# Lakshmi JVarain v. First Atldit~nal Distlict Jutlt'" Allahabad - **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lakshmi-jvarain-v-first-atldit-nal-distlict-jutlt-allahabad-2913 - **Pages:** 105 ## Headnote 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS 371 and the order of the High Court transferring the appeal to the District .Judge or the Additional District Judge is set aside. It is directed that the appeal be heard by the High Court itself, in the absence of any law to the contrary. There will be no order as to costs throughout, as the ·main respondent in this Court and below was a Court itsclC and ordinarily no costs are granted against a Court. Appeal r&/lowed. STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. UNION OF INDIA (B. P. SINHA, c. ]., .JAFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAo; J. C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MuDHOL_KAR, JJ.) Land, Acqni.ring Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, l9j7, is not u/fra vires the powers of Parliament and is valid. Under Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to 1he Constitution, Parliament is competent to make a law for the acquisition for the p1operty of a State. The Constitution of India is not truly Federal in character. The basis of distribution of powers between the Union and States is that only those powers \Vhich are concerned with the regulation of local proble·m arc vested in the States and the residue specially those which tend to maintain the economic, industrial and com.m'!rcial unity of the <:ountry are left to the Union. It is not correct to say that ful1 sovereignty is vested in the States. Parliament which is competent to destory a State cannot be held, on the tl1"ory of absolute sovereignty of the States, to be incompetent to acquire by legislation the property owned by the States. Even if the Comtitution were held to be a Federation and the States regarded qua the Union as sovereign, the power of the Union to legislate in respect of the property situate in the States would remain unrestrictcring Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, l9j7, is not u/fra vires the powers of Parliament and is valid. Under Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to 1he Constitution, Parliament is competent to make a law for the acquisition for the p1operty of a State. The Constitution of India is not truly Federal in character. The basis of distribution of powers between the Union and States is that only those powers \Vhich are concerned with the regulation of local proble·m arc vested in the States and the residue specially those which tend to maintain the economic, industrial and com.m'!rcial unity of the <:ountry are left to the Union. It is not correct to say that ful1 sovereignty is vested in the States. Parliament which is competent to destory a State cannot be held, on the tl1"ory of absolute sovereignty of the States, to be incompetent to acquire by legislation the property owned by the States. Even if the Comtitution were held to be a Federation and the States regarded qua the Union as sovereign, the power of the Union to legislate in respect of the property situate in the States would remain unrestrictcntain any prohibition a~ainst the transfer of property of the States and if th• property is capable of being transferred by the State it is capable of being acquired. Under s. 127 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Government could require the Province to acquire land i s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 373 on behalf of tbe Federation if it was private land and to transfer it to the Federation if it was land belonging to the Province, and the Provincial Government had no option but to comply with the direction. It was not considered an infraction of Provincial autonomy to vest such a power in the Central Government. Absence of a similar provision in the present Constitution made no difference. Under the Government of India Act the power to compulsorily acqufre property was exclusively vested in the Provinces but under the Constitution the Union also has that power. If the other provisions of the Constitution in terms of sufficient amplitude confer power for makin!( laws for acquiring State property, the power cannot be defeated because the express power to acquire property generally does not specifically and in terms refer to State property. Power to acquire and requisition property can be exercised, COIU:urrently by the Union and the States but on that account there c~n be no conflict in the exercise of the power as such a conflict is prevented by Arts. 31 (3) and 254. Under the Constitution fundamental rights can be claimed not only by individuals and corporations but in some cases by the State also. Property vested in the States may not be acquired under a law made under Entry 42, List III, unless the law complies with the requirements of Art. 31. The rule that the State is not bound, unless it is expressly named or by necessary implication _in a statute is one of interpretation. In interpreting a constitutional document provisions conferring legislative power rr.tust normally be inter ... preted liberally and in their widest amplitude. There is no indication in the Constitution that the word Hproperty" in Entry 42 of List III is to be understood in any restricted sense; it must accordingly be held to include property belonging to the States also. Per Subba Rao, J.