# KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH v. MOHANLAL BHAGW ANDAS & ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 623
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-04-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1271 of 1967
- **Bench:** M. HmAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH, s. M. Soou, R. S. Bachawat, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter, C. A. Vaidial!Ngam, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/keshavlal-jethalal-shah-v-mohanlal-bhagw-andas-anr-4324
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Bonibay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57
of 1947, s. 29(1)
a11d
(2)-amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965whether anumded s. 29(2) applied to a case where decision of appellate
Court given before the ammded section came into fo~r if High
Court could o,,/y exercise power under s. 115 C.P.C. in such case.
In a suit filed by the respondent in July 1958 for a decree in cjectment, arrears of rent and other dues against the appellant in respect of
certain premises in Ahmcdabad. the trial court dismissed the claim for
ejectment and passed a decree for arrears. of rent and pennitted increases.
Jn appeal .under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 the decree was eonfirmed on February 25,
1963.
Bv s. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal lay against
any decision in appeal under sub .. ection ( 1) from the order of the trial
court.
The respondent therefore moved the High Court by a petition
under s. 115 CPC. While this petition was pending Bombay Act 57 of
1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 and it was provided in
the amended s. 29(2) that while no appeal would lie against any decision
in appeal under sul><;eetion ( 1). the ffigh Court may, .for the purpose
of satisfying itself that a decision in appeal was according to Jaw, call for
the case and pass such order os it thinks fit.
On the assumption that the
amended Act applied to all petitions pending before it, the High Court.
after a detailed examination of the case, reversed the order of the appellate court and decreed the respondent's suit.
In appeal by special leave to this Court, it was contended, i11ter aJia.
by the appellant that the order of the appellate court which had acquired
finality, subject to the exercise of the limited jurisdiction by the ffigh
Court under s. 115 C.P.C. could not. be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended s. 29(2) in t.he abs·ence of a provision in the
Amending Act making the an1endmcnt retrospective.
HELD : The High Court exercised the jurisdiction invested by Act
18 of 1965 in respect of a judgment which had become final a Jong time
before that Act. The appeal must therefore be allowed, the order passed
by the High Court set aside and the proceedings remande<l to the High
Court to deal v."ith and dispo~ of the revision application on the footing
that it wns governed by s. 115 C.P.C. under which it was purported to
have been filed. [630 G].
When the revision application v:as entertained under s. 115 of th~
Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court assumed to itself
a limited
jurisdiction conferred by that ~ection, anJ. in the absence of any express
provision made in the Amending Act, the jurisdiction conferred by that
seetion eould not be extended. r629 H-630 BJ.
There is nothing in the language of s. 29(2) as amended, which may
indicate that it was intenccd to be retros~cctive in operation. [630 DJ.
'
I
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
Indira Sohan Lal \', Custodian of Evacuee Property,
Delhi [1955)
A
2 S.C.R. 1117 and Moti Rw11 v. Smaj Bhan [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896; distinRUisbed.
Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haii Safibhai, (1964]
5 S.C.R. 157; Colonial Sugc.r Refi11ing Company Ltd, v. Irving, [1905]
A.C. 369; Garikapatti Veerava v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957] S.C.R. 488;
Nana Bin Aha v. Sheku Bin Andu, I.L.R. 32 Bom. 337 and Dafedar
Niranjan Singh & Anr. v. Custodian, Evacuee Property (Punjab) & Anr.
[1962] I S.C.R. 214; referred to.
In conferring upon the High Court a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the decision of the appellate court was
acoording to law, the Legislature did not attempt to legislate in the matter
of procedure. It expressly sought to confer upon the High Court power
to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided.
[630 C].
Section 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction upon the High
Court to call for the record of a case for the purpose of satisfying itself
that. the

## Text

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KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH
v.
MOHANLAL BHAGW ANDAS & ANR.
April 2, 1968
[M. HmAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, s. M. Soou,
R. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, G. K. MITTER,
C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)
Bonibay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57
of 1947, s. 29(1)
a11d
(2)-amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965whether anumded s. 29(2) applied to a case where decision of appellate
Court given before the ammded section came into fo~r if High
Court could o,,/y exercise power under s. 115 C.P.C. in such case.
In a suit filed by the respondent in July 1958 for a decree in cjectment, arrears of rent and other dues against the appellant in respect of
certain premises in Ahmcdabad. the trial court dismissed the claim for
ejectment and passed a decree for arrears. of rent and pennitted increases.
