# LACHHI RAM v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1967] 1 S.C.R. 243
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-03-30
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 1964
- **Bench:** V. Ramaswami, V. Bhargava, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lachhi-ram-v-state-of-punjab-3817
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

c
D
E
F
G
H
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), ss. 133 and 114 /II. (b)-
Evidence of approver-Tests for.
The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Judge mainly
on the elVidence of the approver. The High Court, in appeal did
n.ot
consider it safe to rely on a part of the approver's evidence which related:
to an earlier incident but found that his main story was reliable as wcll
as corroborated by other evidence. The conviction of the appellant was
upheld. In appeal before this Court by special leave, the appellant contended that the double test for the approver's evidence laid down in Sarwan
Singh's case had. not been correctly applied by the courts below.
HELD : The first iest la:d down in Sarwan Singh's case is that the ap·
prover's evidence must show that he is a reliable witness, and that is a test
which is common to all witnesses. The test obviously means that the court
should find that there is nothing inherently improbable in the evidence given
by the approver and that there is no finding that the approver had given false
evidence. The second test which thereafter still remains to be applied in the
case of an approver, and which is not always necessary when judging the
evidence of other witnesses, is that his e\idence must receive sufficient corroboration. (24 7 HJ
In the present case the High Court had held that the e1Vidence of the
approver was reliable and was corroborated on material particulara by
good prosecution witnesses who had been believed by the Court. There was
therefore no error in the judgment of the High Court in uphold'ng the
conviction of the appellant. The fact that the High Court did not accept
the evidence of the approver relating to the earlier incident did not mean
that the Court held the approver to be an unreliable or untruthful witness.
What 't did was to act on the principle of valuing· the evidence of the ap·
prover with caUtion and not accepting it unless it was corroborated at least
in some material particulars.
[246 DJ
·
Sarwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1957] S.C.R. 923 explained and
applied.

## Text

A
LACHHI RAM
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
September, 2, 1966
B
(V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA, AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J
c
D
E
F
G
H
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), ss. 133 and 114 /II. (b)-
Evidence of approver-Tests for.
The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Judge mainly
on the elVidence of the approver. The High Court, in appeal did
n.ot
consider it safe to rely on a part of the approver's evidence which related:
to an earlier incident but found that his main story was reliable as wcll
as corroborated by other evidence. The conviction of the appellant was
upheld. In appeal before this Court by special leave, the appellant contended that the double test for the approver's evidence laid down in Sarwan
Singh's case had. not been correctly applied by the courts below.
HELD : The first iest la:d down in Sarwan Singh's case is that the ap·
prover's evidence must show that he is a reliable witness, and that is a test
which is common to all witnesses. The test obviously means that the court
should find that there is nothing inherently improbable in the evidence given
by the approver and that there is no finding that the approver had given false
evidence. The second test which thereafter still remains to be applied in the
case of an approver, and which is not always necessary when judging the
evidence of other witnesses, is that his e\idence must receive sufficient corroboration. (24 7 HJ
In the present case the High Court had held that the e1Vidence of the
approver was reliable and was corroborated on material particulara by
good prosecution witnesses who had been believed by the Court. There was
therefore no error in the judgment of the High Court in uphold'ng the
conviction of the appellant. The fact that the High Court did not accept
the evidence of the approver relating to the earlier incident did not mean
that the Court held the approver to be an unreliable or untruthful witness.
What 't did was to act on the principle of valuing· the evidence of the ap·
prover with caUtion and not accepting it unless it was corroborated at least
in some material particulars.
[246 DJ
·
Sarwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1957] S.C.R. 923 explained and
applied.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
177 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March 30, 1964 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
85 of 1963.
B. K. Bannerjee AND N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.
B. K. Klu;nna AND R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bbargava, J. The appellant, Lachhi Ram, has come up to this
Court in this appeal by special [eave against the judgment of the
High Court of Punjab upholding the conviction and sentence of
243
21 I
SUPREME COt;RT
REPORTS
[ 1967] I S.C.R ..
imprisonment for life awarded to him under section 302 read with
sections 109 and 115 of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional
Sessions Judge of Gurgaon.
Both the courts below have, on the
consideration of evidence, held that the appellant had enmity with
the complainant, Devi Ram, even though they we(e collaterals in
the third or fourth degree and their wives were sisters. There was a
dispute between them about payment of compensation of some land,
and on July 28, 1958, the appellant had sent a post-card to Devi Ram
enquiring why he was delaying the payment of compensation.
asking
him
to
act intelligently and sensibly. and telling
him that it
was not good
to forcibly usurp the share of
others. Then. about six months before the occurrence, which was
the subject-mailer of the charge, the appellant and his brother Chet
Ram visited Devi Ram in his village Tigaon and made a demand in
respect of the property, adding a threat that otherwise he v..:iuld
have to pay heavily for the same.
