# KIRAN BEDI & ORS v. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR

- **Citation:** [1989] 1 S.C.R. 20
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1989-01-04
- **Bench:** E.S. Venkataramiah, M.M. Dutt, N.D. Ojha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kiran-bedi-ors-v-committee-of-inquiry-anr-10217
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952/Commissions of Inquiry
(Central) Rules, 1972: Sections 4 and 8-B/Rule 5(5)(a)-Commission
of Inquiry-Examination of witnesses-Sequence of-Issuance of
formal notice under s. 8-B-When arises-Holding persons not entitled
C to be covered bys. 8-B, and compelling them to enter witness box at the
inception while directing similarly placed persons to whom notice issued
to be examined at the end-Whether justified-Whether discriminatory-Persons whose conduct being inquired into called upon for
being cross-examined at the inception of the inquiry while persons
similarly placed directed to be enquired at the end-Refuse to bind
D themselves by oath and affirmation believing to be covered bys. 8-BWhether can avoid consequences-Refusal-When justified.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 178---Commission of lnquiryDirecting filing of complaint for prosecution for failure to enter witness
box~Whether complaint liable to be quashed for infringement of
E fundamental right.
r-
~
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Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 21, 32, 136 & 142Commission of Inquiry-Holding persons not covered by s. 8-B of
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and compelling them to enter witness
box, while directing issue of notice to similarly placed persons- 1c
F Whether discriminatory-On refusal-Directing filing of complaints
\
under s. 178 I PC-Whether infringement of fundamental rights-Writ
Petition/Special Leave Petition filed challenging order for filing
complaints-Summons by Magistrate not challenged-Maintainability
of-Interference by Supreme Court-Whether called for.
G
A Committee consisting of two Judges of the High Court was
constituted hy Delhi Administration to enquire into certain incidents in
January 1988, involving the lawyers and the police sequel to an alleged
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incident of a lawyer, being apprehended hy the students of a College,
and handed over to the police on the accusation of committing an offence within the campns of the said College and his subsequently being
H
brought in handcuffs by the police for production before a Magistrate,
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KIRAN BED! v. COMMITIEE OF INQUIRY
21
who ultimately discharged him with direction to the Commissioner of A
Police to take action against the guilty police officials.
In its interim report, the Committee observed that it had to
examine the conduct of various police officers, and, in particular,
among others, the petitioners and recommended the transfer of the
petitioners from t"eir posts.
In pursu& 1ce of a notice issued by the Committee under Rule
5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of cases on behalf of the Higb Court Bar
Association and the Commissioner of Police together with the support·
ing affidavits were tiled before the Committee. The Police were
required to be ready for examination froin May 16, 1988 onwards but
the counter affidavit and the list of witnesses had not been tiled till 17th
May, 1988, on which date the Commissioner of Police submitted two
applications praying for postponement of hearing and for calling upon
the Bar Association to start their evidence first and to call upon the
Commissioner of Police to adduce the evidence thereafter. Rejecting
these applications, the Committee passed an order saying that since the
Police had failed to file their counter affidavit or list of witnesses, the
petitioners should be present in Court on May 19, 1988 for cross.
examination.
011 the· petitioners' refusing to enter the witness-box for taking
oath for cross-examination, the Committee decided to file complaints
against the petitioners for an offence under s. 178 of the Indian Penal
Code and in pursuance of which complaints were tiled against the
petitioners in the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate's Court under sub-s.
(4) of s. 5 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read withs. 346 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The petitioners challenged these orders in this Court by way of
writ petitions and Special Leave Petitions. This Court passed an orde

## Text

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A
KIRAN BEDI & ORS.
v.
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR.
JANUARY 4, 1989
B
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, M.M. DUTT AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.]
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952/Commissions of Inquiry
(Central) Rules, 1972: Sections 4 and 8-B/Rule 5(5)(a)-Commission
of Inquiry-Examination of witnesses-Sequence of-Issuance of
formal notice under s. 8-B-When arises-Holding persons not entitled
C to be covered bys. 8-B, and compelling them to enter witness box at the
inception while directing similarly placed persons to whom notice issued
to be examined at the end-Whether justified-Whether discriminatory-Persons whose conduct being inquired into called upon for
being cross-examined at the inception of the inquiry while persons
similarly placed directed to be enquired at the end-Refuse to bind
D themselves by oath and affirmation believing to be covered bys. 8-BWhether can avoid consequences-Refusal-When justified.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 178---Commission of lnquiryDirecting filing of complaint for prosecution for failure to enter witness
box~Whether complaint liable to be quashed for infringement of
E fundamental right.
r-
~
I
-·cl
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 21, 32, 136 & 142Commission of Inquiry-Holding persons not covered by s. 8-B of
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and compelling them to enter witness
box, while directing issue of notice to similarly placed persons- 1c
F Whether discriminatory-On refusal-Directing filing of complaints
\
under s. 178 I PC-Whether infringement of fundamental rights-Writ
Petition/Special Leave Petition filed challenging order for filing
complaints-Summons by Magistrate not challenged-Maintainability
of-Interference by Supreme Court-Whether called for.
