# KRISHNA BIHARILAL v. GULABCHAND AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 27
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-03-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 74 and 75 of 1967
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegdb, P. Jaganmohan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/krishna-biharilal-v-gulabchand-and-ors-5242
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Widow entitled to life estate-Entering into compro1nise
with reversioners giving up rights over portion of property in return for
recognition of her absolute ownership of pat·t of property-Revt!rsioners
are estopped from challenging alienations by widow of properties recognised as absolutely hers in compromise-'Malik Mustakal' means absolute
estate-Document must be read to give efJect to plain and natural meaning to words employed-Plea of .stoppel when may be considered though
not specifically raised in pleadings.
B filed a suit for the possession of ancestral property against the
descendants of his father's brother and &ister. D.uring the pendency of the
suit B died and bis widow P was impleaded as his legal representative.
Some of the defendants also died; those who left legal representatives were
substituted by them. On June 7. 1941 the parties to the suit compromised
their disputes. Before compromisin& the suit the parties had obtained the
leave of the court as the minor defendants had joined the compromise.
Under the compromise a portion of the suit properties was aiven to P
and the remaining portion to the defendants in that suit. P alienated the
properties given to her under three different sale deeds.
The appellant
was the alienee under all these sale deeds. The alienations were challenged by the defendants in the earlier suit and their descendants in three suits
wherein declarations were sought that the aforesaid alienations by P were
not valid and binding on the plaintiffs who were the _presumptive reversioners to the estate of B. During the pendency of the -Suits P died and
thereafter the suits were contested only by the appellant as the alience. The
trial court dismissed two of the suits holding that in view of the compromise in the earlier suit the parties were cstopped from challenging the validity of the sale deeds as under that compromise the estate given to P wa-s an
absolute one. After ·various stages of litigation the Division Bench of the
High Court held that the compromise of 1941 was illegal and as such could
not be used to non-suit the plain.tiffs. It also, held that the compro111ise did
not ameunt to a family arrangement.
HELD : (i) The ordinary rule of construction of a document is to
give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in
the document. The compromise deed specifically said that the properties
given to P were to be enjoyed by her as 'Malik Mustakal'. These words
have been interpreted to mean an absolute estate. The circumstances in
which the compromise was entered into as welt as the languaae used in
the deed did not in any manner go to indicate that the estate given to P
was anything other than an absolute estate. [31E-F]
Dhyan Singh and Anr. v. /uga/ Kislwre & Anr .• (1952] S.C.R. 478 and
Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumar, 60 I.A. 56, relied on.
(ii) In holding that the compromise in question was illegal the Division Bench overlooked the fact that this was not a compromise entered
into fWith third parties. It was a compromise entered into with presumptive
revefsioners. Further, since at no stage had the plaintiffs pleaded that the
compromise was illegal. the High Court was not justified in going into
the validity of the compromise. [31H-32B]
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(iii) Even if the compromise was illegal the parties to the compro1nisewere cstopped from challenging the impugned alienation.
It is well settled that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her estate by
entering into a compromise with third parties to the prejudice of the ultimate reversioners.
But the same will not be true if the compromise is
entered into with persons who ultimately become the reversioners. P was
entitled to enjoy the entire properties included in the earlier suit during
her life time; but under the compromise a fraction of those properties
was given to her absolutely. She gave up her rights in a substantial portion of the p

## Text

KRISHNA BIHARILAL
v.
GULABCHAND AND ORS.
March 16, 1971
[K. S. HEGDB AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.]
Hindu Law-Widow entitled to life estate-Entering into compro1nise
with reversioners giving up rights over portion of property in return for
recognition of her absolute ownership of pat·t of property-Revt!rsioners
are estopped from challenging alienations by widow of properties recognised as absolutely hers in compromise-'Malik Mustakal' means absolute
estate-Document must be read to give efJect to plain and natural meaning to words employed-Plea of .stoppel when may be considered though
not specifically raised in pleadings.
B filed a suit for the possession of ancestral property against the
descendants of his father's brother and &ister. D.uring the pendency of the
suit B died and bis widow P was impleaded as his legal representative.
Some of the defendants also died; those who left legal representatives were
substituted by them. On June 7. 1941 the parties to the suit compromised
their disputes. Before compromisin& the suit the parties had obtained the
leave of the court as the minor defendants had joined the compromise.
