# Kiran Singh and Others • v. Chaman Paswan and Others

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 131
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE No. 89 of 1953
- **Bench:** BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, Ghulam Hasan, T. L. Venkatarama Ayyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kiran-singh-and-others-v-chaman-paswan-and-others-339
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Co-sharers-faint property-Adverse possession
by a co-sharer
against another co-sharer-Ouster-Principles applicable thereto.
Once it is held that a possession of a co-sharer has
become
adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running of adverse
possession.
He must actually
and
effectively break up the exclusive possession of
his
co-sharer by
re-entry
upon the
property or by
resuming
possession in such
manner as it was possible to do. It may also check the running of
time if the co-sharer who is in exclusive possession acknowledges
the title of his co-owner or discontinues
his exclusive
possession
of the property.
The fact that one co-sharer who had allowed himself to be dispossessed by another co-sharer as a result of ouster exhibited later
on his animus to treat the property as
the joint property of himself and his co-sharer cannot arrest the running of adverse possession in favour of the co-sharer.
A mere mental act on the part of
the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of
possession cannot
affect the
continuity of adverse possession of the
<leseizor.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 89 of 1953.
JuRisDICTION : Civil·
Appeal
1954
Kiran Singh and
Others •
v.
Chaman Paswan
and Others.
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1954
April 15.
1954
Wuntakal ralpi
Chenabasavana
Gowd
V•
Rao Bahadur
r. Mahabnlesh·
warappa and
·Another.
132
SUPREME' COURT REPORTS·
(1955]!
Appeal. from the Judgment and Decree dated the28th day of March, 1949, of .the High Court of Judica..c
ture at Madras· in Appeal No.· 654 of 1945, arising out
of the f udgment and Decree . dated the 23rd day . of
July,
1945, of the Court of the District Judge, Bellary,.
in Original Suit No. 17 of 1944.
K. S. Krishnaswami. Iyengar (K; R. Chowdhury,
D. Gundu Rao, A. Rama Rao and Rajinder Narain, with.
him) for the appellant.
B. Somayya (M. V. Ganapathi and Ganpat Rai,.
with him) for respondent No. 1.
1954. April 15. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-This
appe~l arises out of a suit,.
commenced by the plaintiff respondent, in the Court of
the District Judge of Bdlary, being Original Suit No. 17
of 1944, for establishment of his title to one-half share
of the land described in the schedule to the . plaint and
for recovery of possession of the same after partition:
with defendant No. 1, who is the appellant before us.
The suit· was dismissed by the trial Judge by,his judgment dated the 23rd of July, 1945. On an appeal being
taken against that decision by the plaintiff to the High
Court of Madras, a Division Bench of· the High . Court
by its judgment dated the. 28th. qf March, 1949, allowed
the appeal and reversed the judgment of the trial Court.
The defendant No.· 1 has now ·come ·up· on· appeal
t0o
this Court 'on the strength of a
certifi~ate · granted' · by:
the High Court under . article · 133 of the Constitution
read. with sections 109 and ·110 of the., Civil Procedure:
Code ....
To appreciate the .contentions that have been raised'
before us it may be necessary to give a short resmneof the material facts. The !:ind in suit, · which has · an·
area of a little over. 9 acres, was admittedly die property of one Basappa who died some time befor.e
1918,.
leaving three daughters, to wit P~ramma, Pompamma
and
Hampamma. Under a settlement entered into
with the immediate reversioner of Basappa which is
evidenced by two registered deeds-Exhibits P-2
and
P-3'-executed respectively in the years 1918 and
1919,
the three sisters got about 15 to 16 a= of" ·wet land
....
....
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-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
in. absolute right. Hampam·ma subsequently took away
her one-third share in these lands and we are not concerned with her any further in this litigation. Paramma
and Pompamma continued to enjoy the remaining two--
thirds share of the property and it is this two-thirds
share_ comprising 9 acres 49 cents of wet. land which
forms the
subject-matter of the
present
suit.
