# LAJWANTI v. LAL CHAND AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 506
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-03-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 687 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lajwanti-v-lal-chand-and-ors-4439
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

East Punjab Factories (Control of DisnwntUng) Act 19411, s. 3Whether bars execution of delivecy of possession.
Execution of Decree-No appeal from earlier execution applicationFresh application, if barred by res judicata-S. 3 of East Punjab Factories
(Control of Dismantling) Act, if bars.
The eviction of the respondent from the appellant's premises, which
\\'38 used as a factory, was decreed and application for execution of an
order for p~ssession was made.
The respondents resisted the execution
on the plea that the machinery installed in the factory could not be removed without the prior permission of Chief Inspector Of Factories as
provided by the East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act. The
execution of the decree in so far as it involved the dismantling or removal
of the machinery was stayed, but the p0ssession of the other part of the
premises was allowed. Both parties appealed. The appellate Court took
the view that the machinery and spare parts were lying practically in all
the rooms, and the locking and sealing of the factclry would result in its
closure which would be against the provisions of the Act, and therefore
directed the appellant to pursue the matter with the State Government.
Thfa order dated April 22, 1953 was not challenged by any appeal. But
the appellant restarted th" execution proceedings in which it was held
that the State Government had refused permission for demolition of the
factory, so the file was ordered to be consigned to the record room. The
appOUant filed ~n appeal, which was dismissed, but in further revision the
High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955 observed that on the record
it wa:s not possible to decide whether the execution of the decree would
defeat the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, so it set aside the order and
directed the executing court to give decision on points that arose under
s. 3 of the Act, The executing court found that the provisions of the Act
did not prohibit the execution and as such the respondents were liable to
ejectment but since the application had become over a year Old it would
be struck off the file with liberty to make a fresh application. The respondents appealed.
The District Judge held that the Act did not apply
to involuntary dismant1ing of factories and that the issue raised by the
ex-ecuting court did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the
appOUant by the High Court in revision. The appellant's appeal to High
Court was dismissed by a Single Judge, and in the Letters Patent Appeal,
it \Vas held that the delivery of possession was not barred in execution
of decree by the Act, but the matter had become res judicala in conse~
quenee of the decisions in the first execution application and the decision
of the High Court dated July 13, 1955 in the second execution application. Allowing the appeal,
HELD : The Act does not bar the deJivery of possession in execution
of a decree. It makes no re1ference to any decree for possession against
the owner of a factory.
By ordering delivery of possession of the premises. the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a
factdry and a bailiff charged with execution of a warrant for possession
does not infringe the provision of law by rendering possession of the
proper!• to the decree·holder. [510 C-DJ
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LAJWANTI v. LAL CHAND (Mitter, J.)
507
There was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the
first application for execution. Further the High Court by its order dated
July 13, 1955, did not .decide the question as to whether the decree for
J>OSSCSSion would be inexecutable in. \iew of the Act. It stated expressly
that it \\o·as not possible for it t~ dcdde whether the execution of the decree 1,1,·ould defeat the provisions of the Act, and being unable to come
to a decision on the record it r·~manded the matter to the court of execu·
tion.
It found itself unable to interpret the section on the evidence
hefore it.
The proceedings subsequ

## Text

LAJWANTI
v.
LAL CHAND AND ORS.
March 22, 1968
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J
East Punjab Factories (Control of DisnwntUng) Act 19411, s. 3Whether bars execution of delivecy of possession.
Execution of Decree-No appeal from earlier execution applicationFresh application, if barred by res judicata-S. 3 of East Punjab Factories
(Control of Dismantling) Act, if bars.
The eviction of the respondent from the appellant's premises, which
\\'38 used as a factory, was decreed and application for execution of an
order for p~ssession was made.
The respondents resisted the execution
on the plea that the machinery installed in the factory could not be removed without the prior permission of Chief Inspector Of Factories as
provided by the East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act. The
execution of the decree in so far as it involved the dismantling or removal
of the machinery was stayed, but the p0ssession of the other part of the
premises was allowed. Both parties appealed. The appellate Court took
the view that the machinery and spare parts were lying practically in all
the rooms, and the locking and sealing of the factclry would result in its
closure which would be against the provisions of the Act, and therefore
directed the appellant to pursue the matter with the State Government.
