# KOTAGIRI v. RAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 371
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-03-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 91 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. 0. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kotagiri-v-raj-amanickam-and-others-1618
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

I ndu.strial Dispute-Lay-off compensation-Closure of division
due to disturbances by workers-Lock-out-Subsequent reopening of
division-Claim for lay-off compensation-Lock-out and lay-off,
Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act, z947-(I4 of z947), ss. 2(l),
2 (kkk), 25C, 25E(iii), 33C.
The appellant's manager was violently attacked by its
workmen as a result of which he sustained serious injuries.
The workers in the lower division also threatened the appellant's
staff working in that division that they would murder them if
they worked there. The appellant was therefore compelled to
notify that the division would be closed until further notice.
Subsequently as a result of conciliation before the labour officer,
the division was opened again. The workers made a claim for
lay-off compensation under s. 25C of the Industrial Disputes
Act, r947, for the period during which the lower division was
closed on the footing that :the management for their own
reasons did not choose to run the division during that period.
The appellant's answer was, inter alia, that the closure of the
division amounted to a lock-out which under the circumstances
was perfectly justified and as such the workers were not entitled
to claim any lay-off compensation :
Held; (r) that the concept of a lock-out is essentially
different from that of a lay-off and where the closure of business
amounts to a lock-out under s. 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
Nor th Brook ] ute
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Das G"pta ].
March z4.
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
it woulrl be impossible to bring it within the scope of a lay-off
under s. z (kkk) of the Act.
Management of
·(z) that the expression "any other reason " ins. z (kkk)
Kairbetta Estate means any reason which is allied or analogous to reasons already
v.
specified in that section.
Rajamanickam
]. J{. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India
& Anr, A.LR. 1956 All. 498, approved.
(3) that the lock-out which was justified on the facts of the
case, \vas not a lay-off and therefore the 'vorkmen \Vere not
entitled to claim any lay;off compensation.

## Text

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
rationalisation scheme required them to do, they refused to do work, which the employer had no right in
law to ask them to do. It is difficult to say that ·this
amounted to a "strike" by the workmen ; but even
if it could be said to be a " strike " such strike was
certainly not illegal or unjustified.
Our conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal was
right in its opinion that the closure of the mills by the
employer amounted to an illegal lock-out, and the
workmen, unable to work 'in consequence of the lockout, are entitled to wages for the period of absence,
caused. by such lock-out.
The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,
KOTAGIRI
v.
RAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. 0. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
I ndu.strial Dispute-Lay-off compensation-Closure of division
due to disturbances by workers-Lock-out-Subsequent reopening of
division-Claim for lay-off compensation-Lock-out and lay-off,
Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act, z947-(I4 of z947), ss. 2(l),
2 (kkk), 25C, 25E(iii), 33C.
The appellant's manager was violently attacked by its
workmen as a result of which he sustained serious injuries.
The workers in the lower division also threatened the appellant's
staff working in that division that they would murder them if
they worked there. The appellant was therefore compelled to
notify that the division would be closed until further notice.
Subsequently as a result of conciliation before the labour officer,
the division was opened again. The workers made a claim for
lay-off compensation under s. 25C of the Industrial Disputes
Act, r947, for the period during which the lower division was
closed on the footing that :the management for their own
reasons did not choose to run the division during that period.
The appellant's answer was, inter alia, that the closure of the
division amounted to a lock-out which under the circumstances
was perfectly justified and as such the workers were not entitled
to claim any lay-off compensation :
Held; (r) that the concept of a lock-out is essentially
different from that of a lay-off and where the closure of business
amounts to a lock-out under s. 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
Nor th Brook ] ute
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Das G"pta ].
March z4.
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
it woulrl be impossible to bring it within the scope of a lay-off
under s. z (kkk) of the Act.
Management of
·(z) that the expression "any other reason " ins. z (kkk)
Kairbetta Estate means any reason which is allied or analogous to reasons already
v.
specified in that section.
Rajamanickam
]. J{. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India
& Anr, A.LR. 1956 All. 498, approved.
(3) that the lock-out which was justified on the facts of the
case, \vas not a lay-off and therefore the 'vorkmen \Vere not
entitled to claim any lay;off compensation.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 91 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
March 24, 1958, of the Labour Court, Coimbatore, in
R. P. No. 35 of 1958.
G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi and T. S. Venkataraman, for
the respondents.
1960. March 24.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Gajendragadkar ].
GA.TENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave
iR directed against the order passed by the Labour
Court, at Coimbatore directing the appellant, the
Management of the Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri, to pay
lay-off compensation to its workr;nen, the respondents,
for the period between July 28, 1957, to September 2,
1957. This order was passed on a complaint filed by
the respondents before the Labour Court under
s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947
(hereinafter called the Act).
