# KHEM CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 229
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-11-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 124 of 1962
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUP'l.'A ANDJ. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/khem-chand-v-union-of-india-2705
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Public Servants-Dismissal-Order set aside by Sup»eme
Court-Fresh enquiry on same charges-Snsperu;ion-Rule providing that public servant shall be deemed w be under snspenBion
from date of original order of suspension-Validity of-Central
Civil Services (ClflSs(~cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, .1957,
r. 12(4)-Caru;titution of Ind,ia, Arts. 14, 19(1) (f), 31 (1),
142, 144,
The appellant a public servant was served with a charge
sheet and after enquiry was dismissed. He filed a suit for a
declaration that the order of dismissal was invalid and for a
further declaration that he still continued to be in service. The
suit was ultimately decreed by the Supreme Court by making
the declarations sought.
In the meanthne, the appellant filed
another suit for recovery of arrears of salary and allowances.
The suit was stayed pending the disposal of the appeal before
the Supreme Court. After the judgment of the Supreme Court,
the authorities decided to hold a further enquiry against the
appellant m1 the original allegations, In view of L
12(4)
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957, the trial court ordered that the proceedings· shall
remain stayed till the order of suspension was revoked or set
aside,
Rule 12(4) provides that where a penalty of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement· is set aside by a court of la\v
and the authorities decide to hold a further enquiry on the
same allegations, the public servant shall be dcc1necl to have
been placed under suspension from the date of the original
order of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retire1nent.
The
appellant contended that r. 12 (4) offended Arts, 14, 19 (1)
(f), 31, 142 and 144of the Constitution and was void,
Held, that r. 12(4) did not offend any of the Articles of
the Constitution and was valid,
Article 142 provides that decrees passed by the Supreme
Court shall be enforceable throughout 1he territory of .India,
and Art. 144 provides that all authorities, civil and judicial
shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Rule 12 (4) did not go
against the decree of the Supreme Court and accordingly it did
not contravene Arts. 142 and 144,
The declaration by the
1962
1962
?(°hem Chand
v.
Un ion of India
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
Supreme Court that the appellant was a member of the service
at the date of the institution of the suit was not affected by the
appellant being placed under suspension.
The only things
affected by r. 12(4) were the salary and allowal!ccs of the. appellant as to which the Supren1e Court decree contained no
directions.
Rule 12(4) did not contravene Art. 19(1) (f).
Conceding
that the right to receive arrears of salary constituted the appel·
!ant's property and that r. 12(+) placed substantial restrictions
on the exercise of that right, the restrictions were in the interest
of the general public. The taking of disciplinary action against public servants for inefficiency, dishnt-(esty etc. was absolutely
necessary in the interests of the general public.
Suspension of
the public servant pending enquiry was a necessary and reasonable part of the procedure.
Devendra Pratap v. State of U. P., [1962] Supp. I. S. C.R.
315. 1334, distinguished.
The argument that there was discrimination between a
public servant the penalty of dismissal etc. on whom was set
a:<ide by a court and another public servant a similar penalty on
whom was set aside on appeal by the departmental disciplinary
authority was incorrect.
Rule 12(3) provided that in the latter
case also the suspension of the public servant shall be deemed
to have continued in force from the date of the original order
of dismissal etc. Only in the case of a public se<vant who had
not been placed under suspension pending enquiry, would
r. 12 (3) not be operative. But such cases were rare. Rule 12(4)
did not offend Art. 3 l (I)
and
whatever
deprivation of
property resulted from r. 12 (4) was by authority of law .
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 124 of 1962.
Appeal

## Text

-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
KHEM CHAND
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUP'l.'A ANDJ. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Public Servants-Dismissal-Order set aside by Sup»eme
Court-Fresh enquiry on same charges-Snsperu;ion-Rule providing that public servant shall be deemed w be under snspenBion
from date of original order of suspension-Validity of-Central
Civil Services (ClflSs(~cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, .1957,
r. 12(4)-Caru;titution of Ind,ia, Arts. 14, 19(1) (f), 31 (1),
142, 144,
The appellant a public servant was served with a charge
sheet and after enquiry was dismissed. He filed a suit for a
declaration that the order of dismissal was invalid and for a
further declaration that he still continued to be in service. The
suit was ultimately decreed by the Supreme Court by making
the declarations sought.
In the meanthne, the appellant filed
another suit for recovery of arrears of salary and allowances.
