# LAKSHMI NARAIN AGARWAL v. STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, U.P. & ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 635
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-09-26
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 226 of 1963
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, S. M. Sjkri, J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lakshmi-narain-agarwal-v-state-transport-authority-u-p-anr-4152
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 47(3) and 64A-Regiona!
Transport Authority if should consider representations of ea'isting
operator before passing order under s. ·47(3~rder under s. 47(3) if
revisable undei s. 64A.
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13&-:- Discretion und<r.
The Regional Transport Authority, by an order under s. 47(3) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fixed the number of stage carriages, by
increasing their numb€r on a particular route. The appellant, an
existing operator, filed a revision against that order to the State
Transport Authority, under s. 64A, but the State Transport Auth1>
rity held that a revision did not lie. The appellant then filed a writ
petition in the High Court and the High Court dismissed it, holding
D
that: (1) at the stage of s. 47(3). existing operators were not entitled
to be heard by the Regional T1•ansport Authority, and (2) since thei
order of the Regional "I:ransport Authority was gOod on merits,
i~
was not necessary to decide whether a revision lay to the State
Transport Authority.
In appeal to this Court,
lliw: (1) Unlike. s. 47(1), s. 47(3) does not say expressly that
E representations could be made by existing operators and others. The
expression in s. 47(3) that 'the.· Regional Transport Authority may,
having regard to the matters mentioned in suh-s. (l)', only means
that the Authority shall ·have regard to the matters menioned in
sub-els. (a) to (f) of s. 47(1) and has nothing to do the right of making representations. [638F-H]
(2) But whether or not an existing operator has an implied right
F to be heard before an order under s. 47(3) is made he can be sggriev.
ed by an order made under that section increasing or decreasing the
number of stage carriages depending on the circumstances of · the
case, and has therefore a right of revision under s. 64A, the only
condition for filing a revision being that it should be against an
order_ made by the Regional Transport Authority against which no
appeal lies. [639C-D, F-H]
·
G
Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pande!I, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523, referred to.
(3) Since a revision could be filed under s. 64A against the order
under s. 47(3) the aggrieved operator need not approach the Regional Transport Authority first to review its order. [640B-C]
(4) The High Court should have directed the State Transport
B Authority to dispose of on merits the revision petition against tlie
order under s. 47 (3), and not gone into its merits itself, but, in view
of the time that lapsed since the order was passed (five years, during which the demand for stage carriages must have increased). this
Court would not interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under ·
Art. 136. [640C-E]
636
SUPREllE COURT REPORTS
[I 968] 1 s.o.a.

## Text

A
B
c
635
LAKSHMI NARAIN AGARWAL
v.
STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, U.P. & ANR.
September 26, 1967
(J. C. SHAH, S. M. SJKRI AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 47(3) and 64A-Regiona!
Transport Authority if should consider representations of ea'isting
operator before passing order under s. ·47(3~rder under s. 47(3) if
revisable undei s. 64A.
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13&-:- Discretion und<r.
The Regional Transport Authority, by an order under s. 47(3) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fixed the number of stage carriages, by
increasing their numb€r on a particular route. The appellant, an
existing operator, filed a revision against that order to the State
Transport Authority, under s. 64A, but the State Transport Auth1>
rity held that a revision did not lie. The appellant then filed a writ
petition in the High Court and the High Court dismissed it, holding
D
that: (1) at the stage of s. 47(3). existing operators were not entitled
to be heard by the Regional T1•ansport Authority, and (2) since thei
order of the Regional "I:ransport Authority was gOod on merits,
i~
was not necessary to decide whether a revision lay to the State
Transport Authority.
In appeal to this Court,
lliw: (1) Unlike. s. 47(1), s. 47(3) does not say expressly that
E representations could be made by existing operators and others. The
expression in s. 47(3) that 'the.· Regional Transport Authority may,
having regard to the matters mentioned in suh-s. (l)', only means
that the Authority shall ·have regard to the matters menioned in
sub-els. (a) to (f) of s. 47(1) and has nothing to do the right of making representations. [638F-H]
(2) But whether or not an existing operator has an implied right
F to be heard before an order under s. 47(3) is made he can be sggriev.
ed by an order made under that section increasing or decreasing the
number of stage carriages depending on the circumstances of · the
case, and has therefore a right of revision under s. 64A, the only
condition for filing a revision being that it should be against an
order_ made by the Regional Transport Authority against which no
appeal lies. [639C-D, F-H]
·
G
Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pande!I, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523, referred to.