Pom

## Text

'
_) .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
very party who complains about it. Even apart from
this, we are satisfied that no prejudice was caused to
the appellants by their appeal having been heard
by
the District Court. There was a fair and full hearing
of the appeal by that Court ; it gave its decision on
the merits on a consideration of the entire evidence in
the case, and no injustice is shown to have resulted in
its disposal of the matter. The decision of the learned
Judges that there were no grounds for interference
under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is correct.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismmised with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
WUNTAKAL YALPI CHENABASAVANA GOWD
v.
RAO BAHADUR Y. MAHABALESHWARAPPA
AND ANOTHER.
[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM
HASAN and T. L. VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Co-sharers-faint property-Adverse possession
by a co-sharer
against another co-sharer-Ouster-Principles applicable thereto.
Once it is held that a possession of a co-sharer has
become
adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running of adverse
possession.
He must actually
and
effectively break up the exclusive possession of
his
co-sharer by
re-entry
upon the
property or by
resuming
possession in such
manner as it was possible to do. It may also check the running of
time if the co-sharer who is in exclusive possession acknowledges
the title of his co-owner or discontinues
his exclusive
possession
of the property.
The fact that one co-sharer who had allowed himself to be dispossessed by another co-sharer as a result of ouster exhibited later
on his animus to treat the property as
the joint property of himself and his co-sharer cannot arrest the running of adverse possession in favour of the co-sharer.
A mere mental act on the part of
the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of
possession cannot
affect the
continuity of adverse possession of the
<leseizor.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 89 of 1953.
JuRisDICTION : Civil·
Appeal
1954
Kiran Singh and
Others •
v.
Chaman Paswan
and Others.
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1954
April 15.
1954
Wuntakal ralpi
Chenabasavana
Gowd
V•
Rao Bahadur
r. Mahabnlesh·
warappa and
·Another.
132
SUPREME' COURT REPORTS·
(1955]!
Appeal. from the Judgment and Decree dated the28th day of March, 1949, of .the High Court of Judica..c
ture at Madras· in Appeal No.· 654 of 1945, arising out
of the f udgment and Decree . dated the 23rd day . of
July,
1945, of the Court of the District Judge, Bellary,.
in Original Suit No. 17 of 1944.
K. S. Krishnaswami. Iyengar (K; R. Chowdhury,
D. Gundu Rao, A. Rama Rao and Rajinder Narain, with.
him) for the appellant.
B. Somayya (M. V. Ganapathi and Ganpat Rai,.
with him) for respondent No. 1.
1954. April 15. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-This
appe~l arises out of a suit,.
commenced by the plaintiff respondent, in the Court of
the District Judge of Bdlary, being Original Suit No. 17
of 1944, for establishment of his title to one-half share
of the land described in the schedule to the . plaint and
for recovery of possession of the same after partition:
with defendant No. 1, who is the appellant before us.
The suit· was dismissed by the trial Judge by,his judgment dated the 23rd of July, 1945. On an appeal being
taken against that decision by the plaintiff to the High
Court of Madras, a Division Bench of· the High . Court
by its judgment dated the. 28th. qf March, 1949, allowed
the appeal and reversed the judgment of the trial Court.
The defendant No.· 1 has now ·come ·up· on· appeal
t0o
this Court 'on the strength of a
certifi~ate · granted' · by:
the High Court under . article · 133 of the Constitution
read. with sections 109 and ·110 of the., Civil Procedure:
Code ....
To appreciate the .contentions that have been raised'
before us it may be necessary to give a short resmneof the material facts. The !:ind in suit, · which has · an·
area of a little over. 9 acres, was admittedly die property of one Basappa who died some time befor.e
1918,.
leaving three daughters, to wit P~ramma, Pompamma
and
Hampamma. Under a settlement entered into
with the immediate reversioner of Basappa which is
evidenced by two registered deeds-Exhibits P-2
and
P-3'-executed respectively in the years 1918 and
1919,
the three sisters got about 15 to 16 a= of" ·wet land
....
....
