# Kumsr Bimal CkaMtc-SJnha· v. Stole of Punjab

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 563
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/kumsr-bimal-ckamtc-sjnha-v-stole-of-punjab-2520
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
tenure-holders or under-tenure-holders and raiyats.
It is, thus, clear that the. rent payable by the
appollants as· raiyats in respect of the disputed
lands would form part of the assets which have to
be included rn the gross assets in determining
compensatio·n. But that does not mean .that the
interests ·of raiynts also have become vested
in the State as a result of the notification under
s. 3, read with s. 5.
For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held
that the appellant's raiyati interests in the lands
and in the buildings standing on those lands have
not been affected by the abolition of his interest
as proprietors, and .that the State
authorities
had illegally taken possession of those. The ~.ppeal
is accordingly allowed with oosts here and below.
A ppe.al allOwf.d .
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA
v.
EAST INDIA COMMERCIAL CO. LTD.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J ' P. B. QAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANOHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, and
T. L. VANKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) .
Bea CWJtoms-Effect of confirmation of order. in appealOrder of Collector merged into that of Central Board of Revenue
-Sea CWJtoms Act, 1878 (8 of 1878).
·
J..
The respondent imported 2,000 drums of mineral oil
and the appellant confiscated ·50 drums and imposed a personal penalty. The appeal of the respondent was dismissed by
the Central Board of Revenue.
The respondent filed .a
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Culcutta
High Court. .A Full Bench of the High Court held that the
High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the
Central Board of Revenue in view of the decision in the case
._ " of Baka Venkata Bubba Rao. However, as the Central Board
of Revenue had merely dismisssd the appeal ~gainst the
1961
Kumsr Bimal
CkaMtc-SJnha·
v.
Stole of Punjab
--
Sinha C. J.
11141
c,,u~10F of Cullonu,
Cal"""'
..
Eatl India
Comm. rclal Co. Lld.
564
.IDPREME OOUUT REPC.llil'S [1963]
order of the appellant, the High Court further held that it
had jurisdiction to pass an order against the appellant. The
.~
appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate.
l/e/d that the appellant had merged into that of the
Central Board of Revenue and
hence no order could be
is.rued against the appellant. It is only the order of the
appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is
disposed of. It is immaterial whether the appellate order
reverses the original order, modifies it or confirms it.
The
appellate order of confinnation
is as efficacious
as an
operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modifica·
tion. As the appellate authority in this case was
beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it was not open to
the High Court to issue a writ to the original authority which
was within its jurisdiction.
Electwn Oommi8oion, India v. Saku Vankata Subba Rao,
[195!] S. C. ;c 1144, A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M.
Venkitachalam Poai, [1955] 2 S. C.R. 1196, Oommiuionu of
lncome-taz v. M;'s. Amritlal Bltogilal & Oo. (1959] S. C.R.
713 and Madan <Iopa! Rungta v. Secre!ary to the Government of
Oria80, (1962) (Supp.) 3 S.C.R. 906followed.
Barkatali v. Ou8Wdian General of Emcu.e Property, A. I.
R. 1954 Raj. 214, overruled.
Joginckr Singh Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rthabili1
tation, Pep111J,, Patiala, A. I. R. 1955 Pepsu 91, Burhanpur
National TextiZ. Worker. Tlnion v. J.abour Appellcm Tribunal
of India at Bombay, A. I. R. 1955 Nag. 148, and Azmat Ullah
v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, A.I.R. 1955 All 435, approved.
Slatt of U. P. v. Mo/l!lmmed Nooh, (1958] S. C.R. 59S,
distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE Ju11.1sDIOT10N: Civil ,Appeal
No. 383 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated J\
July 21, 1959, of tho Special Benc,h of the Culcutta
High Court in J\latter No. 76 of 1952.
D. R. Prem and R. L. Dhebar, for tho appellant and reapondente Noe. 2 and 3.
S T D
· nnd B. P. Mahexhwari, for res-
.
.
esaiu
,., ..
pondent No. 1.
2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
565
1962. April 30. The Judgment of the Court
was delivere

## Text

..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
tenure-holders or under-tenure-holders and raiyats.