The suit was stayed pending the disposal of the appeal before
the Supreme Court. After the judgment of the Supreme Court,
the authorities decided to hold a further enquiry against the
appellant m1 the original allegations, In view of L
12(4)
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957, the trial court ordered that the proceedings· shall
remain stayed till the order of suspension was revoked or set
aside,
Rule 12(4) provides that where a penalty of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement· is set aside by a court of la\v
and the authorities decide to hold a further enquiry on the
same allegations, the public servant shall be dcc1necl to have
been placed under suspension from the date of the original
order of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retire1nent.
The
appellant contended that r. 12 (4) offended Arts, 14, 19 (1)
(f), 31, 142 and 144of the Constitution and was void,
Held, that r. 12(4) did not offend any of the Articles of
the Constitution and was valid,
Article 142 provides that decrees passed by the Supreme
Court shall be enforceable throughout 1he territory of .India,
and Art. 144 provides that all authorities, civil and judicial
shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Rule 12 (4) did not go
against the decree of the Supreme Court and accordingly it did
not contravene Arts. 142 and 144,
The declaration by the
1962
1962
?(°hem Chand
v.
Un ion of India
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
Supreme Court that the appellant was a member of the service
at the date of the institution of the suit was not affected by the
appellant being placed under suspension.
The only things
affected by r. 12(4) were the salary and allowal!ccs of the. appellant as to which the Supren1e Court decree contained no
directions.
Rule 12(4) did not contravene Art. 19(1) (f).
Conceding
that the right to receive arrears of salary constituted the appel·
!ant's property and that r. 12(+) placed substantial restrictions
on the exercise of that right, the restrictions were in the interest
of the general public. The taking of disciplinary action against public servants for inefficiency, dishnt-(esty etc. was absolutely
necessary in the interests of the general public.
Suspension of
the public servant pending enquiry was a necessary and reasonable part of the procedure.
Devendra Pratap v. State of U. P., [1962] Supp. I. S. C.R.
315. 1334, distinguished.
The argument that there was discrimination between a
public servant the penalty of dismissal etc. on whom was set
a:<ide by a court and another public servant a similar penalty on
whom was set aside on appeal by the departmental disciplinary
authority was incorrect.
Rule 12(3) provided that in the latter
case also the suspension of the public servant shall be deemed
to have continued in force from the date of the original order
of dismissal etc. Only in the case of a public se<vant who had
not been placed under suspension pending enquiry, would
r. 12 (3) not be operative. But such cases were rare. Rule 12(4)
did not offend Art. 3 l (I)
and
whatever
deprivation of
property resulted from r. 12 (4) was by authority of law .
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 124 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 14, 1960, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench), Delhi in Civil Revision Case
No. 22~-D of 195.9.
Janarda.n i::Jharma., for the appellant.
R. Ga.na.pathy Iyer and P. D. Merum, for the
respondents.
1962. September 25. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
;j
'
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS
231
DAS GUPTA, ].---This appeal by special leave
raises the question of validity of r.12(4) of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957, that were framed bv the President and
published by a notification dated February 28, 1957.
Rule 12(4) is in these words:-
"12(4). Where a penalty of dismissal, removal
or compulsory retirement from service imposed
upon a Government servant is set aside or
declared or rendered void in consequence of or
by a decision
of a court
of law
and
the di.sciplinary
authority on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to
hold a further inquiry against him, on the
allegations on which the penalty of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement was orginally
imposed,
the Government servant shall be
deemed to have been placed under suspension
by the Appointing Authority from the date of
the original order of dismissal, removal or
compulsory retirement and shall continue to
remain under suspension until further orders."
The question arises in this way. On July 1, Hl49,
the appellant, who was a permanent Sub-Inspector of
Co-operative Societies, Delhi, was suspended by the
Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, On July 9, he was
served with a charge-slieet under r. 6(1) of the Rules
which had been framed by the Chief Commissioner,
Delhi. On a consideration of the report made by
the officers, who had held an enquiry into the several
charges against him the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi,
made an order
on December 17, 1951, dismissing
this appellant.
The appellant filed a suit on May 20, 1953,
praying for a declaration that the order of dismissal
made against him was invalid in law being in violation of Art. 31l of the Constitution of India and for
a further declaration that he still continued to be in
service of the Government.
1962
/;hem Chand
v.
U11iun of Inrlia
Das Gupta, J.
1962
Khtm Chand
v.
