# Kays Con.<truotlon Co. (P) Ltd v. State of U.P. & Ors. [196S] 2

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 764
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-09-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 525 of 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. H!Dayatullah, J. c. SHAii, s. M. SIKRI
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kays-con-truotlon-co-p-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-ors-196s-2-3611
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss. 251, 31 and 33C-~~tate Act
applicable ro industry-AppLicat'on /or compensation for lay uff-Jurisdlction to decide.
The respondents, who were the workmen of the appellant, applied to
the Second Labour Court, Bombay, under s. 33C(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming compensation for lay-off during a certain period.
The appellant contended that : ( i) the Labour Court had no jurisdiction
as the dispute fell to be tried under the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes
(Settlement) Act, 1947; and (ii) the application under s. 33C was incom.
pctent, hccause, it was not a claim for money due and caJ::ulations had to
be made for ascertaining the money due. The Labour Court, a• well as the
High Coun under Arts, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, rejected the
contcnuons.
Jn the appeal lo this Court.
HELD: (i) The argument that tbe controversy was wrongly before the
Labour Court was entirely erroneous.
Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was inserted by 1. 3
of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953, is the only Chapter in
which there is provision regarding lay off or compensa1ion fur lay off.
Though the C.P. and Berar Act applies to the textile indu,try, it contaim
no provision either for recovery of money or for compensalion for lay
off and 1hey are not matters over which the C.P. and Berar Act has any
jurisdiction.
Therefore, if a workman has a claim for lay off, it c~n only
come up for decision under the Jodusnial Disputes Act.
Even if ss. 31
and 25J save the application of the C.P. and Berar Act, they do so, subject
to the condition that the question of lay-0ff must be decided in accordance
with Chapter V-A.
Since s. 33C provides that a dispute for any money
due under Chapter V-A has to go before the appropriate Government or
its delegate, and since the delegate is the Second Labour Court, the respondents were entitled to go before the Labour Court to realise money
due from the appellant under Oiapter V-A. [769 F]
(ii) It is not es.<!ential that the claim which can be brought before Ille
Government or its delegate under s. 33C(I) must always be for a predetermined sum. [769 G-H]
Kays Con.<truotlon Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [196S] 2
S.C.R. 276, followed.

## Text

THE SAWATRAM RAMPRASAD MILLS CO. LTD.
A
;: .
BALIRAM UKANDAJI AND ANOTHER
September 9, 1965
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. H!DAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAii AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss. 251, 31 and 33C-~~tate Act
applicable ro industry-AppLicat'on /or compensation for lay uff-Jurisdlction to decide.
The respondents, who were the workmen of the appellant, applied to
the Second Labour Court, Bombay, under s. 33C(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming compensation for lay-off during a certain period.
The appellant contended that : ( i) the Labour Court had no jurisdiction
as the dispute fell to be tried under the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes
(Settlement) Act, 1947; and (ii) the application under s. 33C was incom.
pctent, hccause, it was not a claim for money due and caJ::ulations had to
be made for ascertaining the money due. The Labour Court, a• well as the
High Coun under Arts, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, rejected the
contcnuons.
Jn the appeal lo this Court.
HELD: (i) The argument that tbe controversy was wrongly before the
Labour Court was entirely erroneous.
Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was inserted by 1. 3
of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953, is the only Chapter in
which there is provision regarding lay off or compensa1ion fur lay off.
Though the C.P. and Berar Act applies to the textile indu,try, it contaim
no provision either for recovery of money or for compensalion for lay
off and 1hey are not matters over which the C.P. and Berar Act has any
jurisdiction.
Therefore, if a workman has a claim for lay off, it c~n only
come up for decision under the Jodusnial Disputes Act.
Even if ss. 31
and 25J save the application of the C.P. and Berar Act, they do so, subject
to the condition that the question of lay-0ff must be decided in accordance
with Chapter V-A.
Since s. 33C provides that a dispute for any money
due under Chapter V-A has to go before the appropriate Government or
its delegate, and since the delegate is the Second Labour Court, the respondents were entitled to go before the Labour Court to realise money
due from the appellant under Oiapter V-A. [769 F]
(ii) It is not es.<!ential that the claim which can be brought before Ille
Government or its delegate under s. 33C(I) must always be for a predetermined sum. [769 G-H]
Kays Con.<truotlon Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [196S] 2
S.C.R. 276, followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 525 of
1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1962
of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Special
Civil Application No. 360 of 1961.
R
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SAWATRAM MILLS v. BALIRAM (Hidayatullah, I.)