Thfa order dated April 22, 1953 was not challenged by any appeal. But
the appellant restarted th" execution proceedings in which it was held
that the State Government had refused permission for demolition of the
factory, so the file was ordered to be consigned to the record room. The
appOUant filed ~n appeal, which was dismissed, but in further revision the
High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955 observed that on the record
it wa:s not possible to decide whether the execution of the decree would
defeat the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, so it set aside the order and
directed the executing court to give decision on points that arose under
s. 3 of the Act, The executing court found that the provisions of the Act
did not prohibit the execution and as such the respondents were liable to
ejectment but since the application had become over a year Old it would
be struck off the file with liberty to make a fresh application. The respondents appealed.
The District Judge held that the Act did not apply
to involuntary dismant1ing of factories and that the issue raised by the
ex-ecuting court did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the
appOUant by the High Court in revision. The appellant's appeal to High
Court was dismissed by a Single Judge, and in the Letters Patent Appeal,
it \Vas held that the delivery of possession was not barred in execution
of decree by the Act, but the matter had become res judicala in conse~
quenee of the decisions in the first execution application and the decision
of the High Court dated July 13, 1955 in the second execution application. Allowing the appeal,
HELD : The Act does not bar the deJivery of possession in execution
of a decree. It makes no re1ference to any decree for possession against
the owner of a factory.
By ordering delivery of possession of the premises. the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a
factdry and a bailiff charged with execution of a warrant for possession
does not infringe the provision of law by rendering possession of the
proper!• to the decree·holder. [510 C-DJ
8
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LAJWANTI v. LAL CHAND (Mitter, J.)
507
There was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the
first application for execution. Further the High Court by its order dated
July 13, 1955, did not .decide the question as to whether the decree for
J>OSSCSSion would be inexecutable in. \iew of the Act. It stated expressly
that it \\o·as not possible for it t~ dcdde whether the execution of the decree 1,1,·ould defeat the provisions of the Act, and being unable to come
to a decision on the record it r·~manded the matter to the court of execu·
tion.
It found itself unable to interpret the section on the evidence
hefore it.
The proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated
in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal a'rose.
The order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a ~eat on
the proceedinp, [510 F-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 687 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
October 3, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 405 of 1958.
C. B. Agarwa/a and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant.
S. N. Anand, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment
and order of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.
405 of 1956.
The matter arises out of an application for execution of an
order for possession passed on a compromise between the parties.
The Division Bench of the Punjab High Court felt itself unable. to
help the decree-holder because of an earlier decision in the execu·
tion proceedings which was held to constitute res judicata against
her. The main question for consideration is, whether it was right
in doing so.
The relevant facts are as follows. As far back as April 1950.
Harbans Lal, the late husband of the appeJlant before us, obtained
an order for eviction from the Rent Controller against Lal Chand
and Ram Rattan Dass Jain in respec't of certain premises which
were being used as a factory.
This decree was upheld in appeal
and in July 1951 the decree-holder applied for execution. The
court bailiff made a report dated the 14th July 1951 that on his
going to give delivery of possession resistance was offered by a
number of persons and being apprehensive of breach of peace he
could not effect delivery of possession.
The judgment debto1.s
appear to have approached the Department of Industries and
informed them of the attempt at their eviction by the decree-holder.
The copy of a letter from the Extra Assistant Director of Industries
to the Chief Inspector of Factories dated July 18, 1951 exhibited
at the instance of the judgment-debtors goes to show that the
machinery installed in the factory could not be removed without
7 Sup. C.J./68-8
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f
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
the prior permission of the Chief Inspector of Factories.
Obviously the judgment-debtors wanted to thwart the decree-holder
from getting possession through court by invoking the aid of the
East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act XX of 1948.
hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The judgment-debtors applied
for stay of execution of the decree on August 23, 1951. The Subordinate Judge issued notices but did not grant stay. On appeal
the District Judge accepted the appeal noting th.at the Subordinate
Judge had not given any finding about the applicability of the
Act.
