent was committed to the
Court of Sessions to
stan<l his trial. However, he \vas acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge on December 31, 1959. The appellant filed on April
22, 1960, an application under s. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in the High Court for
Special
Leave to appeal from
the order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
application for special
leave to appeal \Vas barred by time. It was held that the provisions
of s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were in the nature
of a special law and the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act
were not applicable. The appellant ca1ne to this Court after getting
a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court.
Dismissing the
appeal,
HELD : (i) The special
rule of limitation laid down in s.
417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a special law of limitation· governing appeals by private prosecutors and s. 5 of the
Limitation Act does not apply in view of s. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. A special law 1neans a law enacted for special cases,
in special circu1nstances, in contra~distinction to the general rule of
law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which
general law deals. In that sense, the Code of Criminal Procedure
is a general la\v regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal
cases generally. When it lays down the bar of time in respect of
special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by
s. 417(3) and (4), it is a special law contained within the general
law.
Likewise, the Lin1itation Act is a general law laying dovvn
general rules of li1nitation applicable to all cases dealt with by
the Act, but there may be instances of a special lavv of limitation
laid down in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the
law of Lin1itation.
S. M. Thakur v. The State of Bihar, 30 Pat. 126; Canara Bank
Ltd. v. The
Warden
Insurance Co.,
LL.R. [1952] Bom. 1083;
Mohammad lbmhim v. Gopi Lal, A.LR. (1958) All. 691;
Rajjan
Lal v. State l.L.R. [1960] 2 All. 761; Vistvanathan Chettiar, in re.
(1957) 1 M.L.J. 150; Coimbatore Municipality v. K. L. Naraya·
nan, A.LR. (1958) Mad. 416; P. V. Subbareddi, v. D. Papireddi,
-
•
r-
-
1
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
A.IR. (1957) An<lh. Pra. 406; In re Parchuri Adeshamma, A.LR.
(1958) Andh. Pra. 230; Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatruo
Dudhe, 1.L.R. [1961 J Born. 135, referred to.
CRIMIN'AL APPELLATE JmusOJcTJON Criminal Appeal
No. 126 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October
31, 1%1 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 825 of 1960.
Vidya Dhar lvfahajan, for the appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SINHA, C. J.-In th.is appeal, on a certificate of fitness granted by the Punjab High Court, the only question for determination is whether the provisions of s. 5
of the Limitation Act (9 of 1908)
apply to an application for special leave to appeal, from an
order of
acquittal, under sub-s. (3) of s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (to be hereinafter referred to as the
Code). The certificate was granted by the High Court
"because there is a considerable cnnAict of opinion in the
various High Courts".
In this case we are not concerned with the factual
aspect of the controversy between the parties. It is not,
therefore, necessary to set out in any detail the facts of
that controversy. It is enough to state that the respondent
was committed to the Court of Sessions to stand his trial
under s. 493, or in the alternative under s. 495, of the
Indian Penal Code, on the charge that he had, by deceit,
caused the appellant who was not lawfully married to him
to believe that she was so married, and in that belief had
sexual intercourse with her.
In the alternative, it was
alleged that he married the appellant after concealing the
fact that he was already married.
The prosecution was launched by a petition of complaint filed by the appellant before the Magistrate. The
respondent was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Gurdaspur, who by his judgment dated December 31,
1959, acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution
had failed to prove that there was a marriage between the
<eomplainant and the accused. The appellant filed an ap1963
Kaushalya Rani
v.
Gopal Singh
Sinha, C. /.
1963
Kaushalya Rani
v.
Gopal Singh
Sinha, C. f.
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
plication on April 22, 1960, very much later than .60 days
from the date of the order of acquittal, for special leave
to appeal from that order, under s. 417(3) of the Code.
In a note appended to the application it was stated "that
the time in filing the present petition might be excluded
in view of the fact that the District Magistrate, Gurdaspur, moved the Advocate-General in filing the appeal under
s. 417, Criminal Procedure Code, which if filed would
have obviated the necessity of filing this petition. But
the State Government declined to file appeal and the intimation to this effect was received on April 1, 1960. Tll.e
original letter is attached herewith; from this date, it is
within time." On this application, a Division Bench i'lf
the High Court passed the order "Admitted", on September 1,
1960. When the appeal was placed for hearing
before Falshaw and Grover, JJ, a preliminary objection
was raised on behalf of the respondent that the appeal
was out of time. While it was admitted on behalf of the
appellant that the appeal was filed long after the period
prescribed by sub. s. ( 4) of s. 417 of the Code, it was argued that the delay could be condoned under s. 5 of the
Limitation Act, and that the delay had been so condoned
by the Bench when the appeal was admitted.
