# KRISHAN PRASAD GUPTA v. CONTROLLER, PRINTING AND STATIONERY

- **Citation:** [1995] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 436
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-10-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No.1980 of 1995
- **Bench:** Kuldip Singh, S. Saghir Ahmad
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/krishan-prasad-gupta-v-controller-printing-and-stationery-13324
- **Pages:** 23

## Headnote

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985-Ss.14, 19, 28, 29, 29A, Paymellt of
Wages Act, 193(r-Ss. 2 (vi), 15, 17; lndustiial Disputes Act-Ss. 2 (n·j, 33C( 1)
& (2).
Jwisdiction of Tiibzmal--Transfer of pe11ding case under payment of
Wages Act~o jurisdiction to ellteitain-Jwisdiction of auth01ity to entertain/decide claim cases under Payment of Wages Act is special and protected
and not affected by constinttion of Tribunal--Appeals are colltinuation of
01iginal proceedings. Paymellt of Wages Act and Industrial Disputes Act are
'Con-esponding Law '.
lnte1pretation of Stanttes--Ouster vf jurisdicti01t-Most suitable rule to
be applie{}-Rule of constmction of giving ordinary meanings to vaiious
expressions used in the Legislation-To constnte the va1ious sections of the
E enactment as a whole, each provision throwing light on the rest.
Appellant an employee of the respondent, tiled case u/s 15 of pay'.
men! of Wages Act, alleging that the respondent had over a period of time
deducted monies illegally and unauthorisedly totaling Rs. 48,274.SOp. An
ex-paite order was passed since the respondent failed to appear. Later, the
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respondent tiled an application for setting aside the said ex-pane order.
This was rejected whereupon an appeal u/s 17 (l), of Payment of Wages
Act was tiled before the District Judge. During the pendency of the Appeal
the Tribunal was constituted and the pending appeal was transferred to
the Tribunal which dismissed the appeal. In the meantime, the appellant's
G application was allowed by order dated 20-7-88 for payment of
Rs.43,092.SOp against which the respondent tiled an appeal u/s 17 of
payment of Wages Act before the District Judge and it stood Transferred
to the Tribunal and was allowed by the Tribunal.
In this appeal it was contended that the appeal pending before the
H District Judge u/s 17 of the payment of Wages Act could not be legally
436
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KP. GUPTA v. CONTROLLER PRTG. AND STATIONERY
437
transferred to the Tribunal u/s 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and A
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. The respondents
submitted that since clause (b) of S.2 has been deleted by Act No. 19 of
1986, and the Administrative Tribunals Act has been made applicaLle to
all persons working in factories/industrial establishments, and jurisdiction of all Courts is now vested in the Tribunal, Appeal u/s 17 of the
Payment of Wages Act will also be before the Tribunal
Allowing the appea~ this Court
HELD : 1.1 Since on the original cause of action, a claim u/s 15 of
B
the payment of Wages Act could not have been made to the Tribunal, the C
appeal would not stand transferred to nor can appeal contemplated u/s 17
of the payment of Wages Act be filed before it. The Appellate Authority is
part of the justice delivery system constituted u/s 17 of the payment of
Wages Act. Its jurisdiction will not be affected by the establishment of
Administrative Tribunals particularly as appeal has always been treated
to be a continuation of the original proceedings. Consequently, the two tier D
judicial system, original as well as appellate, constituted under the 'corresponding law' like the payment of Wages Act, are not affected by the
Constitution of the Tribunals and the system shall continue to function as
before, with the result that if any case is decided u/s 15 of the payment of
Wages Act, it will not be obligatory to file an appeal before the Tribunal E
as required U/S 29A of the Act but the appeal shall lie u/s 17 of the payment
of Wages Act before the District Judge. The pending appeals also therefore,
not stand transferred to the Tribunal u/s 29 of the Act. The matter involved
here relates to the exercise of special jurisdiction by the District Judge
under the payment of Wages Act which is protected jurisdiction. [457-C-F]
1.2. Though the Tribunal has been constituted as a substitute for the
High Court under Article 323A, the Labour Courts and Indus trial Tribunals
etc, over which the High Court exercises jurisdic

## Text

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KRISHAN PRASAD GUPTA
v.