Jn appeal .under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 the decree was eonfirmed on February 25,
1963.
Bv s. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal lay against
any decision in appeal under sub .. ection ( 1) from the order of the trial
court.
The respondent therefore moved the High Court by a petition
under s. 115 CPC. While this petition was pending Bombay Act 57 of
1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 and it was provided in
the amended s. 29(2) that while no appeal would lie against any decision
in appeal under sul><;eetion ( 1). the ffigh Court may, .for the purpose
of satisfying itself that a decision in appeal was according to Jaw, call for
the case and pass such order os it thinks fit.
On the assumption that the
amended Act applied to all petitions pending before it, the High Court.
after a detailed examination of the case, reversed the order of the appellate court and decreed the respondent's suit.
In appeal by special leave to this Court, it was contended, i11ter aJia.
by the appellant that the order of the appellate court which had acquired
finality, subject to the exercise of the limited jurisdiction by the ffigh
Court under s. 115 C.P.C. could not. be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended s. 29(2) in t.he abs·ence of a provision in the
Amending Act making the an1endmcnt retrospective.
HELD : The High Court exercised the jurisdiction invested by Act
18 of 1965 in respect of a judgment which had become final a Jong time
before that Act. The appeal must therefore be allowed, the order passed
by the High Court set aside and the proceedings remande<l to the High
Court to deal v."ith and dispo~ of the revision application on the footing
that it wns governed by s. 115 C.P.C. under which it was purported to
have been filed. [630 G].
When the revision application v:as entertained under s. 115 of th~
Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court assumed to itself
a limited
jurisdiction conferred by that ~ection, anJ. in the absence of any express
provision made in the Amending Act, the jurisdiction conferred by that
seetion eould not be extended. r629 H-630 BJ.
There is nothing in the language of s. 29(2) as amended, which may
indicate that it was intenccd to be retros~cctive in operation. [630 DJ.
'
I
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
Indira Sohan Lal \', Custodian of Evacuee Property,
Delhi [1955)
A
2 S.C.R. 1117 and Moti Rw11 v. Smaj Bhan [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896; distinRUisbed.
Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haii Safibhai, (1964]
5 S.C.R. 157; Colonial Sugc.r Refi11ing Company Ltd, v. Irving, [1905]
A.C. 369; Garikapatti Veerava v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957] S.C.R. 488;
Nana Bin Aha v. Sheku Bin Andu, I.L.R. 32 Bom. 337 and Dafedar
Niranjan Singh & Anr. v. Custodian, Evacuee Property (Punjab) & Anr.
[1962] I S.C.R. 214; referred to.
In conferring upon the High Court a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the decision of the appellate court was
acoording to law, the Legislature did not attempt to legislate in the matter
of procedure. It expressly sought to confer upon the High Court power
to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided.
[630 C].
Section 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction upon the High
Court to call for the record of a case for the purpose of satisfying itself
that. the decision in appeal was according to law, which the High Court
did not possess before the . date of the Amending Act. It could not be
said that tho amending clause only sought to explain any pre-existing
legislation which was ambiguous or defective. [630 D-EJ.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1271 of
1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
March 2, 3, 1967 of the Gujarat High Coun in Civil Revision
Application No. 1010 of 1963.
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B. C. Misrn, R. K. Mathur and M. V. Goswami, for the
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appellant.
S. K. Zarer and K. L. Hat/ti, for the respondents.
Order of Reference
Shah, J. This appeal raises the question whether a revision
petition filed in the High Court under s. 115,-Civil Procedure
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Code, from an order passed by an appellate court under s. 29
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act 1947 may after the amendment of s. 29(2) by the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Co~trol (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965 be tried in accordance with the amended Act.
The High Court assumed that a proceeding pendinz before it at
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the date on which the amending Act came into force had to be
dealt with and decided in accordance with the provisions of subsec. (2) of s. 29' as amended.
There is no dispute that s. 29 (2) as Jmended has not expressly been given retrospective operation. In Colonial _sugar Refining
Co. Ltd. v. Irving('), the Judicial Committee held that "while
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provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure
(1) [19J5] A.C. 369
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KESHAVLAL V. MOHANLAL (Shah, J.)
625
may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible,
have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which
touch a right in existence at the passing of th_e statute are not to
be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment
or necessary
intendment".