··-
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
in. absolute right. Hampam·ma subsequently took away
her one-third share in these lands and we are not concerned with her any further in this litigation. Paramma
and Pompamma continued to enjoy the remaining two--
thirds share of the property and it is this two-thirds
share_ comprising 9 acres 49 cents of wet. land which
forms the
subject-matter of the
present
suit.
Pompamma . married one Nagana Gowd and after giving
birth to two sons to wit Siddalingana and Chenabasavana, she died in the year 1923. It is not disputed that
her share in the lands mentioned above devolved upon
these two sons. After Pompamma's death, Nagana
married again and stayed with his -second wife in his
ancestral village, while these two infant sons of Pom.:.-
pamma remained· at
village
Kampli
with Paramma,
• their mother's sister, who reared them up as her own
sons. .On the 22nd June, 1923, Paramma executed a
deed of gift in favour of the two sons of her sister by
which she conveyed to the latter her own. share in the·
suit property. The result was that the two sons of
Pompamma got the entirety of the 9 acres 49 cents of
land which was owned jointly - by their mother and
their mother's sister Paramma. -Shortly after - this gift
was made,
Siddalingana, the elder son of Pompamma,
died in, the year 1924 and the plaintiff's case isthat
his half-share in the disputed
property devolved upon
his father Nagana under the Hindu law of- inheritance.
It is - admitted however that Paramma continued to
possess the entirety of the land on behalf of the younger
son Chenabasavana who is defendant No. 1 in the suit.
On the- 25th August,
1946, there was a lease deed
Exhibit D-1, and its counter part Exhibit D-2, executed
by any between Paramma on -the one hand and Nagana
as the father and guardian of the infant Chenabasavana
on the other by which the infant represented by his
father purported- to grant a lease of the entire property
to Paramma for a period of 12 years at a rental of
Rs. 500 a year. Two rent receipts passed by Nagana to
Paramma in token of the receipt of rents, reserved by
this lease, ·on behalf of Chenabasavana have
been
proved in this case, Exhibits D-4 and D4-l; and they
arc of the years 1927 and 19J~ respectively.
1954
Wuntakal ratpf
Chenabasavana
Gowd
v.
Rao Bahadur
r. Mahabalesh•
warappa and
Another.
Mukheri•a J.
1954
lWuntakal ralpi
Chenabasavana
Gowd
v.
Rao Bahadur
.r. Mahabal<shwarappa and
Another.
..Muk"'1jea ].
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
It appears that in 1934 Nagana instituted a suit as
guardian of
his
infant son Chenabasavana in the
Munsif' s Court at Hospet to recover a sum of Rs. 500
as rent from Paramma on the basis of the lease mentioned above. The suit was decreed ex parte and the
decree was discharged later on by a document Exhibit D-3, dated the 14th of November, 1934, executed
by Nagana, which contains a recital that as Paramma
had borrowed much money to purchase lands for the
minor, all future rents payable under the lease were
also to be considered as fully paid. It is in evidence
and not disputed, that near about this time Nagana
became financially involved and on the 27th of August,
1935, he executed a deed of mortgage by conditional
sale in respect of half-share of the disputed land in
favour of defendant No. 2 to secure
an advance of
Rs. 3,000. The document recites that the half-share of
the land which was kept as se.curity devolved upon the
mortgagor on the death of his
son Siddalingana and
that he was in possession of the same. On the 16th
July,
1936,
Nagana sold the mortgaged property by a
deed of sale (Exhibit P-6) to the mortgagee himself for
a consideration of Rs. 3,000 which was the principal
sum due under the mortgage. It is admitted that the
purchaser did not and could not obtain possession of
the property at any time since then and on the 2nd
May, 1944, he sold the property to the plaintiff by
a
conveyance which is Exhibit P-1. On the 18th July,
1944, the plaintiff brought the present suit against
Chenabasavana as defendant No. 1 for
recovery
of a
demarcated half-share
of the
disputed property
after
partition with the latter on the strength of the purchase
mentioned above and his own vendor was impleaded
as defendant No. 2 in the suit.
