# LALA DURGA PRASAD AND ANOTHER v. LALA DEEP CHAND AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 360
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954
- **Case number:** Civil Judge ofMeerut in Original Suit No. 4LalaDeep Ohund } of 1942
- **Bench:** B." K. Mukhebjea, Vivian Bose, Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lala-durga-prasad-and-another-v-lala-deep-chand-and-others-270
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Specific performance-Agreement for sale of land-Suit hy
pu,rchaser against vendor anrl .«.itbsequent transfp,ree for speci fie
performance-Forni of decree-Ref1tnd of rnone11 paid by snbsequent
transferee-Oontract-DisputP.. arising s11,bsequently as to Jorni of
'lvarranty-Whether repudiation.
A dispute arising, Rubseqnent to a contract for sale or land,
about the particular form in which the warranty of title should
be inserted in the sale deed cannot affect the completeness of the
contract already made, nor can it amount to a repudiation of the
contract when the party who wanted a particular form to be
adopted does not persist in it and expresses his readiness and
willingness to perform the contract agreed to.
Even if a party
insists on a particular form that would not affect the contract,
though it may in certain circumstances disentitle hin1 to specific
performance,
Binde8hri Prasad v. Mahant .Tairam Gir (I.L.R. 9 All. 705)
referred to.
In a suit instituted by a purchaser against the vendor and a
subsequent purchaser for specific performance of the contract of
sale, if the plaintiff succeeds, the proper form of the decree to be
passed is to direct specific performance of the contract between
the vendor and the plaintiff and <lirect the subsequent transferee
1 to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides
in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants
made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass
on his title to the plaintiff.
Kafiladdin v. Samira.dilin (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 67), Potter v.
Sanders (67 E.R. 1057) and Kali Charan v. Janak Deo (A.I.R. 1932
All. 694) referred to.
In such a suit it would not be right to lay down that in every
case the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the
subsequent transferee up to the extent of the consideration paid
by him.
There may be equities between the vendor and the
subsequent transferee which would make that improper, and unless
these are also raised and decided in the case, the normal rule
should be to direct the money to be paid to the vendor.

## Text

1963
Nov. 18.
360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
LALA DURGA PRASAD AND ANOTHER
v.
LALA DEEP CHAND AND OTHERS.
[B." K. MUKHEBJEA, VIVIAN BOSE
and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Specific performance-Agreement for sale of land-Suit hy
pu,rchaser against vendor anrl .«.itbsequent transfp,ree for speci fie
performance-Forni of decree-Ref1tnd of rnone11 paid by snbsequent
transferee-Oontract-DisputP.. arising s11,bsequently as to Jorni of
'lvarranty-Whether repudiation.
A dispute arising, Rubseqnent to a contract for sale or land,
about the particular form in which the warranty of title should
be inserted in the sale deed cannot affect the completeness of the
contract already made, nor can it amount to a repudiation of the
contract when the party who wanted a particular form to be
adopted does not persist in it and expresses his readiness and
willingness to perform the contract agreed to.
Even if a party
insists on a particular form that would not affect the contract,
though it may in certain circumstances disentitle hin1 to specific
performance,
Binde8hri Prasad v. Mahant .Tairam Gir (I.L.R. 9 All. 705)
referred to.
In a suit instituted by a purchaser against the vendor and a
subsequent purchaser for specific performance of the contract of
sale, if the plaintiff succeeds, the proper form of the decree to be
passed is to direct specific performance of the contract between
the vendor and the plaintiff and <lirect the subsequent transferee
1 to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides
in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants
made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass
on his title to the plaintiff.
Kafiladdin v. Samira.dilin (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 67), Potter v.
Sanders (67 E.R. 1057) and Kali Charan v. Janak Deo (A.I.R. 1932
All. 694) referred to.
In such a suit it would not be right to lay down that in every
case the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the
subsequent transferee up to the extent of the consideration paid
by him.
There may be equities between the vendor and the
subsequent transferee which would make that improper, and unless
these are also raised and decided in the case, the normal rule
should be to direct the money to be paid to the vendor.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION;
Civil Appeal
No. 86 of 1950.
.•
.....
S.C.R.