CONTROLLER, PRINTING AND STATIONERY
OCTOBER 18, 1995
[KULDIP SINGH AND S. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.J
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985-Ss.14, 19, 28, 29, 29A, Paymellt of
Wages Act, 193(r-Ss. 2 (vi), 15, 17; lndustiial Disputes Act-Ss. 2 (n·j, 33C( 1)
& (2).
Jwisdiction of Tiibzmal--Transfer of pe11ding case under payment of
Wages Act~o jurisdiction to ellteitain-Jwisdiction of auth01ity to entertain/decide claim cases under Payment of Wages Act is special and protected
and not affected by constinttion of Tribunal--Appeals are colltinuation of
01iginal proceedings. Paymellt of Wages Act and Industrial Disputes Act are
'Con-esponding Law '.
lnte1pretation of Stanttes--Ouster vf jurisdicti01t-Most suitable rule to
be applie{}-Rule of constmction of giving ordinary meanings to vaiious
expressions used in the Legislation-To constnte the va1ious sections of the
E enactment as a whole, each provision throwing light on the rest.
Appellant an employee of the respondent, tiled case u/s 15 of pay'.
men! of Wages Act, alleging that the respondent had over a period of time
deducted monies illegally and unauthorisedly totaling Rs. 48,274.SOp. An
ex-paite order was passed since the respondent failed to appear. Later, the
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respondent tiled an application for setting aside the said ex-pane order.
This was rejected whereupon an appeal u/s 17 (l), of Payment of Wages
Act was tiled before the District Judge. During the pendency of the Appeal
the Tribunal was constituted and the pending appeal was transferred to
the Tribunal which dismissed the appeal. In the meantime, the appellant's
G application was allowed by order dated 20-7-88 for payment of
Rs.43,092.SOp against which the respondent tiled an appeal u/s 17 of
payment of Wages Act before the District Judge and it stood Transferred
to the Tribunal and was allowed by the Tribunal.
In this appeal it was contended that the appeal pending before the
H District Judge u/s 17 of the payment of Wages Act could not be legally
436
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KP. GUPTA v. CONTROLLER PRTG. AND STATIONERY
437
transferred to the Tribunal u/s 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and A
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. The respondents
submitted that since clause (b) of S.2 has been deleted by Act No. 19 of
1986, and the Administrative Tribunals Act has been made applicaLle to
all persons working in factories/industrial establishments, and jurisdiction of all Courts is now vested in the Tribunal, Appeal u/s 17 of the
Payment of Wages Act will also be before the Tribunal
Allowing the appea~ this Court
HELD : 1.1 Since on the original cause of action, a claim u/s 15 of
B
the payment of Wages Act could not have been made to the Tribunal, the C
appeal would not stand transferred to nor can appeal contemplated u/s 17
of the payment of Wages Act be filed before it. The Appellate Authority is
part of the justice delivery system constituted u/s 17 of the payment of
Wages Act. Its jurisdiction will not be affected by the establishment of
Administrative Tribunals particularly as appeal has always been treated
to be a continuation of the original proceedings. Consequently, the two tier D
judicial system, original as well as appellate, constituted under the 'corresponding law' like the payment of Wages Act, are not affected by the
Constitution of the Tribunals and the system shall continue to function as
before, with the result that if any case is decided u/s 15 of the payment of
Wages Act, it will not be obligatory to file an appeal before the Tribunal E
as required U/S 29A of the Act but the appeal shall lie u/s 17 of the payment
of Wages Act before the District Judge. The pending appeals also therefore,
not stand transferred to the Tribunal u/s 29 of the Act. The matter involved
here relates to the exercise of special jurisdiction by the District Judge
under the payment of Wages Act which is protected jurisdiction. [457-C-F]
1.2. Though the Tribunal has been constituted as a substitute for the
High Court under Article 323A, the Labour Courts and Indus trial Tribunals
etc, over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction continue to function
with the incongruous result that though the High Court cannot quash their
judgments, it must continue to supervise their functioning. [458-D]
2.1. Since the matter involved in this case relates to the ouster of
jurisdiction of all regular Courts, including the High Court, a rule of
interpretation which is most appropriately applicable to the circumstances
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and the only Rule which can be most suitably applied is the rule of
construction of giving ordinary meaning to the various expressions used H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
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in the legislation and to construe various sections of the enactment as a
whole, each provision throwing light if need be, on the rest. [445-H, 446-A)
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Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR (1959) SC 1012; Madan Lal Fakir
Chand Dudhediya v. Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR (1962) SC 1543 and
Jennings v. Kelly, (1939) 4 ALL ER, 464 (HL), referred to.