Union of India
Das Gupta, .T.
232 SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS [Hl63) SUPP.
The Trial Court decreed the suit on l\fa y 3 l ,
1954, declaring that the plaintiffs dismissal was void
and inoperative and that the plaintiff continued to be
in service of the State of Delhi at the date of the
institution of the suit.
The appeal hy the Government of India was
dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi on
December 31, 1954.
The decree was however set aside by the
Punjab High Court on November 1, 1955, in Second
Appeal by the State and the suit was dismissed.
Against this decision of the High Court, the
appellant preferred an appeal by special leave to
this Court. This Court held that the pro·1isions of
Art. 311(2) had not been fully complied with and the
appellant had not had the benefit of all the constitutional protections and
accordingly, his
dismi~al
could not be supported. The Court then passed the
following order :-
"\\' c, therefore, accept this· appeal and set
aside the order of the Single Judge and decree
the appellant's suit by making a declaration
that the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy
Commissioner on December 17, 1951 purporting
to dismiss the appellant from service was inoperative and that the appellant was a member
of the service at the date of the institution of
the suit out of which this appeal has arisen.
The appellant will get costs throughout in all
courts. Ur.der Order XIV Ruic
7 of the
Supreme Court Rules, we direct that the appellant should be paid his
fees
which we
assess at Rs. 250".
The judgment of this· Court was delivered on
December 13, 1957, and is reported in [1958] Supreme
Court Reports at page 1080.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
On April 20, 1955, i.e., shortly after the Government appeal had been dismissed by the Senior Subordinate J udgc, the appellant instituted a suit in the
Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, out of which
the present appeal has arisen.
The defendants in this
suit are: 1. The Union of India; 2. The State of
Delhi; and 3.
The Collector and Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Delhi. In this suit the plaintiff
claims, on the basis of the decree obtained by him in
the earlier suit, a sum of Rs. 14,042/8/- as arrears of
salary and allowances.
The hearing of the suit was
however stayed by the Trial Court on December
26, 1955, in view of the pendency of the appellant's
appeal in this Court against the decision· of the
Punjab High Court dismissing the earlier suit.
As
already stated, this Court delivered the judgment in
that appeal on December 13, 1957. On December
26, 1957, the appellant made an application to the
Trial Court praying that the hearing of the suit be
taken up- Before, however, the suit could be disposed
of, the defendants made an application to the Subordinate Judge, on August 7, 1958, stating that the
disciplinary authority had on a consideration of the
circumstances of the case, decided to hold a further
enquiry against this appellant on the allegations on
which he had been originally dismissed and that,
consequently, the appellant should be deemed to have
been placed under suspension by the appointing
authority from December 17, 1951,-the date of the
orieinal order of dismissal.
Accordingly, it was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff's claim in
the present suit was untenable.
On February 14, l!J5!), the Trial Court made an
order in these terms :-
"It is hereby ordered that the proceedings
in the case shall remain stayed until the time
the order of suspension is revoked under Rule (fl)
of the Central Civil Service (Classifi~atkin. I :on.
trol and Appeal) Rules, l 1Ji)7 rcfcm·d 1,, :,:·,0v1:
1962
Khem Chand
V;
Union of India
D.1s Gupta, J.
1962
.Khem Chand
v.
Union b.f India
Das Gupta, J.
234 SUPREl\fE COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
or its being set aside by a competent tribunal or
authority whichever event occurs earlier.
The
hearing of the suit is adjourned sine die and
the proceedings shall be revived on the application of the plaintiff after the occurrence of any
of the two events referred to above."
Against this order the appellant filed a revisional
application in the Punjab High Court challenging the
validity of r. 12(4) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. A Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the revision petition rejecting the appellant's contention against the
validity of r. 12( 4).
Against that decision of the
High Court the appellant has filed the present appeal
after obtaining special leave from this Court.
It is clear that if r. 1214) of the Central Civil
Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1957, is valid the appellant must be deemed to have
been placed under suspension from December 17,
l \15 l. For, it is not disputed that after the penalty
of dismissal imposed on him had been rendered void
by the decision of this Court, the disciplinary authority did in fact decide to hold a further enquiry
against him on the allegations on which this penalty
of dismissal had orginally been imposed. It is equally
clear that if the appellant be deemed to have been
placed under suspension from December 17, 1951, the
order made by the Trial Court staying the hearing of
the suit and the order of the High Court rejecting the
rcvisional application arc not open to challenge. The
sole question therefore is whether r. 12(4) is valid in law.
