# KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI

- **Citation:** [1980] 1 S.C.R. 854
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-10-04
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. S. KAl:LASAM, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kewal-singh-v-lajwanti-7853
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Frame of Suit-Whether earlier giving up a cause of action by deletion from
the plaint and later on again requesting for inclusion of the same cause is barred
by tile principle of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C.
Doctrine of constructive Res-judicata-When it applies-Whether deletion of
a cause of action from the plaint anti again a request for inclusion would amount
to a bar of Res-judicata.
Delhi Rent Control Act, Section 25B-Whether violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
The appellant was the tenant of respondent in Quarter No. IV-H/ 46 Lajpat
Nagar frqm 1-7~1967.
On 2-6-1976, the respondent filed an application under
Sections 14A(l), 14(l)(e) and· 14{1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, for
eviction of the appellant firstly on the ground that as. her husband was required
by the Government to vacate the Government quarters or pay the penal rent,
the husband of the respondent bad to shift ~o the house of his wife which was
in the tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made that even othemise
the premises were required for a bonafide necessity of the landlord and also
as the premises had become unfit for human habitation the respondent required
the same for carrying out repairs which could not be done unless the premises
were vacated. On 3-6·76 the respondent filed :m application withdrawing the causa
of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide necessity and repairs as contemplated by Section 14(l)(e) and 14(l)(f) of the Act. The Rent Controller accordingly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two ca·uses of action mentioned in the
application since no notice was served at this time on the appeUant. Thereafter
•otice was served on the appellant. On 4-6-1976, the plaintiff again sought to
amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under section
14A(l) of the Act i.e. requirement of the respondent because her husband had·
been directed to vacate the Government Quarter. On 13-8-1976 the appellant
appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an appliaction under section 25B,
sub sections 4 and 5 requesting the Rent Controller to give him permission todefend the suit, on the ground that as the landlady was not a Government servant she was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition under Section 14A(l)
of the Act. On 6-10-76 the husband of the respondent filed an application for
being impleaded a.~ a party, but this application was rejected on 22-11-76;
The resJ¥)ndent thereafter again filed another application on 27-1-77 praying for
amendment of her eYiction application by re-inserting the cause of action con~
tained in section 14{1)(e) of the Act and sought to claim eviction on the ground'
of bonafide requirement. .This application was contested by the appellant but
was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-77 leaving open to·
the appellant to file his objection by a fresh application if he wanted to defend
the suit. The appellant accordingly filed an application on 9-3-77 for permission
to defend the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the pl-aintiff
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately, the Rent
"---..
•
. .,
,.
~.'
..
J
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI
855
controller by his order dated 27-7-77 rejected the application for leave to appear
and defend the suit and passed an order evicting the appellant from the premises.
The revision petition filed by the appellant under Section 25B(8) in the Delhi
High Court was dismissed on 6-4-1978 and hence the appeal by special leave of
the Court.
It was contended : (a) that the second application given by the respondent for
re-a mending her plaint by inserting the relief under section 14 (1 )(e) which she
had given up at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under sectian ·
14A(l) was barred by the principles of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C. (b) that even if
Order n Rule 2 C.P.C., had no application, the second application filed by the
respondent was barred by the doctrfne of constructive
res-judicata and (c)
Secti

## Text

_Characters 0–39,940 of 49,854. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39940 for what follows._

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
B
854
KEWAL SINGH
v.
LAJWANTI
October 4, 1979
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAl:LASAM AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Frame of Suit-Whether earlier giving up a cause of action by deletion from
the plaint and later on again requesting for inclusion of the same cause is barred
by tile principle of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C.
Doctrine of constructive Res-judicata-When it applies-Whether deletion of
a cause of action from the plaint anti again a request for inclusion would amount
to a bar of Res-judicata.
Delhi Rent Control Act, Section 25B-Whether violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
The appellant was the tenant of respondent in Quarter No. IV-H/ 46 Lajpat
Nagar frqm 1-7~1967.