(3) Since a revision could be filed under s. 64A against the order
under s. 47(3) the aggrieved operator need not approach the Regional Transport Authority first to review its order. [640B-C]
(4) The High Court should have directed the State Transport
B Authority to dispose of on merits the revision petition against tlie
order under s. 47 (3), and not gone into its merits itself, but, in view
of the time that lapsed since the order was passed (five years, during which the demand for stage carriages must have increased). this
Court would not interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under ·
Art. 136. [640C-E]
636
SUPREllE COURT REPORTS
[I 968] 1 s.o.a.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 636 of A
1967.
Appeal by special kavc from the judgment and order dated
November 11. 1966 of the
Allahabad High Court. Lucknow
Bench in Writ Petition No. 226 of 1963.
S. T. Desai, J. P. Goyal, D. N. Jha and G. S. Chatterjee. for B
the appellant.
Sari<><> Prashad and 0. P. Rana, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment. dated November 11, J 966. of the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the o
appellant seeking to quash the order of the Slate Transport Autho·
rity, dated March 20/21, 1963. The State Transport Authority
had by this order rejected the appellant's revision petition against
the decision of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground
that a mere decision of the Regional Transport Authority limiting
the number of stage carriages under s. 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles D
Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the Act could
not form the subject matter of a revision application. It was of
the view that "when the Regional Transport Authority actually
proceeds to fill up the vacancies, which it has decided to create,
then the persons whose interests
would be adversely affected,
would have a right of representation before the Regional Trans·
port Authority; and in the case of their representation being E
rejected
by
the
Regional
Transport
Authority the will
have a right of appeal before the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal."
The High Court was of the view that an existing operator
had no say in the matter of determination of the strength on a
route under sub-s. (3) of s. 47. and it was in the discretion of the F
Regional Transport Authority to
determine the strength on a
route. after considering various matters enumerated in els. (a) to
(f) of sub-s. (I) of s. 47.
The High Court further observed that
as the order passed under s. 47(3), to revise which the appellant
had tiled a revision under s. 64-A, was a good order and did not
call for any interference: it did not consider it necessary to decide G
whether a revision lay against such an order under s. 64-A of the
Act.
The learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. S. T. Desai. contends that an order under s. 47(3) of the Act. whether it is quasi.
judicial or administrative. does affect the existing operators 011 the
route and their representations must be cimsidetcd by the Re- H
gional Transport Authority before passing an order under s. 470l.
I le further submits tlrnt a revision lay under s. 64-A of the Act and
the same sh"nll\ not have been dismissed on the μround that no
revision lay.
A
B
c
D
E
]!'
G
B
i .. lkRIJMl NARAIN ,, s:r.A. (Sikri, ./.)
The relevant statutory provisions arc s. 47 and s. 64-A. of the
Act, and rc~d tints:
"47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority
in consiucring application for stage carriage permit: --
(I) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in consider·
ing an application for a stage carriage permit, have
regard to the following matters, namely:--
(a) the interests nf the public genernlly;
thl the advantages to the public of the service to be
provided. including the saving of time likely to be
cll'octcd thereby and any convenience arising from
journeys not being broken;
(cl the adequacy of other passenger transport services
operating or likely to operate in the near future.
whether by road or other means, between the places
to be served;
(d) the bcnelit to any particular locality or localities
likely lo be afforded by the service;
tel
the operation by the applicant of other transport
services. including those in respect of which applirnlions from him for permits are pending;
ti) the coudition of the roads included in the proposed
route or area~
and shall also take into consideration any represenfalions
111adc by pcr~ons already providing passengers transport
facilities by any means along or near the proposed route
or area. or by any association representing persons· in·
tcrcsted in the provision of road transport facilities
recognised in this behalf by the State Government. or
by any local authority or police authority within whose
.iurisuiction any part of th~ proposed routu or area lies:
P1ovidcd that other conditions being equal. an appli·
cation for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative
socidy registered or deemed to have been registered
under any enactment in force for the time being shall,
as far as may be, be given preference over applications
from individual owners.
121 A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to
grant a stap,c carriage permit if it appears from any time
table furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to
the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to
be contravened:
U38
SUPREME COUJ<T Rf~PORfS
[1968] l s.c:a.
Provided that before such
refusal an opportunity
shall be given to the applicant to amend the time table
so as to conform to the said provisions.
(3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having
regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (!). limit
the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified
type for which stage carriage permits may be granted
in the region or in any specified area or on any specified
route within the region."
"64-A. Revision-The State Transport Authority
may, either on its own motion or on an application
made to it. call for the record of any case in which an
order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority
and in which no appeal lies. and if it appears to the
State Transport Authority that the order made by the
Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the
State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit:
Provided that the State Transport Authority shall
not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by
an order of a Regional Transport Authority, unless the
application is made within thirty days from the date of
the order:
Provided further that the State Transport Authority
shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to
any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity
of being heard."
