# KONAPPA RUDRAPPA NADGOUDA v. VISHWANATH REDDY & ANR

- **Citation:** [1969] 1 S.C.R. 395
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-09-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1705 D of 1967
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/konappa-rudrappa-nadgouda-v-vishwanath-reddy-anr-4471
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Representation of the People Act, 1951, s. 9A-Agreements between:
respondent's [inn and State Gov.ernnient for building a road and a dis--
pensary-work at first certified as co1npleted later certificates cancelled-
'Agreements containing claus.es
requiring
contractor to
repair
faulty
work-if contracts subsisting on date of nomination-Respondents' partnership fir111 dissolved before no1ninatio11 without notice to GovernmentC
effect of .
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The appellant and the first respondent were candidates for election in·
February, 1967 from the Yadagiri constituency which was won by the
first respondent.
The appellant challenged his election by a petition on.
the ground that he was a partner in a firm which had two contracts with
the State Government, one for the construction of a road and the other
for the construction of a dispensary building, which were subsisting on
the day when nominations were filed; he was therefore disqualified from
being a candidate unde'.r s. 9A of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 and his election was void.
The appellant also claimed that he was
entitled to be declared elected as the votes cast in favour of the first respondent must be regarded as thrown
away.
From the
evidence led
before the High Court it was clear that the first respond~nt had obtained
certificates from officers of the State Government to the ·effect that the
cont'racts were complere but that these c~rtificates were subsequently cancelled as it was considered that the work \Vas not completed.
After
appraising the evid·ence, the High Court came to the conclusion that
although some of the items from the two contracts might not have been··
completed, the contracts as a whole were substantiaily performed
and,
therefore, there was no bar to the candidature of the first 'respondent. It
also held that although the agreements contained clauses for maintenance·
and repairs over a period of time after the completion of the work of
construction,
th·~se did not have the· effect of making them subsisting,
contracts. The High Court thc'rcfore dismissed the election petition.
HELD : On appeal to this Court,
The High Court was in error in holding that the contracts had been·
fully p·erformed and s. 9A did not apply.
The appeal must therefore be·
allowed and the election of the first respondent declared void.
Furthermore the votes caste in favour of the first respondent must be treated as
thrown away and in the absence of any other contesting candidate, the·
appellant declared elected [ 403 F, 404 B-C]
(i) Taking the fact that some portion of the· original contracts re-·
mained to be performed with the fact that under the contracts the contractor was required not only to complete the original wdrk but to repair·
defects or re-do something which he had not properly done, the matter
must be regarded as falling within s. 9A of the Act.
In the context of
construction of buildings and roads, it is obvieus that if some part is·
found defective and has to be done again, the contract of execution as
such is still to be fully performed. It is posiible to describe the action
taken as one to repair the defect, but in essence it is a part of the contract·
396
SUPREME COVRT REPORTS
jl 969] I S.C.R.
.of cx~cution, because nJ execution can be said to be proper or con1plcte
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lill it is properly cxcculcd. [403 H-0]
(ii) 1Jy.,re was no force in the conlenlion that under Art. 299 the
contract in quc:.tion had to he signed by the Secrciary to the Government
\vhercas in the present case it "'as signed by the
Executive EnginC\:r.
[403 GI
Chatturbhuj J1i1haldas Jcsani v. Atforeshu•ar Parashran1 and
Others.
[19'4] S.C.R. 817, applied.
(iii) 1be Jaw requires that a candidate should not have any interest
in any contract v.·ith Government and therefore even a partner in a firm
has an interest suffici-ent to atlrJct the provisions of s. 9A.
l'hc fact that
the partnership itself had hecn dissolved in the present case would have
no effect upon the relations between the f

## Text

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KONAPPA RUDRAPPA NADGOUDA
v.
VISHWANATH REDDY & ANR.
July 18/19, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
Representation of the People Act, 1951, s. 9A-Agreements between:
respondent's [inn and State Gov.ernnient for building a road and a dis--
pensary-work at first certified as co1npleted later certificates cancelled-
'Agreements containing claus.es
requiring
contractor to
repair
faulty
work-if contracts subsisting on date of nomination-Respondents' partnership fir111 dissolved before no1ninatio11 without notice to GovernmentC
effect of .