On 2-6-1976, the respondent filed an application under
Sections 14A(l), 14(l)(e) and· 14{1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, for
eviction of the appellant firstly on the ground that as. her husband was required
by the Government to vacate the Government quarters or pay the penal rent,
the husband of the respondent bad to shift ~o the house of his wife which was
in the tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made that even othemise
the premises were required for a bonafide necessity of the landlord and also
as the premises had become unfit for human habitation the respondent required
the same for carrying out repairs which could not be done unless the premises
were vacated. On 3-6·76 the respondent filed :m application withdrawing the causa
of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide necessity and repairs as contemplated by Section 14(l)(e) and 14(l)(f) of the Act. The Rent Controller accordingly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two ca·uses of action mentioned in the
application since no notice was served at this time on the appeUant. Thereafter
•otice was served on the appellant. On 4-6-1976, the plaintiff again sought to
amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under section
14A(l) of the Act i.e. requirement of the respondent because her husband had·
been directed to vacate the Government Quarter. On 13-8-1976 the appellant
appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an appliaction under section 25B,
sub sections 4 and 5 requesting the Rent Controller to give him permission todefend the suit, on the ground that as the landlady was not a Government servant she was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition under Section 14A(l)
of the Act. On 6-10-76 the husband of the respondent filed an application for
being impleaded a.~ a party, but this application was rejected on 22-11-76;
The resJ¥)ndent thereafter again filed another application on 27-1-77 praying for
amendment of her eYiction application by re-inserting the cause of action con~
tained in section 14{1)(e) of the Act and sought to claim eviction on the ground'
of bonafide requirement. .This application was contested by the appellant but
was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-77 leaving open to·
the appellant to file his objection by a fresh application if he wanted to defend
the suit. The appellant accordingly filed an application on 9-3-77 for permission
to defend the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the pl-aintiff
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately, the Rent
"---..
•
. .,
,.
~.'
..
J
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI
855
controller by his order dated 27-7-77 rejected the application for leave to appear
and defend the suit and passed an order evicting the appellant from the premises.
The revision petition filed by the appellant under Section 25B(8) in the Delhi
High Court was dismissed on 6-4-1978 and hence the appeal by special leave of
the Court.
It was contended : (a) that the second application given by the respondent for
re-a mending her plaint by inserting the relief under section 14 (1 )(e) which she
had given up at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under sectian ·
14A(l) was barred by the principles of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C. (b) that even if
Order n Rule 2 C.P.C., had no application, the second application filed by the
respondent was barred by the doctrfne of constructive
res-judicata and (c)
Section 25B which lays down the procedure for disposing of the applications
filed by the landlord under the provisions of Section 14A and 14(1)(e) are
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inoomuch as the provisions are arbitrary and discriminatory in nature, and seek tO provide tWQ different procedures
for tenants similarly situated.
Dismissing the appeal by spcciai leave, the Court
HELD : 1. A perusal of order II Rule 2 C.P.C. would clearly reveal that
this provision applies to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a portion @{ the
A
B
c
cause of action on which the suit is based either by relinquishing the cause of . D
action or by omitting a part of it. The provision has, therefore, no application
to cases where the plaintiff has based his suit on separate and distinct oauses of
action and chooses to relinquish one or the other of them. In such cases, it is
always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of
action [860 E-F]
In the instant cese, the second amendment application was not barred by the
principles of order TI, Rule 2 C.P.C. The respondent had first based her suit on
three distinct causes of action, but later confined the suit only to the first cause
of action, namely the one mentioned in Section 14A(l) of the Act and gave up
the cause of action relating to section 14(1 )(e) and (f). Subsequently by virtue
of an amendment she relinquished the fir§.t cause of action arising out of section
14A(l) •md sought to revive her cause of action based on section 14(1 )(e). At
-the time when the respondent relinquished the cause of action arising out of
Section 14(1)(e), the appcl4'nt was not in the picture at all. Therefore it was
not open to the appellant to mise any objection to the amount sought by the
respondent. [861 G·H, 862 A-C]
Mohammed Khalil Khan and Ors. v. Mahbub Al!klwn and Ors., 75 I.A. 121
P.C_.; applied.
E
p·
2. One of the essential conditions of res judicata
is that there must be a
G
formal adjudication between the parties (jfter fu11 hearing. In other words, the
matter must be finally decided between the parties. [862 c]'
In the instant case, the doctrine of constructive res-judicata has no application
whatsoever, since at the time when the respondent relinquished her first cause of
action, the appellant was no where in the picture and there was no adjudication
between the parties. The second amendment application wa'& ma<le in the same
proceedings on a cause of action that she was allowed to insert with the permission of the Court. Although both the parties went to the Court on the basis of
H
i5i
SUPREME COURT RBPORTS
[1~10] 1 S.C.R.
these facts, neither the her of r~sjudicata nor that ef Order • lbue 2 C.P.C.
was raised before the Rent Controller. [862 C, B)
1...