This rule forms part of the rules made by the
President in exercise of the powers conferred on him
by the proviso to Art. 309 and cl. 5 of Art. 148 of
the Constitution. The main provisions of Art. 309
is that subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the
recruitment, and conditions of service of persons
appointed, to public services and posts in connection
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
with the affairs of the Union or of any State. The
proviso to this Article makes it competen'. for
t~e
President or such other person as he may direct, m
the case of services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union, to make rules regulating the
recruitment and the conditions of service of persons
appointed to such services and posts until provision
in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the
appropriate Legislature under this Article.
Clause
5 of Art. 148 makes a similar provision in respect of
the conditions of service in the Indian Audit and
Accounts Department and provides inter alin that
subject to the provisions of the Constitution. and of
any Jaw made by Parliament, the conditions of service
of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts
Department shall be such as may be prescribed by
rules made by the President after consultation with
the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
Mr. Janardan Sharma rightly contends that
this power of the President to make rules is subject to
all the provisions of the Constitution and comcqucntly
ifin making the rule the rule-making authority has
contravened any of the provisions of the Constitution
the rule is invalid to the extent of such contravention.
According to Mr. Sharma r. 12(4) contravenes the
provisions of Art. 142, Art. 144, Art.
19(1) (f),
Art. 31 and also Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The argument that the impugned Rule contravenes Art. 142 and Art. 144 is practically the same.
Article 142 provides inter alw that any decree passe<l
~y the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction s~a!l be enforceable throughout the territory
of India m such manner as may be prescribed by or
under any law made by Parliament and until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the
i:resident may by order prescribe.
Article 144 prov1d~s that all ~uthorities, civil and judicial, in the
territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme
Court.
Mr. Sharma's argument as far as we could
1962
Kliem Chand
v.
Union of India
Das Gupta, J.
1962
li."hern Chand
v.
Union of India
Das Gupta, ].
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
understand it
is that under these provisions of
Arts.142 and 144 a duty lay on the President to do all
that was necessary to give effect to the decree made
by this Court in the earlier appeal and that by framing r. 12( 4) the President has, in effect, gone against
the directions of this Court as contained in that decree.
In our judgment, there is no substance in this contention. If the decree of this Court had directed payment of arrears of appellant's salary and allowances
and the effect of the rule made by the President was
to deprive him of that right there might perhaps have
been scope for an argument that the rule contravened
the provisions of Art. 144. The decree made by this
Court did not however contain any direction as regards
payment of salary and allowances. It did contain a
direction that the appellant will get his costs throughout in all courts.
Quite clearly, however, the
impugned rule does not in any way affect that right
of the appellant.
The only other relief granted by
the decree was the making of a declaration that the
order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Commissioner,
Delhi, on December 17, 1951, purporting to dismiss
the appellant from service was inoperative and that
the appellant was a member of the service at the date
of the institution of the suit out of which the appeal
had arisen. Does the impugned rule go against this
declaration?
The answer, in our opinion, must be in
the negative.
The provision in the rule
that the
Government servant shall be deemed to have been
placed under suspension from the date of the original
order of dismissal does not seek to affect the position
that the order of dismissal previously passed
was
inoperative and that the appellant was a member of
the service on .Mav 25, 1953, when the first suit was
instituted bv the appellant.
An o~der of suspension
of a government servant does not put an end to his
service under the Government. He continues to be a
member of the service inspite of the order of suspension.
There was a termination of the appeilant's
'''!'vice \vl1en the ordcc· of dismissal
\\1~_$ made on
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
December l 7, 1951.
When that order of dismissal
was set aside the appellant's service revived; and so
long as another order of dismissal is not made or the
service of the appellant is not terminated by some
other means, the appellant continues to be a member
of the service and the order of suspension in no way
affects this position. The real effect of the order of
suspension is that though he continued to be a member
of the Government service he was not permitted to
work, and further, during the period of his suspension
he was paid only some
allowance -
generally
called "subsistence allowance"-which is normally
less than his salary-instead of the pay and allowances
he would have been entitled to if he had not been
suspenckd.
There is no doubt that the order of
suspension affects a government servant injuriously.