-The. impugned Act in so far as it confers a power on the Union to acquire lands owned by the States, including coal mines and coal bearing lands is ultra viru. Under the Constitution of India the political sovereignty is divided between the constitutional entities that is, the Union and the States, who are juristic pe~sOnalities possessing properties and functioning through the instrumentalities created by the Constitution. The Indian Comtitution accepts the federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers between the coordinate constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the 1962 State of We.st IJ1ngal v. Union Df India 1962 Sl411 of W111 Dett_tal .. l..inian of !Niio :i74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. States. This concept implies that one cannot encroach upon the governmental functions or instrumenta)itie.o of the other unless the Constitution provides for such interference. The lc~slative fields allotted to the units cover subjects for legislation and they do not deal with the relationship between the coordinate units iunctioning in their allotted fields. This is regulated hy other provisions of the Constitution and their is no provision which enables one unit to take away the property of another except by agreement. The power to acquire the property of a citizen for a public purpose is one of the implied powers of the sovereign. Under the Indian Constitution that sovereign power is divided between the Union and the States. It is implicit in the power of . acquisition by a sovereign that it must relate only to property of the governed. for a sovereign cannot acquire its own property. It is also implicit in the concept of acquisition and requisition that they shall be for public purpose on payment of compensation. The \VOrd "person" in Art. 31 does not include "Sl.ltc 11 ; if Entry 42 were to empower Parliament to acquire thr.. property of. a State, the State would not have the protection of Art. 31 which is available to all other persons. Therefore, Entry 42 List III docs not authorise either Parliament or a State Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of the property of the other. Nor do the residuary Art. 248 and Entry 97 List I confer any power cm Parliament to acquire the property of a State. The residuary legislative field cannot possibly cover inter-State relation, for that matter is not distributed between the Union and the States by way of legislative Lists. When a specific provision is made for acquisition of property, it would be incongraous to confine that Entry to properties other than those of the States and to resort to the residuary power for acquiring the property of the States. Further the anomaly of the Union acquiring the property of the States without compensation would still remain. ;\!either Entry 24 of List JI nor Entry 52 of List r empowers a State Legislature before ·Parliament made a law declaring that the control of a particular industry by the Union is expedient in the public interest or the Parliament, after such declaration, to make such a law for acquisition of State land•, for they deal only with the regulation of an existing industry or an industry that may be started subsequently, but not with acquiaition of lands. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 375 Act 12 of 1952 and Act 67 of 1957 deal only with the regulation of mines an;! further the declarations contained in the said Acts are e'.'prcssly confined to the extent of the regulation provided thereunder and, therefore, the declarations therein could not be relied upon to sustain the validity of the Act. No inspiration can be drawn from fcireign con~titutions or decisions made thereunder in construing the express provisions of our Constitution in the context of its different set up. The property of the states can be acquired by. the Union only by agreement. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Suit No. 1 of 1961. S. M. Bose, Advocate-General for the State of West Bengal, B. Sen, S. 0. Bose, Milon K. Banerjee, P. K. Chatterjee,' and P. K. Bose, 'for the plaintiff. M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, H. N. Sanyal, Addit·ional Solicitor General of India, Bishan Narain, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the defendant. B. Sen and I. N .. Shroff, for the Intervener No. 1. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-G~neralfor the State oj Punjab, R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. D .• 'lllenon, for Intervener No. 2. · B. O. Barua, Advocate-General for the State of Assam and Naunit Lal, for the Intervener No. 3. Dinabandhu Sahu, Advocate-General for the State of Orissa, B. K. P. Sinha and. P. D. Menon, for the Intervener No. 4. A. Ranyanadha1n Olietty. and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. 5. Eal. Narayan Sinha, and D. Goburdhan, for Intervener No. 6. ··~ 1962 St•t• •!West Bm:al v. Union of lnJia 1961 St"'4 of W1Jt Bm;ai •• Union of /Mia SiltM, C. J. 37ti SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. K. S. llajela and C. P. Lal, for Intervener No. 7. P. D. Merum, for Intervener No. 8 . S. M. Sikri, Advocate.General for State of Punjab, and P. D. Menon, for Intervener No. 9. G. S. Pathak, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for Intervener No. 10. 1962. December 21. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate Judgment. SINHA, C. J .