3. It is well settled that what Article 14 forbids is hostile iiserimination 8Bd
not reasonable classification. Discrimination may take place ill many ways and
what Article f4 require!'! i6 that equals must be treated alike. 1l equals and ·ua~
equals one also treated alike tlten also Article 14 is clearly attre.cted and diseri ..
B
mi11atioo reoUs. [862 F~G]
'
(b) A reasonable classification based oft JfOUnds havin& a eleer 11exua wita
the objective to be achieYed and grouping certain persona in a SeJ*"ate categOry
in view of their special peculiarities ., undoubtedly permiaaible.
Of cowse,
clMsificatio.. shovld not be purely a class legislation. [86!1 G-11]
(c) It i!'l also well settled that there i8 always a. pre&amptioll ill favour of 18e
C
sea~hNt1ow.lity of a statl!te and any party who seeks to cballeJIIe the leJ!illation oa the ground of. applicability of Article 14 must plead and prove the neMSSMf facti.
111 making a classification, the Court murt pre&\llllO matteM of
commoa knowledge, common report, history of the time ud tVHY ether HI ...
vant fact. [862 H, 863 Al
D
E
F
Chiranjit Lal Chowqhari v. Union 01/lntlia and Ors., [1950] S.C.R. 1,9,
State of We1t Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952} S.C.R. 284; Sri Ramkrilhna
·nalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tandolkar and Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 279 Mahant Moti
Das v. S. P. Sahi, the Special Offiper in charge of Hindu Religious Trusts and
Ors., [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 563; A. C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate
Delhi and Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali etc., [1968] 1 S.C.R. 205; referred to.
4. The Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation _and is meant mainly
te protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. At the same time, in order to
do justice to the landlords and io avoid such restrictions on 1heir right to evitt
the tenant so as to destroy their legal right to property certain salutary provisiGU
have been made by the legislature which give relief to the landlord. In fue
absence of such a legislation a landlord has a common law right to evict the
knant either on the determination of the tenancy by efflux of time or for default
in payment of rent or other grounds after giving notice under the Transfer of
Property Act. Their broad right bas been curtailed by the Rent Control Legielation with a view to give protec.aoa to the tenants having regard to their genuine
and dire needs. [864 C~E]
J
)
..
While the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to ~
1'
tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief whick it
.)..._
seeks to give to the landlord also. like the question of landlord•s bonafide ,er~
sonal necessity. The concept of bonafide necessity should be msaningfull7 oeaG
strued so as to make the relief aranted to the landlord real &ad practical.
..;.
II
{864 E~G]
Bega Begum end- Ors. v . .Abdul Al1mad Khan (dead) by 1. rs and •rs ••
U979] 2 S.C.R. 1; referred to.
Section 25B of the Delhi llettt Control Act was inserted in tlle statute by
Act 18 of 1976 and was aiven restrospective effect from 1-12-75, with the 88la
o\;ttt of 1implify,ing the procedure for eviction of tenants in case tho Ian~•r•
requires the premisea bonafide for his personal occupation. Tho Legisla•
ia Hs wisdom thought that a short and simple procedure should be proWled
r
..
KIWAL SING~ v, LAJWAN~I
.
,
for those landlords who generally want the premises for their bcnafide necessity
A
se that th:ey may be able to get quick and expeditious relief, [865 G-H, 866 A-Bl
Section 25B does not govern all grounds open to a landlord for evicting
the tenant but it h confined only to 'the. ground in liection 14A and proviso
to section 14U)(e).
In other words, the bonafide ncce11sity of the landlord
ba:; been put in a separate class or category having regard lo the peculiar incidents of his right.
Section 14A also relates to ·a special situation where the
landlord under the Go\·ernment Rules is asked lo ~hift to his own bouse, if ' B
he has one or in a bouse that belongs to his spouse, failing which he bas to
pay a penal l'cn~ which al~ost takes away a major part of his salary.
Thus.
1uch a landlord becomes a class by himself.
The statute thus puts personal
necessity of the landlord as a special class requiring special treatment for quick
eviction of the tenant and cuts out delays and plugs all the loopholes, which
may ,cause delay in getting the relief by the landlord. The classificatioH nt_adc
by the legislature is in public interest and is in complete consonance with the ,
objectives sought to be achieved.