There is no basis for thinking however that because
of the order of suspension he ceases to be a member
of the service. The provision in r. 12(4) that in
certain circumstances the Government servant spall
be deemed to have been placed under suspension from
the date of the original order of dismissal and shall
continue to remain under suspension until further
orders, does not in any way go against the declaration made by this Court. The contention that the
impugned Rnle contravenes Arts. 142 or 144 is therefore untenable.
Equally untenable
is
the appellant's next
contention that the impugned rule contravenes the
provisions of Art. 19(l){f) of the Constitution .. The
argument is that as a result of this Court's decree the
appe)lant had a right to his arrears of pay and
allowances.
This rfo;ht constituted his proiiertv· and
.
',
as the effect of the impugned Rule is that he would
not, for some
time at least, get those arrears it
restricts his right.
It may be conceded that the riirht
to. ar.rean of pay ?nd allowances constituted prope7·ty
w1thm the mean mg of Art. Hl(l ){f) of the Cons1itution and liirther. that the effect of r. 12(4) is :«
1962
Khem Chand
v.
Uuion of fndia
Dax Cuptai J ·
1962
Khem Chand
v.
Union of Indi 1
Das Gupta, J.
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
substantial restriction of his right in respect of that
property under Art. 19(] )( f).
The question remains
whether this restriction is a reasonable restriction in
the interests of the general public. No body can
seriously doubt the importance and necessity of
proper disciplinary action being taken against government servants for inefficiency, dishonesty or other
suitable reasons.
Such action is certainly against the
immediate interests of the Government servant
concerned; but is absolutely necessary in the interests
of the general public for serving whose interests the
government machinery exists and functions. Suspension of a government servant pending an enquiry is a
necessary part of the procedure for taking disciplinary
action against him. It follows, therefore, that when
the penalty of dismissal has been set aside but the
disciplinary authority decides to hold a further enquiry
on the same facts against him a fresh order of
suspension till the enquiry can be completed, in
accordance with law, is a reasonable step of the
procedure. We have no hesitation in holding,
therefore, that in so far as r.12(4) restricts the appellant's right under Art. 19( 1 )( f) of the Constitution, it
is a reasonable restriction
in the interests of the
general public. Rule 12(4) is therefore within the
saving provisions of Art. 19(6), so that there is no
contravention of the constitutional provisions.
l\1r. Sharma drew our attention to the decision
of this Court in Devendra Pratap v. State of Uttar
Pratf,esh(') where the effect of r. 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed bv the State of U. P. under
Art. 309 was considered'. It was held that while
r. 54 undoubtedly enabled the State Government to
fix the pay of a public servant where dismissal is set
aside in a departmental appeal, the rule has no
application to cases in which the dismissal of a
public servant is declared invalid by a civil court and
he is reinstated and that it would not in such a
contingency be open to the authority to deprive the
· (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S. C.R. 315.
l 8.G.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
public servant of the remuneration which he would
have earned had he been permitted to work.
This
decision.has however no application to a case like the
present, where because of the operation of r. 12 ( 4) of
the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, l ~157, the public servant is deemed
to be placed under suspension from the date of the
original order of dismissal.
This brings us to the attack on the rule on the
basis of Art. 14.
According to Mr. Sharma thr
result of the impugned rule is that where a penalty of
dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from
service imposed on a government servant is set aside
pr declared or rendered void in consequence of or by
a decision of a court of law and the disciplinary
authority decides to hold a further enquiry against
him on the allegations on which the penalty was
originally imposed, the consequence will follow that
the government servant shall be deemed to have been
placed under suspension from the date of the origin;il
imposition of penalty, whereas no such consequence
will follow where a similar penalty is set aside not
by a court of law but by the departmental disciplinary authori~y. According to Mr. Sharma, therefore,
there is a discrimination between a government
servant the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on whom is set aside by a decision
of a court of law and another government servant a
similar penalty on w horn is set aside on appeal by
the departmental disciplinary authority. The argument however ignores the result of rule 30 (2) and
rule 12 (3) of these rules.
Rule 30 (2) provides inter
alia that in the case of an appeal against an order
imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 13
i.e., the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsor;
retirement and certain other penalties, the appellate
authority shall pass o~ders: "(i) setting aside, reducing,
confirmmg or cnhancmg the penalty; or (ii) remitting
the case to the authority which imposed the penalty
1962
Khe111 Chan1
v.
llni1111
1~{ India
Dr11· Gupta, J,
1962
Khtm Chand
v.
Union fJj. India
Das Gupta, J,
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
or to any other authority with such direction as it
may deem fit in the circumstances of the case."