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The appellant and the first respondent were candidates for election in·
February, 1967 from the Yadagiri constituency which was won by the
first respondent.
The appellant challenged his election by a petition on.
the ground that he was a partner in a firm which had two contracts with
the State Government, one for the construction of a road and the other
for the construction of a dispensary building, which were subsisting on
the day when nominations were filed; he was therefore disqualified from
being a candidate unde'.r s. 9A of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 and his election was void.
The appellant also claimed that he was
entitled to be declared elected as the votes cast in favour of the first respondent must be regarded as thrown
away.
From the
evidence led
before the High Court it was clear that the first respond~nt had obtained
certificates from officers of the State Government to the ·effect that the
cont'racts were complere but that these c~rtificates were subsequently cancelled as it was considered that the work \Vas not completed.
After
appraising the evid·ence, the High Court came to the conclusion that
although some of the items from the two contracts might not have been··
completed, the contracts as a whole were substantiaily performed
and,
therefore, there was no bar to the candidature of the first 'respondent. It
also held that although the agreements contained clauses for maintenance·
and repairs over a period of time after the completion of the work of
construction,
th·~se did not have the· effect of making them subsisting,
contracts. The High Court thc'rcfore dismissed the election petition.
HELD : On appeal to this Court,
The High Court was in error in holding that the contracts had been·
fully p·erformed and s. 9A did not apply.
The appeal must therefore be·
allowed and the election of the first respondent declared void.
Furthermore the votes caste in favour of the first respondent must be treated as
thrown away and in the absence of any other contesting candidate, the·
appellant declared elected [ 403 F, 404 B-C]
(i) Taking the fact that some portion of the· original contracts re-·
mained to be performed with the fact that under the contracts the contractor was required not only to complete the original wdrk but to repair·
defects or re-do something which he had not properly done, the matter
must be regarded as falling within s. 9A of the Act.
In the context of
construction of buildings and roads, it is obvieus that if some part is·
found defective and has to be done again, the contract of execution as
such is still to be fully performed. It is posiible to describe the action
taken as one to repair the defect, but in essence it is a part of the contract·
396
SUPREME COVRT REPORTS
jl 969] I S.C.R.
.of cx~cution, because nJ execution can be said to be proper or con1plcte
A
lill it is properly cxcculcd. [403 H-0]
(ii) 1Jy.,re was no force in the conlenlion that under Art. 299 the
contract in quc:.tion had to he signed by the Secrciary to the Government
\vhercas in the present case it "'as signed by the
Executive EnginC\:r.
[403 GI
Chatturbhuj J1i1haldas Jcsani v. Atforeshu•ar Parashran1 and
Others.
[19'4] S.C.R. 817, applied.
(iii) 1be Jaw requires that a candidate should not have any interest
in any contract v.·ith Government and therefore even a partner in a firm
has an interest suffici-ent to atlrJct the provisions of s. 9A.
l'hc fact that
the partnership itself had hecn dissolved in the present case would have
no effect upon the relations between the first respondent ancl the Go,·ernment. 1403 HJ
'lbe first respondent could not by a private <lisc;olution of the partnership escape his liability under the contract to the Gov-ernmcnl, and
there was here no novation, because notice of the
disso]ution was not
given to Government and the Government had not accepted the person
to \Vhorn the business ""·as transferred in place of the respondent's finn.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1705
D
of 1967.
Appeal under section I I 6 A of the Representation of People
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated September 15,
J 967 of the Mysore High Coutt in Election Petition No. 8 of
1967.
M. C. Chaf:/a, S. S. Javali and B. Datta, for the appellant.
D. Narsaraju, B. S. Patil and R. V. Pillai, for respondent
No. I.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. This is an appeal from the judgment and
order of the High Court of Mysore, September 15, 1967. in an
election matter in which the present appclla.nt was the election
petitioner.
The election concerned the Yadagiri
constituency
and was held in February 1967 during the last general elections.
To begin with, there were seven candidates. Of these five withdrew leaving the scat to be contested by the appellant and the
first respondent here.
The first respondent was returned as the
successful candidate having obtained 4,000 and odd votes in excess of his rival.
On March 30, I 967 the defeated candidate
preferred an election petition which has given rise to the present
appeal.