n
The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 and a
number of pleas were taken by him in his written statement. The substantial defence put forward was of a
two.fold character. It was contended in the first
place
that under the deed of gift executed by Paramma in
favour of defendant No. 1 and his deceased brother
Siddalingana, the donees became joint tenants with
rights of survivorship. Consequently on the death of
'.J
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>'
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•.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
Siddalingana
his interest devolved upon
defendant
No. 1 and not on his father. The other and the more
material defence raised was that the plaintiff's suit was
barred, as he was never in possession of the property and
the defendant No. 1 acquired a good title by adverse
possession. Both these points were decided against the
plaintiff by the learned District Judge who tried the
suit. It was held that the deed of gift executed by
Paramma conferred no right on Nagana as the heir of
his son and such rights if any were specifically disclaimed by Nagana by the lease deed and also by the receipts
which he granted to Paramma as the guardian of his:
minor son. It was held further that the plaintiff's suit
was bound to fail as he or his predecessors were never
in possession of the property within 12 years from thedate of the suit. The plaintiff indeed was an alienee·
of a co-tenant but it was held that the ordinary rule of
one co-owner being presumed to hold on behalf of theothers could not apply to the present case, as Nagana
di&claimed his rights as a co-owner and purported
t0>
act only on behalf of his infant son Chenabasavana
whose exclusive title to the lands he definitely acknowledged. In view of these findings the trial Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
Thereupon the plaintiff took an appeal against thisdecision to the High Court of Madras and the appeal
was heard by a Division
Bench consisting of Rajamannar
C.J.
and Balakrishna Ayyar J.
The learnec!
Judges held, differing from the trial court, that the two.
sons of Pompamma took their shares in their mother's
property which devolved
upon
them
by inheritance,
as well as in the property which they obtained under
the deed of gift executed in their favour by Paramma,
as tenants in common and not as
joint tenants and
consequently on the death of Siddalingana his interest
vested in his father Nagana and not in his
brother~
the defendant No. 1. On the other question the
High
Court held that though Nagana by his acts and conduct in connection with the execution of the lease
deed did exhibit an animus to hold the property solely
on behalf of Chenabasavana to the exclusion of himself, yet his animus did not last beyond 1935 when he
1954
Wuntakal Talpt
Chenabasavana
Gowd
v.
Rao BahadUT
· r. Mahabalesh--
warappa and
• Another.
Mukherjea-J ~
I954
iWuntakal 'ralpi
Chtnabasavana
Gowd
v.
, Rao Bahadur
.r. Mahabaksh-
.warappa and
Another_.
· Mukhtrjea J.
136
'SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[1955]
asserted
his own right as a .co-sharer to half-share · of
the plaint property by executing the· mortgage deed in
favour of defendant No. 2. In these · circumstances ·it
was held that the defendant No. 1 did not acquire
title by adverse
possession and the plaintiff was entitl-
·ed to succeed. The defendant No, 1 has now come up
·on appeal to this Court.
Mr. Ayyangar appearing in support of the appeal
has not pressed before us the contention t\lat was
raised on behalf of· his client in the' Courts below; that
as the two brothers took the property as joint tenants
:and not as tenants in common, the interest·•i>f Sidda-
· lingana passed on ·his death to his brother, the defend-
;ant No. 1, and not to Nagana. · We must• .take ·it
·therefore that after the death of Siddalingana, -Nagana
became a co-owner of· the disputed property with .. his
minor •son
Chenabasavana.
As the
plaintiff purports
·to derive. his title from Nagana, ·he can be said. to have
-establishe<l his title as a co-owner with· defendant· No. 1
And ·this ·being the position, the presumption of -law
would be that ·the possession of one co-owner1' was· on
behalf of the other ·also unless ·actual · ouster · 'was
proved.. To defeat the claims of the plaintiff: therefore
it is incumbent upon defendant No.• 1 to prove that he
·held the ptoperty adversely to his co-owner 'for the
statutory period.
The· peculiarity
of the presentcase
is that here the joint owners of the property were· the
father and his infant son, of whom the father. himself
was the guardian and the infant could not act in
law
-except through the guardian.