G
A Committee consisting of two Judges of the High Court was
constituted hy Delhi Administration to enquire into certain incidents in
January 1988, involving the lawyers and the police sequel to an alleged
-~
incident of a lawyer, being apprehended hy the students of a College,
and handed over to the police on the accusation of committing an offence within the campns of the said College and his subsequently being
H
brought in handcuffs by the police for production before a Magistrate,
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KIRAN BED! v. COMMITIEE OF INQUIRY
21
who ultimately discharged him with direction to the Commissioner of A
Police to take action against the guilty police officials.
In its interim report, the Committee observed that it had to
examine the conduct of various police officers, and, in particular,
among others, the petitioners and recommended the transfer of the
petitioners from t"eir posts.
In pursu& 1ce of a notice issued by the Committee under Rule
5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of cases on behalf of the Higb Court Bar
Association and the Commissioner of Police together with the support·
ing affidavits were tiled before the Committee. The Police were
required to be ready for examination froin May 16, 1988 onwards but
the counter affidavit and the list of witnesses had not been tiled till 17th
May, 1988, on which date the Commissioner of Police submitted two
applications praying for postponement of hearing and for calling upon
the Bar Association to start their evidence first and to call upon the
Commissioner of Police to adduce the evidence thereafter. Rejecting
these applications, the Committee passed an order saying that since the
Police had failed to file their counter affidavit or list of witnesses, the
petitioners should be present in Court on May 19, 1988 for cross.
examination.
011 the· petitioners' refusing to enter the witness-box for taking
oath for cross-examination, the Committee decided to file complaints
against the petitioners for an offence under s. 178 of the Indian Penal
Code and in pursuance of which complaints were tiled against the
petitioners in the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate's Court under sub-s.
(4) of s. 5 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read withs. 346 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The petitioners challenged these orders in this Court by way of
writ petitions and Special Leave Petitions. This Court passed an order
on June 2, 1988 directing the Committee to reconsider the whole question relating to the order in which the witnesses had to be examined in
the case.
In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Committee passed an
order on 29th June, 1988 holding that the concept of burden of proof
was not quite relevant In the proceedings before a Commission, under
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the Act, which had been given free hand to lay down its ow11 procedure
subject, of course, to the provisions of the Act and the rules made
thereunder and that it would be difficult for the committee to lay down
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[1989) 1 S.C.R.
the manner in which the witnesses were to be examined, foregoing its
right to examine any witness at any stage, if his statement appeared to
be relevant, that merely because there were allegations against a
particular person he would not be said to be covered under s. 8-B,
which required a positive order from the Committee, and that when the
Committee mentioned that it was to examine the conduct of various
Police Officers and others, it did not have in view s. 8-B of the Act. The
Committee specifically held that the three other persons to whom
notices had been issued under s. 8-B would he examined at the end of
the inquiry.
On August 18, 1988 this Court quashed the orders of the Committee directing the tiling of the complaints and the criminal proceedings
C against the petitioners before the Metropolitan Magistrate and held (a)
that the Delhi Administration had to examine first all its witnesses as
required by Rule S(S)(a) of the Rules framed under tbe Act; even those
witnesses who may have tiled affidavits already may first be examinedin-chief before they were cross-examined, since it was stated that when
D the affidavits were tiled the deponents did not know what the other
parties who had also tiled affidavits had stated in their affidavits; the
question whether a party had the right of cross-examination or not shall
be decided by the Committee in accordance with s. 8-C of the Act; the
direction to the Delhi Administration to examine its witnesses first did
not apply to those witnesses who fell under s. 8-B of the Act, who had to
E be examined at the end of the inquiry, as opined by the Committee
itself; (b) that the petitioners were persons, who fell under s. 8-B of the
Act and had to be dealt with accordingly, and ( c) that if the three
persons to whom notices under s. 8-B had been issued were to be
examined, even according to the Committee, at the end of the inquiry
there was no justifiable reason to deny the same treatment to the
F
petitioners who were in the same position as those three persons; the
action of the Committee in asking them to be corss-examined at the
beginning of the inquiry was, therefore, discriminatory; mere non~issue
of notices to them under s. 8-B ought not to make any difference if they
otherwise satisfied. the conditions mentioned In s. 8-B; the issue of such
a notice was not contemplated under s. 8-B of the Act; it was enough if
G at any stage the Commission considered it necessary to inquire into the
conduct of any person and such person would thereafter be governed by
s. 8-B of the Act. Reasons for this order were to be given later.