2.2. S.14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, begins with the words
'save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act' which constitntes an
extremely signilicant expression as they pnrport to constitnte a 'saving
clanse'. This expression has also been used in the opening part of S.14 (3).
C What is intended to be saved is indicated in S 28 which, Incidentally, also
purports to exclude the jnrisdiction of almost all the Courts in service
matters. Ss. 14 & 28 have, therefore, to be read together to lind out the
real intent of the legislature as to the extent of jurisdiction retained or
excluded. [ 458-B)
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2.3. While S.19 operates 'subject to other provisions of the Act, the.
lield of operation of S. 14 is limited by the use of the words 'save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act'. These words control and regulate
the wh~le of the section not only in respect of 'jurisdiction' but also the
matters specilied therein. This constitutes the original jurisdiction of the
E Tribunal. [447-B)
2.4. The Appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is indicated in Ss. 29
and 29A of the Act. The Appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is extremely
limited and was conferred on the Tribunal so that the judgment, if any
passed by a munsif or civil or subordinated judge in ·a civil suit relating to
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a service matter (decided before the establishment of the Tribunal) may be
challenged before the Tribunal notwithstanding that the judgment passed
in that suit is not covered by the word 'order' delined in the explanation
appended to S 14 (i). Except the appeals, which are transferred to the
Tribunal or the appeals which may be liled before the Tribunal in the above
G circumstances, no other appeal would lie before the Tribunal. [447-C, E)
2.5. The 'saving clause' or the 'saving phrase' (not in the sense of
'repeals and savings) divides 'jurisdiction' into two closes, viz, 'jurisdiction'
which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal and 'jurisdiction' which
is not so transferred and is, on the contrary, saved. When 'jurisdiction' thus
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became exercisable by the Tribunal, it was provided by S. 28 that no court
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KP. GUPTA v. CONTROLLER PRTG. AND STATIONERY
439
shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority on and fron1 which
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such jurisdiction, ]10\\'ers and authority becomes exercisable by a Tribunal.
It is, therefore, apparent that inspite of S. 14 of the Act, the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Courts or other Authorities, under Industrial Disputes Act or Authority created under ;Iny other corresponding
law remains unallected. [447-G, 448-B]
3. The jurisdiction which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal
is the jurisdiction of all the Courts except the Supreme Court which is
expressly excluded. The vires of the Act has already been upheld. [446-G]
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S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of ll!dia & Ors., AIR (1987) SC 386, C
relied on.
4. Claim for wages can be entertained not only under the payment
of Wages Act but also u/s 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus
the character and function of the Labour Court under the Industrial
Disputes Act as also the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act are D
similar in purpose and both are designed to produce the same result
particularly as some of the provisions under both the Act prescribe the
same thing to be done. [455-E]
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, (1969) 2 Labour E
Law Journal 651, referred to.
4.2. The Industrial Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages Act are
therefore 'corresponding law' qua each other particularly as both are part
of the sa1ne social legislative canopy n .... Je by Parliament for immediate
an1elioration of work1nen's plight resulting from non-payment, or delayed
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payment or, for that matter, short payment of wages. [455-G]
Winter v. Minist1y of Transport, 1972 (NZLR) 539, referred to.
4.3. The 'Authority', constituted u/s 15 and the Appellate Authority
u/s 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, fall within the exception indicated in G
S 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and this Act, viz, is positively
covered by the connotation 'corresponding law' used in that section. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the authority to entertain and decide claim
cases u/s 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is not affected by the establishment of the Administrative Tribunals. [456-C-D]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995[ SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
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5. While deleting clause (b) from S. 2 so as to make the Act apB
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plicable to workmen etc, the Parliament by the same Amending Act, viz,
Act No 19 of 1986, introduced clauses (a) & (b) so as to preserve the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunals
and the Authorities UOfjer the Payment of Wages Act which is 'corresponding law' within the meaning of clause (b) of S 28. [456-B]
6. The judgment and order dated 4-7-94 by the Administrative
Tribunal Chandigarh, is set aside and it is directed that the Appeal papers
be transmitted forthwith to the District Judge, Chandigarh, for disposal
on merits. [458-E)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1980 of
1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.94 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Chandigarh in T.A. No. 26/CH/89.