It is, thus, clear that the. rent payable by the
appollants as· raiyats in respect of the disputed
lands would form part of the assets which have to
be included rn the gross assets in determining
compensatio·n. But that does not mean .that the
interests ·of raiynts also have become vested
in the State as a result of the notification under
s. 3, read with s. 5.
For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held
that the appellant's raiyati interests in the lands
and in the buildings standing on those lands have
not been affected by the abolition of his interest
as proprietors, and .that the State
authorities
had illegally taken possession of those. The ~.ppeal
is accordingly allowed with oosts here and below.
A ppe.al allOwf.d .
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA
v.
EAST INDIA COMMERCIAL CO. LTD.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J ' P. B. QAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANOHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, and
T. L. VANKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) .
Bea CWJtoms-Effect of confirmation of order. in appealOrder of Collector merged into that of Central Board of Revenue
-Sea CWJtoms Act, 1878 (8 of 1878).
·
J..
The respondent imported 2,000 drums of mineral oil
and the appellant confiscated ·50 drums and imposed a personal penalty. The appeal of the respondent was dismissed by
the Central Board of Revenue.
The respondent filed .a
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Culcutta
High Court. .A Full Bench of the High Court held that the
High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the
Central Board of Revenue in view of the decision in the case
._ " of Baka Venkata Bubba Rao. However, as the Central Board
of Revenue had merely dismisssd the appeal ~gainst the
1961
Kumsr Bimal
CkaMtc-SJnha·
v.
Stole of Punjab
--
Sinha C. J.
11141
c,,u~10F of Cullonu,
Cal"""'
..
Eatl India
Comm. rclal Co. Lld.
564
.IDPREME OOUUT REPC.llil'S [1963]
order of the appellant, the High Court further held that it
had jurisdiction to pass an order against the appellant. The
.~
appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate.
l/e/d that the appellant had merged into that of the
Central Board of Revenue and
hence no order could be
is.rued against the appellant. It is only the order of the
appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is
disposed of. It is immaterial whether the appellate order
reverses the original order, modifies it or confirms it.
The
appellate order of confinnation
is as efficacious
as an
operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modifica·
tion. As the appellate authority in this case was
beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it was not open to
the High Court to issue a writ to the original authority which
was within its jurisdiction.
Electwn Oommi8oion, India v. Saku Vankata Subba Rao,
[195!] S. C. ;c 1144, A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M.
Venkitachalam Poai, [1955] 2 S. C.R. 1196, Oommiuionu of
lncome-taz v. M;'s. Amritlal Bltogilal & Oo. (1959] S. C.R.
713 and Madan <Iopa! Rungta v. Secre!ary to the Government of
Oria80, (1962) (Supp.) 3 S.C.R. 906followed.
Barkatali v. Ou8Wdian General of Emcu.e Property, A. I.
R. 1954 Raj. 214, overruled.
Joginckr Singh Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rthabili1
tation, Pep111J,, Patiala, A. I. R. 1955 Pepsu 91, Burhanpur
National TextiZ. Worker. Tlnion v. J.abour Appellcm Tribunal
of India at Bombay, A. I. R. 1955 Nag. 148, and Azmat Ullah
v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, A.I.R. 1955 All 435, approved.
Slatt of U. P. v. Mo/l!lmmed Nooh, (1958] S. C.R. 59S,
distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE Ju11.1sDIOT10N: Civil ,Appeal
No. 383 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated J\
July 21, 1959, of tho Special Benc,h of the Culcutta
High Court in J\latter No. 76 of 1952.
D. R. Prem and R. L. Dhebar, for tho appellant and reapondente Noe. 2 and 3.
S T D
· nnd B. P. Mahexhwari, for res-
.
.
esaiu
,., ..
pondent No. 1.
2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
565
1962. April 30. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANOHOO, .J.-This is an appeal· on a. certificat.e ~ranted· by the Calcutta. High Court. The
brief facts neceBBary for present purposes a.re these.