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It would be noticed that sub-s. (3) of s. 47 does not expressly
say whether any representations can be made by persons already F
providing transport facilities or by associations representing persons interested in the provision of the transport facilities or by
any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction
the route or area lies.
This is expressly mentioned in s. 47(]).
The learned counsel contends that the expression "matters mentioned in sub-section (I)" occurring in sub-s. (3) refers back not G
only to matters mentioned in sub-els. (a) to (f) to sub-s. (I) in s. 47
but also the right of representation mentioned in sub-s. (I).· We
are unable to accept this line of reasoning as being sound. Even
under s. 47(1), the Regional Transport Authority can only have
·regard to the matters mentioned in sub-els. (al to (f), and those
matters may be brought to the notice of the Regional Transport H
Authority by representations. It could not have been the intention that representations would contain matters which the Regional Transport Authority could not take into consideration
under s. 47()). This is not to say that the matters mentioned in
LAKSRMI NARAIN t• 8.T.A. (Sikfoi, J.)
639
A sub-els. (a) to (f) are exhaustive, but this point does not arise and
we need not say anything as to this.
Therefore, this line of reasoning does not assist the appellant.
This Court in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kai/aslt Pandey(') held
that "where a limit has been fixed under. s. 47(3) by the Regional
Transport Authority, and thereafter the said authority proceeds
B to consider applications for permits under s. 48 read with s. 57,
the Regional Transport Authority must confine the number of.
permits issued by it to those limits and on an appeal or revision
by an aggrieved person, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits
within the limits fixed under s. 47(3)". But this Court did not feel
C it necessary to decide whether under s. 64-A, inserted by Motor
Vehicles (Amendment) Act No. 100 of 1956, it was open to the
State Transport Authority to vary a general order passed under
s. 47(3). ·u we look at the section. it would be noticed that s. 64-A
is very wide in terms; the only condition necessary for filing
a revision is that it should be against an order made by the
D Regional Transport Authority and against which no appeal lies.
The word "order" is wide. and there is no doubt that an order
made under s. 47(3) is an order within s. 64-A because, as held by
this Court in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kai/ash Pandey (') it binds
the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Autho·
rity in dealing with applications under s. 48. read with s. 57, of
E the Act.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, the learned counsel for the State. con·
tends that no revision lies at the instance of an existing operator
because he cannot be called an aggrieved person, and secondly,
that even if a revision lies, the appellant is not entitled to any
relief on the facts of this case, under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
r because the appellant never approached the Regional Transport
Authority in the first instance.
We are unaqle to say that no
existing operator can be aggrieved by an order made under
s. 47(3), increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages; it
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
In
a particular case it may be to his advantage and he then would
G not file a revision against it. but if he files a revision when an order
made under s. 47(3l is prejudicial to his interests. there is no
ground for denying him the right to
approach the revisional
authority and seeking its order.
An order under s. 47(3) affects
the future working on a route and we are of the view that such
an order would have repercussion on the working of the existing
operators, whether for their
good or not.
The High Court, as
. B stated above, was of the view that at the stage of s. 47(3) existing
operators would not be entitled to be heard by the ·Regional
(') [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523.
80PREME COORT REPORTS
[1968] I S.C.R.
Transport Authority.
But assuming that it is so. this does not A
alfcd the right of revision wnferred by s. 64-A. We need not in
this case decide whether it is implied that existing operators would
lie entitled to be heard liy the Regional Transport Authority before an order under s. 47(3) is made.
The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that
a decision under s. 470> is a tentative decision and can be revised. B
But assuming that it can be revised by the Regional Transport
Authority. till the order is in operation it is binding on everybody
and if a revision can be tiled against the order under s. 64-A,
the aggrieved operator cannot be compelled to approach the Regional Transport Authority first to revise its order.
This argument. in a way. concedes that an operator can be a person ag- c
grieved by an order under s. 47(3).
The learned counsel for the appellant contends that if it is held
that a revision lies under s. 64-A against an orcjer passed under
s. 47(3) of the Act, the State Transport Authority should be
directed to hear the revision on merits.
He says that the High
Court had no right lo go into the merits of the order itself. D
Ordinarily what Mr. Desai contends is correct, but here the facts
are that the order under s. 470) was passed as long ago as November 17. 1962.
During the last Jive years demand for stage carriages on this route would have, in the ordinary course, increased
by now, and further it has not been
shown that the Regional
Traiisport Authority has nrnde any glaring mistake.
E
for the aforesaid rca,ons. in exercising our discretion under
Art. 136 of the Constitution wu consider that we should not interfere with the order passed by the High Court.
In the result the
appeal fails and is dismissed. Under the circumstances there will
be no order as to costs.
V.P.S.
Appcul di.1111fa.1ecl.
F
'