SUPREME cotJR'r REPORTS
361
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree, dated the
1953
12th May, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at
d W
h
JJ) . F' t , Lala.Durgu
Allahabad (Seth, Agarwal an
anc oo
. m irs
Pra~ad
Appeal No. 410 of 1943, arising out of the Judgment
and Another
and Decree, dated the 28th April, 1943, of the Court of
v .
.• '°"(
the first Civil Judge ofMeerut in Original Suit No. 4LalaDeep Ohund
}
of 1942.
and Others.
}
(
S. K. Dar (Ram Kumar and B. S. Shastri, with
BoseJ.
him) for the appellants.
G. S. Pathak (G. 0. Mathur, with him) for respondent No. 1.
Jagdish Chandra for the Custodian of Evacuee
Property.
1953. November 18. The Judgment of the court
was delivered by
BosE J.-This appeal arises out of a vendee's suit
for specific performance of a contract of sale dated
7th February, 1942. The vendor is the first defendant
whom we will call the Nawab as that is how he has
been referred to in the courts below. He is now in
Pakistan and his property has been taken over by the
Custodian, U. P. The plaintiff is the vendee and the
second and third defendants, who appeal, are subsequent purchasers.
The only question which we are asked to decide
here, except for certain subsidiary matters, is whether
the agreement of 7th February, 1942, was a concluded
one. The plaintiff's case is that on that date the
Nawab agreed to sell the plaint property to him for
Rs. 62,000 and accepted Rs. 10,000 as earnest money
the same day. Later, namely on 4th April, 1942, the
Nawab sold the same property to the appellants for a
sum. of Rs. 72,000. The plaintiff states that the appellants had notice of his prior agreement.
The appellants' case is that the plaintiff's so called
agreement of 7th February, 1942, was not a concluded
one as the parties.never reached finality.
They raised
a number of otheLdefences such as misrepresentation
and fraud, an agreement, with the Nawabprior to that
of the plaintiff, lack of knowledge of the plaintiff's
362
SUP:R:EitE COURT REPORTS
[19541
1958
agreement and so forth. But all those positions were
abandoned in this court and the only point argued,
l-•~,::;;u•
aside from certain subsidiary ones with which we shall
and Another
deal later, was whether the parties reached finality on
v.
7th February, 1942.
l-ala Deep Chand
The learned trial Judge held, among other things,
and Others.
that there was no concluded contract and so dismissed
'Bo•e J.
the suit. In the High Court the appellate Bench
which heard the appeal differed.
Harish Chandra J.
held that the parties reached finality while Kaul J.
differing from him agreed with the trial court and held
they had not. The matter was accordingly referred to
a Full Bench of three Judges. All three held that
there was a concluded contract. In view of this, the
appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit was decreed
on condition that the plaintiff deposit Rs. 62,000 in
court. This he did. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, who
are subsequent purchasers, appeal.
The plaintiff and the appellants were prepared to
compromise in this court on terms that the plaintiff
should get the property and the appellants be paid
Rs. 62,000 to compensate them for the Rs. 58,000
which they said they had paid to the Nawab for their
subsequent purchase and for the loss of the property.
(The plaintiff said the appellants paid the Nawab
Rs. 72,000 and not Rs. 58,000 but there is no finding
about this). As the Nawab's estate has vested in the
Custodian, U. P., we thought it proper to join him in
this appeal in case he should later lay claim to the
plaintiff's Rs. 62,000.
The fears of the parties regard·
ing the Custodian, U. P., were justified, for he refused
to compromise and claimed the Rs. 62,000 despite the
fact that the Nawab had already been paid Rs. 58,000. ·
His learned counsel stated that it was for him to decide
whether anything had been paid to the Nawab and if
so how much and for him to decide what should be
done with the Rs. 62,000. In view of that we have
been obliged to proceed with the appeal.
The differing opinions of the various learned
Judges who have handled this case show that the
evidence is nicely balanced. Tl{e question· of burden
accordingly assumes importance, as also anoth!lr guide
"
' i
•
J'
....
>'
s~c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
which J-udges of experience have applied through the
1953
Years. When the question is one of fact and is of a
Lala Darya
simple nature it is useful to collect facts which are
Prasad
admitted or proved beyond doubt and then see which _ and Another
case fits in with those facts.