The Bench pointed out that as a matter of fact no
application had been made by the appellant for extension
of the period of limitation for filing the petition for special
leave. The Bench further held that it could not accede
to the contention that the Bench while admitting the appeal had condoned the delay. The Court, on an elaborate
examination of the provisions of the Code, and of the
Limitation Act, came to the conclusion that the bar of
time prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 417 was a 'special law'
within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and
that, therefore, s. 5 of the Limitation Act would not be
available to .the appellant for condoning the admitted delay
in filing the application for special leave. The High Court
noticed a number of decisions of the different High Courts
and preferred to accept the view that the provisions of sub.
s. (4) of s. 417 of the Code were in the nature of a 'special law' though the .Code as a whole was a general
law. In that view of the matter, the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the application for
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
special leave to appeal was barred by time. The appellant
applied to the High Court and obtained the necessary certificate of fitness and has come up to this Court on appeal
from that order of the High Court.
The High Court
naturally did not go into the merits of the controversy.
We have, therefore, to consider whether the High Court_
was right in coming to the conclusion that s. 5 of the
Limitation Act could not be available to the appellant for
condonation of the delay in filing the application for special leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 417 of the Code.
Before we refer to the different decisions of the High
Courts, taking conflicting views on the only question now
before us, we would examine the relevant provisions of
the Code and the Limitation Act. Section 417 of the Code
is in these terms :
"417(1) Subject to the provisions of sul>-section (5),
the State Government may, in any case, direct the
Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal
passed by any Court other than a High Court.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
case in which the offence has been investigated by the
Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
(XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also
direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to
the High Court from the order of acquittal.
(3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
case instituted upon complaint and the High Court,
on an application made to it by the complainant in
this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the
order of acquittal, the complainant may present such
an appeal to the High Court.
(4) No application under sub-section (3) for the
grant of special leave to appeal from the order of
acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after
the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of
acquittal.
(5) If, in any case, the application under sub-section
(3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an
order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order
of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1 )."
83-2 s. c. India/64
1963
Kausha/ya Rani
v.
Gopa/ Singh
Sinha, C. f.
1963
Kaushalya Raoi
v.
Gopal Singh
Sinha, C. /.
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. (1964]
It will appear that the section, which was recast by
Act XXVI of 1955, for the first time made provision for
an appeal by a private complainant from an order of
acquittal, if he obtained special leave to appeal from the
High Court. Previous to the Amending Act aforesaid, it
was only the State Government which could come up in
appeal from an order of acquittal. The section, thus, provides for an appeal by the State Government, as also by
the complainant in a case instituted upon a complaint,
provided that special leave of the Court is obtained. So
far as appeal by the State Government is concerned, s. 417
itself does no~ provide for any period of limitation. The
period of limitation for · such an appeal is laid down in
Art. 157 of the Limitation Act.
Previous to the amendment of 1955, the period of limitation for such an appeal
by the State Government was six months, which was
reduced to three months by the Act XXVI of 1955 with
effect from January 1, 1956. Hence, so far ·as ·an appeal
by the State Government is concerned, the perii:ld of· limitation thus reduced is a part of the general law of limitation and is amenable to the operation of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. But the provisions of sub-s. (3) and ( 4) of
s. 417 are in the nature of 'special provisions' introduced
for the first time by the Amending Act XXVI of 1955.
Sub-section ( 4), in terms, is very precise and mandatory,
prohibiting the High Court from entertaining any application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal after the expiry of 60 days from the date of such an
order. On a perusal of the bare provisions of the section
and the history of the law on the subject, two things are
clear; namely, (1) that the legislature thought it expedient in the interest of justice and public policy that the
period of six months allowed to the State Government to
appeal from an order of acquittal should be curtailed by
half, thus evincing its clear intention to cut short the duration of the litigation which had already resulted in an
order of acquittal; and (2) that in certain· cases the High
Court should have the power of granting special leave to
a complainant, as distinguished from the State Government, to come up in appeal from an order of acquittal,
but at the same time indicating in clear and unambiguous
terms that such an application must be made within 60
-
:
. '
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
day;fr.;;i die· da,te of the nrder of acquittal. This rule of
60 days bar of time has been specifically pr9yided for in
the section itself, 'μnlike the general ru1<:" 6f~limitation applicable .~o an appeal against acquittal, at the instance of
the State Government. In our opinion, therefore, the position is clear that so far. as appeal by ',the State Government
is concerned, the law of' limitation is the general law. laid
down in the Limitation Act
(Art. -157) to which s. 5
would apply by its owri force. But in so far as an appeal
by a priva~e prosecutor is
concerned, the legislature was
astute to specifically lay down that the foundation for such
an appeal should be laid ·within 60 days from the date of
the order of acquittal. In that sense, this rule of 60 days
bar is. a special law, that is to say, a rule of limitation
which is specially proyided for in the Code itself, which
docs not ordiQaril y provide for a period of limitation for
appeals or applications, It is the general law of limitation, a~ laid down in the Limitation Act, which governs
appeals ordinarily preferaplc under the Code,. ilide Arts.