The Judicial Committee further
observed that "provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would
deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute
came into force, were Jina!, are provisions which touch existing
rights."
The same principle has been affirmed by the Judicial
Committee in a later decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills v.
Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi(').
In Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property,
Delhi('), one of the points decided by this Court in dealing with
a case under the Evacuee (Administration of Property) Act, 1947,
as amended in 1948, was that even 'if at the date when an application was made for confirmation of a transaction of exchange by a
evacuee, the order of the Custodian was to be deemed final, if by
an amending Act passed before the order was made, the order
was subject to revision by. the Custodian General, the order of the
Custodian was denuded of its finality_. In Dafedar Niranjan Singh
and Another v. Custodian Evacuee Property (Pb.) and Anr.( 3 )
this Court held that where an order of the Custodian had become
final under the Patiala Evacuee (Administration of Property)
Ordinance, its finality could not be affected retrospectively under
s. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950
which replaced. the Ordinance. The Court distinguished the
observations made in Indira Sohan Lal's case('). Another judgment to which our attention was invited is Moti Ram v. Sura;
Bhan(') in which this Court observed that according to the decision in Indira Sohanlal's case(') an appellate decision under s. SB
of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act.
194 7 acquires finality after the order in question is inade, and
"even if there be in law any such right at all it can in no sense be
a vested or accrued right'', and therefore notwithsta00in~ the declared finality of the judgment of the Controller under th~ Evacuee
Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, when the petition
for ejectme11t was filed, the Act having been amended, the High
Court invested with revisional jurisdiction by s. 15 ( 5) was competent to revise the order of the Controller. This Court observed
that the finality of the order of the Controller atfached thereto
only when the order was made and therefore if before the date on
which the order was made, by amendment of the Act, the order
ceased to be final, a revfsion application to the High Court was
competent.
(I) (1927)L.R. 541.A.421.
(3) [1%2] I S.C.R. 214.
(2) [1955] 2S.C.R.1117.
(4) [19W] 2 S.C.R. 8%,
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
It is true that in the present case the order of the City Civil
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Court was made before the amending Act was enacted.
Under
tho Rent Act. before it was amended, no further appeal lay from
the decision of the Appellate Court, but the jurisdiction of the
High Court under s. 115 Code of Civil Procedure was not on tilat
account excluded. By the amended Act the High Court is expr~ssly
invested with revisional jurisdiction, which is not subject to the
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restrictions prescribed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The result is that the revision petition when originally filed was
triable under s. 115-Civil Procedure Code; it has been tried by
the High Court iinder the amen~ s. 29(2) of the Rents, Rates
Control Act.
Indira Sohanlal's case(') has made a departure from what was
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apparently a settled rule. The question in this case is whether- the
rule in Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case(') Will apply, or
the exception engrafted upon the rule by the judgment in Indira
Sohanlars case(') will apply. We direct that this case be pl:i.ced
before a larger Bench.
It will be open to the parties to argue
such other points as arise out of the order of the High Court, but
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subject to the restridions imposed by the order granting rul~.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah J. The respondents sued the appellant for a decree in
ejectment in respect of shop Municipal Census No.
1754 at
Ahmedabad and for rent in arrears and additional taxes.
The
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trial court dismissed the claim for ejectment and passed a d.xree
for arrears of rent and permitted increases. In appeal under
s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act 57 of 1947, the decree was confinned on February
25, 1963. By s. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal
lay against any decision in appeal under sub-s. ( 1) from the order
of the Court of First Instance.
The respondent accordingly mov··
ed the High Court of Gujarat by a petition under s. 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
When this petition· was pending in the
High Court Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was amended by Gujarat
Act 18 of 1965, and sub-s. (2) of s. 29 was replaced by the
following sub-section :
''No further appeal shall lie against any decision in
appeal under sub-sec. ( 1), but the High Court may for
the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in
appeal was according to law call for the case in which
such decision was taken and pass such order with respect
thereto as it thinks fit."
On the assumption that by ~~ amende~ Act the High Court '!as
empowered to decide all petitions pending on the .date on which
(I) [t955J 2 s.c.R. 1111.
(2) [1905] A.C. 369.
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KESHAVLAL V. MOHANLAL (Shah, J.)