The material facts leading to the respondents' complaint must be set out briefly at the outset. On July
26, 1957, Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer, the appellant's
Manager, was assaulted by some of the workmen of
the appellant. He suffered six fractures and had to
be in hospital in Coouoor and Madras for over a
month. The appellant's staff working in the division
known as Kelso Division was also threatened by the
workmen.
As a result of these threats three members
of the staff wrote to the appellant on July 27, 1957,
that they were afraid to go down to the lower division
and it was impossible for them to work there becau~e
their lives were in danger. , They added that tho
workers in the lower division were threatening them
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
that they would murder them if they worked in the
1960
.lower division. On receiving this communication
f
·
ff h
II
fi d
h
Management of
rom its sta t e appe ant noti e on t e same day J(airbetta Estate
that the Kelso Division would be closed from that
v:
day onwards until further notice. This notice referred
Rajamanickam
to.the brutal·assault on theManager and to the threat
. -
..
held out against the field staff who were reluc'tant to Ga1endragadkar ],
face the risk of working in the lower division. It
appears that the Kelso Division continued to be closed
until September 2, 1957, on which date it was opened,
as a result of conciliation before the labour officer,
when the respondents gave an assurance that there
would not be any further trouble. The claim for layoff is made for the said period during which the division remained closed between July 28 to September 2,
1957.
'
Soon after the division was closed the respondents
made a complaint to the Labour Court (No. 43of1957)
under s. 33A of the Act in which they ,alleged that
they had been stopped from doing their work without
notice or enquiry and claimed an order of reinstate- 4
ment with back wages and continuity of service.
At
the hearing of the said complaint the appellant raised
a preliminary objection that the closure in question
was a lock-out and that it did not amount either to
an alteration of conditions of service to the prejudice
of the workmen nor . did it constitute discharge or
punishment by dismissal or otherwise under els. A
and B of s. 33 respectively, and so the petition was
incompetent. This preliminary objection was upheld
by the Labour Court and the complaint was accordingly dismissed on November 30, 1957.
Thereafter the present complaint was filed by the
respondents on January 31, 1958, under s. 330 of the
Act. In this complaint it was stated that the respondents were refused work from July 28 to September 2,
1957, "by declaring a lock-out of a division of the
estate " and the claim :inade was that, as the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the
division during the said days and laid-off the respondents, the respondents were entitled to claimlay-off
compensation under s. 250 of the Act.
Against· this
pqmplaint. the appellant raised several contentions .
..s
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374
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
[1960)
1960
It was urged on it.s behalf that the complaint was incompetent under s. 330 and that the Labour Court
Management of
Kairbetta Estate had no jurisdiction to deal with it. It was also conv.
tended that the closure of the division amounted to a
llajamanicham lock-out which under the circumstances was perfectly
.
-
justified and as such the respondents were not entitl~d
Ga;endragadkar J. to claim any lay-off compensation. 'l'he Labour Court
rejected the preliminary objection as to want of jurisdiction and held that the complaint was competeut
under s. 33C. On the merits it found in favour of the
respondents and so it directed the appellant to pay to
the respondents the lay-off compensation for the
period in question. It is this order which is challenge< I
before us in the present appeal; and the same two
questions are raised before us.
For the purpose of deciding this appeal we will
assume that the complaint filed by the respondents
under s. 33C was competent and that the Labour Court
could have entertained a claim for lay-off compensation if the respondents were otherwise entitled to it.
•On that assumption the question which we propose to
decide is whether the closure of the appellant's divisi011 during the relevant period which amounts to a
lock-out can he said to fall within the definition of
lay-off.
We have already pointed out that in the
earlier complaint by the respondents under s. 33A it
has been held by the Labour Court that the closure in
question was a lock-out and as such the appellant had
not contravened the provisions of s. 33 of the Act.
Even in the present application the respondents have
admitted that the said closure is a leek-out but they
have added that a lock-out falls within the definition
of Jay-off and that is the basis for their claim for layoff compensation. The question which thus arises for
our decision is: Does a lock-out fall under s. 2(kkk)
which defines a Jay-off?
Section 2(kkk) defines a lay-off as meaning the
failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account
of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the
accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to
a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls
of his industrial establishment and who has not been
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
retrenched. There is· an explanation to the definition.
z960
which it 'is unnecessary to set out. It is clear that the M anageme11t of
lay-off takes place for one or more of the reasons J<airlietta Estate
specified in the definitioa. Lay-off may be due to
v;
shortage of coal or shortage of power or shortage of Rajamanio/1am
raw materials or accumulation of stocks or breakdown of machinery or any other reason.
" Any other Gajemiragadkar J.
reason" to which the definition refers must, we thillk,
be a reason which is allied or analogous to reasons
already specified. It has been urged before us on
behalf of the respondents that " any other reason"
mentioned in the definition need not be similar to the
preceding reasons but shoulainclude any other reason
of whatsoever character for which lay-off may have
taken place ; and in support of this argm:b.~nt reliance
is placed on s. 25E(iii). Section 25E deals. with three
categories of cases where compensation is not liable to
be paid to a workman even though he may have been
laid-off. One of these is prescribed by s. 25E(iii); if
the laying-off is due to a strike or slowing down of
production on the part of workmen in another part of
the establishment no compensation has to be paid.