The respondent had import.ad 2,000
drums of
mineral oil. Out of this quantity, the appellant,
the Collector of Customs, Calcutta., confiscated 50
drums by order dated September 20, 1950.
He
also imposed a personal penalty of Rs.61,000/-
on the respondent under the Sea. Customs Act,
No. 8 of 1878, (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The respondent appealed to the Central Boa.rd of
Revenue under s. 188 of the Act, and this appeal
was dismissed in April 1952. Thereupon the respondent filed a petitfon under Art. 226 of the Contitution in the High Court. We are in the present
appeal not concerned with the merits , of the case
put forward · by the respondent, for the matter
h'iB not yet been heard on the merits. When. the
petition ea.me up before a. lea.med Single Judge a.
question was raised as ·to the jurisdiction of the
Hi$h Court to hear the ·petition in view of the
decision of this Court in Election OommiS&ion I rUJ,ia
v. Saka Venkata Stthba Rao.(1) As the learned Single
Judge considered the p6int important,· he referred
the matter to a. larger bench; .a.nd eventually the
question was considered by a. Full-Bench of the
High Court. The. Full-Bench addressed itself two
questions in that connection, namely, (i) whether ·
any writ could issue against the Central Boa.rd
of Rev'?nue which w.as a party to the writ· P!'titien
and. which was permanently located outside the
jurisdiction of the High court, and (ii) whether if
no writ could iUue against the Central Board ,of
Revenue a.ny writ could be issued against the
appellant, which was the original authotity kl pa.es
the order under challenge, when the appellate
n osss) s.c.R. 11<1+,
1911S -
Colhctor of C..lomt0
Cakutia
••
iast India
Ctmtttereial Oo. Lltl.
566
. SuPRE:ME COURT REPORTS (1963]
authority (namely, the Central' Board of' Revenue)
• 0,zteci-;ifc,;,;
0
;.,, had merely dismissed the app~al. ·.
Calcuua
The Full-Bench held' on'-the• first ·question
· · E~;·I~Jia.
that the High· 'Cou'rt had no jurisdiction to issue
• Cummercial Co. Ltd.· a writ against the Central ·Board of Reveriue in
' IVaachoaJ.
view of the decision in the case of' Sake Venkata
· _Subba Rao.('). On tpe second question; it held th~t
as the Central· Board of Revenue had merely dismissed the appeal against the order of the Collector of Customs Calcutta, the really o~ruiiue order
was the order of the ·appellant, which{~:,.:a:5;iliicated
within the jurisdiction of the HigIBJ Cou'tt, and· · .
. · therefore it had ·jurisdiction to pass; an order
against the Collector of Customs in Hpite · of the
fact tliat that order · had been ·taken . in appeal
(which ·was dismissed) ··to· the Central ;Board of
Revenue to which no writ could ' be issued. · The
Full-Bench
further directed that the petition
· would be placed before the· learned . Single Judge
for disposal in tho light of ·its decision or. the
question of jurisdiction. Thereupon there
was
an application for a· certificate to appeal to this
. Court, which . was granted; and that in how the
matter has come uii liefore us: ·
.
'
. , .
The only question · which fells for decision
before us in the second question debated in the
High Court; namely, whether the High Court would
have jurisdiction to issue a writ. against the Cullector of Customs Calcutta. in 'spite of the fact. that his
order was 'taken in appeal to.the Central Board of
Revenue against which th_e High Court could not
issue a·writ and the appeal had been dismissed.
There seems to have be.en a difference of opinion
amongst the High Courts in this· matter. The
Rajas than High Courts in Barko.tali v. CU.stodian ·
GP.neral of Evacuee P.roperty \1) held:that where ··th_e .
. (I) A.J.R. (19\4) · Raj. 2H.
. '..
; \
.)
-~
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
567
~ original authority passing the order was within the
jurisdiction of the High Court but the appellate
authority was not within such jurisdiction, the
High Court would still have jurisdiction to issue a
writ to the original authority, where the appellate
authority had merely dismissed the appeal and
the order of the original authority stood confirmed
without any modification whatsoever. On the
other hand,
the PEPSU
High
Court
in
, .,
Jo?JiruJ£r Singh Waryam Singh v. Dfre,()tor, Rural
Rehabilit,ation, Pepsu, Patiala,(') the Nagpur High
Court in Burhanpur National I'extile Worker8 UnWri
v. Laboui· Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay(')
and the Allahabad High Court in Azmat Ullah v.
