# LAKHMI CHAND KHEMANI v. SMT. KAURAN DEVI Navember 5, 1965

- **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 544
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-05-12
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 641 of 1965
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, J. R. Mudholkar, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lakhmi-chand-khemani-v-smt-kauran-devi-navember-5-1965-3626
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Tenant defined in
~. 2(1)-Person
against wh!l.n decree cannot be executed owing to the provisions oj s. 19
of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 whether remains 'tenan( under Rent Control Act--Suit for declaration of such person
as trespasser whether barred by s. 50 of the Rent Act.
The appellant was the tenant of a building in Delhi of which M was
the owner. M filed a suit and secured a decree for the ejectment of the
appellant.
While an appeal from that decree which was dismissed was
pending the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 came
into force in Delhi and was made applicable to the area in question.
Under s. 19 of the Act no landlord could execute his decree for cjectment against a tenant without the permission of the competent authority.
Such permission was refused to M and his decree remained unexecuted.
He therefore sold the building to the respondent who filed another suit
against the appellant for his ejectment on the ground that he, was a trespasser in view of the ejectment decree in favour of M.
The appellant
pleaded in defence that despite M's decree against him he remained a
tenant within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
and therefore under s. 50 of the Act no suit in a civil court would lie
against him. The trial court accepted his contention but the High Court
rejected it. With special leave he appealed to this Court.
The questions for consideration were (I) whether in view of the
provisions of s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act the appellant was a 'tenant' to
whom the protection of s. 50 the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was
available, and (2) whether the power given to the Controller under the
Rent Control Act barred the filing of the suit in the civil court.
HELD: (i) There is notlling in s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act to
warrant the view that a tenant within the meaning of s. 2(1) ·of the
Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 would include a tenant against whom a
decree in ejectrnent has been passed. Section 19 only says that a person
who has obtained a decree in ejectment cannot execute it without the
pre\;ous permission of the prescribed authority.
The section does not
define the word 'tenant' in any way and is not concerned with the question
whether tenants suffering a decree in ejectment still continue to be such
tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act. The Rent Act was passed
after the Slum Areas Act and when it excluded from the definition of
'tenant' one against whom a decree in ejectment had been passed it did
not obviously contemplate that the provision of the Slum Areas Act would
affect the definition of 'tenant' in it in any way. Section 2(1) of the<Act
of 1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannot be affected hv any
consideration derived from s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act.
[550 C-E, G;
551 Al
(ii) Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 bars the jurisdiction
of a civil court to try a suit for the eviction of a tenant, that is to say.
a tenant defined in s. 2( 1) of the Act. It would not bar a suit against
a person who is not a tenant as so defined. Under the ordinary law aoplicable to landlords and tenants a tenant who has suffered an ejectmcnt decree
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
-'h
•
•
I
LAKHMI CHAND v. KAURAN DEVI (Sarkar, J.)
545
A
is not considered a tenant any more; he has after the decree none of the
rights which as a tenant he earCer possessed. [549 H; 550 A]
B
c
D
E
Therefore after M's decree against him the appellant ceased to be a
'tenant' within the meaning of s. 2( 1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
and could not claim the protection of s. 50 of the Act. [549 G]
Jyoti Pershad v. The Administration for the Union Territory of Delhi,
[1962) 2 S.C.R. 125, held inapplicable.
(iii) The Controller under s. 42 of the Rent Act, has power to execute
orders made under the Act including orders of eviction.
Owing to the
provision in s. 50 that no civil court shall entertain a suit in any proceeding in so far as it rela

## Text

544
LAKHMI CHAND KHEMANI
v.
SMT. KAURAN DEVI
Navember 5, 1965
[A. K. SARKAR, J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Tenant defined in
~. 2(1)-Person
against wh!l.n decree cannot be executed owing to the provisions oj s. 19
of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 whether remains 'tenan( under Rent Control Act--Suit for declaration of such person
as trespasser whether barred by s. 50 of the Rent Act.
The appellant was the tenant of a building in Delhi of which M was
the owner. M filed a suit and secured a decree for the ejectment of the
appellant.
While an appeal from that decree which was dismissed was
pending the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 came
into force in Delhi and was made applicable to the area in question.
Under s. 19 of the Act no landlord could execute his decree for cjectment against a tenant without the permission of the competent authority.
Such permission was refused to M and his decree remained unexecuted.
He therefore sold the building to the respondent who filed another suit
against the appellant for his ejectment on the ground that he, was a trespasser in view of the ejectment decree in favour of M.