They are useful as
v.
pointers to show the way.
Lala Deep Ohand
and Others.
Now the question here is one of fact.
The plaintiff
founds on a contract which the .defendants deny.
He
must therefore prove it. The initial burden is on him.
He relies on two facts in the plaint. The first is that he
paid a sum of Rs.10,000 to the Nawab on 7th February,
1942, by two cheques. The Nawab accepted this money
and cashed the cheques and the money went into his
own account in his bank. The second is that the Nawab
gave the plaintiff a receipt on that date for this
money. These two facts are admitted.
The receipt (Ex. 35-G) is signed by the Nawab and
is in these terms :
"Received this 7th of February, 1942, a sum of
Rs. 10,000 by two cheques .. . as earnest money out of
Rs. 62,000 for the contract of sale [of the plaint property] through Babu Chhater Sen and executed a
receipt. 7th February, 1942.
·
It is further declared that the sale deed would be
executed within three months and that in default the
contract would be deemed ca:ncelled."
This is the language of a completed contract and if
there was nothing more the plaintiff would succeed.
The, burden therefore shifts because of the N awab's
unqualified admission in this document. We must accordingly turn to the defendants' pleadings and their
evidence to see how this burden is discharged.
The Nawab's plea in the main is one of fraud and
misrepresentation. In his written statement he says
that there was a previous contract with the appellants
for Rs. 58,000 and that they paid him Rs. 6,000 as
earnest money on 5th February, 1942. After this, the
plaintiff's broker Chattar Sen told him (the Nawab)
falsely that the appellants had backed out and that in
view of this it would pay the Na wah to accept the
plaintiff's offer of Rs. 62,008. -The Nawab believing this
Bo•e J.
1963
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
to be true entered into the contract of 7th l<'tbruary,
1942, with the plaintiff and accepted Rs. 10,000 as
Lala Durua
Prasad
earnest money. He concludesand Anoth"
"The talk, on the plaintiff's behalf, about payL l D v. Oh
d ment of the earnest money conducted through Chattar
a a
ccp
an
.
<tnd Others.
Sen, broker, was wholly based on fraud and deception
Bose J.
and so it is not binding."
Stopping there. There is implicit in this plea of
fraud and misrepresentation an averment that the
contract was valid and binding till set aside at the
option of the Nawab who was the defrauded party.
The only other plea relevant to this matter is the
following:
" All the conditions of the sale can under no circumstance be taken as fulfilled and deemed as fait
accompli between the plaintiff and the answering
defendant ; and, for this reason also, the talk between
them about the moabeda is not enforceable".
· This is as vague as it can be and is the kind of
woolly pleading which a party who is not sure of his
facts and case usually makes ; no particulars are
furnished.
But apart from that, here again the motif
of the theme is that there was a concluded contract
which fell to the ground because certain conditions,
presumably conditions precedent, were not fulfilled. In
any case, this does not explain the receipt, and the
circumstances in which it came to be given apart from
the explanation which is contained in the plea of
fraud. But that, as we have said, imports the import·
ant averment that there was a concluded contract
which bound both sides until it was set aside at the
option of the defrauded party.
The appellants' pleas follow the same pattern. It is
true that in paragraph 26 of their written statement
they start by saying that "No agreement was entered
into etc ......... " but they explain that by saying that
" whatever proceedings were taken concerning the
plaintiff's moabeda ...... were taken by defrauding and
misrepresenting etc ...... and consequently the moabeda
relied on by the plaintiff is legally invalid."
r
..
1
>
'(
f •
S.C.R.
SUPREME UOURT REPORTS
365
The same theme of fraud and misrepresentation is
1953
carried through to paragraphs 27 and 28.
There is no
Lala Durga
clear cut plea that there was never at any time a conPrasad
eluded agreement and there is no attempt to explain
and Another
away the receipt, Exhibit 35-G, or to show the circumv.
stances in which it came to be made.
Lala Deep Chand
The issues reflect these pleadings and no issue asks
in clear cut terms whether the parties had reached
finality, nor is the burden anywhere laid on the
Nawab and the appellants to explain away the receipt,
Exhibit 35-G.