He had before him the report of the bailiff that possession
of the premises could not be given over as there were machinery
stored therein .. By order dated October 11, 1951 he directed the
Subordinate Judge to decide the objections under the Act.
The ,Subordinat~ Judge framed a number of issues including
one which read : 'whether the judgment-debtors could not be
dispossessed of the factory and machinery could not be dismantled
without permission of the Government ?" Taking evidence of the
parties and noting the contents of the letter of the Industries Department, ·he observed that the judgment-debtors had not secured
permission but the decree-holder might follow up the matter
through court. He stayed execution of 'the decree in so far as it
involved the dismantling or removal of the machinery but allowed
the same for securing possession of the part of the premises where
no machinery was stored. This was on 7th February, 1953.
Both parties filed ·appeals from this order which were dismissed. The appellate court was of the view that machinery and spare
parts were lying practically in all the rooms of the building and
the locking and sealing of the factory would res11lt in its closure
which would go against the provisions of the above-mentioned Act.
The decree-holder was therefore directed to pursue the matter with
the State Government.
Incidentally, the court noted that the
decree-holder bad not challenged the proposition that the court
could not order delivery of possession without the requisite sanction for the dimantling of the factory.
This order dated 22nd
April 1953 was not challenged by any appeal to the Higb Court.
It appears that the court consigned the execution proceedings to
the record room on July 25, 1953.
On Augu~t 18, 1953 the decree-holder applied for execution
proceedings being re-started. On November 7, 1953 the executing
court observed that a reply from the State Government had been
received to the effect that permissi<m for demolition of the factory
could not be given. The execution fi!e·was therefore ordered to
be consigned to the record room once more. From this order.
an appeal was preferred by the decree,holder.
The Additional
District Judge held that in view of the imperative provisions of
section 3 of the Act the decree-holder could not be granted possesA
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LAJWANTI '" LAL CHAND (Mitter, J.)
509
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sion in execution of the decree and dismissed the appeal by order
dated January 8, 1954. On further appeal, a learned Judge of the
High Court by order dated July 13, 1955 observed that in the
&ecution proceedings BO evidence had been adduced on
~e
points arising under Punjab Act XX of 1948. He therefore said
as follows :
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"On the present record it is not possible for me to
decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat
the provisions of section 3 of the Punjab Act XX of
1948. That being the position of matters, I set aside
the order passed by the Subordinate courts and direct
the. court of execution to give fresh decision on the
points that arise under section 3 of Punjab Act XX of
1948.
ln proceedings pursuant to this order parties will be
given opportunity to examine bearing on the points that
arise under section 3 of Punjab Act XX of 1948."
On remand the Subordinate Judge by order dated 30th December, 1955 held that the Act was not intended to cover involuntary dismantling in execution of orders of competent courts :
further the Rent Restriction Act, 1949 passed after Act XX of
1948 did not take any notice of the prohibition contained in the
said Act.
In the result he found that the respondent was liable
to be ejected in e"x.ecution of the decree for eviction but as the
application had become over a year old it would be struck off the
file and the decree-holder be at liberty to take out execution of
the decree by a fresh application.
·
The judgment-debtors went up in appeal to the court of the
District Judge.
The District Judge by order dated December 31,
1956 held that the Act did not apply to involuntary dismantling
F
of factories and that the issue raised by the Subordinate Judge
in this connection did not arise but in fact it had been decided
against the landlord by the High Court in Revision. According
to him, the order of the High Court went to show that s. 3 of
Act XX of 1948 covered delivery of possession even in execution
of the order of the Rent Controller for otherwise the revision
G
application would have been accepted by him straightaway. In
the result he dismissed the execution petition.
The appellant went up in Second Appeal to the High Court
at Chandigarh. A single Judge of that Court dismissed the
appeal.
The decree-holder filed a Letters Patent Appeal.
Although of the view that delivery of possession was not barred in
ff execution of the decree by Act XX of 1948, the Division Bench
concluded that so far as the parties before it were concerned,
the matter had become res judicata in consequence of the decisions of the executing court and the first appellate court on the
510
SUPREME COURT RiPOllTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
firs! .execution appli.cation ~
th~ decision of a sinJ!!e Judge in
A
~on on the preV1ous occas10n m 'the second execution application.