CUBtodian, Evacuee Property (')
held otherwise,
ta.king the view that even where the appeal was
merely dismissed, the order of the original authority
merged in the order of the appellate authority, and
if the appellate authority was beyond the territorial·
jurisdiction of the· High Court, no writ could issue
even to the original authority. It may be mentioned
" that the Rajasthan High Coui:t had occasion to
reconsider the matter after the decision of this
Court in A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M. Venkitacha'lam Patti ( •). and held that in view of .that
decision, its earlier decision in Barkatali's case (•)
was no longer good law.
The High Court has
however not noticed this later decision of ·the
Rajastha.n High Court to which the learned Chief
Justice who was party to the earlier Rajasthan case
;-i' was also a party. The main rea.s.on which impelled
the High Courts, .which held otherwise, was that ~e
order of the original authority got merged in the
order of the ~ppellate authority when the appeal
was disposed of and therefore if the High Court had
no territorhl jurisdiction to issue a writ . against·
the appellate authority it could not issue a writ
~ "
Ill A.I.B.. tl!l55) Pepsu91.
(2) A.I.R.(19551Nag.14B.
(9) A. I. B.. (l!lliS) AIL 455.
(4) IBM 2 s. c. R· 1196..
($) A.LL (!Zi) Jlti,21t.
Calkctof' of C111t01111,
Calcutta
J.
v.
l!.Osl lndic
Commercial Co, ·LU.
WanchOoJ
C.ll«t.r of Crut1a.r,
Calatlta
..
E.,c /ndie
c.in-dal C.. Lit.
Wonelloo J.
568
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
aga.inst the origina.l a.uthority, even though the
a.ppella.te a.uthority ha.d merely dismissed the a.ppeal
without a.ny modification of the order passed by the
original a.uthority.
The question therefore turns on whether the
order of the origina.l authority becomes merged
in the order of the a.ppella.te a.uthority even where
the appella.te authority merely dismiBBeR the a.ppeal
without any modification of the order of the
origina.l a.uthority. It is obvious tha.t when a.n
a.ppea.l is ma.de, the appella.te a.uthority oa.n do one
of thr1ie things, namely, (i) it ma.y revel'!le the
order under a.ppeal, (ii) it ma.y modify that order,
a.nd (iii) it ma.y merely dismiBB the a.ppea.I and thus
confirm the order without a.ny modifica.tion. It is
not disputed tha.t in the fil'llt two oases where the
order of the original authority is either reversed or
modified it is the order of the a.ppellate a.uthority
which is the opera.tive order a.nd if the High Court
h~ no jurisdiction to iBSue a writ to the appellate
a.uthority it ca.nnot iBBue a writ to the origina.l
a.uthority. The question therefore is whether there
is a.ny difference between these two oa.ses a.nd the
third case where the a.ppellate authoriiy dismiBSes
the a.ppea.l a.nd thus confirm• the order of the
original authority. It seems to us that on principle
. .
it is difficult to draw a distinction between the first
two kinds of orders pa.seed by the a.ppellate autho·
rity and the third kind of order pa.ssed by it. ·In all >-
these three cases a.fter the appellate authority has
disposed of the appea.l, the opera.tive order is the
order of the a.ppellate authority whether it has
reversed the original order or modified it or con·
firmed it. In la.w, the a.ppella.te order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an opera.tive order as
1
an appellate order of revel'll&l or modification.