[Their Lordships then reviewed the evidence.] ·
A question was also raised about the plaintiff
demanding a warranty of title and the Nawab refusing.
But this had nothing to do with the bargain struck on
7th February, 1942. The question of warranty arose
in this way. When the sale deed was in the course of
preparation in March, 1942, Chattar Sen brought a
draft containing a warranty in a form to which the
Nawab's manager objected because the plaintiff was
insisting on it ; but there the matter ended. It is usual
to insert a warranty of title in most sale deeds and
when that is not done the law imports one ; and in
some deeds there is a covenant for quiet enjoyment as
well. All that happened here was that the kind of
warranty inserted by Chattar Sen in the draft was not
acceptable to the other side. But nobody suggested
either in the evidence or the pleadings that the plaintiff
refused to accept a sale deed unless the exact form of
warranty placed in the draft was given. As we have
said, this question arose subsequent to the contract for
sale and the plaintiff's insistence on this form of
warranty at that stage could not affect the contract of
7th February, 1942. It might in a given case disentitle
him to specific performance as it did in Bindeshri
Prasad v. Mahant Jairam Gir('). But that would depend
upon whether his proposal regarding a form of warranty
to which he was not entitled was a mere proposal
regarding the form of the sale deed or was a refusal to
perform without it. No question of repudiation or
refusal to perform was raised in the :pleadings nor ii'!
(1) J,L.R 9 ~ll. 705,
and Othera.
Bose J.
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
19{;3
that to be found in the evidence. On the contrary, the
Lala Durga
plaintiff's letter, dated 22nd April, 1942, Ex. 25 calls
Pra•ad
upon the Nawab to complete the conveyance "as
and Another. agreed to"; and the plaint is to the same effect; it
v.
says nothing about a warranty. In the'circumstances,
Lala ~''Ji hOhand a dispute arising subsequent to the contract for sale
an
' "'· about a particular clause in the deed during the
Boa- J.
negotiations about the form the deed should take cannot affect the completeness of the contract already
made, nor can it amount to repudiation when it is not
persisted in and the plaintiff later expresses his
readiness and willingness to perform the contract
" agreed to ".
It was also argued that there was no concluded
contract because the only parties who were competent
to contract never met.
On the 7th Chattar Sen met
the Nawab and the defendants' learned counsel argued
that Chattar Sen had no authority to contract on
behalf of the plaintiff.
The later meeting was between
the plaintiff and the Nawab's manager and it was said
that the manager had no authority to conclude the
bargain.
There is nothing in this point. The plaint states
quite definitely that Chattar Sen was sent by the
plaintiff with Rs. 10,000 earne.~t money and relies on
the contract effected by him. Chattar Sen's authority
to contract was not questioned. We cannot allow it to
be questioned here. That means that there was an
effective and concluded contract on the 7th between
Chattar Sen, on the plaintiff's behalf, and the Nawab
direct, both of whom were competent to seal the
bargain. The question whether the Nawab's manager
had authority to complete the contract on the Nawab's
behalf when he met the plain tiff after this does not
arise, for on that date there was already a binding
contract in existence.
Disagreeing with the trial court, and agreeing with
the majority of the Judges in the High Court, we hold
that there was a completed contract on 7th February,
1942, which the plaintiff is entitled to have specifically
performed. ·
.
· Now arises a question which touches the Custodian,
Uttar Pradesh. The contract was for Es, 62,000, Th~
•
T
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
plaintiff paid Rs. 10,000 as earnest money but this was
1963
later returned, so Rs. 62,000 is stn! due.
But there is
Lala Durga
a conveyance outstanding in favour of the appellants
Prasad
for which they have paid, according to their case,
and Another
Rs. 58,000. If the Rs. 62,000 due to the Nawab
v. '
is paid to him, or to the Custodian, U. P., who Lala Deep Ohand
represents his estate, it is evident that the Nawab, who 'and Others.
is at fault, will be paid twice over for the same property
BoseJ.
and his ,estate will benefit accordingly while the appellants will be left to pursue their remedies against the
Nawab or his estate. The question is whether we have
power to direct that the Rs. 58,000 be paid -to the
appellants instead of to the Nawab and thus obviate
further, and possibly fruitless, litigation. But before
we decide .that, we will consider another question
which is bound up with it, namely, the proper form of
decree in such cases.