-This is a suit by the State of West Bengal agamst the Union of India for a declaration that Parliament is not competent to make a law authorising the Union Government to acquire land and rights in or over land, which are vested in a State, and that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (XX of 1957)-which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act-enacted by the Parliament, and particularly SS. 4 and 7 thereof, were ultra virll8 the legislative competance of Parliament, as also for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding under the provisions of these sections of the Act in respect of the coal bearing lands vested in the plaintiff. As will presently appear, the suit raises questions of great (>Ublic importance, bearing on the interpretation of quite a large number of the Articles of the Constitution. In view of the importance of the questions raised in this litigation, notices were issued by this Court to all the AdvocatesGeneral of the States of India. In pursuance of that notice, the States of Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have appeared, either through their respective AdvocatesGeneral or through other Counsel. The National Coal Development Corporation Ltd., with its head 1 s.c.R. - SUPREME COURT REPORTS 377 office at Ranchi in Bihar, has also intervened in view of a pending litigation between it as one of the defendants and the State of West Bengal as the plaintiff. We have heard counsel for the parties at great length. The Plaint is founded on the following allegations. The plaintiff is a State, specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution, as forming part of India, which is a Union of States. By virtue of Art. 294 of the Constitution, all property and assets in West Bengal, which were vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Government of the Province of Bengal became vested in the State of West Bengal for the purposes of the State. The State of West Bengal, in exercise of its exclusive legislative powers, enacted the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, J 954 (W. B. 1 of 1954 ). By notification issued under the Act, as amended, all estates and rights of intermediaries and Ryots vested in the State for the purposes of Government, free from encumbrances, together with rights in the sub-soil, including mines and minerals. The Parliament enacted the impugned Act authorising the Union of India to acquire any !arid or any right in or over land, in any part of India. In exercise of its powers under the Act, the Union of India, by two notifications dated September 21, 1959 and January 8, 1960, has expressed its intention to prospect for coal lying within the lands which are vested in the plaintiff, as aforesaid. Disputes and differences have arisen between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the competence of Parliament to enact the Act and its power to acquire the property of the plaintiff, which is a sovereign authority. In paragraph !l of the Plaint, a controversy had been raised as to whether or not the proposed acquisition was for a public purpose, but at the actual hearing of the case, the learned Advocate· General of Bengal withdrew that contention, .and, therefore, that issue is no more a live one. Notice 1962 Stat' of West Bengal v. Union of India Sinha, C. J. 1961 Stmef Wut Bmtal •• u.; .. tf lnJi. S ...... C.J. 378 SUPRtMt COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is said to have been duly ~erved. The Writte11. Statement of the defendant does not deny the allegations of fact made in the Plaint, but denies the correctness of each and all the sub· missions or legal contentions as to the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Act and as to the power of the defendant to acquire any property of a State. It is also denied that the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority. The following statement in·paragraph 12 of the Written Statement brings out the policy underlying the enactment in question : "The defendant states that it is in the public interest that there should be a planned and rapid industrialization of the country. For such rapid and planned industrialization, it is essential that the production of coal should be greatly increased as coal is the basic essential for industries. Regulation of mines and mineral development under the control of the Union has been declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. It is submitted that in the circumstances, the acquisition of coal bearing areas by the Union is necessary for , the regulation of mines and mineral development and for increased pro· duction of coal in the public interest. The defendant will rely on documents a list whereof is hereto annexed." On those pleadings, the following issues were raised : I. Whether Parliament has legislative compe tence to enact a law for compulsory acquisition by the Union of land and other properties vested in or owned by the State as alleged in para 8 of the plaint ? .. - i S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS :n!J 2. Whether the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority as alleged in para S of the plaint ? a. W!1ether assuming that the State of 'West Bengal is a sovereign authority, Parliament is entitled to enact a law for compulsory acq~isition of its lands and properties ? 4. Whether the Act or 1\nY of its provisions arc nltra i•ires the legislative competence of Parliament ·1 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to auy relief and if so, what relief? After the arguments on behalf of the plaint:ff, and of the States in support of the plaintiff, had been finished, application was marle for amendment of the plaint praying that the !ullowing paragraph may be added as paragraph !JA, which is as follows :- "Alternatively the plaintiff submits that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (Act XX of 1!157) on its true construction docs not apply to the lands vested in or owned by the Plaintiff the State of West Bengal. Further the notifications purported to have been issued under the said Act arc void and of no effect." At the request of the learned Attorney-General a short adjournment was gr an tcd to consider