Giving reasons for the above order the Court,
H
HELD: I. Recourse to procedure under s. 8-B of the Commis-
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KIRAN BED! v. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY
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sions of Enquiry Act, 1972 is not confined to any particular stage and if
not earlier, at any rate, as soon as the Committee made the unequivocal
A
declaration of its intention, in its interim report to examine the conduct
of the two petitioners it should have issued notice under s. 8-B to the two
petitioners, if it was of the view, for which view there is no justification,
that issue of a formal notice under s. 8-B was the sine-qua-non for
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attracting that Section. At all events, the Committee could not deny the
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petitioners the statutory protection of s. 8-B by merely refraining from
issuing a formal notice even thou~h on its own declared intention, the
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section was clearly attracted. [42C-E]
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Chu/am Mohammad,
[1966] Suppl. S.C.R. page 401 and State of Karnataka v. Union of India c
-f--
& Another, [1978] 2 S.C.R. page I, relied on.
2.1 The use of the word 'or' between clauses (a) and (b) ors. 8-B or
the Act makes it clear that s. 8-B would be attracted if requirement of
either clause (a) or clause (b) is fulfilled. Clause (a) of s. 8-B applies
when the conduct of any person is to be enquired into whereas clause (b)
D
applies to a case where reputation or a person is likely to be prejudicially affected. [42B]
,J~
2.2 The fact that no formal notice had been issued under s. 8-B
would constitute no justification for not treating a person to be covered
by that section if otherwise the ingredients of the said section were made
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out. Having once stated in its interim report in unequivocal terms, that
the conduct of these two petitioners among others was to be examined,
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it was not open to the Committee to still take the stand thats. 8-B was
not attracted in so far as they were concerned. [42B-C]
2.3 Keeping in view the nature of the allegations made in the
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. statements of case and the supporting affidavits filed on behalf of the
various Bar Associations including the Delhi High Court Bar Association, requirement of even clause (b) of s. 8-B was fulfilled inasmuch as if
those allegations were proved they were likely to prejudicially affect the
reputation of the two petitioners. In view of the specific term of refer-
, ___ ,_~
ence which contemplated taking of "stringent action" against all those
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responsible, even the career of the petitioners as police officers was
,,
likely to be affected in case an adverse finding was recorded against
them and the principle that the report of a Commission of Enquiry has
no force proprio vigore does not, on a pragmatic approach to the consequences, seem t~ constitute sufficient safeguard so far as the petitioners
are concerned. [43C-E]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 1 S.C.R.
The reason for the importance attached with regard to the matter
of safeguarding the reputation of a person being prejudicially affected
iu cl. (b) ofs. 8-B oftlte Act is not far to seek. [43E-F]
Blackstone's Commentary of the laws of England Vol-I, IVth
Edition, Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 77 at page 268 and D.F. Marion
v. Davis, SS America! Law Reports page 171 referred to.
3.1 Section 8-B inter alia contemplates an opportunity being
given to the person governed by the said section to produce evidence
in his defence whereas s: 8-C inter alia gives him the right to crossexamine the witnesses who depose against him. [4SD]
Not only that calling upon a person governed by s. 8-B to produce
evidence in his defence at the very inception of the inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in this situation such a person would really
be required to disprove statements prejudicial to him of such witnesses
who are yet to be examined, it would also reduce the right of crossD
examination by such person to a mere formality for the obvious reason
that by the time the witnesses who are to be cross-examined are produced, the defence of such person which would normally constitute the
basis for the line and object of cross-examination would already be
known to such witnesses and they are likely to refashion their statements accordingly. [4SE-F]
E
3 .2 Perhaps in a case where there is no other witness to give
information about the alleged incident about which the inquiry is being
held and the only person or persons who could give such information is
or are the person or persons who are likely to be adversely affected by
the inquiry, it may be necessary to depart from the above view as a
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matter of necessity. But this is not one such case. There are admittedly
any number of other persons who can give evidence about what happened on the relevant dates. [4SG I
Since the two petitioners clearly fell within the category of persons
contemplated by s. 8-B of the Act and were consequently entitled to the
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same treatment as has been accorded by the Committee to the persons
to whom notice has been issued by it under the said section, the Committee was not justified in calling upon the two petitioners to stand in
the witness box for cross-examination at the very initial stage of the
enquiry. [54B-DJ
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3.3 The apprehension that in case a person governed by s. 8-B
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KIRAN BED! v. COMMITIEE OF INQUIRY
25
was to be examined at the end and at that stage such person even at the
risk of not producing his defence, f~r some reason, chooses not to
appear as a witness, the Committee would be deprived of knowing the
facts in the knowledge of such person and such a course would obviously
hamper the enquiry is more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power
of the Commission to call upon any person to appear as a witness under
s. 4 of the Act, which in terms is very wide and is not circumscribed by
fetters of stage, would be available to the Commission and it would he
entitled to call such person as a witness even at that stage. [46A-C]
4.1 In view of the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 6 of the Act, and
the rules framed thereunder a person could not, on the belief that he
was covered by s. 8-B, avoid the consequence of ss. 178 and 179, by
claiming absolute immunity from binding himself by an oath or affirmation for answering questions put to them. [51H; 52A[
Mc Grain v. Daugherty, 71 L.ed. 580; Uphaus v. Wyman, 3 L.ed.