The election petition was dismissed by the High Court
and in this appeal, the election petitioner claims that the decision
of the High Court was erroneous and that the election of the first
respondent was void for reasons to be stated hereafter.
The first respondent was a partner in a firm known as
the
Yadagiri Construction Company, Yadagiri.
This finn held
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KONAPPA V. V!SHWANATH (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
397
A . several contracts from the Mysore Government.
In this appeal,
we are concerned with two contracts only which were the construction of ( 1) a road known as "Nalwar Sonthi Road" in Gulbarga
Division for a distance of four miles and ( 2) a dispensary building for the Primary Health Centre at Wadagara. The contention
of the election petitioner was that these contracts were subsisting
on January 20, 1967 when the nominations were filed
and the
subsistence of the contracts with the Government rendered the
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election of the first respondent void. The election petitioner
claimed that he was entitled to be declared elected after considering that the votes cast in favour of the 1st respondent as thrown
away.
The High Court in its judgment held that the contracts
were not subsisting and that the election was
tlierefore not
affected.
The matter is one of fact but it is necessary, before we enter
into an examination of the facts, to set out the law relating to disqualification of candidates on this ground.
Under s. 9A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 it is provided as follows :
"A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long
as there subsists a contract entered into by him in
course of his trade or business with the
appropriate
Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government.
Explanation :
For the
purpose of
this
section where a contract has been fully performed by the
person by whom it has been entered into with the
appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed
not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract
either wholly or in part."
It may be mentioned here that previously the section did not
contain the Explanation. In Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
/asani v.
~oreshwar Parashram and others('), the existence of the liability on the part of the Government to pay for a fully executed
contract was held to be a disqualification. If appears that Parliament tllought that since Government moves slowly and many
bills remain outstanding for a long time, this part of the disability
may be removed.
The amendment, therefore, takes away from
the ban of the section the subsistence of one side of the contract
viz. the performance thereof by Government by paying for th~
goods supplied or the work executed. In other respects, the law
remains very much the same as it was when the ruling referred
to above was given.
We shall have to refer to certain. observations in the ruling which in our opinion must be taken into
(I) [1954) S.C.R. 817.
L12S.CI/68-11
J98
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
[ ! 969 J I S.C.R.
account before reaching the conclusion whether the contract or
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contracts continued to subsist on the date on which the candidate
offered himself for election.
We shall now continue our narration of the facts.
As has been slated already, there were two contracts one for
the construction of a road for a distance of four miles and the
other for the construction of a dispensary building.
Two separate agreements have been produced which were entered into by
the Yadagiri Construction Company with the Government
for
the execution and performance of these contracts. It was urged
in the High Court by the election petitioner that both these con -
tracts remained incomplete and, therefore, they subsisted and that
the candidate was under a disqualification and could not stand
for the election.
The contract for the construction of the road.
entered into by the Yadagiri Construction Company,
included
twelve it.ems which the firm had to complete. They arc conveniently described as items I to 7 and 8 to J 2.
The case of the
election petitioner was that although items 1 to 7 had been completed, items 8 to 12 remain."..d to be completed. In the Schedule
to the contract for the building of the dispensary, a number of
items were included in the Schedule. Of these, 8 items were
found to be incomplete and, therefore, the same position ensued
as in the case of road. The evidence led in the case consisted of
documents from the Public Works Department and oral testimony
of the engineers who were in charge of these constructions and
others.
After appraising the evidence, the High Court came to
the conclusion that although some of the items from these two
contracts might not have been completed, still the contrncts as a
whole were substantially performed and, therefore, there was no
har to the candidature of the !st respondent.
The High Court
also held that although these agreements contained a clause for
maintenance and repairs over a period of time after the completion of the work of construction, that did not make the contracls
to subsist and therefore, that too was not a disability.
Mr. Chagla in arguing the appeal tries to establish that both
the conclusion of the High Court are erroneous.
Th.e evidence
in the case, as is usual, is widely discrepant between the parties.
They both held certificates issued by the Public Works Department, one set showing that the work had been completed and a
subsequently issued set showing that soml!thing remained to be
done and that the contracts were still subsisting. We shall refer
to these documents now.
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The contract in relation to the road was entered
into
on
December 17, !962 and is evidenced by Ex. P-10. The Schedule
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to the e-0ntract showed that the construction had to be completed
according to it.