765
A
A. S. Bobde,, G. L. Sanghi and Sardar Bahadur, for the
appellant.
Janard{[ll Sharma for respondent No. 1.
H. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the intervener.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. In this appeal by
certificate against the
judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 25, 1962 the
appellant is the Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co., Ltd., Akola
and the respondents two of the workmen of the Mills.
The
c respondents are claiming from the Mills compensation for. lay
off from March 5, 1960 to October 22, 1960. The proceedin~
were commenced by an application to the Second Labour Court,
Bombay under s. 33C(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(Act XIV of 1947). The Mills objected on various grounds
including firstly that the Second Labour Court had no jurisdicD tion to hear the case as the dispute fell to be tried under the
C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947 and,
secondly, that the application under s. 33C, in any event, was
incompetent.
The Second Labour Court held against the Mills
on both the grounds.
The Mills applied to the High Court of
Bombay under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution but by the
E judgment under appeal their application was dismissed. It may
be pointed out here that there were similar applications for compensation for lay off by the other workmen of the Mills and on
this preliminary point they were all heard together.
In this Court. only these two grounds were urged. The conF tention on behalf of the Mills on the first ground was two-fold.
The Mills attempted to establish that the dispute could not be
tried under the Central Act but only under the C.P. & Berar Act
and further that even if the Central Act applied the calculation
of the amount could not be made under s. 33C of the Industrial
Disputes Act as that required proceedings other than those conG templated by that section.
The Industrial Disputes Act was passed in 194 7 and was
brought into force on April 1, 1947. It is not disputed that it
applied to the Textile Industry.
The C.P. & Berar Industrial
Disputes (Settlement) Act (23 of 1947) came into force on
June 2, 1947 but only the first section was then brought into
H force. Later, the remaining sections were brought into force by
a notification dated November 20, 1947 in all industries except
the Textile Industry. From March l, 1951, the Act was also·
766
SUPREME
COURT
RF.PORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
made applicable to the Textile Industry. In 1953 the Industrial
A
Disputes Act, 1947 was amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953.
The changes material to our purpose were
•
the addition of two definitions and a new chapter in the Act.
Previous to the Act there was an Ordinance which the Act replaced but as nothing turns upon the existence of the Ordinance
we need not refer to it.
The two definitions introduced in s. 2
B
of the parent Act were :
"(kkk) 'lay-off'
(with its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or
inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal,
power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks
or the break-down of machinery or for any other reason
to give employment to a workman whose name is borne
on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and
who has not been retrenched :
Explanation-Every workman whose name is borne
on the muster rolls of the industrial establishment and
who presents himself for work at the establishment at
the time appointed for the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given employment by
the employer within two hours of his so
presenting
himself shall be deemed to have been laid-off for that
day within the meaning of this clause :
Provided,
c
D
IE
and s. ( oo) ·retrenchment'.
The definition of 'retrenchment'
F
need not be quoted here because no question has been raised
about retrenchment in this case. Section 3 of the 1953 Amendment Act inserted Chapter V-A headed "Lay Off and Retrenchment". Section 25C gave a right to a workman to ask for compensation if laid off, provided he fulfilled certain conditions. It
is not necessary to go into those conditions here.
Section 25J
G
then provided as follows :
"25J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter.-
( I) The
provisions of
this Chapter shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any law including standing orders made
under the Industrial Employment (Standing OTders)
Act, 1946 (XX of 1946) :
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SAW A TRAM MILLS v. BALIRAM (Hidayatullah, J.)
76 7
Provided that nothing contained in this Act shall
have effect to derogate from any right which a workman has under any award for the time being in operation or any contract with the employer.
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall be
deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the
time being in force in any State in so far as that law
provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the
rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so
far as they relate to lay off and retrenchment shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter."
In 1956 the Industrial Disputes Act was again amended by the
Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1956.
Secti<>n 23 of the Amending Act inserted section
33C which reads as follows :
"33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-
( 1) Where any money is due to a workman from
an employer under a settlement of an award or under
the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman
may
without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make
an application to the appropriate Government for the
recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate
Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it
shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector
who shall proceed to recover the same in the same
manner as an arrear of land revenue.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to
receive
from the employer any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money, the amount at which
such benefit should be computed may, subject to any
rules that may be made under this Act, be determined
by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf
by the appropriate Government,
and the amount so
determined may be recovered as provided for in subsection ( 1 ) .
(3) For the purposes of computing the money
value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks
fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taldng such
evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] 1 S.C.R.
the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering
the report of the
Commissioner and other circumstances of the case."