150, 154, 155 and 157. To such appeals the provisions of
s. 5 would apply.
It has been observed in some of the cases decided by
-rhe High Courts tha~ the Code is not a special or a local
law ,within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
thauis to say, so far as th~ entiie Code is concerned, becaus~ it is a general.1aw laying down procedure, generally, for the trial of criminal cases.
But the specific
question with which we are here concerned is whether
the provision contained in s. 417 ( 4) of the Code is a special law. The whole Code is indeed a general law regulating the procedi1re in crin1inal trials .generally, bu~ it may
contain provisions specifying. a bar of time for particula,r
class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a J;..and Reven Ile Gode, may be a general law regulating the relatio.nship 'between the revenue-payer and the
revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent-receiver.
It is a general law in the sense that -it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it· may contain
special
provisions relating to
bar of time, in specified
cases, different from the general la\V of limitation. Such
a law will be a 'special law' with reference to the law
generally governing the ·subject-m,atter l;>f that kind of re64-2 S C India164
1963
K.aushalya R@i
v.
Goj>al Singh
Sinha, C. /.
1963
Kaushalya Rani
...
Gop•l Sinth
Sinhd, C. /.
983
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
lationship. A 'special law', therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistir:ction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law
~eals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally;
but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special
cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by
s. 417(3) & (4), read together, it will be a special law
contained within the general law. As the Limitation
Act has not defined 'special law', it is neither necessary nor
expedient to attempt a definition. Thus, the Limitation Act
is a general law laying down the general rules of limitation
applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act; but there may
be instances of a special law of limitation laid down in
other statutes, though not dealing generally with the law
of limitation. For example, rules framed under Defence
of India Act, vide S. M. Thakur v. The State of Bihar(');
Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co.(') dealing with the special rule of limitation laid down in the
Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bom. XXXIII of 1948).
These are mere instances of special laws within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Once it is held
that the special rule of limitation laid down in sub-s. ( 4)
of s. 417 of the Code is a 'special law' of limitation, governing appeals by private prosecutors, there is no difficulty
in coming to the conclusion that s. 5 of the Limitation
Act is wholly out of the way, in view of s. 29(2) (b) of
the Limitation Act.
But the question is whether it can be said that even
though- the provisions of s. 417(4) are a 'special law', they
prescribe a different period of limitation from that prescribed
by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, because s. 29(2)
applies where there is a difference between the period
prescribed by the Limitation Act and that prescribed by the
special law. It is said that the Limitation Act does not
prescribe any period of limitation for an application for
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal at the
instance of a private prosecutor. In the first instance, the
Limitation Act, Art. 157, has pres.cribed the rule of limitation
{ 1 ) I.L.R. 30 Pat. 126.
( 2 ) I.LR. [1952] Born. 1083.
-
..
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
in respect of appeals against acquittal at the instance of the
State. Hence, it may be said that there is no limitation
prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an
order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor.
Thus, there is a difference between the Limitation Act and
the rnle laid down in s.417(4) of the code in respect of
limitation affecting such an application. Section 29(2) is
supplemental in its character in so far as it provides for the
application of s. 3 to such cases as would not come within
its purview but for this provision. And for the purposes of
determining any period of limitation prescribed by any
special law, it has made the provisious of the Limitation Act,
referred in cl. (a) of sub-section (2) of section 29 applicable
to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law, and cl. (b) of that
sub-section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed
by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the
provi~ions of the Code, supplemented by the provisions of s.
29(2) of the Limitation Act, make it dear that s. 5 of the
Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special
leave to appeal under s. 417(3) of the Code.
That is our conclusion based on the interpretation of
the statutes in question. But the High Courts of Allahabad,
Andhra Pradesh and Madras have taken the contrary view.