The contract went on to provide by cl. 20 as
follows :
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KONAPPA v. VISHWANATH (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
399
" ...... The conractor is to maintain the reconstructed portion of the road for a period of three months
after the Executive Engineer has certified the same to
be completed to his satisfaction".
The Schedule to this contract provided for surfacing of the road,
· collection of Shahabad soling stones, collection of muram for
earth work, spreading muram over soling and metal etc. In addition to the proper construction of the road; it was the duty of
the contractor to supply and fix mile and hectometer stones and
to fix the road boundaries and demarcation stones etc. This
work represents items 8 to 12. Those relating to the road proper
are items 1-7 to which also reference has been made earlier.
Now it is agreed on both sides that items 1-7 were duly
completed. The dispute is with regard to items 8-12.
Nomination to the Assembly had to be filed on 20th January, 1967
at the latest. 21st January was fixed for scrutiny of the nomination papers and the election was to follow in the month of February.
On 18th January, 1967, the first respondent obtained a
certificate (Ex. P-1) that his contracts had been fully performed.
He approached the Executive Engineer on the 19th. The Executive Engineer was busy throughout the day.
The respondent
therefore asked his Personal Assistant (who
incidentally is a
gazetted officer of the rank of an Assistant Engineer) to give him
the necessary certificate.
The Personal Assistant telephoned to
the Assistant Engineers in charge and on their statement that the
work had been physically completed, he granted the certificates to
that effect.
It appears that the election petitioner was also busy
in his tum. He obtained cancellation of these certificates from
the Executive Engineer on the following day.
The Executive
Engineer asked the Assistant Engineers ~o state whether the work
had been completed and the Assistant Engineer thereupon gave .
the certificate that items 8-12 of the first contract were not comp!e•e. We have so far described the contract dealing with the
road.
The contract for the construction of the dispensary was executed on February 23, 1966. The schedule to that contract contained a description of 27 items which had to be completed. In
addition, there was the requirement that the entire premises would
be cleaned and put in habitable state and then handed over. Here
also the dispute is whether the entire contract had been completed
or not.
It is the case of the election petitioner that 9 items were
left incomplete including the construction of a compound wall
30 ft.
long for the quadrangular open yard, supplying welded
mesh for the front waiting' room and to the rear opening, whitewashing of one room, paint work, floors etc. This also was certified at first to be completed but later the certificate was revised
400
St:PREME COURT REPORTS
(1969]1 S.C.R.
and it was stated that the work was not complete.
It is between
It.
these two rival certificates and the evidence relating to them that
the matter has to be decided.
In respect of the road, the Assistant Engineer in charge of the
work gave a notice on December 20, 1966 saying that certain
work was not complete.
Items 8-12 were, however, not mentioned there.
The High Court was of the
opinion
that
this
omission completely demonstrated that that portion of the work
which is now stated to be incomplete must have been completed.
In answer to this. Mr. Chagla has contended that he had asked
for the issue of a Commission in the High Court for the inspection
of the spot (which petition he has repeated here) and he slated
that even today, this part of the work has not been
completed.
However we do not go by such petitions nor arc we inclined to
issue a Commission which has been asked for in this Court. We
consider the evidence, such as it is, and we find the correct situation to be this.
P.W. 3, the Assistant Engineer no doubt slated
in his notice that the "balance items" were only three.
He had
really mentioned 4 items. but had struck out item No. 2.
That,
however. did not show that no other work remained to be done.
The certificates arc there.
That in favour
of the
completion
of the work were given by the Personal Assistant to the Executive
Engineer on the ·day the Executive Engineer was
absent.
No
doubt. the Personal Assislant worked as the head of the office in
the absence of the Executive Engineer. but it is on record and
duly proved that he had no authority to issue the completion certificates which he did.
The Personal Assistant explained that he
had issued the certificates because they were urg~ntly rcquirc<l
for election purposes and because the Assistant Engineer under
whose supervision the construction of the road was taking place
had reported comple!ion of the work.
The Executive Engineer,
however. verified
this again from
the
Assistant Engineer and
found that items 8--12 remained to be completed.
Mr. Narasaraju complains of the conduct of
the Executive Engineer by
saying that he did not visit the spot to sec for himself _whether the
completion had been made or not.