the position as to whether or not the amendment sought should be opposed on behalf of the defendant. As the amendment sought was ·not opposed, it was granted and an· additional issue was raised in these terms : "\Vhethcr Act XX of I !107 on its true construction applies to l~nds vested in or owned by the Plaintiff State? " 1962 St'ltc of H'tJt Buigal v. l.inion of India ~111.ha, c. J. 1962 .llalt of W ul Rtngal v. Union of !ndi4 Sinha, C. J. 380 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. . It will thus appear that the parties arc not at issue on any question of fact, and the determination of the controversy depends entirely upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, aud the scope and effect of the Act. The issues joined between the parties arc mainly two, (I) whether on a true construction of the provisions of the Act, they apply to lands vested in or owned by the plaintiff; and (2) If this is answered in the affirmative whether there was legislative competence in Parliament to enact the impunged statute. The scope and effect of the Act is the most important question for determination, in the first instance, because the determination of that question will affect the ambit of the discussion on the second question. As already indicated, when the case was opened for the first time by the learned Advocate-General of Bengal, he proceeded on the basis that the Act purported to acquire the interests of the State, and made his further submission to the effect that Parliament had no competence to pass an Act which had the effect of affecting or acquiring the interest of the State. But later he also took up the alternative position that the Act, on its true construction, did not affect the interests or property of the State. The other States which have entered appearance, through their respective counsel, have supported this stand of the plaintiff and have laid particular emphasis on those provisions of the Act which, they contend, support their contention that the Act did not intend to acquire or in any way affect the interests of the States. In this connection, the arguments began by rnaking pointed reference· to the following paragraphs in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, set out at pages 16- I 7 of the Paper Book: "According to the Industrial Policy Resolution of I 95fi the future development of coal is the responsibility of the State. All new units in 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 381 the coal industry will be set up only by the State save in exceptional circumstances as laid down in the Resolution. The production of coal in India in 1953 was 38 · milJion tons and the target for production for the Second Five-Year Plan has been fixed at 60 million tons per annum. It has been decided tnat out of . the additional production of 22 million tons per annum envisaged. the public sector should produce an additional 12 million tons per annum, the balance being allocated to the private industry for production from existing collieries and immediately contiguous areas. Out of the additional 12 million tons in the public sector, the bulk ( 10 million tons per annum) will have to be raised by the development of new coal fields, such as Korba, Karanpura, Kathara and Jhilimili and Bisrampur. Very nearly all tre coal bearing areas however are covered by min'.ng leases held by private persons or prospecting licencees which carry a right to mining lease. Hence it is proposed to take power to acquire unworked coal bearing area.s covered by private leases or prospecting licencees which. are found surplus to the production required in the private sector and to work these areas as lessees of the State Government. With the acquisition of zamindari rights by the the State Governments, the rights in minerals are now vested in all areas in the State Governments, and it is not appropriate to use the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of mineral rights, particularly because the Central Government does· not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the States. There is no other existing Central or State Legislation under which the Government has powers to acquire immediately the lessee's rights over the coal bearing areas acquired by Government for the 1962 State of W•st Bengal v. [lnion of lntlia Sinha, C. J. 1962 Sl1JI~ of H"t1I Btngnl v. l.,iiirm of India S.nha, C, J, 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l064] VOL. additional coal production. It is accordingly considered necessary to take power; by fresh legislation to acquire the lessees' tic;"!Hs over unworked coal-bearing areas on payment of reasonable compensation to the les>ecs, and without affecting the State Government rights as owner of the minerals or the royalty payable to the State Government on minerals. The Bill provides for payment of reasonable compensation for the acquisition of the rights of prospecting licenccrs and mining lessees." Besides setting out the policy of the State in the matter of coal mining industry and the actual state of affairs in relation thereto, the Statement of objects and Reasons contains the crucial words on which particular reliance was placrd on behalf of the States, "because the Central Government docs not intend to acrp1ire the proprietary rights vrstcd in the States ... .. :· and, "without affecting the State (;ovcrnment ri~IHs as owners."" It is however wellscttled that the: Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a bill, whrn introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meauiug and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot lie used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we cmnot use this