On January 27, 1962. when
Devi Ram came hack to his house in the evening, his wife told him
that a friend of his from Rewari had sent some laddoos, pcras and
bananas through a person who had given his name as Partap Singh.
She further told him that Partap Singh had informed her that the
letter which he was asked to give with the sweets had been lost on
the way.
Devi Ram's wife described that youngman, Partap Singh.
There.1fter, Devi Ram, his wife, his two sons and an infant daughter
took their meals, and all of them ate the peras, the laddoos, and the
bananas, while some of these, which were left over, were placed
aside. At night, the infant daughter started vomiting and pa~sing
loose motions, and this was followed by vomiting and passing of
loose motions by all the other members of the family.
Devi Ram
sent for the village Vaid, Mohinder Singh, who came at about
4 a.m. and gave some medicine with tea; but the condition of all the
members of the family did not improve. The local doctor, Rajinder
Singh, was then sent for, but by the time he arrived, the infant
daughter, Padam Wati, died. The doctor removed all the persons
to his dispensary and from there sent them to a hospital in Faridabad in an ambulance. Devi Ram's wife was
removed
from
Faridabad to Irwin Hospital, Delhi, but she also died on the 29th
January, 1962.
Devi Ram himself, however, recovere-0.
The
matter was brought to the notice of the Police and on investigation,
one Hirnmat Singh, who turned the approver, was arrested. Himmat
Singh then related the story on the basis of which the appellant has
been convicted.
According to Himmat Singh, after he passed his Matriculation
Examination in 1955, he remained in the employment of some wine
contractors in Ludhiana and later he took to motor driving for
which he obtained a licence in· 1958. Then, he was looking for a
job when he came to Gurgaon, where he use-0 to take his meals
.in the hotel of one Arjan Singh. He got acquainted with the appeA
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
D
E
F
G
LACHH! RAM v. STATE (Bhargava, !.)
245
Hant in that hotel as the appellant had his shop Op1!9site to it. The
appellant was nice to him and arranged to get a house for him at a
monthly rental of Rs. 9/-. The appellant also started paying his
rent and expenses for the meals. Thereafter, the appellant took him
in his confidence, told him that he wanted to get Devi Ram murdered,
and offered money if the approver helped him in accomplishing
his purpose. The approver agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, the approver once tried to kill Devi Ram by shooting him with
a pistol which he had obtained in an illicit manner, but failed. After
this failure, the appellant worked out this plan of buying sweetmeats in which arsenic was to be mixed. On the 25th January, 1962,
the appellant told the approver that he had made all arrangements
and promised to pay him Rs. 800/- if the approver did the
job
assigned to him. On the morning of the 27th January, 1962, the
appellant, accompanied by the approver, went and purchased one
seer of Laddoos and half a seer of Khoa from the shop of Dal Chand,
and sugar was purchased from the shop of one Jodha Ram. One
dozen of bananas were also purchased from a rehriwala.
The
appel.lant had already procured white arsenic and he mixed it in
the khoa and the sugar which he had purchased, and prepared
peras with it. Thereafter, the appellant gave to the approver two
bags containing the peras and the luddoos, and separately gave the
bananas. He paid Rs. 150/- in cash and promised to pay the balance
on conclusion of the errand. · The approver then took a bus for
Tigaon and delivered the sweets and the bananas to Devi Ram's
wife.
Subsequently, when the approver asked for the balance of
the money, it was not paid to him, because Devi Ram survived
and the appellant went back on the contract on the ground that
success had not been achieved in his objective which was to commit
the murder of Devi Ram. On these facts disclosed by the approver
and the prosecution evidence
available,
the appellant was
prosecuted and has now been convicted and sentenced as
mentioned above.
The only point urged in this appeal before us by learned counsel
for the appellant was that the Sessions Judge as well as the High
Court did not apply the correct principles of law applicable
to appreciation of evidence of an approver. We find no force
in this submission, as the judgment of the High Court makes
it quite clear that there was full justification in this case
for upholding the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the
approver's evidence as corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
The High Court has held that the approver's statement with
regard to the poisoning of Devi Ram and his family is reliable and
doe~ not suffer from any improbabilities at all. It is true that that
Court did not accept the version of the approver in respect of earlier
attempt by him to commit the murder of Devi Ram by shooting
him with a pistol. Dealing with this part of the case; the High Court
Z46
SUPIU!MB COmT REPORTS
[1967] I S.C.R.
held that it was not very much impressed with this story, and it was
apparent that the only witness, Sri Ramdutt, Advocate, who appeared
in respect of this incident, could not be expected to support the version of the approver that the appellant had caught bold of four
cartridges from him and given them to the approver. It was also
noticed that that Advocate was acting as counsel for the appellant
in some criminal case which was pending aganist him for having
caused miscarriage. In these circumstances, the Court came to the
finding that the manner in which the pistol story had been related by
the approver did not
carry much conviction and, therefore,
it would not be safe to rely on the evidence relating to this episode
which should be left out of consideration. The High Court thus
did not choose to act on this evidence given by the approver mainly
on the ground that there was no corroboration and partly for the
reason that it appeared to the Court that the story was not very
convincing. The Court did not, however, come to any finding
that the story put forward by the approver was incorrect or false.