·
It is· conceded· on behalf of the appellant that the
mere fact that the father ·did not participate in the
profits of the prop~rty which was left to the management of Paramma on behalf of the infant could not by
itself make the possession of the son ad verse to his
father. But the acts and conduct of the father in
connection with the lease deed of 1926 and the subsequent granting of receipts in terms thereof undoubt-
.edl y point' to something more than mere non-participation in the enjoyment of profits of the property or
absence of objection to the exclusive enjoyment thereof
· :by Paramma on behalf of the infant. In granting · the
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•
-
,.
.. , l
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
lease on behalf of. the infant the · father definitely
asserted the exclusive title of his son to the property
and by implication denied his own rights as a co-owner
thereto. In law the possession of the lessee is the possession of the lessor and consequently ever since · 1926
when Paramma began to
possess
the property as a
lessee in terms of the lease deed, her possession in law
was the possession of the infant alone to the exclusion
()f Nagana, the father; The fact that Nagana consented to such exclusion is immaterial.
There can
be in law, under certain circumstances, adverse pos-
:session with the consent of the true owner. A common
illustration of this rule is
furnished by the class of
.. cases where the legal owner of a property transfers the
same to another without the requisite legal formalities
and though the transferee does not acquire a legal · title
to it by the transfer, yet if he gets possession of the
property though ·with the consent of the transferor that
·possession becomes adverse to the owner and if · continued for the statutory period creates a title · in him.
We are not satisfied from the materials in this case
·that Nagana was ignorant of his rights as heir of his
deceased son when he executed the lease in .the year
· 1926. But even if he was, as the exclusive possession
of the infant was exercised with the full knowledge and
· consent
Of the father · who openly acknowledged · the
· title of his son, such possession could not but be
adverse to the father. The learned Judges of the High
· Court seem to be of the opinion that the . possession of
the minor could be regarded as adverse . from the date
of the execution of the lease, as the father by being a
party to the said document, did exhibit an animus to
· possess the common property on . behalf of the minor
alone to the exclusion of himself. But according to
the learned · Judges
this . animus ceased
as
soon as
. Nagana executed the mortgage deed in · 1935, asserting
· his right as joint owner of the property in dispute and
the adverse possession of the son forthwith came to an
end. With this view we are unable to agree.
Once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has
become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of
ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the
1954
Wuntakal Talpi
C!unabasavana
Gowd
v.
Rao Ba/zadur
. T. Mahabaleshwarappa and
Another.
M ukherjea ].
1954
Wuntakal raJpi
Chtnabasavana
Gowd
·V•
Rao Bahadur
r. Mahabahsh·
warappa and
Another.
Makh<rjea ].
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running
of adverse possession. He must actually and effectively
break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by
re-entry upon the property or. by resuming possession
in such manner as it was possible to do. It may also
check the running of time if the co-sharer who is in
exclusive possession acknowledges
the title of his coowner or discontinues his
exclusive
possession
of the
property. On the materials on the record, none of
these things seems to have been proved in the present
case.
Resumption of
physical
possession
or re-entry
upon the property was absolutely out of the question,
as the property was in the possession of a less·ee. The
lease, it should be noted, was executed in 1926 and we
have two rent receipts of the years 1927 and 1932
respectively by which Nagana acknowledged receipt
of rents on behalf of his infant son in terms of the lease
deed. The rent suit in 1934 was also brought by him
in his capacity as guardian of defendant No. 1 and the
document Exhibit D-3 by which the decree in that
suit was discharged and a receipt was given in advance
for all the subsequent rents point definitely to the
conclusion that the entire rent for the whole period of
12 years was paid to and was
accepted on behalf of
Chenabasavana and Nagana neither received any
portion of it nor laid any claim to the same. During the
whole period of the lease and up to the present day the
minor is admittedly in possession of the property and
no act or conduct on his part has been proved either
within the period of
limitation or even
after that
which might be regarded as an acknowledgment of the
title of his father as co-owner. In our opinion the fact
that the father who had allowed himself to be dispossessed by his son exhibited later on his
animus to
treat the property as the joint property of himself and
his son cannot arrest the running of adverse possession in favour of the son. A mere mental act on the
part of the person dispossessed
unaccompanied
by any
change of possession .cannot affect the continuity of
adverse possession of the deseizor.