On the other hand, earlier decisions of the Allahabad High
Court and the Bombay High Court, to be presently noticed,
have taken the view that what we have indicated is the
correct view of the legal position.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the
case of Mohammad Ibrahim v. Gopi Lal (1) had taken the
view that the words of sub.s. (4) of s. 417 make it clear that
the application under sub.s. (3) must be made within 60 days
of the order of acquittal, and that the High Court had no
power to extend the period of limitation, and s. 5 of the
Limitation Act did not apply to such cases. They based their
conclusion entirely on the wording of sub. ss. (3) and ( 4) of
s. 417 of the Code. That Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court was overrnled by a Full Bench of that Court
in Rajjan Lei v. State('). The three Hon'ble Judges con-
(1) A.LR. (1958 All 691).
( 2) I.L.R. [1960) 2 All. 761.
1963
Kaushalya Rani
v.
Gopal Singh
Sinha, C. /.
1963
"Kaushalya Raffi
v.
Gapal Singh
Sinha, C. /.
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
' [1%4)
stituting the full bench, in separate but concurring judgments, took the view that the Code was not a local or a
special law and that s. 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable
to an application under s. 417(3) of the Code.
In the Andhra Pradesh High Court a Division Bench
was of the same opinion as had been held by the Full Bench
of the Allahabad High Court, but the decision was obiter
because the Court dismissed the petition on the ground that
the order of acquittal had been passed before the Amending Act XXVI of 1955 came into force, so that the order of
acquittal was not amenable to an appeal at the instance of
the private prosecutor.
A Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court took
the view that s. 5 was applicable to applications for special
leave under s. 417(4).
. In the Madras High Court, a Single Judge decided the
case of Viswanathan
C hettiar. in re (1) and held that
"section 1, sub-section (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
makes all laws applicable to Criminal Procedure Code
including the Law of Limitation and nothing could prevent
the appellant from taking advantage of section 5 of the
Limitation Act." He also held that there was no difference
between the period prescribed by the law of limitation and
the Criminal Procedure Code. Both these observations do·
not appear to be correct.
Another Single Judge of the Madras High Court
decided in the case of Coimbatore Municipality v. K. L.
Narayanan( 2 ) that s. 5 of the Limitation Act could be
availed of by the private prosecutor, but the learned Judge
did not base his decision on the reasoning of the previom
judgment of that Court but preferred to follow the reasoning adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P. V.
Subbareddi
v. D. Papireddi( 3 )
and in re Parchuri
Adeshamma(').
In our opinion, the view taken by the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao
Daulatrao Dudhe(°) is the correct one. In that case it wai
(1) (1957) 1 M.L.). 150.
( 2 ) A.LR. [1958] Mad. 416.
( 3 ) A.LR. [1957] And. Pra. 406.
( 4 ) A.LR. [1958] An<l. Pra. 230.
(5) I.LR. [1961] Born. 135.
,..
•
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4S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
held that the provisiom of s. 417(4) were a 'special law'
within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In
that case, the High Court has dealt with the decisions of the
different High Courts on the question and with the reasonings for those decisions. As we agree with the conclusions of
the High Court of Bombay, we do not think it necessary to
repeat the observations made therein, bearing on the reasons
given by the High Courts of Albhaba<l, Andhra Pradesh
and Madras for coming to contrary conclusions.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the view taken
by the High Court of Punjab is entirely correct. The appeal
is accordingly dismissed.
Appelll dismismJ.
AFZAL ULLAH
"·
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. WAN"cHoo,
J. C. SHAH AND RAGHTJBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
U•ited Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (No. II of 1916),
ss. 298. 299(1) and bye-law cl. 3(a)--.!'Markd' meaning of1-V !tether bye-lau1 ultra vires.
The appellant-accused was charged \Vith committing the off~nu
under s. 299(1) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, read
with cl. 3(a) of the relevant bye-laws framed by Respondent No.
2.
The case against the appellant was that he was running a
n1arket \Vithin the municipal area in which Yegetables, fruit•, fish
and grains were sold.
It was alleged that he was bound to take
a licence for the aforesaid market under cl. 3(a) of the rdevant
bye-laws and since he had failed to do so, he had committed •
breach of the said bye-laws.
He was tried by the Tchsildar of
Tanda on the said charge. The Tehsildar acquitted him. The Tehsildar held that he was running only a grain market and Respondent No. 2 (the Municipality) had no power to make bye-laws for
the running of a purely grain market and so the in1pugned bye~
laws were ultrQ vireJ',
On appeal, the High Court set a~ide- the
order of acquittal and com·icted the appellant under s. 299( I) of
the Act read with cl. 3(a) of the relevant byo-laws,
It has ~
65-2 S C lndia/64
K•u1halyfl &mi
v,
Gop.J Si"fll
Sinha, C, /.
'
1963