Under the compromise a portion of the suit properties was aiven to P
and the remaining portion to the defendants in that suit. P alienated the
properties given to her under three different sale deeds.
The appellant
was the alienee under all these sale deeds. The alienations were challenged by the defendants in the earlier suit and their descendants in three suits
wherein declarations were sought that the aforesaid alienations by P were
not valid and binding on the plaintiffs who were the _presumptive reversioners to the estate of B. During the pendency of the -Suits P died and
thereafter the suits were contested only by the appellant as the alience. The
trial court dismissed two of the suits holding that in view of the compromise in the earlier suit the parties were cstopped from challenging the validity of the sale deeds as under that compromise the estate given to P wa-s an
absolute one. After ·various stages of litigation the Division Bench of the
High Court held that the compromise of 1941 was illegal and as such could
not be used to non-suit the plain.tiffs. It also, held that the compro111ise did
not ameunt to a family arrangement.
HELD : (i) The ordinary rule of construction of a document is to
give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in
the document. The compromise deed specifically said that the properties
given to P were to be enjoyed by her as 'Malik Mustakal'. These words
have been interpreted to mean an absolute estate. The circumstances in
which the compromise was entered into as welt as the languaae used in
the deed did not in any manner go to indicate that the estate given to P
was anything other than an absolute estate. [31E-F]
Dhyan Singh and Anr. v. /uga/ Kislwre & Anr .• (1952] S.C.R. 478 and
Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumar, 60 I.A. 56, relied on.
(ii) In holding that the compromise in question was illegal the Division Bench overlooked the fact that this was not a compromise entered
into fWith third parties. It was a compromise entered into with presumptive
revefsioners. Further, since at no stage had the plaintiffs pleaded that the
compromise was illegal. the High Court was not justified in going into
the validity of the compromise. [31H-32B]
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(iii) Even if the compromise was illegal the parties to the compro1nisewere cstopped from challenging the impugned alienation.
It is well settled that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her estate by
entering into a compromise with third parties to the prejudice of the ultimate reversioners.
But the same will not be true if the compromise is
entered into with persons who ultimately become the reversioners. P was
entitled to enjoy the entire properties included in the earlier suit during
her life time; but under the compromise a fraction of those properties
was given to her absolutely. She gave up her rights in a substantial portion of the properties on the representation of the defendants that she
could take a portion of the suit properties absolutely. This was a representation of fact and not law.
[32B-33AJ
T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Raghava
Mudily<1r
and ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 624, relied on.
When the nearest presumptive reversioners who were parties to the
compromise were estopped from challenging it, they could not advance
their case by impleadin& their sons who could only claim throuah then1.
as co-plaintiffs. [33E-F]
The issue whether tho plaintiffs I & 2 were bound by the term• of the
compromise was broad enough to cover the defendant's plea of estoppel
even though it was not specifically raised in the pleadinas but considererl
by all the courts. [34A]
(iv) The nearest reversioners who were parties to the compromise were
the grand-children of B's aunt. The parties to the earlier suit were near
relations.
The dispute was in respect of property originally owned by
their common ancestar. To consider a settlement as a family
arrangement it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should
all belong to one family.
The courts lean ~trongly in favour of family
arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its
various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might
ruin them all. [34B-EJ
Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini D<vi and Ors., [1965] 3 S.C.R. 841
and Sahu Madho Das and Ors. v. Pandit Mukand Ram and Anr .• relied
on.
{The suits being held to be not maintainable the Court did 11ot consider the question whether the impugned ali~nations were effected
for
valid necessity.]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 74 and
75 of 1967.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
May 3, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh.High Court in LP.A .. Nos.
3 and 4 of 1964.
S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath, Ra;endar Nath and Manik
Chand Jain, for the appellants (in both the appeals).
S. T. Desai, Motila/ Gupta, B. M. Agarwal, P. N. Tiwari. J.B.
Dadachanji. O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respon- '
dents (in both the appeals).
«
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KRISllNA BIHARILAL v. GULABCllAND (Hegde, J.)
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde J.-In these appeals by special leave identical questions of fact and law arise· for decision. It would be convenient
to set out the material facts before formulating the questions
arising for decision.
In the State of Gwalior there was a firm
known as Chhedilal Chaturbhuj.