Rule 12 ( 3) provides that "where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service
imposed upon a Government servant under suspension
is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules
and the case is remitted for further enquiry or action
or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on
and from the date of the original order of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain
in force until further orders." Where a penalty of
dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement imposed
upon a government servant is set aside by the departmental authority on appeal, it may or may not order
further enquiry; just as where a similar penalty is set
a5ide by a decision of a court of law the disciplinary
authority may or may not direct a further enquiry.
Where the appellate authority after setting aside a
penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement makes an order under r. 30 (2) (ii) remitting·
the case to the authority which imposed the penalty,
for further enquiry, rule 12 (3) will come into operation and so the order of suspension which in almost
all cases is likely to be made where a disciplinary
proceeding is contemplated or is pending r. 12 ( 3)
shall be deemed to have continued in force on and
from the date of the original order of dismissal and
shall remain in force until furthl"r orders. There is
therefore no difference worth the name between the
effect of rule 12 (4) on a government servant the
penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement
on whom is set aside bv a decision of a court of law
and a further enquiry is decided upon and the effect
ofr. 12 (4) on another government servant a similar
penalty on whom is set aside in appeal or on review
by the departmental authority and a further enquiry
is decided upon.
In both cases the government
servant will be deemed to be under suspension from
the date of the criginal order of dismissal, except
,
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
that where in a departmental enquiry a government
servant was not placed under suspension prior to the
date when the penalty was imposed, this result will
not follow, as r. 12 ( 3) would not then have any
operation. It is
entirely unlikely
however that
ordinarily a government servant will not be. placed
under suspension prior to the date of his dismissal.
Rule 12 ( 1) provides that the appointing authority
or any authority to which it is subordinate or any
other authority empowered by the President in that
~ehalf may place a government servant under suspens10n :-
(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him
is contemplated or is pending, or
(b) where a case against him
in respect of any
criminal offence is under investigation or trial. Mr.
Sharma does not say that ordinarily any cases occur
where a government servant is visited with a penalty
of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement,
in a departmental proceeding, without there being
a previous order of suspension under the provisions
of r. 12(1) and we do not think any such case
ordinarily occurs.
Consequently,
the effect
of
r. 12(3) will be the same on a government servant
a penalty of dismissal,
removal
or compulsory
retirement on whom is set aside in appeal by the
departmental authority as the effect of r. 12(4) on a
government servant a similar penalty on whom is set
aside by a decision of a court of law. The contention
that r. 12(4) contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution
must therefore be rejected.
As we find that all the above attacks on the
validity of r. 12(4) fail, the further attack on the Rule
on the basis of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution also
necessarily fails.
For, whatever deprivation of property mav result from r. 12(4) would be by author:ty
of law-the law being r. 12(4).
We have therefore come to the conclusion that
the High Court is right in holding that r. 12( 4) is
1962
Khtm Chand
v.
Union of India
Das Gupta," J.
1962
!Cham Chand
v.
Union o}· India
Das Gupta, J.
1962
September 25.
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
valid and consequently, in rejecting the appellant's
revisional application.
The appeal is dismissed.
But, in view of the
circumstances of the case we make no order as to
costs.
Though the appellant has failed in this appeal
which was brought by him as a pauper, we make no
order against him to pay the court-fee which would
have been paid by him if he had not been permitted
to appeal as a pauper.
Appeal dismissed.
JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD., MEERUT
v.
LAKSHMICHAND AND OTHERS
(B. P.
SINHA, c. J., P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Indu.•trial Dispute-Dismi.sal of workmen-Application
for permi>Bion before Conciliation OJ!ker-Direction of Conciliation Officer-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal, if maintainab/,eGrant of special leave-Competence-U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (U. P. 28 of 1947), 88. 3, 8-Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) A.ct, 1950 (48 of 1950), 88. 2 (c) cl. (iii),
4--Constitution of India, Art. 136.
The workmen of the appellant company resorted. to direct
action in order to enforce their demands 'for bonus, leave etc.
Thereupon, the company served charge sheets upon sixty-three
workmen. The enquiry officer who investigated the charges
found that all the workmen were guilty of sabotage and slowdown strike and that they were liable to be dismissed. But as
at that time a dispute between the company and its workmen
relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Industrial
Tribunal, the conditions of service of the workmen could not,
by virtue of cl. 29 of the order issued in 1954 by the Governor