Amar Vivck and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.
K. Madhava Reddy, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Ms. Priya Saxena for
the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Fate of this appeal hinges on the answer
which we ultimately give to the short question "whether the appeals pending in the Court of the District Judge under section 17 of the payment of
Wages Act, were liable to be transferred to the Administrative Tribunals
under section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, J 985 for disposal on
merits or the jurisdiction of the Authority under section 15 and that of the
District Judge under section 17 of the payment of Wages Act to hear and
decide Claim Cases and Appeals, respectively remain undisturbed."
The appellant was an employee of the respondent. On November 23,
G 1987 he filed an application under section 15 of the payment of Wages Act
for recovery of an amount of Rs.48,274.50 p. on the allegations, inter-a/ia,
that the respondent had illegally withheld and had also made unauthorised
deductions from his wages progressively over a considerable period of time.
This application was registered as Case No.407 of 1987 notice whereof was
issued to the respondent, who after putting in appearance, absented on a
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number of dates and ultimately the Authority passed an order that the case
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KP.GUPTA'· CONTROLLERPRTG.ANDSTATIONERY(S.SAGHIRAHMAD.J.(
441
would proceed ex-parte against him. The respondent filed an application A
for selling aside that order hut the application was re_jecled by order dated
June 23,1988 against which the respondent filed an appeal under section
17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act on .July 15, 1988 before the District
Judge during the pendency of which the Tribunal was constituted and
consequently, in view of the provisions contained in sect ion 29 of the Act,
the appeal was transferred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its order B
dated August 31,1990, rejected the appeal.
In the meantime, appellant's main application under section 15 of the
payment of Wages Act was allowed by order dated July 20,1988 for a sum
of Rs. 43,092.50 p. against which the respondent filed an appeal under
section 17 (1) of the payment of Wages Act in the Court of the District C
Judge, Chandigarh, which was also transferred to the Tribunal and the
Tribunal by its judgment and order dated July 4,1994 allowed the appeal
and set aside the order dated 20th July, 1988, passed by the Authority
under the payment of Wages Act. It is this order which is challenged before
us on the grounds, inter alia, that the appeal pending in the Court of the D
District Judge under section 17 of the payment of Wages Act could not
have been legally transferred to the Tribunal under section 29 of the Act
and the Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to dispose it of on merits.
Administrative Tribunals have been constituted under the Act made
by the Parliament under Article 323 A of the Constitution for providing an E
exclusive machinery for the adjudication or trial of disputes and complaints
with respect to recruitments, as also conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts, so as to cut down the time spent
by public servants in litigation in ordinary courts and to provide them relief
at the hands of persons hearing and deciding service litigation exclusively.
The vires of the Act has already been upheld by this Court in
S.P.Sampath v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 386 with the finding
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that with effect from the date on which the Tribunals were constituted, the
jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the Writ Petitions in service
matters came to an end. Whether the above view is correct or not and
whether the abrogation of the High Courts' jurisdiction in entertaining G
writs in service matters under Act. 226 of the Constitution amounts to a
destruction of the basic character of the Constitution are questions which
have since been referred to the Constitution Bench whose answer is still
awaited.
In S.P. Sampath's case (supra), it was held that Tribunal was a H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
substitute for the High Court. In order to confer exclusive jurisdiction in
service matters on the Tribunal, il has been provided in section 14 of the
Act that the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day
(l.11.85) all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately
hcfore that <lay by all Courts except the Supreme Court in respect of cases
pertaining lo recruitment and n1attcrs concerning recruitn1ent to All lndia
Services as also disputes relating to "service matters", (defined in section
3(q)).
Sections 19 to 21
of the Act , read together, indicate that the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked by a "person aggrieved" by
making an application against an
11order'! n1ade by the Government or a
local or other authority etc. subject lo the condition that all other remedies,
if available, under the service rules have been availed of by him and that
loo within the period of limitation indicated in section 21 in which the
starting point of limitation as also the period which would commence from
that point have been specified.
