# KHUSHiRAM BEHARI LAL & CO v. ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 752
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-10-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 442 of 1974
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/khushiram-behari-lal-co-v-assessing-authority-sangrur-anr-6963
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

fVrit jurisdiction of the lligh Court-Scope for interferellce with findings of
iepa~tlnental authorities.
In response to a notice from the assessing authority Uf!der the Punja'b General
Sales Tax Act that the appeliant had not filed a return in respect of the assessment year 1959-60. the appellant claimed that tho firm: had ceased to do any
w·ork since February. 1961 and that a formal document to that effect was executed in August, 1961. The assessing authority made- an order of assessment
in March 1962. In a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed'
by the appeltant the High Court directed the Sales Tax Officer to enquire and
repo1t if the appellant-firm had proved its dissolution in August 1961 or before
the date oft assessment order. The Sales Tax Officer_ reported that it had not.
The High Court itself examined the matter and came· to the same conclusion as
that reached by the Sales Tax Officer.
It alsQ' found that tho1igh intimation
was required to be given under s. 16 of the Act regarding the dissolution of
the firm \Vithin 30 days of such dissolution no such intin1ation \vas given under
April, 1962 and dismissed the writ petition.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ·
HELD: (1) There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment
of the High Court. The facts and circumstances referred to by the High Cour!
throw a considerable doubt upon the correctness of the appellant's statement
that it had stood dissolved in August, 1961. [754 D & BJ
(2) The High Court Was dealing \vith th: matter on the writ side. In a:
"''fit petition~ the scope for interference· with a finding of the departmental
authorities is much more restricted and the court can normally interfere on.Ir
if the finding is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence -or is otherwise
perverse. The same cannot bo said of the finding of the sales tax authority
embodied in its report sent to the High Court in the present C0tse. (75-4 C]

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
752
KHUSHiRAM BEHARI LAL & CO.
v.
ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR.
October 8, 1976
[H. R. KHANNA AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
fVrit jurisdiction of the lligh Court-Scope for interferellce with findings of
iepa~tlnental authorities.
In response to a notice from the assessing authority Uf!der the Punja'b General
Sales Tax Act that the appeliant had not filed a return in respect of the assessment year 1959-60. the appellant claimed that tho firm: had ceased to do any
w·ork since February. 1961 and that a formal document to that effect was executed in August, 1961. The assessing authority made- an order of assessment
in March 1962. In a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed'
by the appeltant the High Court directed the Sales Tax Officer to enquire and
repo1t if the appellant-firm had proved its dissolution in August 1961 or before
the date oft assessment order. The Sales Tax Officer_ reported that it had not.
The High Court itself examined the matter and came· to the same conclusion as
that reached by the Sales Tax Officer.
It alsQ' found that tho1igh intimation
was required to be given under s. 16 of the Act regarding the dissolution of
the firm \Vithin 30 days of such dissolution no such intin1ation \vas given under
April, 1962 and dismissed the writ petition.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ·
HELD: (1) There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment
of the High Court. The facts and circumstances referred to by the High Cour!
throw a considerable doubt upon the correctness of the appellant's statement
that it had stood dissolved in August, 1961. [754 D & BJ
(2) The High Court Was dealing \vith th: matter on the writ side. In a:
"''fit petition~ the scope for interference· with a finding of the departmental
authorities is much more restricted and the court can normally interfere on.Ir
if the finding is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence -or is otherwise
perverse. The same cannot bo said of the finding of the sales tax authority
embodied in its report sent to the High Court in the present C0tse. (75-4 C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 442 of 1974.
(From· the Judgment and Order dated the 17th of August, 1970 cf
the Punjab & Haryana High/ Court in Civil Writ No. 413/621.
V. C. Mahajan and 0. P. Sharma, for the App=lbnt.
Harbans Singh, for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of tho Court was delivered by
KHANNA, ~-
This is an appeal on certificate agc1inst the judgment
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby the_ High Court hold
that the appellant-firm had failed to prove that it bad stood dissolved
on a dato prior to tho date of assessment, viz., March 121 1962.
The appellant-firm carries on business as commission agents of
cotton and food grain'-
In respect of the year 1959-60, the appellant did not submit any return under the Punjab General Sales Tax
Act.