The landlords having personal · necessity
.have been brought together as a separate class becaus'e of their spe-cial needs
and such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable particularly Wllell
the legislature in its obvious wisdom feels th&t the landlords should get this
relief as quickly as possible. [868 A-E]
Even though a summary procedure has been evolved the tenant has been
D
afforded full opportunity to defend the. application provided he can disclQSe
aood grounds for negating th:e case of "the landlord. No litigant has 'a riaht
to protract the legal proceedings by taking frivolous, irrelevant, iwitiorial or
uncalled for pleas. This is what Section 258 see~ to prevent. [86.9 E-F]
An appeal is pnrely a creature of tbe statute and this right has not be.<:n
given in order to cut out unnecessary delay. Indeed the highest Court oi tho
&tate has been given a wid·e power of revision where the said Court can_
examine the, case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order :
passed by the Controller.
The right of lhc tenant, therefore,
is sufficiently
safeguarded by the proviso to sub section 8 of Section 25B of the Act. In order
to give the relief to the tenant against any apparent error of law or fact where
no revision l:$s. been filed in the High Court, the statute confers power of
review qn the Controller. [869 G-H, 870 A1
Thus, taking an overall plcture of the silu~tion, the circumstances
under
which the landlord's n!eds have been .classified and the safeguards givl!n by rhc
statute it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that Section 25B and its
sub sections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In fact, Section
25B contains valuable and ·sufficimt guidelines which completely exclude
the
exercise of tmcanaliscd or arbitrary powers of the ·Rent Controller. [870 A-B]
1
. Section 25B is constitutionally va-lid.
The leghlatl.~re has not taken: away the
nght of ·the te.nant at all but has metely simplified the procedure for eviction
0f the tenant 10 case:. falling withiq the ambit of sections 14A and 14(1 )(e)
of the Act: A tenant can~ot challenge th'e validity of such a provision enacted
by the .legis~ature £:o~ wht:h the tenant itself derive such rights. If the IegisJature c?ns1dered m Its wisdom to confer certain rights or facilities on that
tenants, It could .due to changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even
take away such nghts or the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction
and leave the tenants to seek their remedy under the common law. [870 G-H
171 A, B-C]
'
19-625 SCJ/79
F
G
H
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 1 s.c.a.
A
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1291 of 1970.
Ap~al by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
0-4-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 822/77.
Madan Mohan~ V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for the Appellant.
B
P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgal ·and B. L. Verma for the
Respondent.
'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated the 6th April,
C
1978 dismissing the revision ~tition filed by the appellant against an
order of the Rent Controller.
For the purpose of brevity and to! avoid
confusion the appellant shall hereafter be referred to as the Defendant
and the respondent as the Plaintiff.
The defendant appellant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff
D
in Quarter No. IV-H/46, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on 1-7 ... 1967. On
2nd June, 1976 the plaintiff filed an application under sections 14A(l)
14{1) (e) and 14(1 )(f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter
referred to as the Act, for eviction of t11e tenant firstly on th~ ground
that as the husband of the plaintiff was required by the Government
E
to vacate the Government quarter or pay the penal rent the husband
of the plaintiff had to shift to the bouse of his wife which was in the
tenancy of the defendant. -- A prayer was also made by the plaintiff
that even otherwise the premises were required for a bonafide necessity
of the land-lady and also as the p~emises had become unfit for human
habitation the plain1iff required the same for carrying out repairs which
F
could not be done unless the premises mre vacated.
On the next
date, that is on 3rd June, 1976 the plaintilf filed an application with--
drawing the cause of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide
necessity and repairs as contemplated by sections 14(1) (e)
and
14(1) (f)- of the Act.
The defendant appellant at this time
was
nowhere in the picture and no notice had yet been served on him. The
G
Rent Controller accordingly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two
causes of action mentioned in the application.
Thereafter notice was
issued to the defendant.. On the 4th. June, 1976 the plaintiff again
sought to amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned
under section 14-A(l) of the Act, that is to say requirement of the
plaintiff because her husband had been directed to vacate the GovernH
ment quarter.
This was perhaps necessitated because there were
some amendments in the Government Rules oh the subject.
On the
13th August, 1976 the defendant appeared before the Rent Controller
!
-< '
-).
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali} J.)
