# LALA MATA DIN v. A.NARAVANAN

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 90
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-08-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 2410 and 2411 of 1966
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lala-mata-din-v-a-naravanan-4883
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Counsel, mistake of-When sufficient ground for condoning delay in
filing appeal-Practice and procedure-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Punjab
Courts Act, s. 39(1).
The appellant's suit against the respondent
for re7ndition of account
A
B
and other reliefs was valued at Rs. 5,930/- for purposes df court fee and
C
juri:>d.iction. The suit was decreed in part and the amount decreed was
less than the amount at which he stated his tentative valuation. He filed
an appeal to the Di~trict Court stating the valuation
for
purposes of
appeal at Rs. 4,880/ -.
The memorandum of appeal showed the valuation
in the original suit and the court fee paid was the same amount as in the
trial court. The District Court returned the memorandum of appeal for
presentation to the proper court because, under s. 39(1) of the Punjab
Courts Act appeals above the value of Rs. 5 ,000 /- had to filed before the
D
High Court. The appeal was filed in the High Court the same day, but
it was out of time.
The appellant also filed a revision against the order
of the uistrict Court. His counsel p]aced reliance on r. 4 in Ch. 3-B of
Vol. I cf the Rules of the High Court which states that "in a suit for the
amount found due after taking accounts it is qot the tentative valuation
of the plaintiff but the amount found to be duo and decreed by the court
that determines the forum of appeal." The High Court held that there was
no ground for extending time under s. 5 of the Limitation Act and disE
missed the appeal and also the revision. In appeal to this Court,
HELD : '.i'he High Court should have extended time under s. 5 of the
Limitation Act. [94 A-Bl
(i) The appellant did not have any underhand motive in filing the
appeal before the District Court, the filing had to be attributed entirely to
the ad\ice of his counsel. [93 A-Bl
F
There is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itsePf is
always a sufficient ground for condoning delay. It is always a question
whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. [92 F-Gl
In the present case the original valuation
determined th• court of
lowest denominatian before which the appeal from the suit had to go and
G
that forum was the High Court. The counsel seems to have been misled
by r. 4 in Ch. 3-B of Vol. I of the Rules and Orders of the High Court.
This rule is applicable ·in a case where the amount decreed is larger than
the amount for which the original suit was brought. It . .does not apply
where the amount decreed is below the
valuation in the original court.
There is nothing in the case to show that the error committed by the
counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive. [93 C-F; 94 Al
H

## Text

LALA MATA DIN
v.
A.NARAVANAN
August 25, 1969
(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. AND A. N. GROVER, J.J
Counsel, mistake of-When sufficient ground for condoning delay in
filing appeal-Practice and procedure-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Punjab
Courts Act, s. 39(1).
The appellant's suit against the respondent
for re7ndition of account
A
B
and other reliefs was valued at Rs. 5,930/- for purposes df court fee and
C
juri:>d.iction. The suit was decreed in part and the amount decreed was
less than the amount at which he stated his tentative valuation. He filed
an appeal to the Di~trict Court stating the valuation
for
purposes of
appeal at Rs. 4,880/ -.
The memorandum of appeal showed the valuation
in the original suit and the court fee paid was the same amount as in the
trial court. The District Court returned the memorandum of appeal for
presentation to the proper court because, under s. 39(1) of the Punjab
Courts Act appeals above the value of Rs. 5 ,000 /- had to filed before the
D
High Court. The appeal was filed in the High Court the same day, but
it was out of time.
The appellant also filed a revision against the order
of the uistrict Court. His counsel p]aced reliance on r. 4 in Ch. 3-B of
Vol. I cf the Rules of the High Court which states that "in a suit for the
amount found due after taking accounts it is qot the tentative valuation
of the plaintiff but the amount found to be duo and decreed by the court
that determines the forum of appeal." The High Court held that there was
no ground for extending time under s. 5 of the Limitation Act and disE
missed the appeal and also the revision. In appeal to this Court,
HELD : '.i'he High Court should have extended time under s. 5 of the
Limitation Act. [94 A-Bl
(i) The appellant did not have any underhand motive in filing the
appeal before the District Court, the filing had to be attributed entirely to
the ad\ice of his counsel. [93 A-Bl
F
There is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itsePf is
always a sufficient ground for condoning delay. It is always a question
whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. [92 F-Gl
In the present case the original valuation
determined th• court of
lowest denominatian before which the appeal from the suit had to go and
G
that forum was the High Court. The counsel seems to have been misled
by r. 4 in Ch. 3-B of Vol. I of the Rules and Orders of the High Court.