The argument is that laying-off which is specified in
this clause has been excepted because, but for the
, exception, it .. would have attracted the definition of
. s. 2(kkk) and would have imposed an obligation on
the employer to pay lay-off compensation.
That
no doubt is true ; but we do not see how the case
specified in this clause is inconsistent with the view
that "any othei· reason " must be similar to the pre.
ceding reasons specified in the definition.
If there
is a strike or slowing down of production in one part
of the establishment, and if lay-off is the consequence,
the reason for which lay-off has taken place would
undoubtedly be similar to the reasons specified in the
definition.
We are, therefore, satisfied that the
expression "any .other reason" should be construed
to mean reason similar or analogous to the preceding
reasons specified in the definition. That is the view
taken by the Allahabad High Court in J. K. Hosiery
Factory v. Labour Appellate 1'ribunal of India & Anr.(_!);
(I) A.I.R, 1956 All. +98,
376
SUPREME COUH.T REPOl{TS
[1960]
'960
Let us now consider what a fock-out means under
the Act. Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as 'meaning
A! anagement of
J(airbetta Estate the closing of a place of employment, or the suspenv.
sion of work, or the refusal by an employer to conRajamanickam tinue to employ any number of ]Jersons employed by
--
him.
It may be relevant to point out
~hat the
Gajendmgadka• J. definition of lock-out contained in s. 2(e) of the Trade
Disputes Act, 1929 (VII of 1929), had, in addition to
the present definition under s. 2(1), included an additional clause describing a lock·out which provided
that " such closing, suspension or refusal occurs in
consequence of a dispute and. is intended for the
purpose of compelling ·those persons or of aiding
another employer in compelling persons employed by
him to accept terms or conditions of or affecting employment". This clause has now been _deleted. Even
so, the essential character of a lock-out continues to
be substantially the same. Lock-out can be described
as the antithesis of a strike.
Just as a strike is a.
weapon available to the employees for enforcing their
industrial deniands, a lock-out is a weapon available
to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the
employees to see his point of view and to accept his
demands. In the struggle l]etween capital and labour
the weapon of strike is available to labour and is
often used by it, so is the weapon of lock-out available to the employer and can be used by him. The
use of both the weapons by the respective parties must,
however, be subject to the relevant provisions of the
Act. Chapter V which deals with strikes and lock-outs
clearly brings out the antithesis between the two
weapons and the limitations subject to which both of
them must be exercised.
Thus the concept of lockout is essentially different from the concept of lay-off,
and so where the closure of business amounts to a
'lock-out under s. 2(1) it would be impossible to bring it
within the scope of lay-off under.s. 2(kkk). As observed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in M/S. Presidency Jute Mills Go. Ltd. v. Presidency Jute Mills Go.
Employees' Union (2), in considering the essential
character of a lock-out its dictionary meaning may be
borne in mind.
According to the dictionary meaning
(2) [I9S•] L.A.C. g>.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
lock-out means " & refusal by the employer to furnish
r960
work to the operatives except on conditions to be
11
. l ,
Management of
accepted by the latter co ect1ve y '.
Kairbetta E;tate
Stated broadly lay-off generally occurs in a continuv.
ing business, whereas a lock-out is the closure of the Rajainanickam
business. In the case of a lay-off, owing tp the reasons
.
.
Specified in S. 2(kkk) the employer is unable to give Ga;ondragadkar ].
employment to one or more workmen. In the case of
a lock-out, the employer closes the business and locks
out the whole body of workmen for reasons which
have no relevance to causes specified in s. 2(kkk).
Thus the nature of the two concepts is entirely different and so are their consequences. In the case of a .
lay-off the employer may be liable to pay compensaj;ion as provided by s. 25(C), (D) and (E) of the Act;
but this liability cannot be invoked in the case of a
lock-out. The liability of the employer in cases of
lock-out would d_epend upon whether the lock-out- was
justified and legal or not; but whatever the liability,
the provisions applicable to the payment of lay-off
compensation cannot be applied to the cases of lockout.
Therefore, we hold that the lock-out in the
present case was not a lay-off, and as such the respondents are not entitled to claim any lay-off compensation from the appellant. Incidentally we would like
to add that the circumstances of this case clearly show
that the lock-out was fully justified. The appellant's
Manager had been violently attacked and the other
members of the staff working in the lower division
were threatened by the respondents. In such a case if
the appellant locked out his workmen no grievance
can be made against its conduct by the respondents.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed
by the Labour Court is set aside and the complaint
filed by the respondents under s. 330 is dismissed.
There would be no ordsr as to costs.
Appeal allowed .