Chhedilal, the owner of the
firm had two sons and one daughter.
The genealogy of the
family of Chhedilal is as follows :
Chhedilal
I
Baldv ~rasad
I
Chhaturbhuj
I
Parvati
(daughter)
married to
Manorthilal
I
I
Bulak chand
I
I
Jwalaprasad
I
I
Rajabe11
Mst. Pat1obai
Su ta
(daughler)
I
Kanialal
I
(widow) died
in 19~3.
I . l
Kamtma
alias Kannimal
I
Hirabl@
Hariji
I
Raggamal
I .
Ganeshtlal
I
I
Pannalal
I
Lakshmichand
Sarswatibai
(widow)
Balklishan
Kris~anlal
Phool~hand Poon~mchand
j
1
1
(minor)
(Res. 7)
(Res. 9)
(Res. 8) ____ ~.-------------
1
I
I
I
Gulabchand
Jagdish Chandra.
Mahavir
Karola
@Rambabu
(Res. 2)
(minor)
(daughter)
(Res. I)
IRes. 3)
Minor, Res. 4
After the death of Chhedilal, it appears the firm in question
came into the possession of some of the children of Parvati. In
1926. Bulakichand, grandson of Chhedilal filed a suit against
J wala prasad (his first cousin), Karnimal, Raggamal and Pannalal
seeking possession of the firm. Therein he appears to have alleged
that Jwalaprasad who had a half share in the suit properties had
been colluding with the other defendants. Bulakichand died
during the pendency of the suit. Thereafter his widow
Pattobai was impleaded as his legal representative. During the
pendency of the suit Jwalaprasad, Karnimal, R3ggamal and Pannalal also died. Neither Jwalaprasad nor Karnimal left a.ny successors .. Raggamal was succeeded by his son Ganeshilal a.nd
Pannalal by his son Lakshmichand.
They were duly impleaded
in the suit. On June 7, 1941, the parties to the suit compromised
their disputes. It may be noted that to tha.t compromise the minor
~ons of Lakshmichand as well as of Ganeshilal were also parties.
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Before compromising the suit the parties had obtained the leave
of the court as the minor defendM1ts had joined the compromise.
Under the compromise, a portion of the suit properties was given
to Pattobai and the remaining portion to the defendants in that suit.
Pattobai alienated the properties given to her under, three different
sale deeds i.e. one on July 15, 1941 and the other two on July 24.
1941. The first sal.e· deed was for a sum of Rs. 1,000/- and the
other two for Rs. 9,000/- and Rs. 20,500/- respectively. The appellant is the alienee under all these sale deeds. In 1953, Lakshmichand and his sons and Ganeshilal and his sons instituted three
suits seeking declarations tha.t the alienations referred to above are
not valid arid binding al!lllinst them, the presumptive reversioners
to the estate of Bulakichand. One of those suits is still pending
trial. These appeals arise from the other two suits. During the
pendency of those suits Pattobai died. Therea.fter the suits were
contested only by the appellallt, the alienee !he will be hereinafter
referred to as the defendant). The trial court dismissed the two
suits holding that in view of the compromise in the earlier suit,
the parties are estopped from challenging the validity of the sale
deeds as under that compromise the estate given to Pattobai is an
absolute one. In appeal the first appellate court confirmed the
_judgment of the trial court on the ground that as the pla.intiffs
had not amended the plaint seeking possession of the suit properties after the death of Pattobai. the suits were not maintainable.
On further appeals being taken by the plaintiffs, the .High Court set
aside the first appellate court's judgment. It came to the conclusion that the first appellate court should have taken into consideration the change in the circumstances that had taken place pending
the trial of the suits and moulded the relief aiccording to law. It,
accordingly remanded the cases to the first appellate court for disposal of the same on merits. After remand the first appellate coill't
again affirmed the decision of the trial court on two grounds viz.
(!) that the plaiirtiffs were estopped from claiming any right in.the
suit properties as an absolute estate had been given to Pattobai in
respect of those properties and (2) thM under any circumstance
the compromise in question should be considered as a family
arrangement and as such is not liable to be reopened. This decision was affirmed by a single judge . of the High Court in second
appeal. Thereafter the plaintiffs took up the matter in appeal to
the Letters Patent Bench. The Letters Patent Bench reversed the
judgment of the courts below. It held that the compromise entered
into in 1941 was an illegal compromise and as such the same cannot
be used to non-suit the plaintiffs. It also disagreed with the conclusion of the learned sin)e judge that the compromise recorded
amounted to a family settlement. These appeals are directed a!lllinst
tbal. judgment.