The appellant
pleaded in defence that despite M's decree against him he remained a
tenant within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
and therefore under s. 50 of the Act no suit in a civil court would lie
against him. The trial court accepted his contention but the High Court
rejected it. With special leave he appealed to this Court.
The questions for consideration were (I) whether in view of the
provisions of s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act the appellant was a 'tenant' to
whom the protection of s. 50 the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was
available, and (2) whether the power given to the Controller under the
Rent Control Act barred the filing of the suit in the civil court.
HELD: (i) There is notlling in s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act to
warrant the view that a tenant within the meaning of s. 2(1) ·of the
Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 would include a tenant against whom a
decree in ejectrnent has been passed. Section 19 only says that a person
who has obtained a decree in ejectment cannot execute it without the
pre\;ous permission of the prescribed authority.
The section does not
define the word 'tenant' in any way and is not concerned with the question
whether tenants suffering a decree in ejectment still continue to be such
tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act. The Rent Act was passed
after the Slum Areas Act and when it excluded from the definition of
'tenant' one against whom a decree in ejectment had been passed it did
not obviously contemplate that the provision of the Slum Areas Act would
affect the definition of 'tenant' in it in any way. Section 2(1) of the<Act
of 1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannot be affected hv any
consideration derived from s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act.
[550 C-E, G;
551 Al
(ii) Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 bars the jurisdiction
of a civil court to try a suit for the eviction of a tenant, that is to say.
a tenant defined in s. 2( 1) of the Act. It would not bar a suit against
a person who is not a tenant as so defined. Under the ordinary law aoplicable to landlords and tenants a tenant who has suffered an ejectmcnt decree
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
-'h
•
•
I
LAKHMI CHAND v. KAURAN DEVI (Sarkar, J.)
545
A
is not considered a tenant any more; he has after the decree none of the
rights which as a tenant he earCer possessed. [549 H; 550 A]
B
c
D
E
Therefore after M's decree against him the appellant ceased to be a
'tenant' within the meaning of s. 2( 1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
and could not claim the protection of s. 50 of the Act. [549 G]
Jyoti Pershad v. The Administration for the Union Territory of Delhi,
[1962) 2 S.C.R. 125, held inapplicable.
(iii) The Controller under s. 42 of the Rent Act, has power to execute
orders made under the Act including orders of eviction.
Owing to the
provision in s. 50 that no civil court shall entertain a suit in any proceeding in so far as it relates to any matter which the Controller is empowered
to decide, the civil court is barred from executing an order for e\iction.
However in the present case the trial court was not asked to execute any
decree for eviction.. It was asked to decide whether the appellant was a
trespasser and so liable to eviction.
It does not follow that because a
civil court cannot execute a decree for eviction passed by a Controller, it
cannot also decide the question whether a tenant against whom such an
order has been passed has ceased to be a tenant and become a trespasser. [552
A-CJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 641 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
May 12, 1964 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi
in Regular First Appeal No. 209-D of 1962.
C. B. Agarwala and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, Ravinder Narain, for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sarkar, J. This appeal was filed with special leave of this Court
granted on August 14, 1964.
Various interesting questions of
law were sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant but in our
F
view they do not arise at this stage. The appeal must be confined
to the points decided in the courts below.
The case appears to us to be somewhat out of the ordinary.
One Mehtab Singh was the owner of a certain building known as
Akbar Building, situate in Mohalla Ganda Nala,
Gali Rajan,
Delhi. The appellant was a tenant under him in respect of certain
G accommodation in the building. On June 3, 1955, Mehtab Singh
filed a suit under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952
against the appellant for his ejectment. On October 11, 1956 that
suit was decreed. The appellant filed an appeal against that decree
which, however, was dismissed on March 27, 1957. He thereafter moved the High Court of Punjab in revision but here also he
H was unsuccessful. The precise date of the dismissal of the application in revision does not appear on the record but it was sometime
between March and September 1957 .
546
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R
On February 8, 1957 an Act called the Slum Areas (ImproveA
ment and Clearance) Act, 1956 came into force in Delhi. By a
notification issued unckr s. 3 of this Act, the area in which the
building with whic.h we are concerned was situate, was declared a
slum area for the purposes of the Act which meant that the buildings in that area were unfit for human habitation or that for
various reasons they were detrimental to safety, health or morals
B
of human beings.
The date of this notification does not appear
from the record but it is not in dispute that it was issued before
September 1957.