The practice of the courts in India has not been
uniform and three distinct lines of thought emerge.
(We are of course confining our attention to a
purchaser's suit for specific performance). According
to one point of view, the proper form of decree is to
declare the subsequent purchase void as against the
plaintiff and direct conveyance by the vendor alone.
A second considers that both vendor and vendee should
join, while a third would limit execution of the convey-
' ance to the subsequent purchaser.
The only statutory provisions which bear on this
point are section 91 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882,
section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, illustration (g), and section 27 of that Act, and section 40 of
the Transfer of Property Act.
Section 91 of the Trusts Act, does not make the
subsequent purchaser with notice a trustee properly so
called but saddles him with an obligation in the nature
of a trust (because of section 80) and directs that he
must hold the property for the benefit of the prior
"contractor", if we may so describe the plaintiff,
" to the extent necessary to give effect to_ the
contract."
-
Section 3 illustration (g) of the Specific Relief Act
makes him a trustee for the plaintiff but only for the
1~
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
purposes of that Act. Section 40 of the Transfer of
Lala Durga
Property Act enacts that this obligation can be
Prasad
enforced against a subsequent transferee with notice
and Another
but not against one who holds for consideration and
. v.
without notice. Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act
I:nla Dd '
0'P Ohand does not carry the matter any further.
All it says is
an
thers.
that specific performance may be enforced against
Bose J.
" (a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a
title arising subsequently to the contract, except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract ".
None of this helps because none of these provisions
directly relate to the form of the decree. It will therefore be necessary to analyse each form in the light of
other provisions of law.
First, we reach the position that the title to the
property has validly passed from the vendor and
resides in the subsequent transferee. The sale to him
is not void but only voidable at the option of the
earlier "contractor ". As the title no longer rests in
the vendor it would be illogical from a conveyancing
point of view to compel him to convey to the plaintiff
unless steps are taken to re-vest the title in him either
by cancellation of the subsequent sale or by re~
conveyance from the subsequent purchaser to him. '
We do not know of any case in which a reconveyance
to the vendor was ordered but Sulaiman C. J. adopted
the other course in Kali Charan v. Janak Deo(').
He
directed cancellation of the subsequent sale and
conveyance to the plaintiff by the vendor in accordance
with the contract of sale of which the plaintiff sought
specific performance. But though this sounds logical
the objection to it is that it might bring in its train
complications between the vendor and the subsequent
purchaser. There may be covenants in the deed
between them which it would be inequitable to disturb
by cancellation of their deed.
Accordjngly, we do not
think that is a desirable solution.
(1) A.1.R, 1932 All, 694,
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
We are not enamoured of the next alternative either,
1963
namely, conveyance by the subsequent purchaser alone
-
to the plaintiff. It is true that..-would have the effect
Lala Durga
Prasad
of vesting the title to the property in the plaintiff but
and Another
it might be inequitable to compel the subsequent
v.
transferee to enter into terms and covenants in the Lala neep Chand
vendor's agreement with the plaintiff to "which he
aitd Others.
would never have agreed had he been a free agent; and .
BoBe J.
if the original contract is varied by altering or omitting
such terms the court will be remaking the contract, a
thing it has no power to do; and in any case it will no
longer be specifically enforcing the original contract
but another and different one.
In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to direct
specific performance of the contract between . the
vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent
transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the
title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not
join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff
and his vendor ; all he does is to pass on his title to
the plaintiff. This was the course followed by the
Calcutta High Court in Kafiladdin v. Samiraddin(1),
and appears to be the English practice. See Fry on
Specific Performance, 6th edition, page 90, paragraph 207; also Potter v. Sanders( 2 ).
We direct
accordingly.
That brings us to the question of the Rs. 62,000.