'
KRISHNA BIHARILAL Y. GULABCHAND (Hegde, J.)
3 J
The first question that falls for consideration is whether on
A
a true construction of the compromise decree it can be held that
Pattobai had been given an absolute estate ? According to the
plaintiffs Pattobai having been impleaded to the suit as a legal
representative of her husband, in law she could not take an absolute estate; she could only have a widow's estate and therefore
in construing the compromise decree, we must bear in mind the
B
principles of Hindu Law and if we do so, the only possible conclusion is that the intention of the parties was only to give her a
life estate. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the
defendant that under law Pattobai was entitled to enjoy all the
properties included in the plaint in the earlier suit during her
life time but she agreed to give up her right in bulk of the properties in consideration of her getting an absolute estate in a
C
small portion of the properties involved in that suit. It was further urged on his behalf that the compromise deed specifically
says that the properties given to Pattobai are to be enjoyed by
her as "MaJik Mustikal" which means absolutely and hence there
is no basis for the contention that she took a widow's estate.
The ordinary rule of construction of a document is to give
effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed
in the document. The compromise deed specifically says that the
properties given to Pattobai were to be enjoyed by her as "Malik
Mustakil''. The meaning of the expression "Malik Mustakil" an
urdu word, has come up for consideration before this Court in
some cases. In Dhyan Singh and anr. v. Jugal Kishore & anr(')
this Court ruled that the words "Malik Mustakil" were strong,
clear and unambiguous and if those words are not qualified by
other words and circumstances appearing in the same document,
the courts must hold that the estate given is an absolute one. A
similar view was taken by the Judicial Committee in Blshunath
Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari('). The circumstances
under which. the compromise was entered into as well as the Ian·
guage used in the deed do not in any manner go to indicate that
the estate given to Pattobai was anything other than an absolute
estate.
The Letters Patent Bench of the High Court held that the
compromise entered into was illegal compromise. It came to
that conclusion on the basis that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge
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her own rights by entering into a compromise in a suit. But the High
Court overlooked the fact that this was not a compromise entered
H
into with third parties. It was a compromise entered into with the
(!l [1952] S. c. R. 478.
(2) 60 I. A. S6.
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presumptive reversioners. Further at no stage the plaintiffs had·
pleaded that the compromise entered into in 1941 was an illegal
compromise. The plaintiffs took no such plea in the plaint. There
was no issue relating to the validity of the compromise. Hence
the High Court was not justified in going into the validity of the
compromise. Further even if the compromise was an invalid one,
the parties to the compromise are estopped from challenging the
impugne<I alienations-see Dhyan Singh's case(').
This takes us to the question of estoppel.
As seen earlier,
the trial court, the first appellate court as well as the learned
single judge of the High Court have concurrently come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the impugned alienations. But the Letters Patent Bench took a different view. Its conclusion, a.s mentioned earlier, proceeded on
the basis that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her own estate by
entering into a compromise with. others. It is well settled that
a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her estate by entering into a compromise with third parties to the prejudice to the ultimate reversioners. But the same will not be true if the compromise is entered into with persons who ultimately become the reversioners.
It was urged on behalf of the respondents that Pattobai was impleaded in the earl'ier suit only as a legal representative of her
deceased husband; therefore she could only represent his estate
and not carve out an estate for herself. But this argument over:
looks the fact that according to Pattobai she was entitled to enjoy
the entire properties included in the earlier suit during her life
time; but under the compromise a fraction of those properties
were given to her absolutely; that being so the plaintiffs are estopp;d from backing out of that compromise. It was urged on
behalf of the plaintiffs that the representation made by the defendants in the earlier suit is at best a representation as regards the
true legal position and such a representation cannot estop them;
before there can be an estoppel, the representation must be about
some fact, the opposite side must rely on that representation and'
must suffer some detriment by acting on the basis of. that representation. It was urged on their behalf that in this case -Ole only
representation that the plaintiffs are said to have made in that
Pattobai had an absolute estate in a portion of the suit properties;
this cannot be said to be a representation of a fact and therefore
the same cannot form any basis for invoicing the rule of estoppeL
We are unable to accept this contention. ·From the facts set out
earlier. it is clear that Bulakichand claimed the entire estate for
himself after the death of Jwalaprasad. If lhe contention of
Bulakichand is correct, as we must assume for the purpose of this
case, then Paltobai would have been entitled to enjoy the entire
properties during her life time. But she gave up her rig~t in a
substantial portion of those properties on the repre8C'ltat1on by
(I) [l!>S2] S. C. R. 478.