Section 14 which confers, or, we may be permitted to say, transfers
jurisdiction of all the regular Courts including High Courts all over the
country lo the Tribunal in respect of "service matters", provides, in its
relevant part, as under :-
"14. Jwisdiction, powe1~ u11d ulllho1ity of the Central Administrative
T1ibu11af-(l) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the
appointed day, all the .iurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the
supreme Court) in relation to -
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment 1 to any
all India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil
post under the Union or to a posl connected with defence or
in the defence services, being, in either case, a post fiJled by
a civilian ;
(b)
all service matters concerning -
(i)
a member of any All-India Service ; or
(ii)
a person [nol being a member of an All India Service
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K.P.GUPTA .-. CONTROLLERPRTG.ANDSTATLQNERY[S. SAGHIRAHMAD.J.I
443
or a person referred to in clause (c)\ appointed to any A
civil service of the Union or any civil post under the
Union; or
(iii) a civilian [not being a member of an All India Service -
or a person referred to in clat"c (c)I appointed to any
defence services or a post connected \vith defence,
and pertaining to the service of such mc1nbcr, person or civilian,
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any state or of
any local or other authority within the territory of lndia or under
the control of the Government of lndia or of any corporation [or
society] owned or controlled by the Government ;
(c) ........................................ "
Section 29 provides for the transfer of all pending cases to the
Tribunal while section 29 A provides for the filing of appeals in such cases
as were decided either before or after the establishment of Tribunals on
1.11.85 before the Tribunal instead of the regular appellate forum.
Sections 29 and 29A are reproduced below:
"29.
Tru11sjer of pe11di11g cuses-(l) Every suit or other proceeding
pending before any court or other authority immediately before
the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act', being a
suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such
that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment,
within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on
that dale to such Tribunal :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any
appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court.
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(2)
Every suit or other proceeding pending before a Court or
other authority immediately before the date with effect from which G
jurisdiction is conferred on a Tribunal in relation to any local or
other authority or corporation I or society], being a suit or proceed~
ing the cause of action \Vhereon it is based is such that it would
have been, if it had arisen after the said date, within the jurisdiction
of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such
Tribunal:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any
appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court.
(3) Where immediately before the date of establishment of a Joint
Administrative Tribunal any one or more of the .States for which
it is established, has or have a State Tribunal or State Tribunals,
all cases pending before such State Tribunal or State Tribunals
immediately before the said date together with the records thereof
shall stand transferred on that date to such Joint Administrative
Tribunal.
( 4) Where any suit, appeal or other proceeding stands transferred
from any Court or other authority to a Tribunal under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2),-
(a) the Court or other authority shall, as soon as may be'.
after such transfer, forward the records of such suit, appeal
or other proceeding to the Tribunal ; and
(b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed
to deal with such suit, appeal or other proceeding, so far as
may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application
under section 19 from the stage which was reached before
such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the
Tribunal may deem fit.
(5) Where any case stands transferred to a Joint Administrative
Tribunal under sub-section (3), the Joint Administrative Tribunal
may proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was
reached before it stood so transferred.
( 6) Every case pending before a Tribunal immediately before the
commencement of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment)
Act, 1987, being a case the cause of action whereon it is based is
such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such commencement, within the jurisdiction of any Court, shall together. with
the records thereof, stand transferred on such commencement to
such Court.
(7) Where any case stands transferred to a Court under sub-section (6), that Court may proceed to deal with such case from the
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K.P. GUPTA» CONTROLLER PRTG. AND STATIONERY (S. SAGHIRAHMAD.JJ
445
stage \vhich \Vas reached before it stood so transferred.1'
1129-A.
Provision for filing of ce1tain appeals - Where any decree
or order has been made or passed by any Court (other than a High
Court) in any suit or proceeding before the establishment of a
Tribunal, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon
it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after
such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, and
no appeal has been preferred against such decree or order before
such establishment and the time for preferring such appeal under
any law for the time being in force had not expired before such
establishment, such appeal shall lie-
(a) to the Central Administrative Tribunal, within ninety days
from the date on which the Administrative Tribunals
(Amendment) Bill, 1986 receives the assent of the President,
or within ninety days from the date of receipt of the copy of
such decree or Order, whichever is later, or
(b) to any other Tribunal, within ninety days from its establishment or within ninety days from the date of receipt of
the copy of such decree or order, whichever is later."
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It is then provided by section 33 that the Act shall have overriding E
effect.