859
:and filed an application under section 25B sub-sections 4 and 5 requesting the Rent Controller to give the defe'ndant perniission to defend the
· suit, on the ground that as the land-lady was not a Government servant
she was not entitled to maintain t~~ eviction petition under section
t4A(l) of the Act. The defenda'nt also raised some other contentions.
On 6-10-1976 the husband of the plaintiff filed an application
for being impleaded as a party, but this application was rejected on
22-11-197 6.
The plaintiff thereafter again filed ano.ther application on
27-1-1977 praying for amendment of her eviction application by reinserting the cause of action contained in section 14(1 )(e) of the Act
.and sought to claim eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement.
This application was contested by the defendant but was, allowed by
the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-1977. The Rent Controller however left it open to the defendant to file his objection by a fresh
application if he wanted to defend the suit. The defendant accordingly
filed an application on the 9th March, 1977 for permission to defend
the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff
A
B
c
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately ' D
the Rent Controller by his order dated 27th July, 1977 rejected the
application of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit
and passed ~n order evicting the defendant fr<?m the premises. Being
aggrieved by this order the defendant went up in revision to the Delhi
High· Court as no appeal or second appeal against the order passed
by the Rent Controller was maintainable under sub-section 8 of section
25B of the Act.
The revision ~tition was heard by Justice Prakash
Narain of the Delhi High Court who by his order dated 6th April,
.1978 dismissed the revision petition with costs. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court and obtained special leave.
Hence this
appeal.
E
F
On a perusal of the judgment of the Rent Controller and that of the
High Court prima facie it seems to us that the appeal was clearly concluded by findings of fact inasmuch· as both the Courts had found that
the plaintiff had proved that she required the premises for her bonafide
necessity.
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, raised three
points of law before us.
In the first place, it was argued that the
G
~econ~ applicati~n given by the plaintiff for re-amending her plaint by
Inserting the rehef under section 14 ( 1) (e) which she had given up
at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under section 14A(l)
was barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of avil
Procedure.
It was next contended that even if Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. had no
application, the second application for amendment filed by the plainti1f
20--:-62S SCI/79
H
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1980) 1 S.C.R. ,
r A
was barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. Finally, it was
argued that section 25B which lays down the procedure for disposing
of applications filed· by the landlord under the provisions of sections
14A and 14(1)(e) are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
inasmuch as the provisions are arbitrary and discriminatory in nature,
and seek to provide two different procedures for tenant similarly
B
situate.
c
D
So far as the first two contentions are concerned, we are of the
opinion that do not merit any serious consid~ration. Regarding the
question of the applicability qf Order 2 Ruld 2, C.P.C. too argument
of the learned counsel for the appellant is based on serious miscon~
ception of law.
Order 2 Ru1e 2 C.P.C. runs thus :-
"2 ( 1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which
the plaintiff is entitled.to make in respect of the cause
of action but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion
of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in P~spect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall
· not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted
or relinquished".
E
A perusal of Order 2 Rule 2 would clearly reVt~al that this provision
applies to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a portion of the cause
of action on which the suit is· based either by relinquishing the cause
of action or by omitting a p~rt of it.
The provision has, therefore,
no application to cases where the plaintiff basis his suit on separate
and distinct causes of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other
· F
of them. In such cases, it is always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh
suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action which he may have relinquished.
G
H
In the case of Mohammad Khalil Khan & Ors. v. Mahabub Ali Mian
& Ors. C) the Privy Council observed as follows :-
"That the right and its infringement, and not the ground
or origin of the right and its infringement, constitute the
cause of actiont but the cause of action for the Oudh suit
(No. 8 of 1928) so far as the Mahbub brothers are concerned was only a denial of title by them as that suit was mainly
against Abadi Begum for possession of the Oudh property;
whilst in the present suit the cause of action was wrongful
-··-----
(1) 75 I. A. 121.
·'
) .
f
. .,
A
....
•
'1111 . .(
•
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali, ].)
8 G I
possession by the Mahbub brothers of the Shahjahanpur property, and that the two causes of action were thus different."
"Their Lordships are satisfied that there is no force in the
·contention that the plaintiffs in the present suit could not
reasonably commence an action in respect of the Shahjahanpur property while their right to mutation in the Revenue
registers was the subject of an appeal to the Commissioner
which had not been decided, or, in other words, that it was
not open to them to <lme the defendants in respect of the
Shahjahanpur property at a date earlier than October 29,
1928 and to include the Shahjahanpur property in the earlier
, suit No. 8 instituted on September 14, 1928".