The powers of the Government under the above section admittedly have been delegated to the Second Labour Court Bombay.
A
Section 31 of this Amending Act provides as follows :-
B
"31. Act not to override State laws.
( 1 ) If, immediately before the commencement of
this Act, there is in force in any State any Provincial
Act or State Act relating to the settlement or adjudication of disputes, the operation of such an Act in that
State in relation to matters covered by that Act shall
not be affected by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
as amended by this Act.
(2)
..
From these sections, which we have quoted, certain conclusions indisputably arise.
The first conclusion is that compensation for lay off can only be determined under Chapter V-A of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
This follows from s. 25J (2) as it
D
is so stated there.
The next is that the workmen are entitled
E
under s. 33C(I) to go before the Second
Labour Court to
realise money due
from
their employers under Chapter V-A.
This is clearly stated in s. 3 3C.
The contention on behalf of
the Mills, however, is that the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7
does not apply to the present matter but the C. P. & Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act does.
This argument is put in
F
two ways.
By one argument the application of the Industrial
Disputes Act is sought to be evaded and by the second the C.P.
& Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act
is sought to be
applied.
We shall examine these two arguments in
the same
order. The attempt to oust the Central Act is based upon s. 31
of the 1956 (Amendment) Act and the opening part of s. 25J.
G
Section 31 can have no application because s. 33C has been
included for the purpose, among others, of enabling the workmen to claim any money due from their employers under the
provisions of Chapter V-A.
This is expressly so stated in that
section. Chapter V-A is the only Chapter in which there is
provision regarding lay off or compensation for lay off.
The
11
C.P. & Berar Act contains no provision either for the recovery
of money or for compensation for lay off. It is thus obvious that
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SAW A TRAM MILLS v. BALlltAM (Hidayatul/ah, 1.)
16 9
A if a workman has a claim for lay off it can only come up for
decision under the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 and, indeed,
s. 25J(2) says so in express terms. The attempt to keep out the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly Chapter
V-A and s. 33C must, therefore, fail. The next attempt, namely,
that the C.P. & Berar Act applies is also ineffective. It is pointed
B
out that the oreamble of the C.P. & Berar Act shows that it was
an Act for the promotion of peaceful and amicable settlement
of industrial disputes by condliation and arbitration, that 'industrial disputes' means any dispute or difference connected with an
industrial matter arising between an employer and an employee
or between employers or employees and that 'industrial matter'
C means any matter relating
to pay, wages, reward, etc.
It is
submitted, therefore, that the dispute must come under the C.P.
& Berar Act because of s. 31 of the 1956 (Amendment) Act
and s. 25J of the 1953 (Amendment) Act already quoted. The
argument is the last one in another form. This argument is fallaD
cious at the very start because lay off and compensation for lay
off are to be found only in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. There is no mention of lay off or compensation
for Jay off as one of the matters over which the C.P. & Berar
Act has any jurisdiction. Next, even if ss. 31 and 25J save the
application of the C.P. & Berar Act they do so subject to the
E
condition that question of lay off must be decided in accordance
with Chapter V-A and s. 33C clearly provides that a dispute
for any money due under Chapter V-A has to go
before the
appropriate Government or its delegate.
Here the delegate is
the Second Labour Court, Bombay. The argument that this
controversy is wrongly before the Second Labour Court, Bombay
F
is, therefore, entirely erroneous and must be rejected.
The next contention is that the claim for lay off is not a
claim for money due because calculations have to be made before
the money due can be found.
This argument has been considered on more than one occasion and it was rejected recently by
G this Court in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. &
Ors('). It is not essential that the claim which can be brought
before the Government or its delegate under s. 33C(l) must
always be for a predetermined sum.
The Government or the
Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then
take action under that section. In the present case the dates
u of lay off are known and each workmen will show to the Second
Labour Court that he is qualified to receive compensation for
I. [196S) 2 S.C.R. 276.
L8Sup.CJ/6S-6
'70
SUPREME aJURT REPORTS
[1966) 1 S.C.R.
lay off.
That will be shown from the muster roll which the
A
employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple
arithmetical calculation which, in our judgment, s. 33C permits
to be made.
If there is any question whether there was lay off
or not the Labour Court will decide it. This argument, therefore,
has no force.
The result is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed with
costs.
The employers have. by prolonging this litigation on a
preliminary point, managed to avoid the trial of the real issue
for a number of years and we hope that the Second Labour
Court will now deal with this matter as expeditiously as possible.
Appeal dismissed.
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