Sub-section (1) of s. 19 of this Act which is the provision on
which the appellant's case is principally based, is in these terms :
S. 19(1)-"Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, no person
who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction
of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be
entitled to execute such decree, or order except with
the previous permission in writing of the
competent
authority''.
c
D
When after the dismissal of the revision petition against the
ejectment decree Mehtab Singh sought to execute the decree, he
was faced with the difficulty created by this provision. He thereupon applied to the specified authority for permission to execute E
the decree but this was refused on September 12, 1957. He
....
appealed to the appellate authority mentioned in that Act but
,,
that appeal was rejected on January 7, 1958.
'"f'
Being thus baffled in his attempts to get possession of the
accommodation occupied by the appellant, in execution of the F
ejectment decree, Mehtab Singh sold the building to the respondent on August 21, 1961. On or about March 28, 1962, the
respondent filed a suit against the appellant for possession of the
rooms in the latter's occupation. This suit was filed in the Court
of a Sub-Judge of Delhi which was an ordinary civil Court. The
r~spondent stated in the plaint that she had purchased the property from the previous owner Mehtab Singh who had obtained
an ejectment decree against the appellant on October 11, 1956
and that in view of that decree the appellant's possession of the
rooms was unauthorised and he was a trespasser. The respondent based her claim to recover possession of the rooms from
the appellant on the aforesaid ground, namely, that he was a trespasser. In defence the appellant contended that s. 19 of the Slum
Areas Act barred the suit and also that no civil court had jurisG
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I
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LAKHMI CHAND v. KAURAN DEVI (Sarkar, J.)
547
A diction to entertain it in view of s. 50 of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 which had come into force on February 19,
1959
repealing the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 in so far
as that Act applied to Delhi, as he continued to be a tenant of
the rooms in spite of the decree in favour of Mehtab Singh of
B
October 11, 1956.
The learned Subordinate Judge hearing the suit framed the
following five issues :-
( 1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the premises in suit ?
c
(2) Whether the defendant is in unauthorised occu,
pation of the premises in dispute and is not a
tenant in the same ?
(3) Whether the suit is barred under Section 19 of
the Slum Area (Clearance & Improvement)
D
Act, 1956?
( 4) Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try
this suit ?
(5) Relief.
E On the first issue he held that the respondent had proved her
ownership of the premises and this finding has not been challenged in any subsequent proceeding. He decided issues Nos. 2 and 3
together and held that the real question involved in them was
whether the appellant was a tenant.
He observed that s. 2 (I )
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 no doubt provided that a
F tenant for the purpose of the Act would 'not include any person
against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made"
but he held that the words "order or decree for eviction" in the
provision meant an executable decree or order. He then said
that as the prescribed authority under the Slum Areas Act had
refused permission to Mehtab Singh to execute his decree in
G ejectment, that decree was not an executable decree and, therefore, it could not be said that the appellant was not a tenant
although a decre.~ for eviction had been passed against him. In
this view of the matter he held that the appellant must be deemed
to have continued to be a tenant under Mehtab Singh and the respondent who was a transferee from Mehtab Singh had no better
H
rights in the properties than what Mehtab Singh had. Apparently,
the learned Subordinate Judge held that after the respondent purchased the property, the appellant had become her tenant. He
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
observed that if the contention of the respondent that the appelA
!ant had ceased to be a tenant as a result of the decree was
accepted, s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act would be rendered nugatory.
He was not prepared to accept a view which led to such
a result.
As it was not in dispute that if the appellant was a
tenant he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of s. 50
of the Act of 1958, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the
B
suit for want of jurisdiction and decided issues Nos. 4 and
5
accordingly.
The respondent appealed against this judgment to the High
Court of Punjab. The High Court expressed the view that the
words which we have quoted from the dennition of "tenant" in c
s. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 applied even though the decree in
ejectment had ceased to be executable as of right in view of the
provision of s. 19 , of the Slum Areas Act. It held that s. 50 of
the Act of 1958 which barred the jurisdiction of a civil court to
entertain suits for ejectment against "tenants" did not take away
the learned Subordinate Judge's jurisdiction to try the responD
dent's suit, for the appellant was no longer a tenant after the
decree of October 11, 1956 directing his eviction. It appears
also to have been argued before the learned Judges of the High
Court that when an order in ejectment had once been made
against a tenant, another order could not be passed against him
irrespective of whether the earlier order was made inexecutable E
by a statute or not. Dealing with this argument, Dua J. who
delivered the judgment of the Court, observed, "This broad proposition, in my opinion, may not always hold good, but, in any
event, the institution of the suit and the jurisdiction of the civil
court to try the same can scarcely be held barred on this ground.