Therefore, if the a.ppellate authority is beyond the
\erritorial juriadiot.ion of ~
High Conn A --
diftlml\ to 1aoJd eftD in a -
wllms the appelll&e
• •
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
--'>- authority has confirmed the order of the original
authority that the High Court can issue a writ to the
original authority which may even have the effect
of setting aside the order of the original authority
when it cannot issue a writ t.o the appellate
authority which has confirmed the order of the
original authority. In effect, by i~suing a writ to
the original authority setting aside its order, the
High Court would be interfering with the order of
the appellate authority which had confirmed the
order or the original authority even though it hns
no territorial jurisdiction to issue any writ to the
appt:illate aut.hority. We therefore feel that on
principle when once an order of an original
authority is taken in appeal to the appellate
authority which is located beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order after
the appeal is disposed of; and as the High Court
cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority
for want of territorial jurisdiction it. :Would· not
" be open to it to issue a writ to the original
authority which may be within its territorial
jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though
it may be that the appellate authority has merely
confirmed the order of the original authority and
dismissed the appeal.
It is this principle, viz., that the appellate
order is the operative order !tfter the appeal is
.;,.. disposed of, which is in our opinion the basis of the
' · rule that the decree of the lower court merges in.
the decree of the appellate court, and on the same
principle it would riot be incorrect to. say that the
order of the original authority is merged in the
order of the appellate authority whatsoever its
decision-whether of reversal or modification or
mere coiifirmatiOn. This matter has been considered
by this Court on a number of occasions after
the decision in Saka Venkata Subba Rao'B case~ (1\
Ii) {ISJll) S.C.a. ii.._
1961
Cnll1clor of Cu1/om11
Cakut"1
..
&st India
OOmmereial Co. Ltd.
U' nnehoo .T,
116'
Col11cto, of Ciultmts,
Calcutta
••
F.a,,S India
ComnuFc,in I C.:o. Lid,
Wa11ehoo J.
570
SPPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
In A. Thangal T\unju Mudaliar'a caRe (1), though the
point was not directly in issuo in that case, the
Court had occl\Siou to consider the matter (see
p. 1213) and it approved of the decisions of the
PEPSU, Nagpur and Allahabad Hi'!h Courts, (referred to above). Then in Commissioner of Income·
f,ax v.
Mea.~rs. Amritlal Bhogifal and Company('), a
similar question arose as to the merging of an order
of the income-tax officer into the order of the Appellate Aasistant Commissioner passed in appeal in
connection with the powers of the Commis8ioner "f
Income-tax in rnvision.
Though in that caso the
order of registration by the In<;om<>-tax
officer
was held not to have morged in the
order of
the Assistant CommiBBioner on appeal in view of
the spccia.J provisions of the Incom1. .. tnx Act, this
Court observed a.a follows in that connection at
p. 720 :-
.....
"There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is
provided against an order pas8ed bJ a tribunal,
..
the decision of the appellate nuthority is the
operative decision in law.
If the appellate
authority modifies or reversPs the der:ision of
the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate
decision that is effective and can he enforced.
In law the position would b(' ju.qt the same
even if the appellate decision merely confirms
the decision of the tribunal. As a result of
tho confirmation or affirma1we of the decision ).
of the tribunal by the appellate authority the
original di>oision
merges. in the appellate
decision and it is the appellate decision alone
which subsista and is operative and capable of
enforcement."
The matter was con~idered again by this Court
in Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secreiary to tl1eGovernment
of Orissa. (') in connection with an order of the
(I) tl95S)2S.C.R.1196.
(2) (19'9)S.C.R.711
(SJ (JIU) \SDJ>p.) S li.C .lt. ~-
' .
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
Central Government in revision under the Minaral
Concession RuYes, 1949, framed under the ·MiiieA
and Minerals (Regulation and 'Development)' Act,
(No. 53 of 1948) and it was' held that when the
Central Government rejected the review petition
against the order of the State Government· under
the Mineral Concession Rules it was in effeot reject·
ing the application of the appellant of that case for
grant of the mining lease to him. The question of
the original order with the appellate order was also
considered in that case, though it was pointed out
in view of r.60 of the Mineral Concession Rules that
it is the Central Government's order in review
which is the effective and final order. Learned
counsel for the respondent sou~ht to distinguish
Marlan Gopal Rungt,a's case (1) on the ground that it
was based mainly on an interpretation of r. 60 of
the Mineral Concession Rules 1949, though he did
not pursue this further when s. 188 of the ·sea
Customs Act was pointed out to him.