He states that m Ex. P-1 I
in which the completion was reported on I 8-1-1967 there is no
mention of items 8-12 and it is different in language from Ex.
C-1 in which items 8-12 arc shown not to have been completed.
We do not think that anything turns on that.
The Officers of
the Public Works Department have come to the witness box and
have mainiaincd that these items were in fact not completed before the election took place.
We are satisfied that although the
construction of the road was complete the additional items which
ore described as "miscellaneous" in the contract still remained to
be completed.
What bearing this will have upon the election of
the first respondent is something which we shall consider after we
have analysed the evidence with regard to the hospital.
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KONAPPA V. VISHWANATH (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
401
In respect of the hospital also, the first respondent obtained
the certificate from the Personal Assistant to the Executive Engineer that the work had been completed. This is Ex. P-1. Here
again, the Assistant Engineer was consulted and the certificate
showed that there were physical completion of the work. Later
this certificate was also contradicted by the issuance of another
certificate by the Executive Engineer that the work remained incomplete. This information was given by the Executive Engineer
to the Returning Officer by Ex. P. 13 because it was an important
matter connected with the election.
Mr. Narasaraju hinted that
some outside influence was at work in the cancellation of the
earlier certificate inasmuch as the Minister for the Public Works
Department was present at Y adagiri and had also camped at Gulbarga on the following day. He pointed out that the Chief Engineer and the Executive Engineer were also present. The insinuation is that this was done under the pressure of the Minister, because the Congress had been consistently losing the seat at Yadagiri and it was intended that the first respondent should be knocked
out to ensure Congress victory.
We do not find any evidence
which shows that the Minister took any interest in this matter although his presence may give rise to some suspicion.
We cannot go on suspicion alone. It is obvious that both sides were
straining every nerve to get some documentary evidence in their
hands to prove, one that the work was inc._omplete and the other,
that the work was completed. The later certificates clearly show
that certain parts of the work remain.~d to be completed and they
certainly were overlooked when the first certificate was given.
That they were minor items is not much to the purpose.
The contracts as such were not fully performed. Although we were hesitating whether to apply the de minimis rule to this case we tl1ink
that there are other considerations why we should refrain from
applying that rule.
We make our position clear. If the work is
completed, it would not mean that the contract is subsisting, if,
say, a glass pane is found broken or a tower bolt or a drop bolt
or a handle has not been fixed where it should have been. The
law is not so strict as all that and a sensible view of the section
will have fo be taken. The right of a person to stand for an election is a valuable right just as a right of a person to vote was considered a valuable right in the leading case of Ashby v. White(').
But if the contract subsists in such manner that it cannot be said
to have been substantially completed, the law must take its own
course. It is of the essence of the law of Elections that candidates
must be free to perform their duties without any personal motives
b.~ing attributed to them.
A contractor who is still holding a
contract with Government is considered disqualified, because he
is in a position after successful election to get concession for himself in the performance of his contract. That he may not do so
(1) [1703] 2 Ld. Raym, 938.
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] i s.c.rc
is not relevant.
The possibility being there, the law regards it
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necessary to keep him out of the elections altogether.
But as we
stated, this will be only wh.~re the contract has not been fully performed, although what is full perfonnance of a contract or completion, is a matter on which we do not wish to express a final
opinion in this case, because it depends on the circumstances of
each case and more particularly because there is
here another
B:
condition to which we have referred.
In both the contracts, there was a condition that for a period
of three months in one and for a period of one year in the other,
the contractor would make due repairs to all the defective parts in
the execution of the contract. Th.e question is whether the contract can be said to be subsisting in view of this clause.
Both
sides referred us to Hudson's Building and
Engineering
Contracts. In one passage, Hudson regarded such a clause as in the
nature of a 'repair clause'. But Hudson was not dealinl! with the
law of election when he was discussing a clause such as we have
in this case.
We have to interpret this clause in the context of
election Jaw. Now the contract must be said to subsist if a portion
of it is required to be perfom1ed at any time, because so long as
the contract has not be~n discharged, by full perfonnance, it must
c
be taken to subsist.
Mr. Narasaraju contends that the
phrase
"contract for the execution of the work" shows that i• is the execution of the original work which is contemplated and not any
condition of guarantee for repair. In our opinion, this argument,
however, ingenious, is not acceptable because
a similar
point . E
arose in the case to which we referred earlier.