What the Court did was to act on the principle of valuing the evidence of an approver with caution and of not accepting it unless it
is corroborated at least in some material particulars. The fact that
the Court thus did not accept the evidence of the approver for this
part of the story does not mean that the Court held that the approver
was an ·unreliable or untruthful witness.
On the other hand, the view of that Court on appreciation of
the approver's own evidence is that he hru; given his statement with
regard to the entire manner in which the plot for poisoning was
carried out in such a manner that it is reliable and convincing.
Further, the Court found that his evidence was corroborated on
very material particulars.
First, there was corroboration provided by the entries in the
register of the dealer from whom the appellant purchased arsenic.
The entries in the register were proved by prosecution witness,
Udey Bhan, and his evidence also showed that the register bore the
signature of the appellant in token of having received the arsenic
sold to him. The appellant initially denied that the signatures on
the register were his, but, when later examined under s. 342, Criminal Procedure Code, be admitted that his signatures had been
obtained on a register and that register was this very register produced by the prosecution. He, of course, added that when his signature
was taken, the register was blank and no entries about sale of
poison bad been made.
"'.h~n he originall~ denied bis ~ignature,
the question arose of proVIdmg corroborat10n of the evidence of
Udey Bhan to strengthen the value o_f the entries in the_ register. by
obtaining evidence to prove that the signature on the regISter agamst
the entry was really made by the appellant. But, after the admission
of the appellant that the signature on that register had been obtained
A
B
c
I>
E
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
LAClilil RAM V. STATE (Bhargava, l.)
247
from him, ·it became unnecessary to bring further proof of the signature on the register. . In these circumstances, it cannot be held
that the High Court committed any error in holding that this register
provided good evidence to prove that arsenic poison was purchased
by the appellant from the dealer Uday Bhan.
The High Court found that two witnesses, Dal Chand and Jodha
Ram corroborated the sale of laddoos and
khoa to the
appellant. Thereafter, Sher Singh witness corroborated the statement of the approver that he boarded the bus and that Devi Ram's
house at the end of the bus journey was pointed out to him by Shet
Singh himself. Kamai! Singh and Giasi Ram, prosecution witnesses, also corroborated the approver's version of his journey by
bus. All. of them indentified the approver. · They happened to
remember the approver's travelling by bus because the approver
was a Sikh and yet he started smoking and had to be told by the
driver Kamai! Singh to throw away the cigarette. Thus, on very
material points of the version given by the approver there was
corroboration by prosecution witnesses who were all found by the
High Court to be reliable.
It is true that there were some portions of the story of the
approver for which no corroborative evidence was available. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that there was no corroboration of the fact that it was the appellant who mixed arsenic
poison in the khoa, nor was there any corroboration of the approver's statement that he himself handed over the sweets to Devi Ram's
wife. This submission ignores the natural sequence of events.
When the poison was mixed with the khoa, it could not be expected
that the appellant would ensure presence of other persons to see him
mixing the poison. Naturally, the poison was mixed at a time
when there was no one else present, except the appellant himself
and the approver who was his accomplice and whom the appellant
had hired for. the purpose of carrying out his scheme. At the later
stage, when the approver gave the sweets to Devi Ram's wife, no
corroborative evidence could be available, because Devi Ram's wife
died of the poisoning; and again, there is nothing to show that any
other person was present when the sweets were delivered by the
approver.
It was held by this Court in Sarwan Singh v. The State of Punjab (') that an approver's evidence to be accepted must satisfy two
tests. The .first test to be applied is that his evidence must show
that he is a reliable witness, and that is a test which is common
to all witnesses. The test obviously means that the Court should
find that there is nothing inherent or improbable in the evidence
given by the approver, and that there is no finding that the approver
has given false evidence. The second test which thereafter still
. (/)i1957) S.C.R. 953.
248
SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS
[1967} I S.C.R.
remains to be applied in the case of an approver, and which is not
A
always necessary when judging the evidence of other witnesses, is
that his evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. In the
present case. as we have pointed out above, the High Court has held
that the evidence of the approver was reliable and was corroborated
on material particulars by good prosecution witnesses who haTe
been believed by the Court.
We arc, therefore, unable to find any
B
error in the judgment of the High Court in upholding the conviction of the appcllar.!.
In the result. the appeal fails and is dismissed.
<i.C.
Appeal dism11.11'd