Transfer of jurisdiction of regular Courts to another Court or
Tribunal has never been liked by litigants and lawyers as noticed by
Viscount Simonds in Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C., 1956 A.C. 736 who
observed that:-
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"Any one bred in the tradition of the law, is likely to regard with
little sympathy legislative provisions for ousting the jurisdiction of
the Court, whether in order that the subject may be deprived
altogether of remedy or in order that his grievance may be remitted
to some other Tribunal."
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Since the matter involved in this case relates to the ouster of jurisdiction of all regular Courts, including the High Court, we shall adopt a
rule of interpretation which is most appropriately applicable to the circumstances of the present case and the only Rule which can be most
suitably applied is the rule of construction of giving ordinary meaning to H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
the various expressions use<l in the Legislation and to construe various
seclions of 1 he enactment as a vvhole, each provision, I in the \VOrds of Lord
Wright in Jennings v. Kelly, [ 1939] 4 All ER 464(HL) throwing light, if need
be, on the rest. This rule has since been accepted by this Court in Tahsildar
Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 in which Subba Rao, J. (as he
then was)speaking for the Courr said:-
11The cardinal rule of construction of the provisions of a section
with a proviso is to apply the broad general rule of construction
which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole
each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.
The true principle undoubtedly is that the sound interpretation
and n1eaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause saving
clause, and proviso, taken and construed together, is to prevail.
11
In Madan Lai Fakir Chand Dudhediya v. C/zangdeo Sugar Mills Ltd.,
AIR (1962) SC 1543 Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed :-
"The first rule of construction which is elementary, is that the
words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical
meaning. Since \Ve are dealing with two sub-sections of S. 76, it is
necessary that the said two sub-sections must be construed as a
whole "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. "
Reverting back to section 14, we may immediately notice the striking
feature that this section begins with the words "Save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Actn which constitute an extremely significant expression
as they purport to constitute a "Saving Clause
11
• This expression has also
been used in the opening part of sub-section (3) of section 14.
What is intended lo be saved is indicated in section 28 which,
incidentally, also purports to exclude the jurisdiction of almost all the
Courts in service matters. Section 14 and section 28 have, therefore, to be
read together to find out the real intent of the legislature a.s to the extent
of jurisdiction retained or excluded.
The jurisdiction which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal is
the jurisdiction of all the Courts except the Supreme Court which is
expressly excluded.
The "matters" in respect of which this
11jurisdiction
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are also indicated in this section. That is why it is provided in section 19
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KP. GUPTA!-·. CONTROLLER PRTG.ANDSTATIONERY jS. SAGHIRAHMAD . .T.J
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that any person aggrieved by an
11order
11 (defined in the Explanation appended to sub-section (1) of tlrnt section) pertaining to any "matter" within
the "jurisdiction" of the Tribunal may approach the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. While section 19 operates
11subjcct to other provisions
of the Act", the field of operation of section 14 is limited by the use of the
words
11save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act". These words
control and regulate whole of the section not only in respect of "jurisdiction11 but also the
11Matters
11 specified therein. This constitutes the original
j"urisdiction of the Tribunal.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is indicated in section 29
and 29A of the Act. While all appeals pending in various Courts, except
those pending in the High Court on the date from which Tribunal became
functional stand transferred to the Tribunal by the force of the Act, the
appeals in all cases which were decided prior to the establishment of
Tribunals, are required to be filed before the Tribunal, if they had not
already been filed provided the cause of action on which the case was
based is cognizable by the Tribunal.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is extremely limited and
was conferred on the Tribunal so that the judgment, if any passed, for
example, by a Munsif or Civil or Subordinate Judge in a Civil Suit relating
to a service matter (decided before the establishment of the Tribunal) may
be challenged before the Tribunal notwithstanding that the judgment
passed in that suit is not covered by the word "ordcr"defined in the
explanation appended to sub-section (i) of Section 14. Except the appeals,
which are transferred to the Tribunal or the appeals which may be filed
before the Tribunal in the above circumstances, no other appeal would lie
before the Tribunal.
A
B
c
D
E
F
The "Saving Clause" or the
11Saving Phrase
11 (not in the sense of
11Repeals and Saving!!) divides njurisdictionn into two classes, namely,
11jurisdiction11 which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal and
11jurisdiction
11
which is not so transferred and is, on the contrary, saved. When the G
jurisdiction thus became exercisable by the Tribunal, it was provided by
section 28 that on Court shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and
authority on and from the date from which such jurisdiction, powers and
authority becomes exercisable by a Tribunal. It however, excepts:-
(a) the Supreme Court; or
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
(b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority
constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any
other corrcspnnding law for the ti1nc being in force.