A
B
c
2d 1090; Sinclair. v. United States, 73 L.ed. 692; Kastigar v. United
States, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 and Brown v. Wa/ker40 L.ed. 819, referred to.
D
However, a valid justification put forth by the witness was sufficient ground to make him immune from prosecution. [52F]
Watkins v. United States, I L.ed. 2d 1273; F/axerv. United States,
3 L.ed. 2d 183 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 12
E
L.ed. 2d 678 referred to.
In the instant case, the petitioners are not asserting thai they
could not be required at all to appear as a witness before the Committee
and make statement on oath. It was submitted on their behalf that they
did not either wish to delay the proceedings or to show disrespect to the
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Committee, but only wanted to protect their own interest by making the
submission which they made before the Committee, as per legal advice
given to them, namely that they being covered bys. 8-B of the Act their
defence would be put to serious jeopardy and will be prejudicially affected if they were required to appear in the witness box for crossexamination at the very inception of the inquiry even.before statements G
of witnesses proving the accusations against the petitioners had been
recorded which they were entitled to defend. [528-E]
4.2 On the view of the Committee that persons covered by 8-B
were to be examined at the end of the enquiry, the fact that an affidavit
of the petitioner was on record could hardly justify the petitioner being
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26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989) 1 S.C.R.
A
called upon to enter the wit~s box at the very inception. [SSC)
Smt. Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah Commision of
Inquiry, ILR 1980(1) Delhi SS2 referred to.
4.3 Had the Committee not been labouring under the misappreB hension that the petitioners were not covered by s. 8-B, because no
notices under that section had been issued to them, notwithstanding the
fact that their conduct was to be examined on its own declared, intention, it would obviously not have required the petitioners to take oath
for being cross-examined at the stage at which it did so. The subsequent
orders of the Committee directing complaints to be tiled against the
C petitioners for an offence punishable under s. 178 IPC and the act of
filing such complaints were the consequences of the said misapprehension. [SSF-G]
Since the petitioners were covered by s. 8-B, the action of the
Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter. the witness box for
D being cross-examined, when even according to it persons similarly
situated were to do so at the end of the inquiry, was in itself discriminatory. There was, therefore, valid justification for the refusal by the
petitioners to take oath for cross-examination at the stage when they
were required to do so. [SSH; S6A-B)
E
Therefore, the Committee should not have, in the instant case,
directed the filing of a complaint against either of the petitioners for an
I f--''
offence punishable under s. 178 IPC. [S6C)
S. Since the action of the Committee in holding that the petitioners were not covered by s. 8-B of the Act and compelling them to
\-
F enter the witness box on the dates in question was discriminatory and
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the orders directing complaint being filed against the petitioners were
illegal, it is a case involving infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. In such a situation, the power of this Court to pass an
appropriate order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and
142 of the Constitution cannot be seriously doubted, particularly having
G regard to the special facts and circumstances of this case. IS6D-EI
The orders directing filing of complaints being invalid, the conse- +
quential complaints and the proceedings thereon including the orders of
the Magistrate issuing summons cannot survive. [S6E-FI
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6. If the petitioners are compelled to face prosecution. in spite of
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KIRAN BED! v. COMMIITEE OF. INQUIRY IOJHA, J.]