statement as an aid to the construction of the enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect the State Governments' righr.s as owners of minerals. ,\ statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of' the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute. It was then contended that the preamble of the 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 383 Act was the key to the understanding of the scope and provisions of the statute. The pre am hie is in these words : "An act to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the state of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, , licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith." Particular stress was laid on the I ast two lines of the preamble, showing that only rights "accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise" were being sought to be extinruished or modified by the provisions of the Act. But ·this.argument omits to take note of the words of the previous clause in the preamble which has reference to the fact that the Act also was meant for "acquisition by the state of unworked lands containing or likely to contain coal deposits." Before proceeding to deal with the main arguments it is necessary to advert to a submission of the learned Advocate-General of Bengal that the reference to the "State" in the words "acquisition by the State" occurring in the preamble was a reference to the "States" as distinguished from the union. This contention has only to be mentioned to be rejected as the entire object and purpose of the impugned Act was to vest powers in the Union Government to work coal mines and in that context the word "State" could obviously refer only to the Union Government. The preamble, therefore, does not support the argument that the Act was intended to acquire only the rights of individuals, derived from prospecting licences or based on leases, and to exclude from the 1962 Stat1 of W1St Bmgal v, Uoion of India Sinhtl, C. J 1962 State of IVtst Bengal v, f..lnio11 of India Si'lha. C. J. 384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. pun,iew of the Act the rights of States in coal.bearing lands. Section 4, relating to thr issue of a preliminary notification of the intention to prospect for coal in any given area, makes reference to "lands", without any qualifications, and s. 6, which is consequential upon s. 4 lays down the effect of such notification on prospecting licences and mining leases. Section 7 also speaks of giving notice of the Government's intention to acquire the whole or any part of the land, notified as aforesaid or any rights in or over such land. Section !l, which provides for a declaration of acquisition has also used the same expression, "any land or any rights in or over such land." The proviso to s. !l, which is in these terms : "Provided that, whert: the declaration relates to any land or to any rights in or over land belonging to a State Government which has or have not been leased out, no such rleclaration shall be made except after previous consultation with the State Government" is very important in this connection. This proviso for the first time makes specific reference to any land Pr to any rights in or over land "belonging to a State Government.'' Section !lA authorises the Central Government to dispense with the necessity of complying with the provisions of s. 8, which provides for hearing any objections raised to the proposal to acquire any land which is notified under s. 7 as the subject-matter of acquisition. Ordinarily, if a notification is made by the Central Government of its intention to acquire the whole o(any part of the land or of any right in or over land, notified under s. 4, it is open to any person interested in the land to object to the acquisition of the whole or any part of the land or of any rights in or over such land. If any such objection is raised, an opportunity has to be given for hearing such an objection or I S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 385 objections, by the "competent authority." But under s. 9-A, the Central Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire immediately the whole or any part of the land, or any rights in or over such land, may direct that s. 8 shall not come into operation, and, therefore, no proceedings thereunder would be entertainable. Section 10 lays down the consequences of the notification o~•declaration of acquisition under s. 9. On such a declaration the .land, or the rights in or over the land. shall vest in the Central Government, free from all encumbrances, and under sub-section (~) where the rights acquired happen to have been granted under a mining lease by a State Government, the Central Government shall be deemed to have become lhe lessee of the State Government. .\ good deal of argument was addressed to us as to the significance of the provision, contained in s. 10 (~) or the Act. They will be dealt with later in the conrse of this judgment. But it is open to Government to direct by au order in writing that the land or the rights in or over the laud, instead of vesting in the Central Government under s. 10 shall vest in a Govcrnmt'lll Company, which has expressed its willingncsp to comply with the terms and cuncli lions imposed by· the Central Government. A 'Government Gompam•' means a company as defined in s. !il 7 of the Companies Act, l 95tl. In the case where the land or the rights in or over the land become vested in a Government Company, under s. 11 (I), that company shall be deemed to have become a lessee of the State Government, as if the Company had Geen granted the mining lease by the State Government under the 1Iineral Concession Rules. Compensation under the Act on account of prospecting licence> ceasing to have effect, or the rights under a mining lease haying been acquired, or for any land acquired under s. 9, has been provided for and the rules Jay down the procedure for determining such compensation, in s. 13. It is clear on a reading of the provisions for 1962 Stale of West Bengal v. L ·nion of India Sinha, C. J, I .. \ ' 1962 ·"-:- . Stat1 ef.lY'est Bm;sl v. Union of India SW.a, C. I. ' . . ' :is6 "su1'RE1\1t couRt iU:~oRts [i964J vat. compensation in that section. that·-no-compensation has. been provided for· · in· respect of minerals lying unworked underground.