In Clwtturbhuj
Vithaldas Jasani's( 1 ) case, Bose J. dealt with a similar point in
the following words :
'"It was argued that asstm1ing that to he the case,
then there were no longer
any
contracts
for
the
"supply of goods" in existence but on!y an obligation
arising under the guaran•ec clause.
We arc unable to
accept such a narrow construction.
This tenn of the
contract. whatever the parties may have chosen to call
it. was a tenn in a contrac! for the supply of goods.
When a contract consists
of a number of tcnns
and
conditions each condition docs not form a separate contract hut is an item in the one contract of which it is a
part.
The consideration for each condition in a case
like this is the consideration for the contract taken as a
whole.
Tt is not split up into
several considerations
apportioned between each tenn separately.
But quite
apart from that, the obligatiGn, even under this tem1.
was to supply fresh stocks for these three depots in exchange for the stocks which were returned and so even
(I) [1954] S C.R. 81~.
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KONAPPA V. VISHWANATH (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
when regarded from that narrow angle it would be a
contract for the supply of goods.
It is true they are
replacements but a contract to replace goods is still
one for the supply of the goods which are sent as re1
placements."
403
Applying these observations in the context of construction of
buildings and roads, it is obvious that if some part is found defective and has to be done again, the contract of execution as such
is still to be fully performed. It is possible to describe the action
liaken as one to repair the defect, but in essence it -is a part of
the contract of execution, because no execution can be said to
be proper or complete till it is properly executed. Taking the
fact that some portion of the original contracts remained to be
performed with the fact that under the contracts the contractor
was required not only to complete the original work but to repair defects or re-do something which he had not properly done,
we think this matter must fall within s. 9A of the Representation
of the People Act. This is not a case like the supply of a refrigerator which after giving service for some time goes out of order
and somethinl! has to be done to replace a part which is defective. The analogy is not quite apposite. Here the building was
completed very recently and the flooring had to be re-done and
various other things were left unfinished and these had to be
completed by the contractor.
Similarly in relation to the road,
although the surface was prepared and the road was in actual use,
under the contract, mile and hectometer stones had to be fixed
and certain other stones fixed at curves and boundaries. This
was not done.
The two contracts therefore were not fully performed and under cl. 20 of the agreement, it was incumbent
upon the contractor to complete this part of his obligation. In
our opinion, the High Court was in error in holding that the contracts had been fully performed and therefore s. 9A did not
apply.
Mr. Narasaraju raises three legal points.
The first is
that
under Art. 299, the contract had to be signed by the Secretary to
the Government whereas the contract was signed by the Executive Engineer. This point was also considered in Jasani's(') case
and it was held that it did not go to save the bar of the election
law to the candidature. Next it is argued that the section is applicable to a person whereas the contract was with a firm and therefore the first respondent was not barred from standing for the
election.
In our opinion, the High Court has taken the right
view of the matter.
The law requires that a candidate shonld
not have any interest in any contract with Goverrnnent and
even a partner has an interest sufficient to attract the provisions of s. 9A.
Lastly it is argued that the partnership
(1) (1954) S C.R. 817.
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.C.R.
itself had been dissolved.
That would have no effect upon the
relations between the first respondent and the Govcrnmeut. The
first respondent wuld not by a private dissolution of the partnership escape his liability under the contract to the Government.
and there was here no novation, because notice of the dissolution
was not given to Government and the Government liad not accepted Hampanna to whom the business was transferred in place of
the firm.
We view the transfer of the entire contracts to Hampanna with some suspicion.
It appears that on the eve of the
election, the first respondent who wished to contest the scat from
Yadagiri, hurried through his contracts, managed to get a completion certificate which was not quite accurate,
dissolved
the
par!ncrship with a view to clear himself from
all
connections
with the contracts so that he could stand for the election. In this
effort, he has distinctly fajJed.
We arc satisfied that this appeal must succeed and the· appeal
is therefore allowed, the election of the first respondent is declared void.
Jn this view of the matter, the votes cast in favour
of the first respondent must be treated as thrown away. As there
was no other contesting candidate we
declare
the
appellant
( elt.:ction petitioner) elected to the seat from the Yadagiri constituency.
The first respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant
throughout.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
A
B
c
D