We do not think it would be right to lay down that
in every case the balance of the purchase money
should be paid to the subsequent transferee up to
the extent of the consideration paid by him. There
may be equities between the. vendor and the subsequent transferee which would make that improper,
so, unless they fight the question out as between
themselves and it is decided as an issue in the case,
the normal rule should be to require that the money be
paid to the vendor. But the circumstances here are
peculiar. The parties before us were prepared to compromise, and had the Nawab been here it is more than
probable that he would have been glad to agree so as
to avoid further litigation. But he is in Pakistan and is
(1) l\.I.R. 1931 Cal. 67,
(2) 67 E,R 1057.
370
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1954]
1953
beyond the jurisdiction of the Indian courts. We
think it would be inequitable to leave the appellants
Lala Durga
Prasad
to pursue what in all probability is only a will-o"-theand Another
wisp and for us to augment the Nawab's estate by
v.
what would appear to be an unjust enrichment. This is
Lala Deep Chand an equitable relief and we have a wide discretion. We
and Other..
joined the Custodian, U. P., to afford him the opportuBose J.
. nity of showing why we should not take what appear.s
to be the just and equitable course. We have afforded
him an opportunity of showing how the Nawab could
have defended a suit by the appellants for refund of
-the consideration. As he has nqt been able to show
us anything in the contract between the Nawab and
the appellants, or in the covenants of their deed,
which would disentitle the appellants from claiming
Rs. 58,000 from the Nawab, we consider it right that
Rs. 58,000 should be paid to them and Rs. 4,000 to the
Custodian, U. P. All that the Custodian, U. P., was
able to urge was that the whole amount had vested in
, him arid so was his. But that is not so.
The plaintiff was directed to·pay a sum of Rs. 62,000 into court
as a condition precedent to the execution of a sale deed
in his favour.
Curiously enough, the decree does not
say what is to be done with the money when it is paid
into court. But so long as it is in court under those
conditions it lies there subject to such decree as .may
ultimately be. passed in appeal. We therefore have
full power to direct payment of Rs. 58,000 to the
appellants instead of to the Nawab, especially as there
is this lacuna in the decree.
The High Court's decree will now be modified as
follows:-
(1) The Nawab will be directed to execute a
sale deed in the plaintiff's favour in accordance
with the terms of the contract entered into between
them.
(2) The appellants will be directed to join in the
conveyance to the extent indicated above.
(3) After the conveyance has been executed, the
appellants will be paid Hs. 58,000 out of the Rs. 62,000
now lying in deposit in court as compensation for the
loss they had suffered, without prejudice to any
·'
.,
>
f
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME cotJRT REPORTS
371
further rights they may have against the.Nawab or
his estate.
1953
Lala Durga
(4) After this has beenldone, the Custodian, U. P.,
Pra•ad
will be at liberty to / withdraw the balance of the
and Another
Rs. 62,000.
v.
. .
.
Lala Deep Chand
Except for these mod1ficat10ns, the decree stands
and Others.
and the rest of the appeal is dismissed.
The modifications we have made here do not affect
the plaintiff's rights under the decree except to his
advantage. As-against him, the appellants have
failed.
We accordingly direct that the appellants pay
the plaintiff the costs of this appeal.
There is an application for amendment of the High
Court's qecree.
This will be disposed of by the
High Court.
Decree of High Oourt modified.
Agent for the appellant: B. P. Maheshwari.
Agent for respondent No. 1: N. 0. Jain.
Agent for the Custodian of Evacuee Property, U.P.:
O. P. Lal.
Appeal dismissed.
HARMAN SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
REGIONAL TRANSPORT. AUTHORITY,
CALCUTTA, AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SAsTm C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
S. R. DAS, GHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Oonstitiition of India, arts. 14, 19(1)(g)-Issiiing permits to
smaller taxis and fixing lower tariff for them-Whether infringes
fundamental right .of existing permit holders to carry on occupation
or to equal protection of the laws-Right to carry on ocwpationExtent of the right.
Since 1940 taxis plying in the streets of Calcutta were
required to be not below 22 H.P. and not above 30 H. P. and
rule 1 79 oi the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules as amended in 1944
fixed a minimum charge of one rupee for the first mile and 2 as.
for every one-sixth of each subsequent mile. In 1952 the Regional
Transport Authority issued a notification invitiug applications for
permits to· ply small taxis of not below 10 H.P. and not above
Bose J.
1953
Nov. 24.