"Th,~ principles laid down. in the cases thus far discussed
may be tlms summarized; (1) the correct test in cases falling
under 0. 2. r. 2 is "whether the! claim in the new suit is, in
fact, founded on a cause of action distinct from that which
was the foundation for the former suit.
Moonshee Buzloor
Ruheem v.
Shamsoonnissa Begum e). (2) The cause of
action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment Read v. Brown(2).
(3) If the evidence to
support the two claims is different then the causes of action
are also different
Brunsden v. Humphery(a).
(4) The
causes of action in the two suits may be considered to . be
the same if in substance they are identical.
(Brunsden v.
Humphery). (5) The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that· may be set up by the defendant,
nor does it depend on the character of the 'relief prayed; for
by the plaintiff.
It refers "to the media upon which
the
plaintiff askes the court to arriv~ at a conclusion in his
favour." Muss. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh(4 ). This observation was made by Lord Watsoh in a case under s. 43 of
the Act of 1882 (corresponding to 0.2.r.2) where plaintiff
made various claims in the same suit''.
Applying the afores_aid principles !aid down by the Privy Council
yve find that none of the conditions mentioned by the Privy Council
are applicable in this case. The plaintiff had first based her suit on
(1) 11 Moo. I. A. 551, 605.
(2) 22 Q. B. D. 128, 131.
(3) 14 Q. B. D .. 141J
'
}
A
c
D
E
F
H'
A
B
c
.D
E
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 1 S.C.R..
three distinct causes of action but later confined the suit only to the
first cause of action, namely, the one mentioned in section 14A(1) of
the Act and gave up the cause of action relating to section 14(1) (e)
and (f). Subsequently, by virtue of an amendment she relinquished
the first cause of action arising out of section 14A(l) and sought
to revive her cause of action based on section 14 ( 1 )(e) . At the
time when the plaintiff relinquished the cause of action ·,·rising out of
section 14 ( l) (e) the defendant was not in the picture at all. Therefore, it was not open to the defendant to raise any objection to the
amendment sought by the plaintiff. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the second amendment application was not -barred by the
principles of 0.2 r.2 C.P.C. and the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant must fail.
Secondly, as regards the question of constructive res judicata it
has no application whatsoever in the instant case. It is well settled
that one of the essential conditions of res judicata is that there must
be a formal adjudication between the parties after full hearing. In
other words, the matter must be finally decided between the parties.
Here also at a time when the plaintiff relinquished her first cause of
action the defendant was no where in the picture, and there being no
adjudication between the parti~ the· doctrine of res judicata do~s not
apply.
The second amendment application was made in the same
proceedings on a cause of· action that she was allowed to insert with
the permission of the court.
Although both the parties went to the
court on the basis of these facts, neither the bar of res judicata 'nOr
that of 0.2 r.2 ~ppear to have been raised befor~ the Rent Control).er.
For thesa reasons, therefore, the second plank of the argument put
forward by counsel for the appellant also must be rejected.
Lastly, we come to the question of the application of Article 14
to the provisions of ·the Act.
This is undoubtedly a que,tion which
merit~ serious consideration. Before approaching this question we
might observe that it is well settled that what Article 14 forbids is
hostile di~crirnination and not reasonable classification.
DiscriminaG
tion may take place in many ways, and what Article· 14 requires is
that equals must be treated alike. If equals and unequals are also
treated alike then also Article 14 is clearly attracted and discrimina~
tion results.
A reasonable classification based on grounds having a
clear nexus with the objective to be achieved and grouping certain
persons in a separate category in view of their !Special pecularities is
B
undoubtedly permissible. Of course, classification should
not be
purely a class legislation.
It is also well settled that there is always
a presumption in favour of the comstitutionality of a ~Statute and any
••
.. '
__.._
••
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali,!.)
863
party who seeks to challenge the legislation on the ground of applica~i
lity of Article 14 must plead and prove the necessary facts.
In makmg
· a classification t~
.~;ourt must presumed matters of common knowledge,
i
common report; u1story of the time and e'V'~ry other relevant fact.
~ the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India
·. & OJIJL:1) this Court observed as follows.:-
\
"The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice
in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if
the law deals alike with all of a certai'n class, it is normally
not abnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection;
but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must
always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in re.,t;pect
to which the classification is made; and cla-ssification made
without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid".
Same view was taken in the case of The Sta.te of West Bengal v. Anwar
A
B
c
Ali SarkarC).