27
the finding that the orders directing complaint to be filed against them
were illegal, it would cause prejudice to them. Therefore, this Court
can interfere in the matter. [ 56G I
7. Apart from the directions contained in this Court's order
dated 18th August, 1988, it is not expedient to lay down any particular
rigid procedure to be followed by the Committee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be examined by it. [41G-H/
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 626 of
1988 etc. etc. ·
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S. Murlidharan,
A.D .N. Rao, A. Sobba Rao and Krishnan Kumar for the Petitioners.
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Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugopal,
Kapil Sibbal, Lal Chand, C.S. Vaidyanathan, H.S. Phoolka, N.S. Das,
D
Rajiv Khosla, P. Tripathi, Kailash Vasdev, Miss A. Subhashini.
Harish Salve and Ravinder Sethi, for the Respondents.
,..\-
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
OJHA, J. In the writ petition and the special leave petitions filed
E
by Smt. Kiran Bedi, the orders dated 17th, 20th and 23rd May 1988
passed by the Committee of Inquiry consisting of Mr. Justice N.N.
Goswami and Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa of the High Court of Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as the Committee) are sought to be quashed
whereas in the writ petition and the S.L.P. filed by Jinder Singh, the
order dated 26th May, 1988 passed by the said Committee is sought to
F
be quashed.
In order to appreciate the respective submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to give in brief the
circumstances leading to the appointment of the Committee and also
to quote the terms of reference. What ultimately assumed the shape of G
confrontation between lawyers and police sparked off from an alleged
unfortunate incident on 15th January, 1988 of a lawyer being apprehended by the students of St. Stephens College, University of Delhi
and being handed over to the police on the accusation of committing
an offence within the campus of the said College. According to the
statement of case filed before the Committee on behalf of the Delhi
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989) 1 S.C.R.
High Court Bar Association, the said lawyer was brought by the police
in handcuffs for production before a Metropolitan Magistrate on 16th
January, 1988. The lawyers present protested against the handcuffing
but their protest was ignored by the police officials. The Metropolitan
Magistrate ultimately discharged the lawyer on the same date and also
directed the Commissioner of Police to take action against the guilty
police officials. In support of their demand for action against the police
officials, the lawyers went on strike from 18th January 1988. In the
said statement of case it was further stated that on 20th January, 1988,
Smt. Kiran Bedi, Deputy Commissioner of Police, North District,
Delhi, made a statement in a Press conference justifying the action of
police and criticising the order of the Magistrate in discharging a
"thief" and that in order to express their deep concern and anguish a
group of lawyers went to meet Smt. Bedi on 21st January, 1988 in her
office which at that time was situated in the Tis Hazari Court Complex
itself. Smt. Bedi, however, refused to come out and meet the lawyers
whereupon they preferred to wait upon her till such time as she agreed
to meet them. They assert that while they had waited for 15-20 minutes
the police took recourse to lathi charge on the lawyers at the orders of
Smt. Bedi. In the said statement of case it has further been asserted
that while the indefinite strike and the agitation of the lawyers
demanding a judicial inquiry into the incident of lathi charge and suspension of Smt. Kiran Bedi was continuing, a mob which eventually
swelled to about 3000 persons came to Tis Hazari Court Complex on
17th February 1988 raising slogans in support of Smt. Bedi and against
the striking lawyers. The mob used brickbats and stones causing injury
to some lawyers and damage to property. According to them this mob
attack was engineered by Smt. Kiran Bedi. A statement of case was
also filed byVed Prakash Marwah, the then Commissioner of Police,
attaching thereto affidavits of 25 police officers including an affidavit
of Smt. Kiran Bedi. There is a denial on their part of the assertions and
insinuations made against them by the Delhi Bar Association referred
to above. With regard to the incident on 21st January 1988 the case of
Smt. Kiran Bedi as is apparent from her affidavit filed along with the
aforesaid statement of case is that she along with some other officers
reached her Tis Hazari Office at about 11.15 A.M. and while a meetG
ing was in progress in connection with the arragements for the
Republic Day some time around 12.00 noon, slogans were heard
"being raised outside by an apparently large crowd approaching in our
direction. Before we realised what was happening. all of sudden a
group of lawyers stormed into my office pushing aside the female
'constable on duty at my door. They rushed towards me making violent
H gestures and uttering obsceneties at me. They made physical gesture
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KIRAN BEDI v. COMMITfEE OF INQUIRY IOJHA, !.)
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and threats to the effect ....... The Police Officers who were sitting
around my table jumped to their feet. They held back one of hysterical
A
persons who had actually advanced in my direction and formed a ring
around the lawyers and managed to move them out of my office while
bolting me inside along with my female constable and a female visitor
who had come to see me for her own work". We have thought it
proper not to quote the actual words of threat stated in the said
B
affidavit. According to Smt. Kiran Bedi the situation thereafter outside her office was handled by the other officers present while she
remained inside the office.