It is therefore apparent that in spite of section 14 of the Act the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Courts or other Authorities
under the Industrial Disputes Acts or Authority created under any other
Correspl)nding Law rcn1ains unaffected. The original, or for that matter?
the Appellate Authority under the payment of Wages Act is neither an
Industrial Tribunal nor a Labour Court nor arc they "Authorities" under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but if the payment of Wage Act is
ultimately found to be a ''Corresponding Law'', the jurisdiction of the
Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act would also be saved.
Let us take up this exercise.
Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is an Act to regulate the payment of
D wages to certain classes of person employed in an industry. The Act was
amended from time to time and was ultimately amended in 1982 by Act 38
of 1982 with the following objects and reasons :-
E
F
G
"The payment of Wages Act, 1936 regulates the payment of wages
to certain classes of persons cn1ployed in industry. It was enacted
to ensure that the wages payable to employees covered by the Act
are disbursed by the employers within the prescribed time limit
and that no deductions other than those authorised by law are
made by the employers. The Act applies proprio vigore lo the
payn1cnl of \Vagcs to persons en1ploycd in any factory or to persons
t:n1pluycd in a railway by a railway a<l1ninistration either <lircctly
or through a sub-contractor. Further, the State Government are
.en1po\vcred to extend the provisions of the Act to cover persons
employed in any industrial establishment or any class or group of
Industrial establishments as defined in the Act. The wage limit for
the applicability of the Act is Rs. l,000 per mensem. It is proposed
to amend the Act with a view to extending its protection to a larger
nun1bcr of pcrson.s and making the provisions of the Act n1ore
effective and beneficial.
11
While the Act, to begin with , was applicable to industrial estabH
lishments so as
to ensure payment of wages to workmen or persons
KP. GUPTA~·. CONTROLLER PRTO.ANDSTATIONERY [S. SAGHIRAHM1\D.J.J
449
en1ploycd in an industry at regular intervals \Vithout any unauthorised A
deduction, the an1end1nents introduced by Act 38 of 1982 widened the
scope of the original Act as many !!other establishn1ents'' could be brought
\Vithin its purvie\V on a Gazette notification issued either by the c:cntral
(Jovernment or the State C.Jovcrnn1ent.
Section 2 contains definitions of various tern1s, nan1cly, "E1nployed
person'',
1'En1ploycr", "Factory
11, !!Industrial or other establish1nents
11
, "RailB
way Ad1ninistration
1
' and
11Wagcs" etc. Almost all these terms are a!So
defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. In order to understand whether
payment of Wages Act is part of the legislative scheme governing Industrial
Law, we would, by way of illustration concentrate on "Wages'' and its
C
recovery from the employer through judicial process. The definition of
11Wages
11 in section 2 (vi) is an exhaustive definition which is in very wide
terms. Its relevant portion is quoted below :-
"2 (vi). "Wages" means all remuneration( whether by way of salary,
allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable D
of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment,
express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed
in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment,
and includes -
(a) any remuneration payable under any award or settlement
between the partie~ or order of a Court ;
(b) any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of ovcrtin1e work or holidays or any leave
period;
( c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of
employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name);
( d) any sum which by reason of termination of employment
E
F
of the person employed is payable under any law, contract or G
instrument which provides for the pay111cnt of such sum,
whether with or without deductions hut does not provide for
the time within the payment is to be made;
(e) any sum to which the person employed is entitled under
any scheme fran1ed under any law for the time being in force;
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
but does not include -
( J) .
(2) ..... .
(3)
(4) ........................... .
(5) ......... ··········· .. .
(6) ························ .... .
Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the term "Wages" has been
defined in section 2 (rr) as under :-
n2(rr). "Wages
11means all remuneration capable of being expressed
in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment,
express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in
respect of his employment or of work done in such employment,
and includes-
(i)
such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the
workman is for the time being entitled to;
(ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light,
water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service
or of any concessional supply of foodgrains or other articles;
(iii) any travailing concession;
(iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both ;
but does not include-
(•) .............................................. .