D
In the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia
v.
Shri Justice .
S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. C) it was held that in determining whether
there is any intelligible differentia on the basis of which the petitioners
a'nd their companies could have been grouped together it is permissible to look to the facts appearing in the notiftcation as also those
brought to the notice of the court.
1n the case of Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi, The Special Officer
in charge of Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors.(4 ) this Court held that
apart from there being a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment the burden is upon the party who alleges that
there has been a clear transgression of· the constitutional guarantee.
It was further pointed out that the legislature correctly appreciated
the needs of its own people and that its laws are directed to problems
made manife5t by experience and that any discrimi'nation made are
~based on adequate grounds as the legislature is fro~ to
recognise
degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where
the need is d~emed to be the clearest.
These observations . clearly _justify the classification made by the
legislature in enacting the Delhi. Rent Control Act as we shall show
later.
·
(1) [1950] S. C. R. 869.
(2) [1952} S. C. R. 284.
(3) [1959] S. C. R. 279.
(4) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C. R. 563
.,,
E.
~
F
G
H
A
c
D
E·
/ ..
G
'
H
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 1 s.c.R.
To the same effect is the decision m
the case of Slzri A. C.
Aggarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi & Anr. v. Mst. Ram K~li
etc.C)
In the light of the principles enunciated by the decisions of this
Court we would now brlefly appr_oach the relevant provisions o,_ the
Delhi Rent Control Act which have been applied to the facts f'._ the ·
present case.
To begin with, it is not necessary for. us to deal with
section
14A(l) because the cause of action contained in this section has been
given up by _thr~ plaintiff-respondent.
We would, therefore, confihe
ourselves to the validity of section 14( 1 )(e) and the procedure
prescribed to give relief mentioned in the aforesaid section in section
25B. Before discJ.Issing the relevant provisions of the Act it may be
necessary to observe that the Rent Control Act is a piece of social
legislation and is meant mainly to prgtect the tenants from frivolous
evictions.
At the same time, in order to do justice . to the landlords
and to avoid placing such restrictions on their right to . evict the
tenant as to destroy their legal right to property certain salutary
provisions have been made by the legislature which give relief to the
landlord. In the absence of such a legislation a landlord has
a
common law right to evict the tenant either on the determination of
the tenancy by efflux of time or for default in payment of rent or
other grounds after giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act.
This broad right has been curtailed by the Rent Contro1 Legislation
with a view to give protection to the tenants having regard to their
genuine and dire needs. ·While the rent control legislation has given
a numb2.r of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so as
to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord
also. For instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contain~
ed in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question
of landlord's bonafide personal 'necessity.
The concept of bonafide
necessLty should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief
granted to the landlord real and practical.
In the case of Bega Begum
& Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by.L.Rs and Ors.C) this Court
to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party and spoke for the
Court observed as follows :-
"Moreover, section 11 (h) of the Act uses the words
'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that
(1) [1968} 1 S. C. R. 205.
(2) [1979] 2 S. C. R. 1.
¥
•
\
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali, J.)
865
there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere
desire or wish. · The distinction between desire and need
should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even
the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court
has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation
, '} of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially
\ ,
,~xtended nor its language ~o unduly stretched or strained as
B
, to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the· landlord
to get a decree for eviction.
Such a course would defeat the
very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction
~f the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds.
This appears to us to be the general scheme· of all the Rent
Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. This
C
Court has considered the import of the word 'requirement'
and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be
· an element of need".
Coming back to the Delhi Rent Control Act it appears that section
25B was inserted in the statute by Act 18 of 1976 and was given
retrospective effect from 1-12-1975.
The statement of objects and
-reasons which formed part of the Delhi Rent Control Act run thus :
"There has been a persistent demand for amendments
to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to conferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs fsuccessors of a ,deceased statutory tehant so that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simp.lifying the procedure for
eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises
bona fide for his personal occupation. Further, Government
decided on the 9th S>~ptember, 1975 that a person who owns
his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommod<ftion allotted to
him before
the
31st
December, 1975.
Government considered that in the circumstances, the Act requires to be amended urgently.
As the Parliament was not in session the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Ordi'nance 1975 was
promulgated
on the 1st December, 1975. The Bill seeks
to replace
tl)e said Ordinance".
I
(Emphasis ours)
This Act actually replaced the Ordinance which was promulgated on
1st December, 1975.