·
The view taken by the High Court probably rests on
the supposition that as it was
the father, who, acting
_,
-"..
• .. -
•
S.C.R.
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
139
on behalf of his son, · asserted the exclusive title of
r954
the son to the property in denial of his own rights, it
-
· .
was open to the father again if he so chose to resile wchuntabkal Yalp<
f
· h
. .
d
k
f
h d I
.
h
ena asavana
rom t at pos1t10n an ma e a res
ec arat10n t at
Gowd
property was not the sole property of the son but
v.
belonged to him as well; ·and this subsequent act
Rao Bahadur
would annul the -consequences of his previous act. Y. MahabakshThis reasoning does not appear . to . us to be sound.
warappa and
Another',
The father's acts in connection with the lease were
entirely in his capacity as guardian of his son. In the Mukherjea J.
eye of the law they ·were the acts of the son, but the
creation of the mortgage in 1935 was not the act of
the father on behalf of his son, it was the personal act·
of the father himself qua co-proprietor of the son and
the interest of one being adverse to the- other_ such
acts could not be held to be acts of the son performed
through the father. It is extremely doubtful whether
• qua guardian the father could make such _declaration
at all.
Any change of intention,- on the part of the
guardian can be brought home to the minor through
the guardian alone and the minor can react to it again
onfy through the guardian. It may be proper in such
cases for the father to renounce . his . guardianship
before he could assert any right of his own against· his
ward ; bu~ it is- not necessary for us to go into that
question, as the mortgage in this case was made by the
• father not as guardian of the minor at all. It was no
more than a declaration, by a person who was dispossessed by his co-sharer, of his jofot title to the
property and. as has been already poinfod out, as it
did not involve any change of possession it did not .
affect the adverse possession of the deseizor. In our
opinion therefore the view taken by the learned Judges
of the High Court is not proper and cannot be sustained. The result is that the appeal is allowed ; the
judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside
. and those of the District Judge restored; The appellant will have his costs in all the Courts.
· Appeal allowed .
-
-
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME CO~RT REPO.l;lT~,
139on behalf of his son, a,sserted th¢ exclusive title of
the son to the property in denial of his own rights, it
was open to. the father again if he so chose to resile
from that position and make a fresh declaration that
property was not the sole property of the son but
belonged to him as well ; and this subsequent act
would annul the consequences of his previous act·
This reasoriing does not appear to us to be sound.
The father's acts
in connection with the lease were
entirely in his capacity as guardian of his son. In the
eye of the law they were the acts of the son, - but the
creation of the mortgage in 1935 was not the act of
the father on behalf of his son, it was the personal act
of the father himself qua c°'proprietor of the son and
the interest of one being adverse to the other such
acts could not be held to be acts of the son performed
through the father.
It is
extremely doubtful whether
qua guardian the father could make such declaratfon
at all. Any change of intention on the part of the
guardian can be brought home to the minor through
the guardian alone and the minor can react to it again
only through the guardian. It may be proper in such
cases for
the father to
renounce his guardianship
before he could assert any right of his own against his
ward ; but it is not necessary for us to go into' that
question, as the mortgage 'J. this case was made by the
father not as guardian of the minor at all. It .was no
more than a declaration, :,i a person who was dispossessed by his co-sharer
of his joint title to the
- property and as has betn already pointed out, as it
did not involve any change of possession it did not
affect the. adverse possr;.:1sion of the deseizor. In our
opinion therefore the vi ... w taken by the learned Judges
of the High Court is not proper and cannot be sustained. The result is that the appeal is allowed ; the
judgment and decree of the High Court are _set aside
and those of the District Judge restored. The appel~
!ant will have his costs in all the Courts.
Appeal allowed,
10-86 S. C. India/59
1954
Wuntakal Yalpi
Chenabasauana
Gowd
v.
Rao Bahadur
r. Mahabaleshwarappa and
Another.
Mukherjea J.