\. Section 14 to 17. Jay down' the method of determining 'compensation and other . cognate matters relatini; to payment of compensation. The rest of the provisions of the Act do not bear on . the present. 4] VOL. to be made by the Central Government in respect of the proposed acquisition. But consultation docs not necessarily mean consent, though ordinarily consultation betwlrn two governments or two public authorities would signify the co-operation and willingness to accede to the proposal-a situation which is not contemplated with reference to the interests of private persons. On the question of the proper interpretation of the proviso to s. !l (l ), a number of readings were suggested, which went to the length of not only rewriting the section but of adding words which were not there so as to m;ike the proviso mean what on its plain reading it cannot. \'\'e arc not, therefore, mclined seriously to examine tho~e se\'cral alternative readings of this part of the section. Similarly the provisions of s. JO (2) were pressed in aid of the construction suggcsteu on behalf of the plaintiff anu the other inter\'cning States, that the interests of a State Government were not wi1hin the purview of the Act. Thi~ :w·t11nt11t is bsed on thr consideration that if rights ·,;r interest' of a State (;ovcrume11t were also within tl1c purview of the Act, it would be meaningless to provide that the Central Coverr1111ent ur a Government Company, as contemplated by s. 11, should be deemed to be the lessee of the State Government in respect of the rights acquired. We arc unable to aceccds to this construction. Sections liJ (2) and 11 have particular reference to those cases where the property acquired consists of rights uw1er any mining leases granted by a State Govcrnm t. Apart from the kind of property contemplated oy ss. 10 (2) and 11 (2), as aforesaid, there may be other kinds of property acquired, e. g. coal-bearing land, in which the entirety of the interest is vested in a State Government. In such cases, thert' would be no question of the Central Government or a Government Company becoming or bring deemed to become a lessee of a State Government. Reference was made 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 389 to s. 18 but the mention of a "State Government" in the section is consequential upon the provisions of ss. 10 and 11, that is to say, where the Central Government or a Government Company has, by operation of those provisions of the Act. become the lessee of a State Government. In the case of any differences between the Central Government and a State Government on the question of how prospecting is to be done or of how far the mineral Concession Rules shall be observed, is, by virtue of this section, to be resolved by arbitration or in such other manner as the Governments concerned may deciithrr to an individual or to a juristic person. Such lane\ may comprise not only surface rights but also mineral rights. The land to be acquired by the Central Govt. might be_ virgin soil unencumbered by any prospecting licences or mining leases .granted by the State or by an intermediary, usin!j the expression to mean all interests below the State. Such an interest as aforesaid may be vested in a State or different interests may be vested in different persons by virtue of leases or licences grantee\ by proprietors in permanently\ settled States or by tenure-holders who have expressly obtained minini:: rights. The Act, therefore, had to use the compendious language "land or any interest in or over land" to cover all those diverse rights and interests which the Central Govt. would be interested to acquire in order to have a free hand in developing the land for coal mining in the public sector, as it is called, The Act may have been more artistically drafted but r.onstruing it as it is, we have no doubt tha.t 1962 State of ~Vest Bengal v. l/nion of India Sin.','a, C. J. 1962 Shit of U'tst Btntai v. {j11io11 of Jrulia Sinha, C. J. 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. Parli?.ment intended to acquire a II rights and interests in coal bearing land with a view to prospecting for coal and for exploiting coal bearing mines. It must, therefore, be held that th.e supplemt"ntary issue as regards the intcrprela1ion of the :\ct joined between the parties as a result of the amendment of the plaint must be decided against the plaintiff. Starting with the position that on a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, the rights and interests of a State Government in coal bearing land had not been exdudcd from the operation of the Act, either in express terms or by necessary implication, the next question that arises for consideration is the first issue which co\·ers issues 3 and ·1 also. The competence of Parliament to enact the Act has to be determined with reference to specific provisions or the Co11stit11tion, with parti· cu Jar reference to the entries in the Seventh SchednlcList I and List III. By Entry 42 ip List III of the Seventh Schedule to the ConstittJtion read with Ari.