F
Whether or not to pass a decree or order for eviction on the ground
that such an order had already been passed, may have to be determined on the merits of the. particular controversy on its own cir~
cumstances, the question scarcely, afiects the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain and try the suit.'' The High Court concluded
by saying, "For the reasons foregoing, we are clearly of the view
G
that the order of the Court below is erroneous and allowing the
appeal we set aside the judgment and decree of the learned subordinate Judge and remit the case back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with Jaw, in the light of the observations made above."
It would thus appear that the only point which the High Court H
decided was whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to try
the suit.
It refused to go into the question whether on the merits
'
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LAKHMI CHAND v. KAURAN DEVI (Sarkar, J.)
549
A the suit would succeed and remitted the case back to the Subordinate Judge apparently because he had not consiilered those merits,
that is to say, whether in view of the earlier ejectment decree a
fresh ejectment decree could be passed. It is clear from what we
have said about the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge
that he had not in fact gone into the merits of· the case and had
B only held that in view of s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act he had no
jurisdiction to encertain the suit as the
appellant
rema.jned a
'tenant' within the meaning of that word in the Act of 1958 notwithstanding the decree in ejectment against him.
C
In this appeal the only question that we have to consider is
whether the High Court was right in passing the order remanding
the case to the learned Subordinate Judge for trial on the merits.
That would depend on whether the High Court was right in its
view that notwithstanding s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act rendering
the decree against him inexecutable, the appellant ceased to be a
D tenant within the meaning of the Act of 1958 because of that
decree. Before proceeding to discuss the question, we think it
proper to observe that if the High Court was right in its view
about the appellant ceasing to be a tenant, it was fully justified in
passing the order of remand. It was not called upon to decide
whether the suit might succeed on the merits. That question had
E not been decided by the learned Subordinate Judge and it did not
strictly arise in the appeal before the High Court. The High
Court was certainly entitled to the views of the learned Subordinate
Judge on it.
We are unable to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge
F that a tenant remained a tenant in spite of the definition in s. 2 (I)
of the Act of 1958 and notwithstanding a decree in ejectment
earlier passed against him, because, in view of the refusal of the
authority concerned to grant sanction to execute the decree under
s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act, that decree was for the moment inexecutable.
The Act of 1958 quite clearly excluded from
the
G definition of "tenant" a person against whom any order or decree
for eviction had been made, that is to say. under it a tenant who
had suffered a decree in ejectment was no more a tenant. Section
50 of this Act says, "No Civil Court shall entertain any snit or
proceeding in so far as it relates ...... to eviction of any tenant
under s. 14". Section 14 provides for an order in ejectment being
H made by the Controller appointed under the Act on any of the
grounds mentioned in it but not otherwise. Section 50, therefore,
bars the jurisdiction of a civil court to try a suit for the eviction of
Sup:::I/66---1
550
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R
a tenant, that is to say, a tenant as defined in the Act. It would
not bar a suit for eviction against a person who is not a tenant as
so defined.
Under the ordinary law applicable to landlords and
tenants, a tenant who has suffered an ejectment decree is not considered a tenant any more; he has after the decree none of the
rights which as tenant he earlier possessed.
We find no justification for changing the definition of tenant
in the Act of 1958 by drawing upon the provisions of the Slum
Areas Act as the learned Subordinate Judge did. The last mentioned Act is not concerned with relations between landlords and
tenants as such; it does not purport to interfere directly with the
ordinary contractual rights of landlords and tenants either as to
re:it or as to recovery of possession. However, that may be, we
find nothing in s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act to which alone we
were referred by learned counsel for the appellant for tlie purpme,
lo warrant the view suggested that a tenant within the Act of 1958
would include a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has
been passed. Section 19 only says that a person who has obtainA
B
c
D
ed a decree in ejectment against a tenant shall not be entitled to
execute it without the previous permission of the
prescribed
authority. It does not say that a tenant suffering the decree still
continues to be a tenant for any purpose. The section does not
purport to define the word 'tenant' in any way. It assumes that E
a decree for eviction has been passed against a tenant. The expression "decree or order for the· eviction of a tenant" in s. 19
necessarily -contemplates a person who was prior to the decree a
tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act of 1958 or any of its
predecessors. The section is not in any way concerned with the
question whether the tenants suffering a decree in ejectment still F
continue to be such tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act.
It is of some importance to point out in this connection that the
Slum Areas Act making ejectment decrees against tenants inexecutable without the requisite permission came into existence before
the Act of 1958.
It is pertinent to observe that notwithstanding
this, the latter Act excluded from the definition of "tenant" one
who had suffered an ejectment decree.
Obviously, the Act of
1958 did not contemplate that the Slum Area's Act would in any
way affect the definition of tenant contained in it.