(b). ·············································
( c ) .............................................. .
H
If the "Wages" are not paid within the prescribed time limit or
KP. GUPTA v. CONTROLLERPRTG.ANDSTATIONERY [S. SAGHJRAH~·tAD.J.] 451
deductions, other than those authorised hy la\v, are n1a<lc by the ernploycrs
the employee can recover it under the payment of Wages Act for which an
elaborate machinery has heen provided in section 15 relevant portion nf
\vhich is quoted bclov . .r :-
'
1/5.
Clai111s arising out of deductions fiD111 lvages or delay in
paynrenl <~( 1vages and jJenalty j(Jr 111alicious or ve.ratious clainis :-
A
B
(1) The State Government may, by notification in the official
Gazette, appoint la pre~iding officer of any Labour Court or
Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the C
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the
State orJ any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other
officer with experience as a Judge of Civil Court or as a stipendiary
Magistrate lo be the authority to hear and decide for any specified
area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay D
in payment of the wages [of persons employed or paid in that area],
including all matters incidental to such claims : ·
Provided that where the State Government considers it necessary so to do, it may appoint more than one authority for any
specified area and may, by general or special order, provide for
E
the distribution or allocation of work to be performed by them
under this Act.
(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has
been made forn1 the \Vages of a·n cn1ployed person, or any pay1nent
F
of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal
practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised
in \Vriting to act on his behalf. or any Inspector under this Act, or
any other person acting with the permission of the authority
appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for
a direction under sub-section (3) :
G
Provided that every such application shall be presented within
[twelve months] from the date on which the deduction from the
wages was n1ade Of form the date On \Vhich the payment of the
wages was due to be n1ade, as the case may be :
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
Provided further that any application may be admitted after the
said period of [twelve months] when the applicant satisfies the
authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the apr}lication \Vilhin such period.
(3) When any application under sub-section (2) is cntcrtoinccL the
authority shall hear the applicant and the en1ploycr of other
persons responsible for the payn1cnt of \vagcs under section 3, or
give tbcn1 an opportunity of being hcard1 and, after such further
inquiry (if any) as 1nay be necessary, may) without prejudice to any
other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable
under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the
amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together
with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think
fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former
case and [not exceeding twenty-five rupees in the latter, and even
if the amount deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the
disposal of the application, direct the payment of such compensation, as the authority may think fit, not exceeding twenty-five
rupees] :
Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation
shall bc made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is
satisfied that the delay was due to -
(a) a bone fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount
payable to the employed person or
(h)
the occurrence of an en1crgency, or the existence of
exccptiona] circumstances, such that the person re.sponsihle
for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising
reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or
(c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept
payment.
(4) ············································
( 4-A) .......................................... .
H
(4-B) ........................... : ............. .
\
·, •
.\~" • I"·
I
K.P. GUPTA v. CONTROLLER PRTG.AND~"'TATIONERY [S. SAGI-URAHMAD,J.]
453
(5) ...........................................
A
Before procec<ling further , \VC 1nay point out that there have been
many local amendments made almost by all the States in the Act but for
purposes of the question under our consideration, \vill refer to the text of
the Central Act which is the parent Act.
A perusal of section 15 (1) would indicate that the State Government
has lo constitute an" Authority" by appointing either the presiding Officer
of a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or any Commissioner for
workmen's Compensation or a Judge of a Civil Court or Stipendiary
Magistrate lo hear and decide all claims arising out of deductions from the
wages or delay in payment of wages including all matters incidental thereto.
If an employee does not get his wages in time and its payment is delayed
B
c
or deductions are made form the wages unauthorisedly, he may either
personally or through a legal practitioner or any official of a registered
Trade Union or any Inspector appointed under the Act, may, apply to the
"Authority" constituted under the Act and the latter namely, the D
"Authority", after hearing the employer or any other person responsible for
payment of wages, may direct the refund of the amount deducted or
payment of delayed wages , as the case may be, together with compensation
as indicated in sub- section (3) of section 15 without prejudice to the
penalty to which the employer or the other person may be liable under the
Act. The amount so awarded is recoverable as fine imposed by a
Magistrate as indicated in sub-section (5) of section 15.
Under section 33 C of the Industrial Disputes Act, there is an
altogether different machinery provided for recovery of wages etc. It
provides as under :-
"33C.