We are not concerned with the correctness or otherise of either
of the two versions stated above and as already pointed out we have c
referred to them only to indicate the background in which the Committee was constituted. Having referred in brief to the circumstances
which led to the appointment of the Committee we now quote the
order of reference:
"F.No. 10/9/88-NP-II
D
DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI
(HOME POLICE-II DELHI)
Dated the
23rd Feb. 1988.
E
ORDER
Whereas the Administrator of the Union Territory of
Delhi is of the opinion that a judicial inquiry is necessary
into matters of public importance mentioned below; Now
therefore, the Administrator is pleased to constitute a
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Committee, in consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi
High Court consisting of Mr. Justice N .N. Goswami and
Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa Hon'ble Judges of the I:Iigh
Court to inquire into and record their findings on the
following:
G
(i) The incident of the 15th January, 1988 in St. Stephen's
College, University of Delhi regarding apprehension
of a lawyer by the police.
(ii) The incident and reported lathi-change on the 21st
January, 1988 outside the office of the DCP/North,
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Delhi.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 1 S.C.R.
(iii) Circumstances leading to presence of a mob in Tis
Hazari premises on 17th February, 1988 and the resultant violence.
(iv) Any other incidental development connected with the
above.
The Committee is requested to ascertain the facts leading
to the aforesaid incidents with a view to identifying those
responsible for the incidents so that stringent action could
be taken against all those responsible.
The Committee may, if it deems appropriate, submit
an interim report within seven days of its first sitting suggesting action if any, against police officials or any other
involved persons pending submission of the final report
within a period of 3 months."
Subsequently in pursuance of a direction issued by this Court the
aforesaid notification was modifi~d by the Administrator vide Notification dated 15th March, 1988 by directing that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6, 8, 8-A, 8-B, 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions
of Inquiry Act, 1952 and the rules made under Section 12 thereof shall
apply to the said Committee.
The Committee submitted an interim report on 9th April, 1988
and during the course of proceeding& before it thereafter passed the
aforesaid orders which are the subject matter of these writ petitions
and special leave petitions.
F
After having heard learned counsel for the parties at length we
G
passed an order on 18th August, 1988 which we consider it appropriate
to reproduce here with a view to avoiding the repetition of the reasons
already given therein in support of the said order:
"It is unfortunate that this case has arisen between lawyers and
police who are both guardians of law and who constitute two
important segments of society on whom the stability of the
country depends. It is hoped that cordiality between the two
sections will be restored soon.
In order to avoid any further delay in the proceedings beH
fore the Committee consisting of Goswamy and Wadhwa, JJ,
'
-1~.
--"\
\
~
. ..,...._
I
_,L
"If
'• j
KIRAN BEDJ v. COMMITIEE OF INQUIRY IOJHA, J.}
31
constituted by Order dated 23rd February, 1988 to enquire into
A
certain incidents which took place on the 15th January, 1988.
21st January, 1988 and 17th February, 1988, we pass the following order now but we shall give detailed reasons in support of this
order in due course:
The order is as under:
B
1. This order is passed on the basis of the material available on
record, the various steps already taken before the Committee
and other peculiar features to the case.
2. The Delhi Administration has to examine first all its witnesses c
as required by Rule 5(5)(a) of the Commissions of Inquiry
(Central) Rules, '1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules)
framed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Even those witnesses who may
have filed affidavits already may first be examined-in-chief
before they are cross-examined, since it is stated that when
D
the affidavits were filed the deponents did not know what the
other parties who have also filed affidavits had stated in their
affidavits. The question whether a party has the right of crossexamination or not shall be decided by the Committee in
accordance with Section 8-C of the Act. In the facts and
circumstances of the case to which reference will be made
E
hereafter this direction issued to the Delhi Administration to
examine its witnesses first as provided by rule 5(5)(a) of the
Rules referred to above does not apply to those witnesses
falling under section 8-B of the Act, who have to be examined
at the end of th~ inquiry as opined by the Committee itself.
'
F
3. We have gone through the several affidavits and other material placed before the Committee and also the Interim Report
dated April 9, 1988 passed by the Committee. In para 13 of
the Interim Report the Committee has observed thus:
· During the course of the inquiry, we have to examine the
G
conduct of various police officers and others and particularly, as the
record shows, of the DCP (North), Addl.. DCP (North), SHO, PS
Samepur (Badli) and SI Incharge Police Post, Tis Hazari and SI.
Samepur (Badli).
In para 14 of the Interim Report it is observed.
H
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11989] 1 S.C.R.