No question
as to what the rights of-a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed in view of s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act are,
arises in this appeal, the only point being whether he is a tenant
within the Act of 1958 so as to oust the jurisdiction of a civil court
to entertain the suit. We think he is not, for s. 2(1) of the Act
G
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1,AKHM! CHAND v. KAURAN DEVI (Sarkar, !.)
55.l
A of 1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannot be affected
by any consideration derived from s. 19 of the Slum Areas Act.
We iuay now refer to Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for
the Union Territory of Delhi(') to which our attention was drawn.
That case is, in our view, of no assistance. It deals with the contenB lion whether the Slum Areas Act was unconst.tutional as it aftected fundamental rights of landlords.
That is not a question that
arises in this appeal. This Court in its judgment no doubt stated
that to buildings in slum areas both the Slum Areas Act
and the Act of 1958 would apply and also that the former
Act afforded some protection to tenants against eviction.
c As we have earlier stated, we are not concerned in this appeal
with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas
Act to tenants, nor as to the result of the application of both the
Acts to a particular case. This Court did not say that the result of
applying both the Acts to a case was to make part of the definition
of "tenant" in the Act of 1958 nugatory; that was not a question
D that arose. All that the Court said was that a tenant was entitled
to all such benefits as each Act independently conferred on him.
Again, when the judgment stated that the Slum Areas Act protected tenants, it did not purport to define the word "tenant" for !he
purpo'e of the Acts. This Court certainly did not say that notwithstanding the definition ins. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 a person
E would remain a tenant within the meaning of tha~ Act in 'Pile of
the order of eviction. That question did not arise for decision.
This case does not help the appellant at all.
It was then pointed out that s. 50 of the Act of 1958 also
provided that "no civil court shall entertain ....... : any proceedF ing in so far as it relates ........ to any ...... matter which the
Controller is empowered by or u'nder this Act to decide ...... "
It was said that s. 25 of that Act provided that when an order has
been made by the Controller for recovery of possession of premises from a tenant, he will give vacant possession of the premises
to the landlord by removing all persons in possession thereof. It was
G
contended that in view of these two provisions the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the relpondent's suit.
This argument seems to us to proceed on a misapprehension. First,
we do not think that the argument correctly states the effect of s. 25.
ft seems to us that all that the section does is to state who shall be
bound by an order of eviction passed by the Controller and how
H
effect shall be given to it. It is unnecessary, however, to express
a final opinion on the effect of s. 25, for, in any event, clearly
(!) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125.
.,
552
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
s. 42 of the Act provides that the Controller shall have power to
A
execute orders made under the Act. If the Controller has the power
to execute orders made under the Act including orders for eviction
-and that is all that learned counsel for the appellant now con·
tends-all that will happen in view of that part of s. 50 of the
Act of 1958 on which reliance is now placed is that a civil court
will not be able to execute an order for eviction.
This however
B
has nothing to do with the point before us. The learned Subordi·
nate Judge was not asked to execute any decree for eviction. He
was asked to decide whether the appellant was a trespasser and so
liable to eviction. It does not follow that because a civil court
cannot execute a decree for eviction passed by the Controller, it
cannot also decide the question whether a tenant against whom
C
such an order has been passed has ceased to be a tenant and become
a trespasser. The present contention, therefore, must be rejected.
We are told that after the High Court had passed its order of
May 12, 1964 remanding the case to the Subordinate Judge for.
trial on the merits, the Subordinate Judge heard the suit and pass·
D
ed a decree in favour of the respondent on August 12, 1964. This,
if correct, must have happened because no order for stay of the
proceedings pursuant to the order of remand had been obtained
from the High-Court. A plain copy of the judgment of the learn·
ed Subordinate Judge of August 12, 1964 was handed over to us by
learned counsel for the appellant and from that it appears that he E
thought that since the High Court had held that the appellant was
not a tenant within tb.e meaning of the Act of 1958 after the decree
in ejectment of October 11, 1956, it must be held that the respondent's contention that the appellant's possession of the rooms was
unauthorised was correct. It is for this reason that the learned
Subordinate Judge appears to have passed his decree for eviction
F
of the appellant of August 12, 1964. We wish, however, to
observe that we are not aware that the copy of the judgment is a
correct copy.
We have referred to it only to say that even if
correct, it doe~ not affect the question which we have to decide.
We are also informed that the appellant has· filed an appeal in the
High Court from this judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge G
and that appeal is pending. It will be for the High Court now to
decide the correctness of the decree of the learned Subordinate
Judge of August 12, 1964 and it is not right that we should express any opinion on that question and we do not so.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and it is dismissH
ed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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>