Section 3 sul>-s. (1) of East Punjab Act XX of 1948 pro
vides as follows :
"No person shall, without the written permission of
the State Government or of· an officer. authorised in this
behalf by the State Government, dismantle any factory
or remove from a factory any spare parts kept for
maintaining the machinery of the factory in order."
The Act which oontains only eight sections makes no ref~
to any decree for possession against the owner of a factory. By ordering delivery of possession of the premises the executing court
does not make an order for dismantling a factory and a baililf
charged with execution of a wammt for possesswn docs not
infringe the above provision of law by rendering possession of
the property to the decree-holder. So far as the judgment-del>-
tor, the owner of the tactory, ~ concerned, it wQuld be his look
out to take the matter up with the State Government, if necessary
and we have no doubt ~at in a case like this where there is no
oo,llusion between the decree-holder and· the judgment-debtors the
State Government would not prosecute the judgmellt-debtors or
refuse to accord sanction to the judgment-debtors for removal of
the machinery from the premises of which they could not lawfully
c<intinue in possession.
It appears that the Subordinate Judge; the District Judge and.
the Judges of the Punjab High Court were all of the view that
the. Act did not bar the delivery of possession in execution of a
decree.
Iii our opinion there was no final order about the inexeclltability of the decree on the first application for execution which
was consigned to the record room by order dated July 25, 1953.
·Further, the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Punjab
High Court dated July 13, 1955 did not decide the question as to
whether the decree for possession would be inexecutable in view
of Act XX of 1948. He stated expressly that it was ndt possible
for him to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat
.the provisions of s. 3 of Punjab Act XX of 1948 and being unable
to come to a decision on the record he remanded the matter to the
court of execution. He found himself unable to interpret the section on the evidence before him. The proceedings subsequent to
the remand order culminated in the order of the Division Bench
from which the present appeal arises. The order dated July 13,
1955 was not a final order which put a seal on the proceedings.
The course of litigation subsequent to the order for eviction
in 1950 is truly amazing.
For 17 years the decree-holder has
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LAJWANTI v. LAL CHAND (Mitter, J.)
511
been unable to reap the fruits of the decree although practically
all the courts felt that the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid
by the judgment-debtors to resist execution by delivery of possession.
We cannot but condemn in very strong terms the attitude
of the judgment-debtors who, to say the least, are persons who
have little regard for sanctity of their own solemn promise made
before a court of law. On June 29, 1950 in Miscellaneous Civil
Appeal No. 39 of 1950 they stated on oath that they had reached
an agreement with the landlord that they would "remain on the
premises only up till 31st March 1951 when they would of their
own accord vacate the premises" and on their failure to do so the
landlord would be entitled to take out execution against them.
Even before the time to vacate the premises came, one of the
judgment-debtors filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restmin the decree-holder from obtaining possession in terms of the
consent order of 29th June 1950. The suit was dismissed on
July 11, 1951. The judgment-debtors also lost the appeal filed
against that dismissal.
At every step and turn for nearly twe
decades they have successfully resisted delivery of possession by
raising an illusory plea.
Learned counsel for the respondents argued that even now
his clients can urge the plea that the decree was not executable
because of the provisions of Act XX of 1948. According to him,
the agreement was in contravention of a statute and the respondents could not be estopped from pleading or proving facts which
would render the agreement void.
His case was that Act XX
of 1948 being in force on June 29, 1950 any agreement arrived
at between the parties in contravention of its provisions would not
be binding on the parties. No exception can be taken to the
broad proposition of Jaw but no question of estoppel ever arose
in this case because Act XX of 1948 did not operate as a bar to
the delivery of possession of premises in execution of a decree.
In the result, the appeal is a!lowed with costs throughout from
the 18th August 1953 irrespective of any order in that behalf
made at any time thereafter.
It is. unfortunate that the decreeholder has been kept out of possession so long; but she is partly
responsible for it herself. If she had preferred an appeal from
~
order of the District Judge passed on 22nd April, 1953 to the
High Court, probably her troubles would have ended Jong ago.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.