This rule is applicable ·in a case where the amount decreed is larger than
the amount for which the original suit was brought. It . .does not apply
where the amount decreed is below the
valuation in the original court.
There is nothing in the case to show that the error committed by the
counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive. [93 C-F; 94 Al
H
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal Nos. 2410
and 2411 of 1966.
•
MATA DIN \I. NARAYANAN (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
91
A
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 20, 1963
of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in R.F.A. No.
122-D of 1962.
Bi~han Narain, K., K. Raizada and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
appellant (~n both the appeals).
B
A. S. Nambiar, K. R. Nambiar and Lily Thomas, for the res·
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pond,ent (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J.
This is an appeal against the judgment. dated March 20, 1963, of
a Division Bench of the
Punjab High Court dismissing an appeal and a revision filed by
the present appellant. The appeal arises under the following circumstances : A suit was filed by the appellant in the Court of
the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi for three reliefs in respect of a
business in which the respondent was stated to be the manager
and also for eject111ent of the respondent from the premises in
which the business was being carried on.
The same valuat10n
was adopted for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. The
valu:ition was divided into three parts : Rs. 4,000/- were taken
as the valuation for rendition of accounts or arrears of
rent,
Rs. 130/- for injunction and Rs. 710/-
for
ejectment-Total
R;. 4,840/ -.
During the hearing of the suit and on objection
by the defendant, the valuation for
ejectment was
raised to
Rs. 1,800/-.
It appears that the appellant μaid :he additional
court-fee but did not amend the plant. The suit was decreed in
part on May 11, 1961.
The appellant obtained a decree for
Rs. 600/- as arrears of rent for f
portion of the shop
and
Rs. 463.33 P.
as
damages for
i portion of the shop ejec~
ment from which portion was also decreed in his favour.
But
the suit was dismissed as to the remaining arrears of rent or for
accounts and ejectments from 'f of the premises.
The plaintiff (appellant) thereupon filed an appeal in the
District Court of Delhi.
In stating the valuation for appeal, he
correctly described' the three-fold
valuation
in
the
suit
as
Rs. 4,000/-, Rs. 130/- and Rs. 1,800/- (total Rs. 5,930/-). He
however valued the appeal as follows :
Rs. 3,400/- as the valuation for arrears of rent or
for rendition of accounts, Rs. 130/- for injunction and
Rs. 1,350/- for ejectment-(Total Rs. 4,880/-).
Now it is obvious that if the valuation was Rs. 4,880/- 1he
appeal would have lain in the District Court, but if the appeal
hac.I to be valued at Rs. 5,930/- it had to go before the Hioh
Court. When the notice of the appeal was served on the defe~-
dent (respondent) he filed a cross-objection in the same court
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
but did not take any exception to the valuation of the appeal
in the District Court·on its presentation in that Court.
On July
25, 1962, the District Judge made an order upholding a preliminary objection taken before him at the hearing that the memorandum of appeal was liable to be retv-ned for presentation ;o the
proper court, and he ordered the memorandum of appeal to be so
returned. It appears that it was filed in the High Court the same
day and, therefore, there was no loss of time after the return
of the memorandum.
The appeal was delayed by nearly
one
y<!llr.
It may, however, be mentioned that the plaintiff (appellant)
did not submit to the decision of the District Court but took the
matter in revision before the High Court.
The appeal as represented and the application for revision were disposed of by
the common judgment under appeal before us.
The High Court
held that there was no ground for extending time under s. 5 of
the Limitation Act for which purpose an application had been
sub-joined to the appeal filed in the High Court.
The question in this case is whether the High Court was right
in dealing with this problem as it did.
The High Court seemed
to be of the opinion that an Advocate (Mr. K. K. Raizada) of
34 years' standing could not possibly make the mistake in view
of the ciear provisions on the subject of appeals
existing
in
s. 39(1) of the Punjab Courts Act.