The objects and reasons clearly reveal that the
amendment has been made for simplifying the procedure for eviction
()f tenants- in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for
D
E
G
H
.. -- ~ '
866
SUPREME .COURT REPORTS
[1980) 1 S.C.R.
A
his personal occupation. It is a matter 0~ com~on know:edge ~at
even though ·the landlord may have an ·unmedia1e ~nd Jmpcrauve
necessity for vacating the house given to a tenant he 15 compelled to
resort to the time consuming any dilatory procedure of a suit which
takes yean; before the landlord is able to obtaiil tbe decree and in
most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord dies
B . or· the need disappears and the landlord is completely deprived of
getting any relief. It appears to us thM jt was for these reasons th.af
the legislature in its wisdom thought that a short and· simple procedure
should be provided for those landlords who generally want tbe premises for their bo11a fide necessity so that they may be able to get quick
c
D
E
F
G
Jl
and expeditious relief. Section 25B of tbe Act runs thus:-
_
.
.
"25.B (1) Every application by a bndlord for the recovery of po."scssion of any premires on tbe ground specified
in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-s~:ction .0) of section
14, or under section 14A, shnU be d~alt with in accordance
with the procedure specified in this section.
(2) The Controller shan. issue summons, in relation to
cvc:ry application referred in sub--section ( 1) in the form
spccifkd jn the Third Schedule.
(J)(;1) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issu~ of summons for service on the tenant,
aho dir~ct the summons to be served by registered post,
acknowkdgC"mcnt due. addressed to the t~nant or his aoent
;;>
emro,\•::r~d. tn 0Ctt.'pt the service at the place where the
tenant or h1s agent ncttnUy and voluntarily rcsidc:!s or carries
0:1 busint~s or r·~rsonaUy works for gain and mn.y, if the .
~Trcumstnncl'S 0f th~ ca5:~ ~o rcq\Jirc; also direct tbe publica~
~1on o~ the t';Ununl)ho;; in <1 tl.:wspapcr cir<"ubtin~ in the locality
10 'vh1ch th·~ tenant is f:l~t knmvn to ll::l\'e r..:siJed or carr~: :I
on husincsl\ nr p: : r~('lnJHy work~d for g:1in.
(b) \\'lh'n an n<:knfJwledgemC"nt pnrf'('rtin~ to be signed
hy .thr kn:l'nt or his ~Ig\'tlt i" n'ceivC'J by the C~ntroller o; the
r .... ·.~·t-.,t·~r~J :Jrtid..: Ct)ntainrng the !iUmmons is received back
\VJth an. cndorst!m~nt purporting to ·have been m::tdc by a
P:J~.tal employee tn the. effect thnt the tenant or his agent
h.tJ rdu--cd to tak·· ddivery or th
' t
.1
• 1
tb
c.
-
·
~ regys ercu arttc e.
e
(lflholkr ·muy uecli.\rc that there has bc~n a valid service of
bUmmons.
~
( 4) The tcna'nt on wh
h
·
(wh~::ther in th..
r
. om t c summons is duly served,
~ or< 103TJ w~y or by registered post) in the
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali,/.)
867
form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the
prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which h~ seeks to contest the
application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance
in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave,
the statement made by the landlord in the application for
eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and
the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the
ground aforesaid.
( 5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to
contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant
discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
obtaini'ng an order for the recovery of possession of ~e premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the p\oviso
to sub-section (1) of section 14 or under section 14A.
(6) Where leave 'is granted to the tenant to contest the
application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of
the application as early as practicable .
. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)
of section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry
in a proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the
practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence.
( 8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against
an
ordt:=r for the recovery of possession of any premises made by
the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in
A
B
c
D
E
t_his section;
F
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of
satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under
this sectio'n is according to law, call for the records of the
case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
(9) Where no application has been made to the High
Court on revision, the Controller may exercise the powers
of review in accordance .with the provisi9ns of Order XL VII
of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(10) Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the pro-_
ccuure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section
(1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be the same
G
H ·
A
I
~
[1980] 1 S.C.R.
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
as the procedure for the disposal of applications by Controllers".
It is obvious that this section does not govern all grounds open to ·
a landlord for evicting the tenant but is confined only to the ground in
section 14A and proviso to sectio~ 14(1) (e). In other words, the
il. bona fide necessity of the landlord has been put in a separate class
or category having regard to the peculiar incidents of this right.