'
KRISHNA BIHARILAL •. GU'.ABCHAND (Hegde, J.)
the defendants that she can take a portion of the suit properties
absolutely.
This is a representation of a fact and not of Jaw.
The representation is that the defendants were willing to confer
on Pattobai an absolute right in a portion of the suit properties
if she gave up her right in the remaining properties.
Pattobai
relied on that representation and gave up her claim in respect of
a substantial portion of the properties included in the earlier suit.
Hence the plaintiffs particularly Lakshmichand and
Ganeshilal
who alone were tee reversioners to the estate of Bulakichand on
the d?.te of the death of Pattobai, are estopped from contending
th1t they are entitled to succeed to the properties given to Pattobai.
The other plaintiffs have no independent right of their own <n the
properties with which we are concerned. In Dhyan Singh's case(')
this Court ruled that even if an award made is Invalid, the persons
who were parties to that award are estopped from challenging
the validity of the award or from going behind the award in a
subsequent litigation. In T. V. R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar and ors.,(') this Court ruled that
if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well
as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time, he cannot be
permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens.
At the time of the compromise Lakshmichand and
Ganesh'1al were the nearest presumptive revers'ioners. They must
be deemed to have known their rights under law. Under the compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit properties
absolutely to Pattobai, evidently in consideration of- her giving up
her claim in respect of the other properties. They cannot be now
permitted to resile from the compromise and claim a right inconsistent with the one embodied in the compromise. They cannot
advance tr.eir case by impleading their sons as co-plaintiffs. Their
sons can only claim through them.
For the first time in this Cciurt it was urged tha.t the plea of
estoppel was not available to the defendant as no such plea had
been taken in the pleadings. It is true that no specific plea of estoppel had been taken in the written statement filed by the defendant.
But he had definitely stated in paragraph 14 of his written statement that the plaintiffs are bound by the compromise and have no
right to deny the right of Pattobai over the whole of the properties
sold to him. One of the issue raised in the suit (Issue No. 4) is :
"Are the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 bound by the terms
of compromise filed in Qvil Original Suit No. 3 of S. Y.
19~ I of the High Court? If so. what is it~ effect?"
(ll (1952] S. C.R. 478.
3-1 s. a. Ind;a/71
(21 [1961] 3 S. C. R. 624.
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This issue is broad enough to cov~r the plea of estoppel. The plea
of estoppel had been urged and considered by all the courts without any objection from the plaintiffs. They cannot be now permitted to contend that the defendant had not t>ken any specific
plea of estoppel.
The next question that we have to consider is whether the compromise in question can be considered as a settlement of family disputes. It may be noted that Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal who
alongwith Pattobai were the principal parties to the compromise
were the grand-children of Parvati who was the aunt of Bulakichand. The parties to the earlier suit were near relations. The
dispute between the parties was in respect of a certain property
which was originally owned by their common ancestor namely Chhedilal. To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is
not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong
to one family.
As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das
v. Girjanandini Devi and ors.(') the word "family'" in the context
of a family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense
of being a group of persons who are recognised in Taw as having
a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property
in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near re·
lations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as
a family arrangement-see Ramcharan Das's case(')
The courts lean strongly in favour of the family arrangements
to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various
members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might
ruin them all-see Sahu Madho Das and ors. v. Pandit M11ka11d
Ram and anr.(')
For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that
in view of the compromise entered into between the parties in 1941,
the suits from which these appeals arise are not maintainable. In
that view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the
alienations were effected for valid necessity, a question that has not
been gone into finaJ!y.
In the result these appeals are allowed and the suits from which
these appeals arise dismissed with costs throughout.
G.C.
(!) [1965] 3 S. C.R. 841 at p, 850 & 851.
(2)
Appeals allowed.