That sub-section at
that
time clearly showed that appeals of the value of Rs. 5,000/- must
be filed before the District Court but appeals above Rs. 5,000/-
must be filed before the High Court. The High Court also felt
that the learned counsel persisted in pursuing his own theory by
willing a revision. It is on this account that time was denied to
the present appellant in the appeal. The only question is whether
the decision of the High Court can be accepted.
The law is settled that mistake of counsel may
in certain
circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although
there is no general proposition that mistake of 9ounsel by itself is
always a sufficient ground.
It is always a question whether the
mistake was bona fide or was merely device to cover an ulterior
purpose such as !aches on the part of the litigant or an attempt
to save limitation in an underhand way.
The High Cvurt unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle.
If it
had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt
to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a
wrong reading of the situation.
It is quite clear that the limitation for the appeal to the High
Court was three times as much as it was for the District Court.
When the appeal was filed, litigant had as much as two months
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MATA DIN v. NARAYANAN (Ilidayatul/ah, C.J.)
93
in hand to file the same in the High Court.
Further he did .10t
attempt to save court-fee on the app:al but P.aid the same court·
fee which would have been payable m the High Court.
It does
not appear that he had an underhand motive for filing the appeal
in. the District Court.
Therefore, the filing of the appeal must be
attributed entirely to the advice of the counsel.
Here again, the
counsel did not suppress anything.
As has been stated earlier,
he put. down both the valuations in the forefront of his D?e~oran
dum of appeal, that is to say, the valuation of the smt m the
original court and the valuation of the appeal.
No doubt the
counsel wiis one with some experience and ought to have known
that an appeal above Rs. 5,000/ - must be filed in the High Court
and not the District Court and therefore, we have to s"e whether
he was genuinely under a mistake or not.
Here there is proof
that he adhered to this view, because not only he filed the appeal
but also took a r.:vision from the order of the District Court to
the High Court, still labouring under the same mistaken view.
Further he seems to have been misled by a rule, i.e. r. 4 in Ch. 3B
of Vol. I of the rules and orders of the High Court which read as
follows :
"In a suit for the amount found to be due after
taking into accounts, it is not the tentative
valuation
of the plaintiff, but the amount found to be due
and
decreed by the court that determines
the
forum
of
appeal."
This rule is applicable in a case in which the amount decreed is
larger than the amount for which the original suit was brought.
Now it is well-known that in a suit for accounts, the plaintiff is
not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after
the taking of accounts. He may do so if he is able to; but if he
is not, he can put a tentative valuation upon his suit for accounts
takin~ care that the valuation is adequate and reasonable in all
the circumstances of the case.
But the rule also obtains that
if the amount which is found is larger than the amount at which
he stated his tentative v.aluation, he must file the appeal against
the larger amount and m the forum before which an appeal of
that valu~tion can go.
This rule does not apply where the amount
decr_eed 1s bel~w the valuation in the original court. Here the
ongmal .valual!on holds good both to find the forum and to put
a va}ual!on.
After the amendment of the valuation on account
of eiectment the total claim was Rs. 5,930/- and that determin~.d
the co.urt of lowest denomination before which the appeal from
the su~t had to go. . That according to the other rule which we
have c~ted was the High Court.
The second rule, which we have
later cited, d<_JCS not cut across the first rule.
This appears to be
the error which was committed b) Mr. Raizada and we do not
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 2 S.C.R.
find anything in the case to show that this error was tainted by
any ma/a-fide motive on the part of tji.e counsel for the litigant.
In the circumstances we think that the High Court would have
been justified in extending time under s. 5 of the Limitation Act
and the reasoning of the I!igh Court unfortunately started from
a wrong angle.
We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and
remit the appeal for hearing and disposal according to Jaw.
The
appellant will however pay all the costs of the respondent which
have been incurred till ;oday irrespective of the result.
We may mention that there are two appeals pending before
us.
The other appeal is from the revisional order of the High
Court and we think that there is no need to pronounce any decision in that appeal, because it becomes infructuous by reason of
our decision in this appeal.
As the appeal before the High Court
is an old one, we hope that the High Court will be able to give
it priority.
Y.P.
Appeal remitted.
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