The main reliance however of the respondent
both in the High Court and before us is on the
decision in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohmmed
Nook('). That was a case where ~a public servant
was uismissed on April 20, 1948 before the Constitution had come into force. His appeal from the order
of dismissal was dismissed in May 1949 which waa
also before the Constitution came into force. Hie revii', sion against tbe order in the appeal was dismissed on
'April 22, 1950, when the Constitution ·had come
in to foroe, and the question that arose in that case
was whether the dismissed 'public serTant could
take advantage of the provisii>ns of the constitution
because the revisional order had b~n passed after
the Constitution 0M11e into force. In that case, this
Court certainly held that the order of dismissal
passed on April 20, 1948 oould not be said to have
merged in the orders in appeal ~d ii,t revision. n
(I) (1962) (S"l'I'.) s s.c;.a. 906.
(2) 119llll). s.c.a. 515..
Collectoi of Cu•toma,
~ CalnAta
v.
Eon India
Ctnnmwcial Co. Ltd.
Wanclwo J.
19111
Colk,to1 of CwlMP,
Calcwta
•·
Krid India
Commtrtlol Co. Ltd,
Wanchao .T.
572
SUPREME ·oooRT REPORTS [1963)
was pointed out that the order of dismisse.l wa.s
operative of its own strength a.s from April 20, 1948
and the public servant stood dismisded as from that
date and therefore it was a case of dismissal before
the Constitution came into force and the public
eervUTit could not take advantage of the provisions
of the Constitution in view of the fact that his
dismissal had taken place before the Constitution
had come into force.
As was pointed
out in
Madan Gopal Rungla'8, c.a.se(I) Mohammad Nook's
ca~e (') was a special case, which stands on ita own
facts.
The question there was whether a
writ
under Art. 226 could be issued in respect of a dismiasal which waR effective from 1948.
The relief
that was being sought was against an order of
di8miesal which came into oxistcnce before the
Constitution came into force and remained effective all along even after the dismissal of the appeal
and the revision from that order. It was in those
special circumstances that this Court held that the
dismissal had taken place in 1948 and it could not
he tho subject-matter of consideration under Art.226
of the oon~titution, for that would be giving retrospective effect to the Article. The argument based
on the principle of merger was repelled by this
Court in that case on two grounds, namely, ( i) that
the principle of merger applicable to decrees of
courts would not be applicable to departmental
tribunals, and (ii) that the original order would be
operative on its own strength and did not go.in
greater effioa.cy by the subsequent order of dismissal of the appeal or revision. In effect, this moans
that even if the prinolple of merger were applicable
to an order of dismissal like the one in Mohammad
N ooh' s c.a.se, (') the fa.ot would still remain that the
dismissal was before the Constitution came into
force and therefore the person dismiBB could not take
advantage of the p!"Ovisions of the Constitution, so
(I) (l962)l5un·l 3 S.c,R. !Ill&.
(21 11951) S.C.R. S'llS.
/If
•
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
573
•
-'> far as that dismissal was concerned. That case was
not concerned with the territorial jurisdiction
of the High Court where the original authority is
within such territorial
jurisdiction while the
appellate authority is not and must therefore be
confined to the special facts with which it was dea·
ling. We have therefore no hesitation in holding
conAistently with the view taken by this Court in
Mudaliar's case (1) as well as in Messrs. Amritlal
Blwgilal!s (') that the order of the original authority
must be held to have merged in the order of the
appellate authority in a ease like the present and it
is only the order of the appellate authority which
is operative after the appeal is dillposed of. There·
fore, if the appellate authority is beyond the terri·
torial jurisdiction of the High Court it would not
be open to it to i88ue a writ to the original autho·
rity which ia within its jurisdiction so long as it can
not issue a writ to the appellate authority; It is
not in dispute in this case that no writ could be
issued to the appellate.authority and in the ciroum·
stances the High Court could issue no writ even to
the original authority. We therefore allow the
appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and
dismiss the writ petition with -i..
Appeal allowed.
(I) (19SS) 2 s.c.R. 1196.
C2) (1959) s.c.R. 'TJS.
11111
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