A
Lawyers have seriously urged that this Committee should send a
report recommending suspension of the DCP (North) Ms Kiran Bedi.
Ultimately the Committee recommended the transfer of the
petitioners in these cases, namely, Ms Kiran Bedi, DCP (North) and
B Jinder Singh SI, Incharge Police Post, Tis Hazari.
c
D
Section 8-B of the Act reads:
"8-B. If, at any stage of the inquiry, the. Commission,
(a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any
person; or
(b) is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely
to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,
the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce
evidence in his defence:
'j.. ..
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply
-i...
where the credit of a witness is being impeached."
E
In its Interim Report the Committee has unequivocally observed
that it had to examine the conduct of various police officers, and in
particular among others Ms Kiran Bedi, DCP (North) and Jinder
Singh, SI, Incharge Police Post, Tis Hazari.
F
Having given our anxious consideration to all the aspects of the
case we hold that the petitioners Ms Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh are
persons who fall under Section 8-B of the Act arid have to be dealt with
accordingly.
4. According to the Committee's own opinion formed in the
G light of the facts and circumstances of the case, all these persons to
whom notices under Section 8-B of the Act are issued have to be
examined at the end of the inquiry. This is obvious from the order of
the Committee passed on June 29, 1988 after it was asked by this Court
by its order dated June 2, 1988 to reconsider the whole question relating to the order in which the witnesses had to be examined in the case.
p
In its order dated June 29, 1988 the Committee has observed thus:
\-_
,
,.._
(
KIRAN BED! v. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY IOJHA, J.J
33
---f.
"Without going into the controversy if Rule 5(5) is an indeA
pendent rule or is governed by Sections 8-B and 8-C of the
Act, we would direct that in the circumstances of the case
three persons namely, the Additional Commissioner of
Police (Special Branch), DCP (Traffic) and Mr. Gopal Das
--'\
Kalra, SI to whom notices under Section 8-B of the Act
have been issued be examined at the end of the inquiry."
B
If three persons referred to above to whom notices under Section
~-1
8-B have been issued are to be examined even according to the Committee at the end of the inquiry there is no justifiable reason to deny
the same treatment to the petitioners Ms Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh
who are in the same position as those three persons. The action of the c
~ Committee in asking them to be cross-examined at the beginning of
I
the inquiry appears to us to be discriminatory. Mere non-issue of
notices to them under Section 8-B ought not to make any difference if
they otherwise satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 8-B. The
issue of such a notice is not contemplated under Sedion 8-B of the
Act. It is enough if at any stage the Commission considers it necessary
D
to inquire into the conduct of any person. Such person would thereafter be governed by Section 8-B of the Act. The Committee should
'
have considered whether the petitioners were entitled to be treated as
_,>,-
persons governed by Section 8-B of the Act before asking them to get
into the witness box for being cross-examined. If the Committee had
found. that the petitioners were covered under Section 8-B, then
E
..
perhaps they would not have been asked to get into the witness box for
being cross-examined till the erid of the inquiry. The Committee would
have then asked them to give evidence along with others who were
~}
sirriilarly placed at the end of the inquiry.
On behalf of both the petitioners it is submitted that they.did not
F
either wish to delay the proceedings or to show disrespect to the Corr,-
mittee but only wanted to protect their own interest by making the
submission which they made before the Committee as per legal advice
given to them.
-This is not a case where the circumstances in which the several
G
~-
incidents that had taken place were not known to anybody else. The
affidavits and other material before the Committee show that there
were a large number of persons who were eye-witnesses to the incidents and who could give evidence before the Committee.
Taking into consideration all the aspects of the case we feel that
H
A
B
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34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 1 S.C.R.
the Committee should not have in the circumstances of the case
directed the filing of a complaint against either of the petitioners for an
offence punishable under Section 178 IPC.
In view of the foregoing we feel that the orders of the Committee
directing the filing of the complaints and the criminal proceedings
initiated against the petitioners before the Metropolitan Magistrate
pursuant to the complaints filed on behalf of the Committee should be
quashed and we accordingly quash the said orders of the Committee
and also the criminal proceedings.
A judgment containing the reasons for this order will follow.
Before concluding t!iis order we record the statement made by
Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for
the Delhi Administration that the Delhi Administration and its police
officers will fully cooperate with the Committee so that the Committee
may complete its work as early as possible. We also record the stateD ment made by Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional Solicitor
General that he and his clients, the petitioners in this case hold the
Committee in great respect and that they never intended to show any
kind of discourtesy to the Committee. He also expresses apology for
using one or two strong words against the Committee in the course of
the arguments in this Court.