627
the amended section came into operation, as if the amended section
applied thereto, the High Court entered upon a detailed investigation of the questions raised by the respondent in the petition-
( I) whether the tenant proved that he was ready and willing to
pay the stlllldard rent and permitted increase$ within the meaning
of s. 12(1) of the Act; (2) whether the tenant was in arrears of
standard rent and permitted increases and the amount of tax for
more than six months, and therefore the case fell within the purview of s. 12(3)(a) and not under s. 12(3)(b) of the Act; and
(3) whether in any event the tenant having failed to observe the
conditions of the tenancy was disentitled to the protection either,
under s. 12(1) ors. 12(3)(b) of the Act, and reversed the order
of the appellate court and decreed the respondent's suit.
With
special leave, the appellant has appealed to this Court.
This Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimohomed "· Haji Gulumr.ubi
Haii Safibhai(') held that in a petition under s. 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure from an order made by the appellate court
under s. 29 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947, the Higb Court had no
power to set aside the order merely because if was of opinion that
the judgment was assailable on the ground of error of fact or even
of Jaw: the High Court may exercise its power under that section
only if the appellate court had acted without jurisdiction or had
failed to exercise its jurisdiction or had acted with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thereafter
the Gujarat Legislature amended s. 29(2) by Act 18 of 1965 in
the manner set out, so as to confer upon the High Court a jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction exercisable under s. 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Counsel for the appellant contended that in entering upon an
enquiry into the questions raised by the respoμdent,
the High
Court exercised jurisdiction which it did not possess.
Counsel
contended that the right to appeal-and which expression includes
the right to move a superior court in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction-attaches to a litigation when it commences and it is
not affected by any subsequent amendment unless an express provision is made giving retrospective operation to the amendment and
tliat the right to appeal which originally attached to the litigation
will continue to govern it till it is finally decided.
Counsel relied
in support of that contention upon the decisions in Colonial S11gar
Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving('); Garikapatti Veeraya v. N.
S11bbiah Choudhur;v( 8 ); and Nana Bin Aha v. Sheku Bin Andu(').
In the alternative counsel contended that the order of the appellate court which had acquired finality, subject to tile exercise
of the limited jurisdiction by the High Court under s. 11 S of the
(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 157.
(2)
1190~] A.C. 369.
(3) 11957] S.C.R. 488.
(4) 1.l.R. 32 Born. )37
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 3 S.C.R.
Code of Civil Procedure could not, in the absence of a provision
in the Amending Act making the amendment expre:;sly or by necessary implication retrospective, be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court bys. 29(2) of the Amending Act enacted after the date on which the judgment of the appellate court was delivered. We do not think it necessary to express
any opinion on the first question, because, in our judgment, on the
second point raised by counsel, the appeal must succeed.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was file4 by the respon-
~ dent on July 22, 1958; it was decided on October 28, 1961; the
appellate court decided the appeal on February 25, 1963 and the
Amending Act 18 of 1965 came into effect on ;rune 17, 1965.
The High Court exercised the jurisdiction 'investe4 by Act 18 of
1965 in respect of a judgment which had become final a long time
before that Act. It is true that this Court in Indira Sohanlal v.
Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others(') distinguished
the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Colonial Sugar
Refi11ing Co. Ltd.'s case(2 ) and observed at p. 1133:
". . . . . . it appears to be clear that while a right of
appeal in respect of a pending action may conceivably
be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant
on the commencement of the action-though we do not
so decide-no such vested right to obtain a determination with the attnb11tc of finality can be predicated in
favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. By
the very terms of section 5-B of East Punjab Act XIV
of 1947, finality attaches to it on ¢he making of the order.
Even if there be; in law, any such right at all as the right
to a determination with the attribute of finality, it can
in no sense be a vested or accrued right. lt does not
accrue until the determination is in fact made, when
alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as
in ...... "
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Jn J11dira SohMlal's case('), the Court was dealing with a case in
which by amendment of statute, the finality which would but for
the amendment have attached was taken away before the order
was made. This Court in Dafedar Niranjan Singh and Another
'!. C!!Stodian Evacuee Property (Pu11jab) and Another(') distinG
guished Indira Sohaniafs case(') and held that an order which had
become final under a provision of the law could not be affected
retrospectively under an Amending Act so as to deprive the order
of its finality acquired under the original provisiqn. In Dafedar
Niranjan Singh's case(') an order releasing the property in dispute
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was passed by the Custooian of Evacuee Property under Patiala
Ordinance No. IX of 2004 Samvat. No appeal was filed against
(1) [!955]2S.C.R.1117.