A notice was thereupon issued to the appellant-firm and the
r
' 1
KHUSHIRAM BEl-IARILAL v. ASSESSING AUTHORITY (Klu111na, J.)
7 53
case was fixed fo~ July l, 1960.
The appellant challenged the validity of the assessment proceedings by means of a writ petition in the
High Court.
The High Court during the pendency of the petition,
stayed the proceedings.
Ultimately, it seems, the writ petition was
dismissed and the assessment proceedings were resumed on Novernber 30, 1961.
Various dates were fixed thereafter.
February 17,
1962 was fixed as the final date of hearing.
On that date, intimation
was given on behali of the appellant that.the appellant-firm had ceased
to do any work since February 1961. It was also respresented that
a formal document had been executed on August 8, 1961.
The
assessin,g authority despite that intimation proceeded to make an order
of assessment dated March 12, 1962.
The appellant thereupon filed
another petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab
High Court, praying for the- quashing of the assessment order.
H
was stated on behalf of tho appellant thnt the appellant-firm had been
dissolved before the date of assessment order and as such, the sales
tax authorities could not make an order for assessment.
The High
Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the assessment proceedings had been initiated long before the alleged date of dissolution
of the firm.
The appellant thereafter came up to this Court in appeal
against the ~aid decision of the High Court. This Court set aside the
judgment of the High Court, following its decision in the case of State
of Punjab v. M/s Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate.(li)
The case was
remanded to the High Court as no definite finding had been given by
the High Court regarding the dissolution of the appellant-firm and
about the fact as to whether the said dissolution had taken placo before
the date of the; order of assessment, namely, March 12, 1962.
After remand, the High Court called upon the sales tax officer to
make an enquiry and submit a report on the point as to whether. the
appellant-firm had been dissolved on August 8, 1961 as alleged by the
appellant. The sales tax officer thereafter made an enquiry and submitt~d a report that the appellant-firm had not proved its dissolution
A
B
c
D
E
on August 8, 1961 or before the date of assessment order.
Tho High
Court, after receipt of the report, itself examined the matter and came
F
to the conclusion that on the material on record brought by tho appellant, it had not boon proved that the appellant-firm had stood dissolved
on a date prior to March 12, 1962.
It is the correctness of the above
decision of the High Court which has now been assailed before us by
the appellant in this appeal.
'
We have heard Mr. Mahajan on behalf of the appellant and find
no cogent ground to take a view different from that of the High Court.
The High Court, in tho course of its judgment, has pointed out that
though the assessment order was made on March 12, 1962 a large
number of hearings took place between March 8, 1961, the alk:;ed
date of clilillolutiOU: and March 12, 1962.
At no hearing, was a.ny
intimation given by the appellant to th~ assessing authority that the
firm had ~tood dissolved.
All that was intimated on February 17.
1962 wa~ that the firm had ceased to do work in February 196 l and
(I) ]11166] 2 S.C.R. 457.
H
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
0977] 1 S.C.R.
A
that a formal document had been executed on August 8, 1961.
It
was also not the case of the appellant that all the six partners of the
appellant firm had signed that document.
Another factor which
weighed with the High Court was that though intimation is required
to be given undel\ section 16 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act
regarding the dissolution of a firm within thirty days of such dissolution no such intimation was given by the appellant-firm until April 2,
B
1962, i.e., nearly eight months after the alleged date of dissolution.
c
D
In our opinion, the facts and circumstances referred to by the High
Court throw a considerable doubt upon the correctness of the statement made on behalf of the appellant-firm that it had stood tiissolved
on August 8, 1961.
It has to be borne in mind that the High Court
was dealing with the matter on the writ side.
In a writ petition, the
scope for interference with a finding of the departmental authorities is
much more restricted and the court can normally interfere only if the
finding is based upon no evidence or is based upon extraneous
or
irrelevant evidence or is otherwise perverse.
The same cannot he said
of the finding of the sales tax authority embodied in its report sent to
the High Court in the present case.
We see no sufficient ground to
interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
The appeal fails and
is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal dismissed.
(
,... -l
/
.
\
/
/
/