E
We now proceed to give our detailed reasons in support of the
aforesaid order:
We find it necessary to refer to some of the regulations framed
by the Committee to regulate its procedure. We also find it necessary
F
to indicate the nature of the orders which have been challenged in
these writ petitions and special leave petitions. It also seems appropriate at this very place to refer to the order of this Court passed in
these proceedings on 2nd June 1988 and the order of the Committee
passed on 29th June, 1988 in pursuance of the order of this Court .dated
2nd June 1988. As is apparent from a copy of the regulations filed in:these
G
proceedings, the Committee framed "Regulations of procedure under
Section 8 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 to be followed by
the Committee of Inquiry". Regulations 8, 11, 14, 18, and 21 which in
our opinion appear to be relevant for purposes of these cases are
reproduced as hereunder:
H
"8. To avoid its proceedings being unduly prolonged and
"
,)om
+-'
~
.
I
KIRAN BED! v. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY !OJHA, J.I
35
protracted, the Committee may divide and group together
A
the various persons; Associations and departments before
it in such manner as it thinks just and proper for the
purposes of producing oral evidence, cross-examination of
witnesses examined "before it, and for. addressing argu·
ments.
Provided, however, any person ·who is likely to be
prejudicially affected as provided 'in Sec. 8-B of the Act
s!>all be entitled to appear personally or through an
authorised agent, and to produce evidence in his or her
defence.
•
11. The witness whose evidence is recorded by the Com·
mittee orally on oath will be allowed to be cross-examined
by the concerned parties in accordance with the provisions
.of the Act.
I3.
c
14. The affidavit or statement of case filed by any depo·
D
nent can be treated as his examination-in-chief.
18. Technical rules of the Evidence Act, as stlch, shall not
govern the recording and admissibility ·of'eviderice before
the Committee. However, the principles ofhatural justice
and fair play shall be followed.
·
E
21. The Committee reserves the right to alter, modify,
delete or add to any of these regulations of procedure at
any time during the inquiry, as and when it considers
necessary."
F
In pursuance of a notice issued by the Committee under Rule
5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of case inter alia on behalf of Delhi
High Court Bar Association and the Commissioner of Police which
were accompanied by affidavits in support of the facts set out in the
respective statements of case were filed before the Committee. On 8th
April, 1988, the parties and their counsel stated that they would need
G
two weeks' time to file counter affidavit and list of witnesses to be
examined by theni. The time prayed for was granted. The proceedings
on that date were adjourned to 22nd April, 1988. On that date an
application was made on behalf of the Commissioner of Police and
other police officers for extension of time to file counter affidavit
which was extended till 13th May, 1988. The following order, howH
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989) 1 S.C.R.
ever, was simultaneously passed on that date. "Mr. Vi jay Shankar Das
has been told to keep his witnesses ready for being examined from 16th
May, 1988. The Committee proposes to hold the sitting from day-today w.e.f. 16th May, 1988. For further proceedings and recording of
evidence to come up on 16th May, 1988." Here it may be pointed out
that Mr. Vi jay Shankar Das was the counsel appearing for the Delhi
Police and the effect of the order aforesaid was that the Delhi Police
was required to keep its witnesses ready for being examined from 16th
May, 1988. On 16th May time till 5.00 P.M. to all concerned to file
their counter affidavits along with the list of witnesses was granted and
further proceedings were adjourned for the next day. On 17th May,
1988, two applications were made on behalf of the Commissioner of
Police; one for postponement of hearing and the other for calling upon
the Bar Association to start their evidence and to call upon the Commissioner of Police to adduce his evidence thereafter. The counter
affidavit and the list of witnesses on behalf of the Commissioner of
Police had not been filed even till 17th May, 1988. The Committee
dismissed both the applications referred to above and passed an order
saying that since the Comissioner of Police has failed to file the
counter affidavit or the list of witnesses, Mr. Jinder Singh, S.I., and
Mrs. Kiran Bedi, the then D.C.P. (North) be present in Court on
19.5.88 at 10.30 A.M. for being cross-examined. On 19th May, 1988,
counsel for Delhi Police was directed to produce Mr. Jinder Singh,
S .I., in the witness box for being cross-examined. On being informed
by counsel for Delhi Police that Mr. Jinder Singh was not available,
bailable warrant was ordered by the Committee to be issued for production of Mr. Jinder Singh at 10.30 A.M. on 23rd May, 1988. Thereafter Smt. Kiran Bedi who was present in Court was directed to come
in the witness box for cross-examination. The relevant portion of the
order passed thereafter on 19th May, 1988 reads as hereunder:
"Mrs.