(ll [1962] l S. C.R. 214.
(2) [ ! 905] A.C. 369.
KES!IAVLAL r. MOHANLAL (Shah, /.)
629
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the order of the Custodian and it became final on that account.
The order was however set aside by the Custodian in exercise of
jurisdiction under s. 58 ( 3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of 1950.
This Court held that since the order had
become final in exercise of the jurisdiction subseq11ently conferred.
in the absence of any positive indication giving s. 58(3) retrospecB
tive operation, the finality of the previous order could not be taken
a\vay;
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Counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of this
Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and Others(') in which following llldira Sohan/al's case(') it was held that the High Court could
in exercise of jurisdiction under an Amending Act enacted after
the litigation was commenced, set aside an order which, according
10 the law in force at the date when the litigation was commenced,
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court.
In Moti
Ram's case(') an application for eviction of the appellant from a
'hop was made in August 1956 under s. 13 of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. An appeal . was provided
under s. 15 of the Act from the order of the Rent Controller, and
sub-s. ( 4) of s. 15 provided that the decision of the appellate
authority, and subject only lo such decision, the order of the
Controller shall be final.
By Amending Act 29 of 1956 which
came into force on September 24, 1956, the High Court was empowered to call for and examine the records relating to any order
passed under the Act for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order. The landlord's application was dismissed
by the Rent Controller and in appeal the appellate authority confirmed the order. Thereafter on the application of the landlord
the High Court reversed the order.
This Court rejected the contention that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
revision application under s. 15(3) as amended. The decision
brought before the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 15(5) of the amended Act was delivered o.n
August 19, 1958, after amendment of the Act on September 24.
1956. On the date on which it was made, the order had acquired
no finality, for it was subject to an order which may be passed in
a revision application which may be filed before the High Court
under the amended Act. Moti Ram's case(') has, therefore, no
application to this case.
Counsel for the respondent urged that the extension of the
jurisdiction of the High Court bys. 29(2) of Bombay Act 57 of
1947 as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 related not to any
right in existence, but to a matter of procedure, and on that account the Act as amended applied at the hearing, and in deciding
1hc revision application filed by the respondent the High Court
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fl) (l'J6G] 2 S.C.R. 896.
(2) [1955P S.C.R. ttl7.
630
SUPREJllE COURT REPORTS
( 1968] J S.C.R.
was bound to apply the amended Act.
But when the revision
application was entertained under s. 115 of the Code o[ Civil
Procedure, the High Court assumed to itself a limited jurisdiction
conferred by that section, and in the absence of any express provi·
sion made in the Amending Act, the jurisdiction conferred by that
section could not be extended.
The question whether the High
Cou1t could in exercise of its jurisdiction set aside, modify or
alter the decision of the appellate court was not a matter. of procedure. The order of the appellate court, subject to scrutiny by
the High Court within the limited field permitted by s. 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, was final. In conferring upon the High
Court a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether
the decision of the appellate court was according to law, the Legis·
lature did not attempt to legislate in the matter of procedure. The
Legislature expressly sought to confer upon the High, Court power
to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally
decided.
Counsel for the respondent also submitted that s.
29(2) as
amended was intended to have retrospective operation, because the
Amending Act was in the nature of explanatory legislytion. There
is nothing in the language of s. 29(2) as amended, which may
indicate that it was intended to be retrospective in operation. Sec·
tion 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction upon the High
Court to call for the record of a case for the purpose of satisfying
itself that the decision in appeal was according to law, which the
High Court did not possess before the date of the Amending Act.
The amending clause does not seek to explain any pre-existing
legislation which was ambiguous or defective. The power of the
High Court to entertain a petition for exercising revisional juris·
diction was before the amendment derived from. s. 115 Code of
Civil Procedure, and the Legislature has by the Amending Act
attempted to explain the meaning of that provision. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to
clear up doullts as to the meaning of the previous Act. Section
29(2), before it was en11cted, was precise in its implication as well
as in its expression : the meaning of the words used was not in
doubt, and there was no omission in its phraseology which was
required to be supplied by the amendment.
The appeal is therefore allowed and the order passed by th~
High Court is set aside, and the proceeding is r~manded to the
High Court to deal with and dispose of the revision application
on the footing that it is governed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure under which it purports to have been filed.
The. costs
of this Court will be costs in the High Court.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
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